Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The McMullans filed a complaint against U.S. Bancorp, U.S. Bank N.A. (collectively the Bank), and the Johnson Group. In answering the complaint, all defendants pled improper venue. The McMullans filed an amended complaint. The Johnson Group answered, again pleading improper venue, and filed a cross claim against the Bank. The Bank answered the McMullans’ amended complaint and the Johnson Group’s cross-claim, pleading improper venue in both. The Johnson Group filed a motion to change venue, joined by the Bank. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the defendants had waived venue because they had unduly delayed pursuit of the defense and had substantially participated in the litigation. The Bank sought and was granted permission to file this interlocutory appeal, which was joined by the Johnson Group. Upon review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the trial court erred in denying the motion to transfer venue because the Bank consistently pled improper venue, joined the Johnson Group’s motion to transfer, and did not otherwise substantially participate in the litigation. View "U.S. Bancorp v. McMullan" on Justia Law

Cherri Porter’s beachfront vacation home was completely destroyed during Hurricane Katrina. Porter claimed the destruction was the result of a barge, owned by Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc.–Biloxi, breaking free from its moorings and alliding with her home. Because Porter’s all-risk insurance policy excluded from coverage damage caused by water or windstorm, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company denied Porter’s claim. Porter filed suit against the insurance agent who maintained the policy, Max Mullins, against State Farm, and against Grand Casino. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of each defendant, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Porter filed a petition for writ of certiorari claiming genuine issues of fact existed as to each defendant, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted her petition. Because Porter’s all-risk insurance policy unambiguously excluded from coverage loss that would not have occurred absent water damage, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Porter’s bad-faith denial of coverage claim against State Farm. Additionally, Porter failed to produce sufficient evidence showing a genuine issue of fact as to whether Grand Casino breached its duty to take reasonable measures to prevent foreseeable injury. The Court therefore affirmed the decisions of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals as to all issues. View "Porter v. Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc.- Biloxi" on Justia Law

James Hobson placed the highest bid at a foreclosure sale on real property in Warren County. The receipt Hobson obtained at the sale disclaimed that the sale was subject to withdrawal in the event of a timely reinstatement by the obligor on the deed of trust. The day before the sale, the defaulting obligor on the deed of trust reinstated the loan with Chase Home Finance, the obligee, and Priority Trustee Services of Mississippi, the trustee. Although Hobson’s check was returned, he sued Chase and Priority for breach of contract, arguing that he was entitled to receive the difference in the amount he had bid for the property and the appraised value of the property. The County Court initially granted summary judgment to Hobson and the Circuit Court affirmed; but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a determination of whether the obligor validly reinstated her loan prior to the foreclosure sale. On remand, the County Court granted summary judgment to Chase and Priority and the Circuit Court affirmed. Finding no error in the respective judgments of the County and Circuit Courts, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hobson v. Chase Home Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

When the Mississippi State Highway Commission (MHC) sought a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) to fill wetlands in the roadbed of a proposed limited-access road, it pledged approximately 1,300 acres of Ward Gulfport Properties, L.P.’s and T. Jerard Gulfport, L.L.C.’s (collectively, “Ward”) property as wetlands mitigation. ACE issued the permit to MHC in 2009. Ward filed suit in state court against MHC, seeking damages from an unlawful taking, and in federal court against ACE, seeking to have the permit invalidated. The federal court vacated the permit. MHC moved for summary judgment, arguing that no taking had occurred and that the federal court had determined ACE, not MHC, had caused Ward’s losses. The trial court granted MHC’s motion. Ward appealed. Finding the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of MHC, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Ward Gulfport Properties, L.P. v. Mississippi State Highway Commission" on Justia Law

Earnest Magee sued Covington County Bank (CCB) for conversion after it seized collateral for a promissory note and later sold the property at auction. CCB moved under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss, arguing: (1) that the statute of limitations had expired; (2) that it had a contractual right to the property; and (3) that Magee’s claim was barred by issue preclusion. The circuit judge denied CCB’s motion and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Covington County Bank v. Magee" on Justia Law

In 2004, Clayton Hinton purchased a tract of real property to use as a used-car lot. He financed its acquisition with funds provided by Wells Fargo. In 2007, Hinton conveyed his interests in the property to CZ Inc., a Mississippi corporation, subject to the debt secured by a Deed of Trust. In 2008, CZ Mississippi conveyed its interests in the property to CZ Florida. In 2009, CZ Florida conveyed its interests in the property to Hinton’s children, Nathan Hinton and Seneca Eubanks. All transfers were subject to the debt instrument. In May 2012, the loan matured and became immediately payable in full. In May 2013, Clayton Hinton and Nate Rolison executed a global Settlement Agreement which included Rolison agreeing to pay off the past-due Note and to obtain clear title by judicial foreclosure. On June 7, 2013, CZ Florida and Hinton’s two children conveyed “all of their rights, title, and interest” by quitclaim deed to Rolison. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a quitclaim deed acts to assign and transfer a grantor’s rights and interests retained in a deed of trust even when that grantor no longer holds title to the property. The Court held that it does, and so it affirmed. View "Hinton v. Rolison" on Justia Law

In this premises-liability case, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the trial judge erred in holding, as a matter of law, that the owners and management of an apartment complex where Bobby Batiste murdered his roommate, Andreas Galanis, could not be held liable for failing to warn Galanis about Batiste's violent tendencies. According to the trial judge, a resident concern form describing Batiste's violent intent toward a former roommate "alone is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact" as to whether the complex management knew of Batiste's violent nature. When viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court concluded this was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, the Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the apartment complex, reverseed and remanded for trial. View "Galanis v. CMA Management Company" on Justia Law

The Elchoses purchased a 1.11 acre parcel of a fifty-acre tract of largely undeveloped land located near and on the Jourdan River in Hancock County near Kiln, Mississippi, from Kevin and Lisa Haas in 2004. The Elchoses proceeded to construct a house partially on property the Haases did not sell or convey to the Elchoses. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the dispute, the Haases sued, claiming the Elchoses were trespassing and violating restrictive covenants to which they had agreed at the time of the sale and conveyance. The Elchoses answered and claimed, among other things, that the dispute resulted from a mutual mistake and that the Haases' claims were barred by the doctrines of estoppel and laches. After receiving evidence and testimony at trial, the chancellor found that the Elchoses, who had received a deed, complete with an attached property description and survey, knew or should have known the boundaries of the property they had purchased. The chancellor further found that the Haases were without knowledge of the encroachment until December 2007. Thus, he decreed that the Elchoses had to move the structure off of the Haases' property and onto the property the Elchoses purchased. Aggrieved, the Elchoses appealed the chancellor's judgment to this Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Elchos v. Haas" on Justia Law

A lease agreement included a five-year renewal provision but failed to specify the rent to be paid during the renewal period. The circuit judge granted a judgment on the pleadings, finding the renewal provision unenforceable. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Intrepid, Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

The City of Madison enacted an ordinance requiring landlords to obtain a license for each unit of rental property. The Rental Inspection and Property Licensing Act (RIPLA) conditioned the grant of a license on the landlord’s advance consent to property inspections. Kenneth Crook was convicted in municipal court of two counts of violating RIPLA by maintaining a rental unit without a rental license and sentenced to pay a fine of $300 on each count. After a bench trial, the County Court of Madison County affirmed. Crook then appealed to the Circuit Court of Madison County, which also affirmed. Crook then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court assigned his appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. At each level of review, Crook argued that RIPLA’s inspection provisions violated the ban on unreasonable searches imposed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that RIPLA was not unconstitutional because it required the City to obtain a judicial warrant if the landlord or tenant withheld consent to an inspection. The Supreme Court granted Crook’s petition for certiorari and reversed: RIPLA’s inspection provisions were constitutionally defective because, although RIPLA had a warrant provision, that provision allowed a warrant to be obtained “by the terms of the Rental License, lease, or rental agreement,” which was a standard less than probable cause. The Court reversed the lower courts' judgments affirming Crook's convictions, and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "Crook v. City of Madison" on Justia Law