Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Christopher Doby was shot on August 23, 2019, at South Park Village Apartments in Laurel, Mississippi. Christopher and Cheyveon Doby filed a lawsuit against South Park Village Apartments, its management company, Millennia Housing Management, and its owners, South Park MS, LLC, and South Park MS Investment, LLC. The complaint alleged that South Park failed to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition, provide adequate security, repair or maintain fences, gates, and locks, and warn tenants and guests of dangerous conditions. It also claimed that South Park knew or should have known of prior criminal acts on the property and failed to take reasonable measures to prevent future criminal activity.The Jones County Circuit Court dismissed the complaint under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that the complaint alleged only general negligence and did not contain allegations that South Park affirmatively impelled the third party’s conduct. The court also dismissed Cheyveon Doby’s claims, noting that the complaint made no specific allegations concerning him. The Dobys filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied, leading to the current appeal.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and held that the allegations in the complaint, taken as true, were sufficient to state a claim for relief under Mississippi’s notice pleading standard. The court found that the complaint provided reasonable notice of the claims against South Park and demonstrated a recognized cause of action upon which Christopher Doby might prevail. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Cheyveon Doby’s claims due to the lack of specific allegations pertaining to him. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding Christopher Doby’s claims. View "Doby v. South Park Village Apartments" on Justia Law

William H. Tatum Jr. was convicted of bank fraud and had a $15,284,348 restitution judgment against him. He owned a 50% membership interest in Tatum Land and Cattle Company, LLC (TLCC). Upon his death in 2018, his estate, including his TLCC interest, was left to his wife, Betsy Gay Roberts-Tatum. Betsy died in 2020, and her son, Zachary I. Haynie, became the executor of her estate. Darrell Tatum, William’s grandson, was appointed executor of William’s estate. The United States, Peoples Bank, and John Deere Financial filed claims against William’s estate.The Tippah County Chancery Court admitted William’s will to probate and appointed Gay as executrix. After Gay’s death, Darrell was appointed as successor executor. Darrell petitioned for the public sale of William’s TLCC interest to satisfy estate debts. Zach opposed, seeking to enforce the TLCC operating agreement’s buyout provision. The chancellor ordered the public sale, which resulted in Joe Tatum purchasing the interest for $675,000. Zach objected, arguing the sale price was inadequate and sought relief, including assignment of the promissory note and deed of trust from Peoples Bank.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. The court found that any additional funds recovered from the estate would go to the United States due to the restitution judgment, rendering Zach’s claims moot. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that a decision would not benefit Zach practically since the United States would claim any additional funds. The court affirmed the chancellor’s decisions, including the public sale and denial of Zach’s motions. View "In The Matter of The Estate Tatum" on Justia Law

Shanda Yates was bitten by a pit bull named Yurk while visiting her friend Neah Friar, who rented a property from TLM Investments, LLC. Friar's lease had a no-pet provision, which she disregarded by keeping Yurk and concealing his presence from TLM. Yates filed a personal injury claim against both Friar and TLM, alleging negligence on TLM's part for allowing Yurk on the property and claiming protections under the lease.The Prentiss County Circuit Court denied TLM's motion for summary judgment, leading to an interlocutory appeal. TLM argued that it had no knowledge of Yurk's presence or his dangerous propensities, as Friar had intentionally concealed the dog. TLM also contended that Yates failed to establish herself as an intended third-party beneficiary under the lease.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo and found that Yates did not provide evidence that TLM had actual or constructive knowledge of Yurk or his dangerous propensities. The court noted that the no-pet provision in the lease was not an admission that all dogs are dangerous but was intended to prevent property damage. Additionally, the court found that Yates did not have standing to claim protections under the lease as she was not a party to it and was not an intended third-party beneficiary.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment, rendered summary judgment in favor of TLM, and remanded the case to the Prentiss County Circuit Court for any necessary further proceedings. The case against TLM was dismissed with prejudice. View "TLM Investments, LLC v. Yates" on Justia Law

The case involves the Mississippi Apartment Association (MAA) and other property owners challenging an ordinance adopted by the Jackson City Council. The ordinance imposed registration and inspection requirements on rental housing units in Jackson. MAA appealed the city council's decision in the Hinds County Circuit Court but did not request a stay of the ordinance's implementation. Subsequently, MAA filed a separate action in the Hinds County Chancery Court seeking injunctions against the ordinance's enforcement, arguing that the planning department's interpretation and enforcement of the ordinance were unlawful.The Hinds County Chancery Court dismissed MAA's claims for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the city council's decision under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75. The chancery court found that the circuit court also had pendent jurisdiction over MAA's equitable claims regarding the ordinance's enforcement.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the city council's decision and pendent jurisdiction over related claims regarding the ordinance's enforcement. The court emphasized that allowing a separate action in the chancery court could lead to contradictory rulings and confusion. The court also noted that MAA had an adequate remedy at law in the circuit court and could have requested a stay of the ordinance's implementation under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 62. View "Mississippi Apartment Association v. City of Jackson" on Justia Law

Emmett Hotard acquired two lots in Hancock County in 2006 and used one as security for a loan from The Peoples Bank. After defaulting on the loan and failing to pay property taxes, Lot 17 was sold at a tax sale to Ken Foreman in 2012. The bank later assigned its interest to Emmett's brother, Eric Hotard, who initiated foreclosure proceedings. Eric's company, DHP1, LLC, purchased the lots at a foreclosure sale in 2014. The chancery clerk sent a notice of the tax sale to Emmett, which was returned undelivered. Notices were also sent to lienholders, including Eric.The Hancock County Chancery Court found that the chancery clerk failed to satisfy statutory notice requirements for the tax sale and declared the sale void. The court granted summary judgment in favor of DHP1, LLC, and voided the tax deed to Ken Foreman and the subsequent quitclaim deed to Baron Foreman, who had acquired Lot 17 from Ken.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the chancery court's decision. The court held that Emmett, as the record owner 180 days before the redemption period expired, was entitled to notice. The chancery clerk failed to provide proper notice by certified mail or personal service and did not conduct a diligent search for Emmett's address, which was easily discoverable in the land records. The court emphasized that any deviation from the statutory notice requirements renders a tax sale void. Consequently, the tax sale was declared void, and summary judgment in favor of DHP1, LLC, was affirmed. View "Foreman v. DHP1, LLC" on Justia Law

Linda Lee owned a motel in Pascagoula, Mississippi, which had deteriorated significantly and was being used improperly, attracting vagrants and drug users. The city council ordered the demolition of the motel after a hearing, citing it as a menace to public health and safety. Lee did not attend the hearing, but her son did. The city council decided the motel was beyond repair and ordered its demolition.Lee appealed the city council's decision to the Jackson County Circuit Court, arguing that the city failed to provide substantial evidence and did not comply with statutory notice provisions. The Circuit Court affirmed the city's decision. Lee then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which found that the city’s notice was insufficient and reversed and remanded the case for further determination.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. The court found that the appeal was moot because the motel had already been demolished by a new owner, as admitted by Lee in her appellate filings. Additionally, Lee lacked standing to pursue the appeal because she had transferred the property to her son on the day of the city council meeting and no longer had any interest in it. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Mississippi vacated the Court of Appeals' decision and dismissed Lee's appeal. View "Lee v. The City of Pascagoula, Mississippi" on Justia Law

Les Smith filed a petition for injunction and declaratory relief against Elizabeth and Rebecca Brockway to prevent them from installing a manufactured home on their property, alleging it violated restrictive covenants. The Brockways' property, Lot 13, was part of the Lakewood Village Subdivision, developed by Rainmaker’s Development Company, Inc. The restrictive covenants were referenced in the original warranty deed but were unsigned by the original grantor, Frank J. Steed.The Panola County Chancery Court denied Smith’s petition, finding the restrictive covenants unenforceable because they were not signed by the original grantor, as required by the covenants themselves. The court concluded that without the grantor's signature, the covenants never became a valid contractual obligation and thus did not run with the land.Smith appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, arguing that the restrictive covenants were valid because they were attached to the original warranty deed, which was signed by the grantor. He contended that the covenants should be enforceable as they were intended to run with the land and that all subsequent purchasers, including the Brockways, had notice of them.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancellor’s decision, holding that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable because the original grantor failed to sign them. The court emphasized that the plain language of the covenants required the grantor’s signature to trigger their enforceability. Since the grantor did not sign the covenants, there was no intent to create covenants that would run with the land, and thus, they were never enforceable. View "Smith v. Brockway" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a tax sale of a property in Jackson County, Mississippi. The property was owned by Deborah Hallford, who failed to pay property taxes in 2014, leading to the property being sold at a tax sale in 2015. Pierre Thoden, a resident of New York, purchased the property at the sale. Hallford failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, and Thoden later received title after he paid the delinquent taxes for 2015-18. After learning of the tax sale, Hallford filed a complaint to set aside the tax sale, claiming that due to a lack of proper notice, the sale was void. The chancery court found in Hallford’s favor and voided the tax sale based on insufficient notice.Thoden appealed the chancery court's decision, arguing that he was entitled to a statutory lien and reimbursement for appliances, costs, and expenses on the property. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the chancery court’s finding that the tax sale was void but held that Thoden was entitled to a hearing to present proof of his damages. The case was remanded for a hearing to determine the amount Thoden was owed as damages.On remand, the chancery court found that Thoden was unjustly enriched by the rent he collected from tenants and that he could not keep money he collected on property where he was in the nature of a trespasser. The court also found that Thoden was entitled to the amount he paid in taxes, plus interest. However, the court denied Thoden’s claim to reimbursement for his repairs on, improvements to, and maintenance of the property. Thoden appealed these findings.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part. The court held that Thoden was entitled to a refund of his purchase price and interest on that price, and that he was not entitled to reimbursement of the cost of repairs, improvements, and maintenance. The court also held that Hallford was entitled to a $4,500 set-off. However, the court reversed the chancery court's determination that Thoden was not entitled to the taxes he paid on the property for 2015-18, and awarded Thoden $2,231.06. View "Thoden v. Hallford" on Justia Law

Joe Tubwell had been living in a house in DeSoto County, Mississippi, since 2005. In 2016, the mortgage loan on the house went into default, and foreclosure proceedings were initiated. Tubwell filed a complaint against the mortgage companies in an attempt to stop the foreclosure. The case was moved to a federal court where the mortgage companies were granted summary judgment. Tubwell, Morgan Stanley, and Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (SLS) entered settlement negotiations and reached an agreement. Tubwell agreed to vacate the property by April 30, 2020, in exchange for a confidential sum of money. The property was sold to FV-1, Inc., in trust for Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC. However, Tubwell refused to vacate the property by the agreed deadline and did not return the settlement funds.The mortgage companies filed a complaint against Tubwell in the DeSoto County Circuit Court to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The circuit court granted summary judgment ordering Tubwell to relinquish possession to the plaintiffs and dismissed Tubwell’s counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction. Tubwell appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the circuit court's decision.The Supreme Court of Mississippi granted Tubwell’s petition for certiorari to address the issue of whether it was error to dismiss his counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain Tubwell’s counterclaims and erred when it declined to do so based on a lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals with regard to the dismissal of Tubwell’s counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court and the Court of Appeals on the remainder of the issues raised. View "Tubwell v. FV-1, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two parties over the right to quiet enjoyment of property versus the right to hunt and harvest wildlife. The Dickersons, who own approximately 220 acres in Booneville, Mississippi, filed a complaint against the Allens and Cain, members of the Sand Hill Hunting Club. The Dickersons alleged that the Allens' and Cain's hunting dogs trespassed on their property, interfered with their preferred method of still hunting, and disturbed the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of their land. They sought injunctions to prevent the Allens' dogs from entering their property and to stop the Allens from parking or walking on any road right-of-way adjoining their land.The Prentiss County Chancery Court found that the repeated intrusion of deer hunting dogs onto the Dickersons' property constituted a private nuisance. The court granted permanent injunctions disallowing the hunting dogs from going onto the property. The court also ruled that if any of the Allens were found to be parked on the public road or public road right-of-way within sight of the Dickersons' property when deer dogs were found to be running on the Dickersons' property, it would be prima facie proof that the Allens violated the court’s injunctions. The court denied the Dickersons' request for monetary damages due to lack of sufficient evidence.The Allens appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Mississippi. They raised several issues, including whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to specify its path to finding private nuisance, whether deer hunting with dogs can be considered a private nuisance when done within the parameters of the law and in an area long known for dog hunting, and whether the trial court’s injunction adequately addresses the nuisance. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the trial court's finding of private nuisance was supported by the evidence and that its issuance of a permanent injunction was within its judicial authority and adequately addressed the nuisance. View "Allen v. Dickerson" on Justia Law