Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Earnest Magee sued Covington County Bank (CCB) for conversion after it seized collateral for a promissory note and later sold the property at auction. CCB moved under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss, arguing: (1) that the statute of limitations had expired; (2) that it had a contractual right to the property; and (3) that Magee’s claim was barred by issue preclusion. The circuit judge denied CCB’s motion and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Covington County Bank v. Magee" on Justia Law

In 2004, Clayton Hinton purchased a tract of real property to use as a used-car lot. He financed its acquisition with funds provided by Wells Fargo. In 2007, Hinton conveyed his interests in the property to CZ Inc., a Mississippi corporation, subject to the debt secured by a Deed of Trust. In 2008, CZ Mississippi conveyed its interests in the property to CZ Florida. In 2009, CZ Florida conveyed its interests in the property to Hinton’s children, Nathan Hinton and Seneca Eubanks. All transfers were subject to the debt instrument. In May 2012, the loan matured and became immediately payable in full. In May 2013, Clayton Hinton and Nate Rolison executed a global Settlement Agreement which included Rolison agreeing to pay off the past-due Note and to obtain clear title by judicial foreclosure. On June 7, 2013, CZ Florida and Hinton’s two children conveyed “all of their rights, title, and interest” by quitclaim deed to Rolison. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a quitclaim deed acts to assign and transfer a grantor’s rights and interests retained in a deed of trust even when that grantor no longer holds title to the property. The Court held that it does, and so it affirmed. View "Hinton v. Rolison" on Justia Law

In this premises-liability case, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the trial judge erred in holding, as a matter of law, that the owners and management of an apartment complex where Bobby Batiste murdered his roommate, Andreas Galanis, could not be held liable for failing to warn Galanis about Batiste's violent tendencies. According to the trial judge, a resident concern form describing Batiste's violent intent toward a former roommate "alone is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact" as to whether the complex management knew of Batiste's violent nature. When viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court concluded this was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, the Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the apartment complex, reverseed and remanded for trial. View "Galanis v. CMA Management Company" on Justia Law

The Elchoses purchased a 1.11 acre parcel of a fifty-acre tract of largely undeveloped land located near and on the Jourdan River in Hancock County near Kiln, Mississippi, from Kevin and Lisa Haas in 2004. The Elchoses proceeded to construct a house partially on property the Haases did not sell or convey to the Elchoses. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the dispute, the Haases sued, claiming the Elchoses were trespassing and violating restrictive covenants to which they had agreed at the time of the sale and conveyance. The Elchoses answered and claimed, among other things, that the dispute resulted from a mutual mistake and that the Haases' claims were barred by the doctrines of estoppel and laches. After receiving evidence and testimony at trial, the chancellor found that the Elchoses, who had received a deed, complete with an attached property description and survey, knew or should have known the boundaries of the property they had purchased. The chancellor further found that the Haases were without knowledge of the encroachment until December 2007. Thus, he decreed that the Elchoses had to move the structure off of the Haases' property and onto the property the Elchoses purchased. Aggrieved, the Elchoses appealed the chancellor's judgment to this Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Elchos v. Haas" on Justia Law

A lease agreement included a five-year renewal provision but failed to specify the rent to be paid during the renewal period. The circuit judge granted a judgment on the pleadings, finding the renewal provision unenforceable. Finding no reversible error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Intrepid, Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

The City of Madison enacted an ordinance requiring landlords to obtain a license for each unit of rental property. The Rental Inspection and Property Licensing Act (RIPLA) conditioned the grant of a license on the landlord’s advance consent to property inspections. Kenneth Crook was convicted in municipal court of two counts of violating RIPLA by maintaining a rental unit without a rental license and sentenced to pay a fine of $300 on each count. After a bench trial, the County Court of Madison County affirmed. Crook then appealed to the Circuit Court of Madison County, which also affirmed. Crook then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court assigned his appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. At each level of review, Crook argued that RIPLA’s inspection provisions violated the ban on unreasonable searches imposed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that RIPLA was not unconstitutional because it required the City to obtain a judicial warrant if the landlord or tenant withheld consent to an inspection. The Supreme Court granted Crook’s petition for certiorari and reversed: RIPLA’s inspection provisions were constitutionally defective because, although RIPLA had a warrant provision, that provision allowed a warrant to be obtained “by the terms of the Rental License, lease, or rental agreement,” which was a standard less than probable cause. The Court reversed the lower courts' judgments affirming Crook's convictions, and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "Crook v. City of Madison" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jourdan Rivers Estates, LLC (JRE) and Jourdan River Resort and Yacht Club (Yacht Club), filed suit for damages in December 2011 against Defendants Scott Favre, Cindy Favre, Jefferson Parker, and CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini. CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini was later dismissed from the action without prejudice. The complaint alleged multiple claims against Defendants, including slander of title; slander and/or defamation; trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; harassment and intimidation of plaintiffs' agents and intentional infliction of emotional distress upon plaintiffs' agents; assault upon plaintiffs' agents; willful destruction of plaintiffs' property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; unjust enrichment; false imprisonment; and any other applicable theory of law giving rise to a cause of action. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The circuit court dismissed all of Yacht Club's claims in relation to the claim(s) that Defendants made false representations to the Hancock County Board of Supervisors and/or Hancock County employees, finding that such allegations fell under the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine, expressly adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The circuit court dismissed JRE's claims of slander of title, slander and/or defamation; harassment; assault; and false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress because each claim constituted an intentional tort and was barred under the statute of limitations. The circuit court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss as to JRE's claims for trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; willful destruction of property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs thereafter petitioned for an interlocutory appeal. Because the Supreme Court found that Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion should have been converted into a motion for summary judgment, as provided in Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, it reversed the circuit court's order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jourdan River Estates, LLC v. Favre" on Justia Law

After the Lowndes County Board of Supervisors voted to abandon a railroad crossing, the county put up a barricade. Residents affected by the barricade filed two separate motions for reconsideration, and the Board held a second meeting in which it affirmed the abandonment but ordered the barricade removed. The residents filed a bill of exceptions which reversed the Board’s decision to abandon the crossing. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding it had no jurisdiction to hear the bill of exceptions. After review, the Supreme Court found that, although the circuit court had appellate jurisdiction to review the Board’s second decision, it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Board’s original decision. So the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court were reversed, and the case remanded for the circuit court to consider only whether the Board’s second order complied with the statutory procedure for abandoning a road. View "Lowndes County v. McClanahan" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the City of Magee challenged the Simpson County Circuit Court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment against Connie Jones, arguing that Jones’s claim was barred by the discretionary-function provision of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). In 2007, raw sewage entered Connie Jones’s house through a shower drain and flooded several rooms of the house. In early 2008, Jones filed suit against the City and two unnamed defendants, claiming that Magee had negligently installed and maintained the sewage lines providing service to her home, causing the sewage overflow. Jones asserted that her family had suffered both property damage and physical illnesses as a result of Magee’s negligence. Magee moved for summary judgment, arguing that Jones' suit was barred by the MTCA's discretionary-function exception under Mississippi case law because her claim was based on acts of sewage-system maintenance. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying the City's motion. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court’s denial of Magee’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Magee v. Jones" on Justia Law

Janet Olier was attacked and chased by a domestic goose in Donna Bailey's yard. In attempting to flee, she fell and broke her arm. Olier sued Bailey under a theory of premises liability and, alternatively, under the "dangerous propensity" rule. The trial court granted summary judgment because it found that Olier was a licensee on Bailey's property and that Bailey did not breach her duty of care toward Olier. It also denied relief under the dangerous-propensity rule because there was no evidence that the particular goose that bit Olier ever had exhibited dangerous propensities prior to the incident. Olier appealed to the Circuit Court, which affirmed. Olier then filed this appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held that, while Olier could not, as a matter of law, pursue her claim under her theory of general premises liability, she could proceed under the dangerous propensity theory. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Olier v. Bailey" on Justia Law