Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Northeast Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission challenged the validity of a ninety-nine-year fixed-lease agreement with a private contractor, V.M. Cleveland. The Commission contracted to pay Cleveland $18,000 per month over a ninety-nine-year period to build and to lease a facility on land owned by the Commission. Payments continued uninterrupted for ten years, until the Commission became concerned about the agreement’s legality. The Commission stopped making payments and sought to rescind the agreement. The chancellor found that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the Commission to pay Cleveland $612,000 in back rent. The Commission appealed, arguing that the agreement’s ninety-nine-year duration rendered the agreement voidable at the Commission’s discretion as a matter of law due to the rule against binding successors. The Commission also argued that the specific terms of the agreement were unreasonable, illegal, or both, and thus void ab initio as a matter of law. The Supreme Court found that the agreement at issue here violated the common-law rule against binding successors, and as such reversed the chancellor’s judgment and rendered judgment in the Commission’s favor. View "Northeast Mental Health - Mental Retardation Commission v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

The special court of eminent domain granted Todd and Angela Kuhn’s petition for a private road across Cheryl High’s property in Gulfport. As grounds for their claim, the Kuhns utilized Mississippi Code Section 65-7-201 (Rev. 2012), which created a statutory right for private citizens to petition the special court of eminent domain when a private road over the land of another is necessary for ingress and egress. Section 110 of the Mississippi Constitution empowered the Legislature to create the statutory right to “private roads, where necessary for ingress and egress” upon “due compensation” to the property owners, this section was equally clear “such rights of way shall not be provided for in incorporated cities and towns.” Because the private property the Kuhns sought to condemn for a private road was in the incorporated City of Gulfport, the special court of eminent domain could not condemn High’s property for the Kuhns’ private benefit. So the Supreme Court reversed the special court of eminent domain’s order granting the Kuhns a private road under Section 65-7-201. View "High v. Kuhn" on Justia Law

Marcus and Patricia Byrd’s home, in The Timbers of Crossgates subdivision in Brandon, was managed by Ridgway, Lane & Associates (Ridgway). The Byrds claimed that mold began growing inside the home when Ridgway and the Timbers Homeowners’ Association (HOA) failed to repair a leak in the dining room ceiling, that the influx of water damaged the home and property inside, and that Marcus Byrd developed breathing problems as a result of mold exposure. Both Ridgway and the HOA filed motions for summary judgment asserting that the statute of limitations had expired. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions with regard to the property damage claims but denied their motions respecting the personal injury claims. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted Ridgway and the HOA leave to file an interlocutory appeal. Because no assignment of error regarding the Byrds’ property damage claims was raised on appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment with regard to those claims. Finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the time at which Marcus Byrd knew or by reasonable diligence should have known of his illness, the Court affirmed the denial of summary judgment and remanded this case for trial. View "Ridgway Lane & Associates, Inc. v. Watson" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC) filed a complaint to condemn 11.5 acres of highway frontage property owned by United Assets, LLC, leaving United Assets with 12.02 acres. After a trial in the Forrest County Special Court of Eminent Domain, a jury awarded United Assets $1,620,060.66 as just compensation for the taking. MTC appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it allowed United Assets’ appraiser to testify to the value of the remaining property without supporting market data, and when it denied its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and/or a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that MTC’s failure to object contemporaneously to the admission of the appraiser’s testimony waived the issue, and therefore affirmed. View "Mississippi Transportation Commission v. United Assets, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a trial court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing Ike Thrash’s and Dawn Investments LLC’s claims for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty against Deutsch Kerrigan & Stiles, LLP (DKS). The dispute underlying this appeal arose over the purchase of land at a trustee sale. Joel Blackledge, the acting trustee, prepared a trustee's deed in favor of Dawn Investments. Thrash deposited $5.6 million dollars into the trust account of his attorney, Charliene Roemer. The trustee’s deed was then delivered to Dawn Investments, and Thrash authorized the transfer of the funds. The former owner of the property, Coastal Land Development Company, filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. Neither Thrash nor Blackledge was aware of the bankruptcy filing, but William Little Jr., Coastal’s bankruptcy attorney, notified Roemer through email. Subsequently, Thrash and Roemer discovered that the foreclosure sale had been conducted improperly. According to statute, the foreclosure sale must occur one week following the last day of publication; however, the foreclosure sale was conducted one day after the last day of publication. Thrash notified the seller of the error and demanded the funds be returned, but the request was refused. DKS filed suit in circuit court against Thrash, Dawn Investments, and the seller seeking a declaratory judgment that the failure of Blackledge to conduct a foreclosure sale properly was not the proximate cause of Thrash’s and Dawn Investments’ damages. Thrash and Dawn Investments counterclaimed, alleging that Blackledge was negligent and breached his fiduciary duty by improperly conducting the foreclosure sale, leading to Thrash and Dawn Investments to suffer damages. The parties agreed to dismiss DKS’s complaint for declaratory judgment and proceed under Thrash’s and Dawn Investments’ counterclaim. The parties were realigned, naming Thrash and Dawn Investments as Plaintiffs and DKS as Defendant. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted DKS’s motion. The Dawn Plaintiffs then filed this appeal. The Supreme Court found that the trial court was correct in finding that DKS did not owe the Dawn Plaintiffs a duty. View "Thrash v. Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, LLP" on Justia Law

Alesa Dawn Crum’s home in Corinth, Mississippi, was flooded with backflowed sewage, twice. Crum filed suit against the City of Corinth, alleging damages as a result of the City’s negligent maintenance of its sewage system. The Circuit Court granted the City’s motion to dismiss Crum’s complaint, finding that the City was immune under the discretionary-function exemption of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). Crum appealed, arguing that the City was not entitled to discretionary-function immunity. Because the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in dismissing Crum’s complaint, it reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Crum v. City of Corinth" on Justia Law

The McMullans filed a complaint against U.S. Bancorp, U.S. Bank N.A. (collectively the Bank), and the Johnson Group. In answering the complaint, all defendants pled improper venue. The McMullans filed an amended complaint. The Johnson Group answered, again pleading improper venue, and filed a cross claim against the Bank. The Bank answered the McMullans’ amended complaint and the Johnson Group’s cross-claim, pleading improper venue in both. The Johnson Group filed a motion to change venue, joined by the Bank. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the defendants had waived venue because they had unduly delayed pursuit of the defense and had substantially participated in the litigation. The Bank sought and was granted permission to file this interlocutory appeal, which was joined by the Johnson Group. Upon review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the trial court erred in denying the motion to transfer venue because the Bank consistently pled improper venue, joined the Johnson Group’s motion to transfer, and did not otherwise substantially participate in the litigation. View "U.S. Bancorp v. McMullan" on Justia Law

Cherri Porter’s beachfront vacation home was completely destroyed during Hurricane Katrina. Porter claimed the destruction was the result of a barge, owned by Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc.–Biloxi, breaking free from its moorings and alliding with her home. Because Porter’s all-risk insurance policy excluded from coverage damage caused by water or windstorm, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company denied Porter’s claim. Porter filed suit against the insurance agent who maintained the policy, Max Mullins, against State Farm, and against Grand Casino. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of each defendant, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Porter filed a petition for writ of certiorari claiming genuine issues of fact existed as to each defendant, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted her petition. Because Porter’s all-risk insurance policy unambiguously excluded from coverage loss that would not have occurred absent water damage, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Porter’s bad-faith denial of coverage claim against State Farm. Additionally, Porter failed to produce sufficient evidence showing a genuine issue of fact as to whether Grand Casino breached its duty to take reasonable measures to prevent foreseeable injury. The Court therefore affirmed the decisions of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals as to all issues. View "Porter v. Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc.- Biloxi" on Justia Law

James Hobson placed the highest bid at a foreclosure sale on real property in Warren County. The receipt Hobson obtained at the sale disclaimed that the sale was subject to withdrawal in the event of a timely reinstatement by the obligor on the deed of trust. The day before the sale, the defaulting obligor on the deed of trust reinstated the loan with Chase Home Finance, the obligee, and Priority Trustee Services of Mississippi, the trustee. Although Hobson’s check was returned, he sued Chase and Priority for breach of contract, arguing that he was entitled to receive the difference in the amount he had bid for the property and the appraised value of the property. The County Court initially granted summary judgment to Hobson and the Circuit Court affirmed; but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a determination of whether the obligor validly reinstated her loan prior to the foreclosure sale. On remand, the County Court granted summary judgment to Chase and Priority and the Circuit Court affirmed. Finding no error in the respective judgments of the County and Circuit Courts, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hobson v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

When the Mississippi State Highway Commission (MHC) sought a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) to fill wetlands in the roadbed of a proposed limited-access road, it pledged approximately 1,300 acres of Ward Gulfport Properties, L.P.’s and T. Jerard Gulfport, L.L.C.’s (collectively, “Ward”) property as wetlands mitigation. ACE issued the permit to MHC in 2009. Ward filed suit in state court against MHC, seeking damages from an unlawful taking, and in federal court against ACE, seeking to have the permit invalidated. The federal court vacated the permit. MHC moved for summary judgment, arguing that no taking had occurred and that the federal court had determined ACE, not MHC, had caused Ward’s losses. The trial court granted MHC’s motion. Ward appealed. Finding the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of MHC, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Ward Gulfport Properties, L.P. v. Mississippi State Highway Commission" on Justia Law