Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Minor Tamarcus Ewing and his mother were involved in a motor-vehicle accident. Tamarcus sustained severe injuries and his mother died. Tommy Lee Ewing, Tamarcus’s father, was appointed guardian of Tamarcus’s person and estate. Tommy filed a negligence complaint on behalf of Tamarcus. At some point, the parties settled the circuit-court case. The Chancery Court sealed the guardianship case file on stipulation and agreement of the parties and attorneys of record in the circuit-court action. Then in 2010, the chancellor removed Tommy as guardian of Tamarcus’s estate after finding that seventy-five thousand dollars in annuity payments had been redirected from a frozen guardianship account into an unfrozen account jointly owned by Tommy and Tamarcus. The court also found that Tommy had spent those funds without court approval. Chokwe Lumumba and Roy Perkins were appointed as coguardians of the estate. Tommy was not removed as the guardian of Tamarcus’s person. Tommy later sought a copy of the sealed settlement documents after he had been removed as guardian. The chancellor denied his request. But because he had access to those documents as guardian and participated in the settlement process, no purpose was served by keeping the sealed documents from him. So, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions for the chancellor to grant him access to the documents. View "Ewing, Jr. v. Neese" on Justia Law

Charlene Ivy was admitted to East Mississippi State Hospital (“EMSH”) in May 2012, and she died on July 17, 2012. Alleging medical negligence by EMSH staff, Ivy’s son Spencer sent a Notice of Claim letter via certified mail dated July 11, 2013, to EMSH Director Charles Carlisle. Carlisle signed for the letter on July 15, 2013, as evidenced by a return receipt. The definitive question in this appeal was whether Carlisle, as the Director of the East Mississippi State Hospital (“EMSH”), was the proper “chief executive officer” for notice purposes under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), as opposed to the Executive Director of the Department of Mental Health (“DMH”). The trial judge found that “proper pre-suit notice” required service “upon the executive director of [DMH], not a facility manager of one of the institutions under its jurisdiction and control.” The trial judge found further that the statute of limitations was not tolled because Ivy had “failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 11-46-11(1)” and dismissed Ivy’s complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that EMSH’s Director was the CEO under the MTCA, and that Ivy provided the "proper pre-suit notice. View "Ivy v. East Mississippi State Hospital" on Justia Law

Bobby Gibson filed a legal-malpractice action against Joe Montgomery and his law firm, Williams, Williams and Montgomery, P.A. (“WWM”), alleging wrongful conduct in connection with the administration of his late wife Debbie's estate. The trial court granted summary judgment to Montgomery and WWM. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Bobby timely filed his Notice of Appeal and raised four issues: 1) whether the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel barred his claims, 2) whether judicial estoppel precluded his malpractice action, 3) whether the thirty-day period provided in Section 11-1-39 required dismissal, and 4) whether there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of his legal-malpractice and fiduciary-duty claims. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: Bobby's claims were not precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; judicial estoppel did not preclude Bobby's legal-malpractice action; there was no merit to Montgomery's Section 11-1-39 argument; and there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed. View "Gibson v. Williams, Williams & Montgomery, P.A." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on the validity of a 1995 Florida divorce decree. Sarath Sapukotana (Sarath) and Palihawadanage Ramya Chandralatha Fernando (Fernando) were married in Sri Lanka in 1992. Sarath moved to the United States a year later. In 1995, a Florida court entered an uncontested divorce decree, dissolving the marriage of Sarath and Fernando. In 2004, Sarath then married Martha Gay Weaver Sapukotana (Martha) in Mississippi. Sarath died intestate in 2008 from injuries which led to a wrongful death suit. The trial court granted Martha’s petition to be named the administratrix of the estate, over the objection of Fernando, Sarath’s first wife. This allowed Martha to file, and later to settle, the wrongful death claim. Fernando claims that the 1995 Florida divorce decree was fraudulent and void for lack of service of process, and that she instead was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate and to the proceeds of the wrongful death action. Fernando filed a motion to vacate the chancery court’s decision to appoint Martha as administratrix of Sarath’s estate. The chancery court dismissed Fernando’s motion and held that Martha was the rightful beneficiary to Sarath’s estate. Fernando appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court, finding that the chancery court lacked authority to vacate the 1995 Florida divorce decree. View "In Re: In the Matter of the Estate of Sarath Sapukotana" on Justia Law

Following Steve Broome’s death, his ex-wife Elizabeth Strickland and his children, Stephen Broome and Jesse Broome, filed claims against Steve’s estate for child support arrears, other unpaid support obligations, and for life insurance proceeds. The chancellor dismissed all of the claims, holding that the claims were not valid because they were not reduced to a judgment before Steve’s death and that the claims were barred by res judicata. After review, the Supreme Court held that the chancellor erred in dismissing the claims, since Elizabeth, Stephen, and Jesse presented sufficient evidence to satisfy Mississippi Code Section 91-7-149. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Strickland v. Estate of Steve Alan Broome" on Justia Law

Limestone Products, Inc., jointly owned by Ronald (Ronnie) Lampkin and James Oldrum (J.O.) Smith, Jr., operated with a line of credit personally guaranteed by Lampkin and Smith. Limestone was in the business of selling rock, predominantly to Lampkin's company, Lampkin Construction. Following Smith's death and his estate's subsequent refusal to guarantee Limestone's line of credit, Lampkin formed Delta Stone, a new corporation which operated on the same property, made use of the same facilities, and sold rock to the same clients to whom Limestone had sold. Lampkin sought a declaratory judgment against the Smith estate's executors that he was violating no fiduciary duties in continuing to sell Limestone's inventory. The executors counterclaimed, seeking lost profits and attorneys' fees. The chancellor bifurcated the trial and determined, in the liability stage, that Lampkin had breached his fiduciary duty to Limestone by usurping a corporate opportunity. In the damages phase of the trial, the chancellor heard expert testimony, assigned an award of damages to the Smith estate, and denied the executors' request for attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and punitive damages. The executors appealed, and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Finding that the chancellor erred in his calculation of damages, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Lane v. Lampkin" on Justia Law

John McAdams, in his official capacity as Chancery Clerk of Harrison County, was appointed guardian of Sybil Bowden and Jonathan Dunn. In October 2003 the Chancery Clerk opened guardianship accounts for Dunn and Bowden at the Peoples Bank of Biloxi, Mississippi. Woodrow "Woody" Pringle III served as the Chancery Clerk's attorney. The Chancery Clerk was the sole signatory on both accounts. Two years later, Pringle closed the Bowden guardianship, without any authority to do so. The Bank issued Pringle a cashier's check payable to Bowden and Pringle, jointly. Pringle forged Bowden's signature, cashed the check, and retained the funds for himself. The Dunn account required a court order before disbursements could be made. The Bank paid checks drawn on the Dunn guardianship account, in the absence of a court order. The Chancery Clerk filed suit against the Bank alleging gross negligence, negligence, and conversion of a negotiable instrument. The Bank pleaded that the statute of limitations had run on these claims and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion. The Bank petitioned the Supreme Court and was granted leave to file this interlocutory appeal. The Court found that the Chancery Clerk filed his complaint May 8, 2013. The three transactions at issue occurred on January 24, 2005; June 11, 2008; and March 25, 2009. As to the conversion claims, the most recent transaction occurred more than four years before the filing of the complaint (well outside the three-year statute of limitations). However, negligence/gross negligence claims were subject to the "discovery rule." The Bank offered evidence that it sent statements to the Chancery Clerk concerning these transactions on the last day of each month. The Chancery Clerk offered no proof to dispute the Bank's assertion, although he claims he never received a Bank statement because Pringle removed the Bank statements delivered to the Chancery Clerk. "The statute-of-limitations issue is not a question of fact because reasonable minds could not differ [. . .] that the Chancery Clerk lacked diligence in failing to obtain and review any account statements for more than a year and a half on one account and more than eight years on the other." The Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in refusing to grant the Bank its motion for summary judgment because the Chancery Clerk's claims expired due to the applicable statutes of limitation. View "Peoples Bank of Biloxi, Miss. v. McAdams" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was one of first impression regarding the interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 91-5-33, known as the “Slayer Statute.” John Armstrong, a severely mentally ill man, killed Joan Armstrong, his eighty-year-old mother. This fact was not disputed by any party. The Circuit Court determined that John was not competent to stand trial for the murder of Joan, and John was committed to the state hospital at Whitfield. Based on the Slayer Statute, John’s four siblings requested that the devise to John in their mother’s will be declared void. The chancellor granted their motion, and John, through his court-appointed guardian ad litem, appealed. Finding that a hearing to determine John’s mental status at the time of the murder was necessary prior to granting the motion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Joan Armstrong" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was one of first impression regarding the interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 91-5-33, known as the “Slayer Statute.” John Armstrong, a severely mentally ill man, killed Joan Armstrong, his eighty-year-old mother. This fact was not disputed by any party. The Circuit Court determined that John was not competent to stand trial for the murder of Joan, and John was committed to the state hospital at Whitfield. Based on the Slayer Statute, John’s four siblings requested that the devise to John in their mother’s will be declared void. The chancellor granted their motion, and John, through his court-appointed guardian ad litem, appealed. Finding that a hearing to determine John’s mental status at the time of the murder was necessary prior to granting the motion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Joan Armstrong" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal stemming from a law suit by Mautrice Vaughn’s estate and wrongful-death beneficiaries against The Service Companies Inc., (“FSS”), following Vaughn’s fatal heart attack at work. Plaintiffs Vaughn’s estate and wrongful-death beneficiaries sued for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs alleged Vaughn’s supervisor would not let her leave work to see a doctor despite complaints of severe chest pain and a headache. Following the denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Supreme Court granted FSS leave to bring this interlocutory appeal. FSS argued the circuit court erred by finding a factual dispute existed as to whether FSS had “an actual intent to injure” for purposes of determining whether the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act exclusively governed plaintiffs’ claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found plaintiffs’ common-law false-imprisonment claim was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the plaintiffs did not produce evidence of intent to detain. "The plaintiffs may not merely rest on the pleadings and allegations alone." The Court found summary judgment in favor of FSS proper, reversed the trial court’s ruling denying summary judgment, rendered judgment in favor of FSS finally dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint and this action with prejudice. View "The Service Companies, Inc. v. The Estate of Mautrice Vaughn" on Justia Law