Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Gerald Collins granted Garrett Prestenbach a one-year option to purchase about 150 acres of Collins's farm and pasture land for $500,000. Prestenbach agreed to make a $25,000 down payment on the property and finance the remaining $475,000 through a combination of a $225,000 USDA loan and $250,000 financing agreement with Collins. The option contract included the following details: (1) a recital of $100 consideration; (2) a township-and-range description of the property; (3) a reference to the buyer's intent to obtain a USDA loan; (4) the total purchase price; and (5) a recital that the option was irrevocable for the first three months and, after three months, the option could be revoked by giving ten days' written notice. The parties also agreed that Collins would allow the USDA to inspect the property before closing. About a month after giving Prestenbach the option to purchase his land, another buyer offered to buy Collins's property immediately. Collins attempted to persuade Prestenbach to give up his option so he could sell to the other party, but Prestenbach refused and quickly recorded the option contract to prevent the sale. By early December, relations between Collins and Prestenbach had deteriorated. Collins's attorney sent Prestenbach a letter attempting to terminate the one-year option "upon the latter to occur of December 15th, its date of expiration, or ten (10) days after receipt of this notice." Prestenbach responded by hand-delivering a letter exercising his option to purchase. At that time, the USDA loan process was nearly complete, and on December 22, 2011, the USDA conditionally approved Prestenbach's loan. Prestenbach tried to set a closing date for the loan, but Collins refused to move forward with the closing. Claiming that the option to purchase had been terminated, Collins denied the USDA's request to inspect the property. He then filed a quiet-title action against Prestenbach. Prestenbach filed an answer and a counterclaim for specific performance, stating he was "ready, willing, and able" to close the deal. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The chancellor granted Collins's motion for summary judgment and denied Prestenbach's motion, finding that Prestenbach was not entitled to specific performance because, at the time he exercised his option, he could not pay the entire purchase price. Prestenbach appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case "to correct a fundamental misunderstanding of the law on option contracts and specific performance." The option holder timely exercised his option to purchase and is entitled to specific performance, so the Court reversed and remanded. View "Prestenbach, Jr. v. Collins" on Justia Law

A.A. was electrocuted while playing on the farmland of David and Sherry Melton. Riley Berry, who worked for the Meltons, had parked a cotton picker under an allegedly sagging power line, which was owned by Entergy Mississippi, Inc. Ultimately, A.A. climbed onto the cotton picker, touched the power line, and was electrocuted. At the time of the accident, A.A.'s mother, Mary Bethanne Acey, was en route to Moon Lake, in Coahoma County with her son and Charles Graves. A 911 dispatcher called Graves to inform him of the accident. Graves immediately turned the car around to proceed to the Meltons' home. Acey then spoke with the dispatcher, who explained the gravity of the situation to Acey and informed her that A.A. had been "shocked." Emergency medical responders arrived shortly after Acey's arrival. A.A. suffered severe burns to both of her arms and her hip. A.A. subsequently was airlifted to Le Bonheur Children's Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, and was later transferred to Shriners Hospitals for Children in Cincinnati, Ohio, which specializes in treating burn patients. Thereafter, Acey commenced legal action on behalf of A.A., and individually, against defendants Entergy, David and Sherry Melton, Melton Farms, Mary Mac, Inc., and Norfleet Investments, LP. Defendants settled all claims on behalf of A.A. Regarding Acey's individual bystander claims for emotional distress, Entergy moved for summary judgment and moved to strike the affidavits of Acey and Dr. William Hickerson. The trial court subsequently denied each motion. According to the trial court, based on the nature of A.A.'s injuries, this case "cries out for the expansion of" the factors provided by the California Supreme Court in "Dillon [v. Legg," 441 P. 2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)], adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in "Entex, Inc. v. McGuire,"(414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982)). Thereafter, Entergy was granted interlocutory appeal. Because the Mississippi Court found that Entergy's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Acey" on Justia Law

A property dispute between neighbors came before the Supreme Court in this case. The issue centered on the rights of the various parties as to Nicola Road, a road that allows the various property owners access to Highway 603. Plaintiffs Jourdan River Estates, LLC, and Jourdan River Resort and Yacht Club, LLC (together, "JRE") owned of a 269-acre tract of land in a rural area in Hancock County. Nicola Road leads from Highway 603 to the JRE tract, and passes by and provides access to three parcels. In its Final Judgment, the Chancery Court of Hancock County determined that Jourdan River Estates held a private 947-foot right-of-way, and it shared a public 340-foot right-of-way with neighbors and surrounding property owners Scott and Cindy Favre, Jefferson and Constance Parker and Hancock County. The neighbors constructed a gate that limited JRE's access to Nicola Road. The trial court entered an injunction against the Favres and Parkers forbidding them from erecting any gates which would impede JRE and from further harassment, and they appealed. Finding the trial court’s judgment to be "well reasoned," the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "Favre v. Jourdan River Estates" on Justia Law

In 1972, the Board of Supervisors of Jackson County, Mississippi, approved the final plat for Spring Lake Subdivision. At that time, the only vehicular access to the subdivision was Spring Lake Drive East, which crossed Spring Lake Dam. The McBrooms, who owned three subdivision lots on Spring Lake, and the dam forming the lake and providing access to the subdivision, contended that Jackson County was obligated to maintain the deteriorating roadway by virtue of the McBrooms’ dedication of the roadway to public use and Jackson County’s acceptance of their dedication. The Chancery Court held that the McBrooms were entitled to no relief. Finding that the Spring Lake Dam and the roadway over it were dedicated to public use and accepted by Jackson County under common law (as evidenced by more than thirty years of continuous use by the public), the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for the McBrooms. View "McBroom v. Jackson County" on Justia Law

Kenyatta Cheeks was entering an AutoZone store when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Jason Johnson. The jury returned a verdict for Cheeks in the amount of $2.5 million, finding that AutoZone was forty-five percent at fault and Johnson was fifty-five percent at fault. Later, the trial court granted AutoZone’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Cheeks appealed, arguing that granting AutoZone's motion was made in error. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to non-movant Cheeks, the jury had credible evidence to determine that an injury was reasonably foreseeable. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court’s grant of JNOV in favor of AutoZone and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cheeks v. AutoZone, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a property-line dispute between neighboring landowners in Lafayette County. Jerry Mize filed suit to confirm title to property described in a recorded corrected warranty deed. Defendants Westbrook Construction Company of Oxford, LLC, Jimmy A. Lewis, Jr., Kay W. Lewis, and Jimmie Waller, answered the complaint, counterclaimed to quiet and confirm their titles, and sought damages for slander of their respective titles. The chancellor found for Defendants and awarded damages and attorneys’ fees on their slander-of-title claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed. In his petition for certiorari, Mize raised several issues; the Supreme Court's review of this case was limited to whether there was sufficient evidence to support a slander-of-title action. No evidence of record supported a finding that all of the elements of a slander-of-title action were met. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment against Mize for slander of title and the award of damages to Defendants as well as the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming it. The Court affirmed the Chancery Court in all other respects, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Mize v. Westbrook Construction Company of Oxford, LLC" on Justia Law

First National Bank of Clarksdale (FNB) secured a loan of more than $800,000 with a deed of trust on real property in Oxford with the understanding that the bank would become the primary lien holder on the realty. FNB acquired title insurance from Mississippi Valley Title Insurance Company against the risk of an undiscovered superior lien holder. No formal title search on the property was performed, although Mississippi Valley’s agent did discover the existence of another deed of trust on the property held by Community Trust Bank (CTB). The agent never relayed this information to FNB or to Mississippi Valley and issued the policy without regard to this prior recorded lien. Years later, CTB’s loan went into default and CTB initiated foreclosure proceedings, which alerted FNB to the existence of CTB’s deed of trust on the property. FNB brought suit in Chancery Court to be subrogated to the primary lien holder position on the property in the amount that it had paid to satisfy the original primary deed of trust. After a bench trial, the chancellor found that the doctrine of equitable subrogation applied and granted primary status to FNB. CTB appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: based upon the facts presented, subrogation was not equitable. View "Community Trust Bank of Mississippi v. First National Bank of Clarksdale" on Justia Law

This case arose from the City of Hattiesburg’s annexation of property in 2007. Pearson’s Fireworks leased land which was part of the annexed property for the purpose of selling fireworks during the Fourth of July and New Year’s holiday seasons. Prior to the annexation, the City passed an ordinance prohibiting the sale of fireworks within city limits. After the annexation, the City notified Pearson’s that it could no longer sell fireworks on the newly annexed land. Pearson’s then filed suit against the City. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, and Pearson’s appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pearson's Fireworks, Inc. v. City of Hattiesburg" on Justia Law

Sam Woodruff owned land in Rankin County. He agreed to sell a part of that land to Rita Thames, his first cousin’s daughter, who was also a neighbor. Woodruff claimed that he agreed to sell Thames one acre from a tract of land for the purchase price of $9,750. Thames claims that Woodruff agreed to sell her 6.53 acres from a different tract of land for that amount. Woodruff claimed that Thames then brought him a blank contract of sale to sign, which he did. Thames appears to claim that the blank contract of sale included attachments that described the land; however, the appellate record contained no evidence of this. The trial court entered a default judgment awarding specific performance in favor of the Thames. Woodruff moved to have the default judgment set aside, and the trial court denied the motion, finding that Woodruff lacked good cause for the default and lacked a “compelling defense.” The Supreme Court concluded after its review of the trial court record that serious question remained regarding whether a valid contract existed between the parties, giving the seller a colorable defense. Because the trial court abused its discretion by failing to set aside the default judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for proceedings on the merits. View "Woodruff v. Thames" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal from Chancery Court, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether plaintiff Ralph Saulters alleged sufficient ownership interest in a disputed piece of land to sustain his complaint to clear title to his alleged remainder interest; whether the various allegations in his complaint fell under the ten-year statute of limitations to recover land or the general three-year statute of limitations governing fraud; and whether the relevant statute of limitations had expired. The chancellor denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiff's valid claims were not time-barred. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s holding that the claim to quiet title was not barred by the statute of limitations. However, because any claims for actual and punitive damages were barred as untimely, the Court reversed the chancellor’s holding as applied to plaintiff's claims for damages. View "Lott v. Saulters" on Justia Law