Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In an interlocutory appeal, the City of Magee challenged the Simpson County Circuit Court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment against Connie Jones, arguing that Jones’s claim was barred by the discretionary-function provision of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). In 2007, raw sewage entered Connie Jones’s house through a shower drain and flooded several rooms of the house. In early 2008, Jones filed suit against the City and two unnamed defendants, claiming that Magee had negligently installed and maintained the sewage lines providing service to her home, causing the sewage overflow. Jones asserted that her family had suffered both property damage and physical illnesses as a result of Magee’s negligence. Magee moved for summary judgment, arguing that Jones' suit was barred by the MTCA's discretionary-function exception under Mississippi case law because her claim was based on acts of sewage-system maintenance. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying the City's motion. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court’s denial of Magee’s motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Magee v. Jones" on Justia Law

Janet Olier was attacked and chased by a domestic goose in Donna Bailey's yard. In attempting to flee, she fell and broke her arm. Olier sued Bailey under a theory of premises liability and, alternatively, under the "dangerous propensity" rule. The trial court granted summary judgment because it found that Olier was a licensee on Bailey's property and that Bailey did not breach her duty of care toward Olier. It also denied relief under the dangerous-propensity rule because there was no evidence that the particular goose that bit Olier ever had exhibited dangerous propensities prior to the incident. Olier appealed to the Circuit Court, which affirmed. Olier then filed this appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held that, while Olier could not, as a matter of law, pursue her claim under her theory of general premises liability, she could proceed under the dangerous propensity theory. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Olier v. Bailey" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the tax sale of a piece of property located in the City of Horn Lake in DeSoto County. Until August 2003, Millennium of Mississippi, LLC, owned the property in question. On August 4, 2003, Millennium conveyed the property to DeSoto County Development, LLC, by warranty deed. At that time, DeSoto Development granted Marshall Investments Corporation, and Fred Spencer, as trustee, a deed of trust lien and mortgage on the property. Marshall Investments then appointed Franklin Childress Jr., Spencer Clift III, and K. David Waddell as substitute trustees for the deed of trust. Subsequently, DeSoto Development defaulted on its mortgage, and Marshall Investments foreclosed on the property. Marshall Investments purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and, in December 2007, executed a substitute trustee's deed to MIC-Rocky, LLC. DeSoto County and the City of Horn Lake levied $520,508 in ad valorem taxes on the property for the tax year ending December 31, 2007. These taxes were never paid and became delinquent on February 1, 2008. The property was offered for sale at public auction by the DeSoto County tax collector on August 25, 2008, to collect the delinquent taxes. SASS Muni-V, LLC was the successful bidder at the auction. No purported property owner or lienholder attempted to redeem the property within the two-year statutory redemption period. Approximately a year after the expiration of the redemption period, SASS filed a complaint in DeSoto County Chancery Court, asking the court to declare the tax sale void and to order a refund of the purchase price. SASS Muni-V appealed the Chancery Court's order dismissing its complaint seeking to void its 2008 tax-sale purchase of real property. Because the trial court erred in finding that SASS Muni-V lacked standing to pursue its claims, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of SASS's complaint and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Sass Muni-V, LLC v. DeSoto County" on Justia Law

Abutting landowners Clyde Gunn, D. Neil Harris, and Vecie Harris, filed suit to confirm title to a sand beach located to the south of a road and seawall in Ocean Springs. The State, Jackson County, and the City of Ocean Springs claimed title to the same land. The lower court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Gunn and Neil and Vecie Harris, and found that the sand beach was not public trust tidelands. The chancellor then vested title to the sand beach in fee simple in Gunn and Harris, subject to prescriptive easements to the City and County for maintenance. The court held the State, County, and City failed to prove adverse possession or public prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. The court found that the County had a prescriptive easement in maintaining the sand beach for seawall protection and the City had a prescriptive easement for road maintenance. The court denied the City's Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment or in the Alternative for New Trial. The State, County, and City each appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by its omission of certain evidence, and in its interpretation of case and statutory authority. Accordingly, summary judgment was improvidently granted. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hosemann v. Harris" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the grant of summary judgment and a final judgment against Melanie Bosarge. The trial court found that Bosarge was individually liable for the deficiency balance after foreclosure under the terms of a personal guaranty she executed in relation to a secured loan made to her company, Indian Head Station, LLC ("Indian Head"). On appeal, Bosarge argued that a material issue of fact existed, inter alia, as to the value of the property securing the debt, that LWC MS Properties, LLC (LWC) should not have been permitted to maintain suit as a dissolved corporation, and that Bosarge should have been allowed to amend her pleadings and answer under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that material facts indeed existed, and reversed and remanded the case with respect to summary judgment. Further, the Court found the second and third issues should have been addressed by the trial court upon remand. View "Bosarge v. LWC MS Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Ted Boroujerdi’s home and yard were flooded with sewage that backed onto his property in February 2009. Boroujerdi sued the City of Starkville, alleging that he had suffered property damage and personal injuries as a result of the City’s negligent maintenance of its sewage system. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the maintenance of the sewage system is a discretionary function and that the City was immune from suit pursuant to statute and Supreme Court precedent, "Fortenberry v. City of Jackson," (71 So. 3d 1196 (Miss. 2011)). Boroujerdi appealed, arguing that the maintenance of the sewage system was ministerial and the City is not immune from suit, that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate, and that this Court should overrule its plurality opinion in Fortenberry. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. Recently, in "Brantley v. City of Horn Lake," (152 So. 3d 1106 (Miss. 2014)), the Supreme Court overhauled its analysis of discretionary function immunity. Accordingly, the Court revisited the issue of sewage-system maintenance as a discretionary function. The Court held that, while the overall function of maintaining a sewage system may be discretionary, certain narrower functions and duties involved with sewage maintenance may be rendered ministerial through applicable statutes, regulations, and/or ordinances. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case back to the trial court for plaintiff to address whether his premises flooded as a result of the City’s fulfilling or its failing to fulfill a ministerial function or duty. View "Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville" on Justia Law

When Booneville Collision Repair (BCR) unknowingly purchased land that had been sold for delinquent municipal taxes, it redeemed the land and sued Prentiss County, the City of Booneville, and the municipal tax collector, Sheila Bolden, for the damages incurred from the failure to provide notice of the tax sales. BCR argued that it had not received notice because Bolden never filed with the chancery clerk the list of properties sold for taxes as required by Mississippi law. BCR appealed the dismissal of its claims against the City and Bolden, asserting that they may be found liable under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and under Section 27-41-79. After review, the Supreme Court found that an action under Section 27-41-79 was a separate statutory action and not a tort action subject to the MTCA, and that BCR stated a claim under the statute. Furthermore, the Court found that, while BCR's negligence claim was subject to the MTCA, no immunity existed. Therefore, the Court reversed the grant of the motions to dismiss and remand for further proceedings. View "Booneville Collision Repair, Inc. v. City of Booneville" on Justia Law

In this replevin action, a tenant sued his landlord and a towing company, alleging wrongful possession of several vehicles towed from the property he leased from the landlord. The County Court granted the defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal, and also found that the landlord's use of self-help was lawful. The Circuit Court affirmed. Finding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to maintain the replevin action, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the replevin action for a trial de novo between the plaintiff and the towing company. It also found the landlord's use of self-help to be unlawful, and reversed and rendered that issue in favor of the plaintiff. Because the Supreme Court find that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals improperly addressed the issue of the landlord's use of self-help, it reversed the judgments and remanded the replevin action to the trial court for a trial de novo. View "Crowell v. Butts" on Justia Law

In 2011, Gerald Collins granted Garrett Prestenbach a one-year option to purchase about 150 acres of Collins's farm and pasture land for $500,000. Prestenbach agreed to make a $25,000 down payment on the property and finance the remaining $475,000 through a combination of a $225,000 USDA loan and $250,000 financing agreement with Collins. The option contract included the following details: (1) a recital of $100 consideration; (2) a township-and-range description of the property; (3) a reference to the buyer's intent to obtain a USDA loan; (4) the total purchase price; and (5) a recital that the option was irrevocable for the first three months and, after three months, the option could be revoked by giving ten days' written notice. The parties also agreed that Collins would allow the USDA to inspect the property before closing. About a month after giving Prestenbach the option to purchase his land, another buyer offered to buy Collins's property immediately. Collins attempted to persuade Prestenbach to give up his option so he could sell to the other party, but Prestenbach refused and quickly recorded the option contract to prevent the sale. By early December, relations between Collins and Prestenbach had deteriorated. Collins's attorney sent Prestenbach a letter attempting to terminate the one-year option "upon the latter to occur of December 15th, its date of expiration, or ten (10) days after receipt of this notice." Prestenbach responded by hand-delivering a letter exercising his option to purchase. At that time, the USDA loan process was nearly complete, and on December 22, 2011, the USDA conditionally approved Prestenbach's loan. Prestenbach tried to set a closing date for the loan, but Collins refused to move forward with the closing. Claiming that the option to purchase had been terminated, Collins denied the USDA's request to inspect the property. He then filed a quiet-title action against Prestenbach. Prestenbach filed an answer and a counterclaim for specific performance, stating he was "ready, willing, and able" to close the deal. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The chancellor granted Collins's motion for summary judgment and denied Prestenbach's motion, finding that Prestenbach was not entitled to specific performance because, at the time he exercised his option, he could not pay the entire purchase price. Prestenbach appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case "to correct a fundamental misunderstanding of the law on option contracts and specific performance." The option holder timely exercised his option to purchase and is entitled to specific performance, so the Court reversed and remanded. View "Prestenbach, Jr. v. Collins" on Justia Law

A.A. was electrocuted while playing on the farmland of David and Sherry Melton. Riley Berry, who worked for the Meltons, had parked a cotton picker under an allegedly sagging power line, which was owned by Entergy Mississippi, Inc. Ultimately, A.A. climbed onto the cotton picker, touched the power line, and was electrocuted. At the time of the accident, A.A.'s mother, Mary Bethanne Acey, was en route to Moon Lake, in Coahoma County with her son and Charles Graves. A 911 dispatcher called Graves to inform him of the accident. Graves immediately turned the car around to proceed to the Meltons' home. Acey then spoke with the dispatcher, who explained the gravity of the situation to Acey and informed her that A.A. had been "shocked." Emergency medical responders arrived shortly after Acey's arrival. A.A. suffered severe burns to both of her arms and her hip. A.A. subsequently was airlifted to Le Bonheur Children's Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, and was later transferred to Shriners Hospitals for Children in Cincinnati, Ohio, which specializes in treating burn patients. Thereafter, Acey commenced legal action on behalf of A.A., and individually, against defendants Entergy, David and Sherry Melton, Melton Farms, Mary Mac, Inc., and Norfleet Investments, LP. Defendants settled all claims on behalf of A.A. Regarding Acey's individual bystander claims for emotional distress, Entergy moved for summary judgment and moved to strike the affidavits of Acey and Dr. William Hickerson. The trial court subsequently denied each motion. According to the trial court, based on the nature of A.A.'s injuries, this case "cries out for the expansion of" the factors provided by the California Supreme Court in "Dillon [v. Legg," 441 P. 2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)], adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in "Entex, Inc. v. McGuire,"(414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982)). Thereafter, Entergy was granted interlocutory appeal. Because the Mississippi Court found that Entergy's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Acey" on Justia Law