Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Trusts & Estates
by
The conservators of Soon San Pak's estate filed suit against their two attorneys, Harrison County, the Harrison County Chancery Clerk, John McAdams, and the guardian ad litem appointed for Mrs. Pak, after the previously appointed conservator, Woodrow W. Pringle III, embezzled money from the estate. The claims were dismissed when the circuit court found that the applicable statutes of limitation had lapsed. The conservators appealed. McAdams cross-appealed, asserting that the trial court improperly held that the conservators asserted a Section 1983 claim by implication against him and that Pringle was a state actor for whom McAdams and Harrison County could be vicariously liable. In affirming the circuit court, the Supreme Court concluded that the Conservators should have discovered, by reasonable diligence, that Pringle was misappropriating funds from the estate no later than January 24, 2008, when the coconservators (using due diligence) would have received an accounting and bank statements regarding Pak's estate, and would have “by reasonable diligence. . . discovered the injury.” The statute of limitations issue was not a question of fact for the jury because reasonable minds could not differ as to when the Conservators knew or should have known of Pringle's failure to file an accounting and, thus, Harrison County's and McAdams's failure in requiring an accounting to be filed. Based on the circuit court record, the trial court properly held that the Conservators' claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. View "Benvenutti v. McAdams" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
by
Bronwyn Benoist Parker and William Benoist were siblings who litigated the will of their father, Billy Dean "B.D." Benoist. 2010, B.D. executed a will which significantly altered the distributions that were in a previous will that B.D. had executed in 1998. Bronwyn alleged that William had unduly influenced their father, who was suffering from dementia and drug addiction, into making the new will, which included a forfeiture clause that revoked benefits to any named beneficiary who contested the will. Bronwyn lost the will contest and her benefits under the new will were revoked by the trial court. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Mississippi law should recognize a good faith and probable-cause exception to a forfeiture in terrorem clause in a will. The Court held that it should, and that Bronwyn had sufficiently shown that her suit was brought in good faith and was founded upon probable cause. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the chancery court that excluded Bronwyn from the will, and entered judgment in her favor to allow her to inherit in accordance with her father's 2010 will. Because the chancellor applied the wrong legal standard, the Court reversed the chancellor's decision to allow William to continue as executor and remanded for a determination of whether a temporary executor should be appointed. View "Parker v. Benoist" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
by
Attorneys representing the administratrix of an estate settled wrongful-death claims under two insurance policies without filing a wrongful-death lawsuit. The proceeds of the settlement of the first policy were distributed equally to the wrongful-death beneficiaries. The attorneys submitted the proceeds of the second policy to the chancery court and moved for an unequal distribution, arguing that two half-siblings should recover nothing or, if allowed to recover, less than the three other claimants. The chancellor determined that the half-siblings were entitled to recover, and that she had no authority to apportion the wrongful-death settlement proceeds unequally. She divided the proceeds equally among the wrongful-death beneficiaries after awarding attorneys’ fees of forty percent of the amount of recovery. Two of the beneficiaries argued that they should not have been required to pay attorneys’ fees because the attorneys had made numerous attempts to exclude them from any recovery, and then to reduce their share. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor’s determination that the half-siblings were entitled to an equal distribution but remanded for factual findings on the amount of attorneys’ fees they should be required to pay. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and the trial court that the proceeds must be equally divided. On the issue of attorney fees, four justices held that because the attorneys had an actual conflict of interest with the half-siblings and acted adverse to their interests; and because they could not satisfy the requirements for quantum meruit, they were not entitled to recover any attorneys’ fees from the half-siblings shares. Four justices would have affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Dane Richard Eubanks" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
by
Charles William White (“Bill”) and his son Charles Thomas White (“Tommy”), were partners in a business that owned and operated convenience stores. In 2000, during the course of the partnership, Bill married Anita White. In 2005, Tommy bought his father’s share of the partnership for $42,600, but in dissolving the partnership, Bill and Tommy neglected to execute and file deeds transferring the partnership’s real property. In early 2009, Bill’s health declined rapidly, and Anita and Tommy began to clash over Bill’s healthcare. During this time, Tommy realized that he and his father had failed to execute deeds transferring the partnership’s real-property assets. Tommy used a durable power of attorney his father had given him years before to execute quit-claim deeds transferring the partnership property to himself. Bill and Anita continued to clash over who had authority to make healthcare decisions for Bill, so Tommy filed a petition for a conservatorship for his father’s benefit and sought appointment as his father’s conservator. Anita filed a counterclaim to challenge Tommy’s fitness to serve as his father’s conservator and sought to have Tommy return all assets he had transferred to himself using his father’s power of attorney. The chancellor agreed that a conservatorship was appropriate, but he appointed a third party as Bill’s conservator. Bill died in 2009, and at that time, the conservator filed a motion asking to be discharged from his duties and to be allowed to distribute the assets of the conservatorship to Bill’s estate. The parties agreed to an order discharging the conservator and to a distribution of funds held by the conservator to Bill’s estate. The chancellor’s order made no mention of Anita’s action to set aside the deed transfers. In 2010, Anita filed suit to set aside the quit-claim deeds and to redeem the real property Tommy had acquired using his father’s power of attorney. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The chancellor held that Anita’s action was barred by res judicata, granted Tommy’s motion, and denied Anita’s cross-motion. The Supreme Court found that the judgment dismissing the conservatorship was not a final judgment on the merits, and reversed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Charles William White" on Justia Law

by
The McTaggarts filed suit against the former trustee and trust advisor of their family trust, alleging improper handling of their trust funds. The former trustee and trust advisor moved to dismiss the case or have the case stayed pending arbitration, based on an arbitration provision in a wealth-management agreement between the former trustee and trust advisor. The trial court found that, because the McTaggarts did not sign the agreement containing the arbitration provision and because the agreement specifically excluded nonsignatories, including third-party beneficiaries, the arbitration provision was not binding on the McTaggarts. The former trustee and trust advisor appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pinnacle Trust Company, L.L.C., EFP Advisors, Inc. v. McTaggart" on Justia Law

by
Diane Truddle, as mother and wrongful-death beneficiary of Eric Carmichael, sued Baptist Memorial Hospital-Desoto, Inc., and Dr. Sunil Malhotra after Carmichael committed suicide upon being discharged from Baptist. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Baptist and Dr. Malhotra and entered a final judgment in their favor as a matter of law. Truddle appealed. Finding no error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Truddle v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-Desoto, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Boyce Elmore died on November 5, 2000. More than ten years later, Cedric Williams (claiming to be Boyce’s son) filed a paternity action in an effort to recover under Boyce’s estate. After the chancellor held that Cedric’s action was timely, Boyce’s estate appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the chancellor’s decision should have been reversed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Boyce Elmore, Deceased" on Justia Law

by
This case involves a familial dispute between two sisters. Jackie charged her sister Caron with unduly influencing their mother to obtain a greater share of the family property. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's sua sponte award of an additional $100,000 post-judgment, was reversed. The trial court’s judgment was otherwise supported by substantial evidence on all other issues and was affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Administration of the Estate of Norma Allene Cloud Crowell" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
by
Bronwyn Benoist Parker and William Benoist were siblings who litigated the will of their father, Billy Dean "B.D." Benoist. In 2010, B.D. executed a will which granted significantly more property to William and consequently, less to Bronwyn than did a previous will that B.D. had executed in 1998. Bronwyn alleged that William had unduly influenced their father, who was suffering from dementia and drug addiction, into making the new will, which included a forfeiture clause that revoked benefits to any named beneficiary who contested the will. Bronwyn lost the will contest and her benefits under the new will were revoked by the trial court. In this appeal, the issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether Mississippi law should recognize a good faith and probable cause exception to a forfeiture in terrorem clause in a will. The Court held that it should, and that Bronwyn has sufficiently shown that her suit was brought in good faith and was founded upon probable cause. Accordingly, the decision of the chancery court that excluded Bronwyn from the will was reversed, and granted judgment in her favor to allow her to inherit in accordance with her father’s 2010 will. The Court affirmed the chancellor’s decisions to permit William to pay attorneys with funds obtained from his father’s estate and to permit William to continue as executor, and the chancery court’s decision to deny attorney fees to the estate. View "Parker v. Benoist" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
by
In 1987, Joseph Bagley purchased a cancer and dread-disease policy through his friend and insurance agent, Jackie McPhail. The policy was issued by American Heritage Life Insurance Company. McPhail worked as an independent insurance broker, and she was a registered agent with American Heritage at the time the policy was written. The policy indicated that Bagley purchased coverage concerning cancer and dread disease, a home-recovery rider, and a hospital intensive-care rider. Bagley also had an option to purchase life insurance; however, McPhail testified that Bagley did not purchase life insurance under this policy because he had purchased a separate life-insurance policy. In 2008, Bagley was diagnosed with cancer. Bagley contacted McPhail to file a claim under the policy and to "change the beneficiary" of the policy from his estate to Michael and Betty Strait. McPhail testified that she had ceased writing policies for American Heritage; however, she still retained the authority to service Bagley's policy, and she acquired his written consent to receive information regarding his policy from the insurance company. While Bagley was in the hospital, McPhail presented an American Heritage change-of-beneficiary form, which Bagley ultimately signed. The signature was witnessed by Bagley's physician, a nurse, and McPhail. Bagley orally communicated that he wished for the beneficiary to be changed from his estate to the Straits. At the time that Bagley signed the form, the Straits had yet to be listed as beneficiaries on the form. McPhail met with the Straits after the form was signed to confirm their correct legal names to be placed on the change-of-beneficiary form at a later time. McPhail provided that she did not fully complete the form because she was attempting to contact American Heritage to confirm the correct procedure for completing the process; however, American Heritage's office was closed because of Hurricane Fay, and McPhail never succeeded in speaking with American Heritage regarding the matter. Bagley's physician, who witnessed Bagley signing the form, later communicated to Betty Strait that his attorney advised that the form could not be used because the Straits' names were not listed on the form prior to Bagley's signature. Betty Strait relayed this to McPhail, who then attempted to contact American Heritage's legal department. McPhail called the company on multiple occasions, but she never received a return phone call. Soon thereafter, Bagley passed away, and the form was never completed. The estate was probated and the Straits did not contest the passage of the policy proceeds to the estate at the time that the estate was being settled. The executor of Bagley's will, William Kinstley, petitioned for the approval of the estate's final accounting, which included the policy proceeds. The Straits initiated legal action against McPhail and American Heritage in Hinds County Circuit Court, arguing that Bagley intended for them to receive the proceeds from the cancer policy. The Straits alleged breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, negligence and gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duties and the duty of good faith and fair dealing, bad-faith refusal to pay benefits and to promptly and adequately investigate the claim, misrepresentation and/or failure to procure, promissory and/or equitable estoppel, and they sought a claim for declaratory relief. McPhail filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the circuit court. The circuit court found that the issue had been previously litigated and resolved in chancery court, and that no appeal had been taken from the chancery court judgment. Likewise, the circuit court granted American Heritage's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case, finding that genuine issues of material fact did exist and that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar the Straits' claims. Because the Straits failed to raise any issues upon which relief may be granted, the circuit court's grant of McPhail's motion to dismiss was proper. However, the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. Furthermore, the circuit court properly granted American Heritage's motion for summary judgment: the Straits were never eligible to be third-party beneficiaries under the policy, and they have failed to show any equitable entitlement to reimbursement. For those reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court's judgment. View "Strait v. McPhail " on Justia Law