Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In July 2001, Kaye Hankins entered into a home-construction contract with Elite Homes, Inc. ("Elite"). An August 2001 soil-test report on the subject property recommended that "a stabilizing blanket of natural silty clays . . . and/or compacted fill soils having a maximum 7-foot thickness" was required "to minimize the Yazoo Clay . . . swell or heave potential to within limits tolerable to a strong slab foundation . . . ." Hankins received assurances from Elite that the Yazoo clay "was nothing to be concerned about." She moved into the new home in April 2002. During Hankins's first year in the home, she reported to Elite numerous cracks, leaks, and difficulties in closing doors and windows. In September 2009, Hankins filed a complaint against Elite averring "that the damage which has occurred to said house . . . would not have occurred except for the negligence" of Elite. Thereafter, a "Default Judgment" of was entered against Elite. In August 2010, Hankins filed a "Suggestion for Writ of Garnishment" against Elite's commercial general liability ("CGL") insurer, Maryland Casualty Company/Zurich American Insurance Company ("Maryland Casualty"). In October 2010, a default judgment was entered against Maryland Casualty. Subsequently, Maryland Casualty filed a "Motion to Suspend Execution of Default Judgment against Maryland Casualty and For Leave to File Answer to Writ of Garnishment," which argued, inter alia, that because its CGL policy "exclud[ed] coverage for property damage caused by earth movement," then it "has no property or effects in its possession belonging to" Elite. Maryland Casualty then filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on the same basis. The circuit court concluded that the "earth movement" endorsement "excludes the damages suffered by [Hankins] from coverage under the policy." Based thereon, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, and set aside the default judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Maryland Casualty's "earth movement" endorsement was unambiguous and operated to exclude the property damage Hankins suffered from coverage under the CGL policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the insurance company, and the setting aside of the default judgment. View "Hankins v. Maryland Casualty Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (collectively "Tellus") alleged that they owned the "shallow gas" rights in a tract of land known as the Bilbo A Lease. While ownership of the shallow gas was disputed, all parties agreed that the defendants (collectively "TPIC") owned the gas rights below 8,000 feet and the oil rights in both the shallow and deep zones. In 2004, Tellus sued TPIC, alleging that it had produced Tellus's shallow gas through one if its wells known as the A-1 well. After much pretrial litigation and a two-month jury trial, the trial judge declared that the plaintiffs were the rightful owners and submitted the plaintiffs' conversion and negligence claims to a jury. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants, and both sides appealed. Finding no reason to reverse, the Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict and the trial court's declaratory judgment. View "Tellus Operating Group, LLC, v. Texas Petroleum Investment Co." on Justia Law

Town Creek Water Management District of Lee, Pontotoc, Prentiss, and Union Counties ("Town Creek") appealed a decision of the Lee County Chancery Court that awarded compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest to the Webbs for Town Creek's wrongful taking of the their property. The case was before the trial court on remand from the Supreme Court's reversal of an earlier grant of summary judgment for Town Creek, with an instruction to conduct a trial on all issues. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by limiting the trial to damages alone, rather than holding a trial on all issues. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the Lee County Chancery Court for a trial on all issues. View "Town Creek Master Water Mgmt. Dist. of Lee, Pontotoc, Prentiss, and Union Counties v. Webb" on Justia Law

Ernest and Bonnie Harland filed suit in the Chancery Court of Lafayette County seeking to have a "corrected" warranty deed set aside; to vacate three lots from the official plat of Long Meadow subdivision; or to validate the protective covenants included with their original deed. The chancellor set aside the "corrected" deed and validated the Harlands' original covenants. The Long Meadow Homeowners' Association appealed the chancellor's judgment, and the Supreme Court assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, found no error and affirmed the judgment of the chancery court. The Supreme Court granted Long Meadow’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Having reviewed the briefs and record in this appeal, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, and used the opportunity of this case to discuss precedent as it related to the Harlands' equitable-estoppel claim. View "Long Meadow Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Harland" on Justia Law

Gary Fordham, David Thompson, and Venture Sales, LLC appealed a chancery court order that dissolved Venture Sales pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 79-29-802 (Rev. 2009). Walter Ray Perkins owned 27.7 acres of land. Sometime in the late 90s, he was approached by Fordham and Thompson about a potential business venture involving his land. Perkins, Fordham, and Thompson eventually agreed that Fordham and Thompson would acquire the 438 acres of land that adjoined Perkins's land; the parties would combine their respective land, along with some cash, and form a venture to develop the land. Following the contributions, the operating agreement of Venture Sales was revised to reflect the arrangement. The parties signed the new operating agreement in 2000. In February 2010, Perkins filed an application for judicial dissolution of Venture Sales. Following a trial, the chancellor found that, based on the property's history, the company's inability to get funding for development, and the uncertainty regarding the economic climate in the area, it was not reasonably practicable to carry on the business of Venture Sales. The chancellor therefore ordered the company dissolved. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that the chancellor's decision to order the dissolution of Venture Sales was not an abuse of discretion: substantial evidence existed supporting the chancellor's determination that it was not reasonably practicable for Venture Sales to carry on business in conformity with its operating agreement. View "Venture Sales, LLC v. Perkins" on Justia Law

Lamar Hooker appealed a chancery court's grant of Stephen Greer's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, in which the court awarded attorney's fees to Greer based on Hooker's improper filing of a lis pendens, and Greer's Motion for Summary Judgment on Hooker's counterclaim. Greer and Hooker knew each other for more than thirty years, having worked together in multiple business ventures. In early 2002, Greer and Hooker entered into an agreement for the purchase, development, and sale of two tracts of land to which each made monetary contributions and participated in certain decisions regarding the development and marketing of the properties. In September 2003, Greer sent a letter to Hooker in which he cancelled their business arrangement. In this letter, he characterized the relationship as a "proposed joint venture" and declared such proposed venture "null and void." Greer claimed the venture was predicated on Hooker's ability to put up one half of the initial capital investment to purchase the properties, and that Hooker had failed to do so. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the lis pendens was improperly filed. However, because the trial court based the attorney's fees award on an improper interpretation of the Litigation Accountability Act, the Court reversed the judgment, vacated the award, and remanded for further consideration. Finally, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Greer on Hooker's counterclaim, holding that his claim was subject to a three-year statute of limitations and was thus time-barred. View "Hooker v. Greer" on Justia Law

This case came before the Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal from the Circuit Court of Warren County in which the circuit court affirmed in part and reversed in part the county court's grant of summary judgment for Plaintiff James Hobson, Jr. Defendants Chase Home Finance, LLC, and Priority Trustee Services of Mississippi, LLC (collectively, Chase) appealed the circuit court's affirmance of their liability. Plaintiff cross-appealed the circuit court's order that vacated the county court's award and ordered trial on damages. The dispute arose from Plaintiff's purchase of real property at a foreclosure sale. He tendered a cashier's check to Chase's agent, for which Chase gave Plaintiff a receipt. Approximately two weeks later, Chase returned Plaintiff's check and refused to tender a deed to the property, stating that the foreclosure sale had been cancelled due to the original borrower's reinstatement. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract, arguing that Defendants breach was grossly negligent, and requested actual and punitive damages along with attorney's fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the borrower's alleged reinstatement prior to the foreclosure sale created a genuine issue of dispute regarding Chase's liability, and, therefore, the Court held that the circuit court erred in affirming the county court's grant of summary judgment as to liability. Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remand to the county court for further proceedings. View "Chase Home Finance, L.L.C. v. Hobson" on Justia Law

J.C. and Betty Lockhart owned a life estate in an undivided one-fourth interest in 160 acres in Monroe County, Mississippi. After the death of J.C., Betty Lockhart filed a complaint to partition by public sale the land that she shared with her in-laws, Bolin and Orene Hamilton. The Hamiltons also owned a life estate in the same property, and they maintained the property as their homestead. Additionally, Lockhart sued Richard and Peggy Collins, who have a future interest in the property as remaindermen. The trial court dismissed Lockhart's petition, and Lockhart appealed. Because Lockhart failed to meet the statutory requisites for a partition sale, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's ruling. View "Lockhart v. Collins" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court concerned whether the Union County Circuit Court erred in finding that the City of New Albany Board of Aldermen's (City) decision that a tract of land had been legally rezoned from agricultural to industrial was arbitrary and capricious and that the City failed to give statutorily required notice before changing the zoning designation. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court did not err: in finding that the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously; in finding that the City failed to give statutorily required notice; and in concluding that the property should remain zoned for agricultural use. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals' holding and reinstated the judgment of the circuit court. View "Riverside Traffic Systems, Inc. v. Bostwick" on Justia Law

J. C. and Betty Lockhart owned a life estate in an undivided one-fourth interest in 160 acres in Monroe County, Mississippi. After the death of J.C., Betty Lockhart filed a complaint to partition by public sale the land that she shared with her in-laws, Bolin and Orene Hamilton. The Hamiltons also owned a life estate in the same property, and they maintained the property as their homestead. Additionally, Lockhart sued Richard and Peggy Collins, who had a future interest in the property as remaindermen. The trial court dismissed Lockhart’s petition, and Lockhart appealed. Because Lockhart failed to meet the statutory requisites for a partition sale, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s ruling. View "Lockhart v. Collins" on Justia Law