Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

William Ashwell pleaded guilty to burglary and escape. He sought postconviction relief. The Mississippi Supreme Court found, after review of his case, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction and authority to accept guilty pleas when Ashwell never had been charged with a crime. Accordingly, the Court reversed and vacated Ashwell’s convictions. View "Ashwell v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

As Greg Peters and Mike Williams were attempting to position Peters’ fishing boat on its trailer, the winch handle recoiled, struck, and seriously injured Williams. Peters, who owned the truck, the trailer, and the boat, had two liability insurance policies covering bodily injury: his truck and trailer were insured by Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Allstate) and his boat was insured by Continental Casualty Company (Continental). Ultimately, the insurers settled with Williams for $460,000, each paying $230,000 toward the total settlement. Prior to settlement, however, the insurers had not agreed on apportionment. Continental sought a declaratory judgment that it was indemnified by Allstate based on its apportionment theory and also reimbursement for the defense costs it had incurred investigating the claim. Allstate moved to dismiss, seeking indemnity from Allstate based on its own apportionment theory and also sanctions against Continental for having made its defense costs and expenses claim. The circuit court treated the motion to dismiss as a motion for partial summary judgment and granted summary judgment in Allstate’s favor, but declined to award sanctions. Allstate then moved for summary judgment on Continental’s remaining indemnity claim, which the circuit court granted. Continental appealed the grant of summary judgment on its indemnity claim. Allstate cross-appealed the denial of sanctions. As to Continental’s indemnity claim, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed summary judgment to Allstate and rendered judgment in favor of Continental. As to Continental’s claim of entitlement to defense costs, the Court affirmed summary judgment for Allstate. The Court affirmed the denial of sanctions. View "Continental Casualty Co. v. Allstate Property & Casualty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The circuit court ruled Enoch Oliver could proceed to trial with his malicious-prosecution claim against University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) and two of its law-enforcement officers, Syrone McBeath and David Stewart. Oliver was charged with three misdemeanors: disorderly conduct for failure to comply with the commands of a police officer, resisting arrest, and carrying a concealed weapon. A nol-pros order was signed by the trial court and charges were ultimately dropped against Oliver. Oliver sued civilly, and UMMC, McBeath, and Stewart were served with process; several other officers were not. UMMC, McBeath, and Stewart filed a motion to dismiss, which was joined by the unserved defendants, who specially appeared. The served defendants argued Oliver’s claims were governed by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and its one-year statute of limitations. The lone exception was the malicious prosecution of the felony claim, because the one-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until that charge was nol-prossed. The unserved defendants’ motion was granted, leaving the remaining claim against the served defendants as the malicious-prosecution claim based on the felony charge. Three-and-a-half years later, UMMC, McBeath, and Stewart filed a motion for summary judgment. UMMC argued, as a state agency, it had not waived sovereign immunity for a malice-based claim; McBeath and Stewart argued Oliver lacked proof they maliciously prosecuted him. Alternatively, all defendants cited the MTCA’s police-protection and discretionary-function immunity. The circuit court denied the defendants’ motion. UMMC, McBeath, and Stewart filed this interlocutory appeal, claiming they were entitled to summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined as a matter of law, malice-based torts did not fall under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act’s sovereign-immunity waiver. So Oliver had no malicious-prosecution claim against UMMC or its employees in their official capacity. Oliver also brought malicious-prosecution claims against the UMMC officers in their individual capacity, but the record showed Oliver failed to put forth any evidence the officers acted with malice or lacked probable cause. The Court thus reversed the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment and rendered a final judgment in defendants’ favor. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Oliver" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal involves an action by Lucille Crotwell’s heirs against Richard Prestage’s successors in title. In 1973, Gilbert Lum conveyed a forty-acre tract of land by warranty deed to his daughter, Lucille Crotwell, reserving a life estate in the lands and all mineral interests owned by him. The deed recited receipt of good and valuable consideration and was filed of record. No words of inheritance were contained in the deed. A quarter of a century later, Lum attempted to reconvey one acre of the same forty-acre tract to Prestage. By special warranty deed, Prestage subsequently deeded the property from himself to himself and his wife, Sheri, as an estate by the entirety with full rights of survivorship. The Prestages then executed a deed of trust in favor of American Title Company, Inc., as trustee for Hurricane Mortgage Company, Inc. This deed of trust ultimately was assigned to HSBC Bank, USA, N.A., as trustee for Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corporation Home Equity-Backed Certificates. In 2011, Emily Courteau, as Substituted Trustee, conducted a foreclosure sale of this deed of trust. T&W Homes, Etc, LLC (“T&W”) was the successful bidder and received a Substitute Trustee’s Deed. The Crotwells filed a complaint to confirm title, remove cloud on the title, and for ejectment. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The chancellor found that Lum had reserved a life estate in the land and minerals only and that he could have conveyed his reserved life estate, but that reading the conveyance as retaining the right to reconvey title in fee simple was repugnant to the granting clause in the conveyance to Crotwell. The Chancery Court granted summary judgment to the Crotwells on this issue only. T&W Homes filed this interlocutory appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "T & W Homes Etc, LLC v. Crotwell" on Justia Law

In 1996, James Harper was to appear before Judge John H. Sheffield at the Lee County Justice Court on charges of driving under the influence and having an expired inspection sticker. But Harper failed to appear, and Judge Sheffield issued a warrant for his arrest. The trial went forward, and Judge Sheffield convicted Harper on both charges. Judge Sheffield then imposed a six-month suspended sentence and a $600 fine for the DUI and a $50 fine for the inspection sticker. That same day, Harper entered into a payment plan with the Lee County Justice Court for his $600 fine. Two days later, he paid $50, which was credited to the DUI case number. Harper appealed his DUI conviction. The conviction was upheld; and he satisfied the terms of his sentence. In 2013, Harper again was arrested for DUI in Lee County. At that point he was told he could not post bond until he resolved a matter with Judge Sheffield. The next day, Harper appeared before Judge Sheffield, who accused Harper of failing to pay the fines imposed for the 1996 justice-court convictions. Despite Harper’s protestation that he had appealed to county court, lost, and paid his fines, and despite the fact that Judge Sheffield had with him the justice-court case files for Harper’s earlier convictions, both of which contained Harper’s notice of appeal and the county-court notification, Judge Sheffield sentenced Harper to serve six months at the Lee County Work Center for the DUI conviction. Harper served four months in the work center before being released due to an infection requiring hospitalization. The Mississippi Supreme Court determined Judge Sheffield’s conduct was not due to an innocent mistake, it amounted to judicial misconduct. So the Court imposed a public reprimand, a 120-day suspension without pay, and a $3,000 fine, and assessed all costs of the proceedings to Judge Sheffield. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Sheffield" on Justia Law

Jimmy Kinard died in 2012. In 2014, Teresa Hamlet, Kinard’s sister, filed suit against Graceland Care Center of New Albany, LLC; Advanced Healthcare Management, Inc.; Karen Clayton, in her official capacity as administrator of Graceland Care Center of New Albany; W. Larry Overstreet; Sharon Windham; and John Does 1-10, jointly and individually (collectively referred to as “Graceland”). Hamlet alleged that Graceland’s negligence was the proximate cause of Kinard’s death. Hamlet filed a motion for an extension of time to serve process, prior to the expiration of a 120-day deadline provided by Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h). The trial judge granted the motion and signed an order, yet the order was not filed with the circuit clerk until the day before the granted extension expired, well after the expiration of the original, 120-day deadline. Hamlet served process on three defendants during the extension. On the same day the order was filed, Hamlet filed a second motion for time, which the trial court also granted. While Hamlet served process on the remaining defendants within the second extension period, the order granting the second extension was not filed with the clerk until three months after it was signed by the judge. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Hamlet’s complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations had run before the court’s order granting additional time to serve process had been entered by the clerk of court. The defendants further argued that Hamlet’s suit could not be revived by the untimely filed order. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because Hamlet was the only party to the action, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the trial judge’s order granting her motion for extension of time to serve process became effective once the order had been signed and had left the trial judge’s control. Accordingly, it affirmed the trial court. However, in cases where more than one party is involved, notice becomes essential. Therefore, in cases involving multiple parties, the Court adopted the holding of the majority of states that required the entry of an interlocutory order before it becomes effective. View "Graceland Care Center of New Albany, LLC v. Hamlet" on Justia Law

The Madison County Board of Supervisors (the Board) found Arlin George Hatfield, III (who raised “chickens, guinea fowl, and ducks”) violated a Madison County Zoning Ordinance (the Ordinance) section, which did not expressly permit raising and keeping fowl in residential neighborhoods. The Board’s decision was consistent with an earlier interpretation and application of the Ordinance section. Hatfield was sued in October 2013 a little over a year after purchasing a lot in the Deer Haven Subdivision, by the Deer Haven Owners Association (DHOA). The claim stemmed from his supposed violation of subdivision covenants that prohibited keeping or raising fowl4 and constructing structures—such as pens and coops—without DHOA approval. Hatfield alleges that while this lawsuit was pending, DHOA contacted and involved Scott Weeks, an administrator with the Madison County Planning and Zoning Department. Weeks inspected Hatfield’s property on February 18, 2015, and found Hatfield was violating the “R-1 Residential District” section of the Madison County Zoning Ordinance. Hatfield filed a Notice of Appeal and Intent to File Bill of Exceptions, arguing the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, not supported by substantial evidence, and was based on an unconstitutionally vague Ordinance section. After review, based on the Board’s prior treatment of a similar matter and its construction of the applicable zoning law, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the Board’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Court also found that, in light of the entire Ordinance, Hatfield had sufficient notice that keeping or raising fowl on residential property was prohibited. View "Hatfield v. Board of Supervisors of Madison County" on Justia Law

Thomas Dennis appealed a Chancery Court judgment, arguing that the chancellor erred by denying a petition to terminate his child-support obligations with respect to his step-great-grandchild, J.R.H. Thomas Dennis and Sheila Sims Dennis (“Sims”) were married; prior to her relationship with Dennis, Sims had a daughter named Renee Wright. Renee had a daughter named Courtney; Courtney was Sims’s granddaughter. Courtney married Josh Hartzell, and they were the natural parents of J.R.H. Therefore, Sims was J.R.H.’s great-grandmother and, by extension, Dennis was J.R.H.’s stepgreat-grandfather. J.R.H. and Dennis were not blood-related in any way. In May2005, the Mississippi Department of Human Services (“DHS”) informed Sims that J.R.H.’s natural parents had gotten into legal trouble. Dennis, Sims, and the Hartzells filed a Joint Petition for Child Custody. All parties agreed that it would be in the best interest of J.R.H. to be placed in the custody of and reside with Dennis and Sims. In the petition, the Hartzells each agreed to pay $106 per month to Dennis and Sims for the care, maintenance, and support of J.R.H. The Hartzells also requested visitation rights. Two years later, Sims filed for divorce. At some point after Dennis’s and Sims’s divorce, J.R.H. cut off any relationship with Dennis. Dennis filed an amended petition to consolidate the divorce matter and the child-custody matter and to modify the child-custody and support agreement. In his petition, Dennis argued that the chancellor should allow him to relinquish his custody of J.R.H. and to terminate any ongoing child-support obligations. The chancellor ultimately denied Dennis’s requested relief, finding no material change in circumstances had arisen. The chancellor also rejected Dennis’s argument that his child-support obligations should have been terminated because of J.R.H.’s refusal to see or speak to him for two years. He reasoned that the child was only twelve years old and therefore “not old enough to appreciate that [the] failure to have a relationship with Mr. Dennis is legally significant.” Dennis appealed, raising nine issues, which the Mississippi Supreme Court reduced to three main themes: (1) whether there was a legal basis for child support or, alternatively, whether the collapse of the relationship justified termination; (2) whether the natural parents’ ongoing parental obligations establish that Dennis should not be required to pay child support; and (3) whether Dennis should be permitted voluntarily to terminate his custodial obligations. Finding no reversible error in the chancellor’s decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dennis v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Trevioun Briggs was convicted for robbery and witness-tampering. The Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions. Briggs petitioned the Mississippi Supreme Court for certiorari, which was granted to consider whether his indictment for the witness-tampering count was defective. Finding that the indictment fairly tracked the language of Mississippi Code Section 97-9-115, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Briggs v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Groundworx,LLC, appealed a judgment dismissing its breach-of-contract action against the City of Hattiesburg. After reviewing the contract between Groundworx and the City, which Groundworx attached to its complaint, the Mississippi Supreme Court was left with “no doubt” that Groundworx’s complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim. Even taking all of Groundworx’s allegations as true, Groundworx could cite no contractual provision the City allegedly breached. Even if Groundworx expended millions of dollars preparing to perform under the contract, it did so before securing the necessary financing to complete the project. And unfortunately for Groundworx, the contract was clear: if Groundworx did not secure financing by a certain date, the City had the right to terminate the contract. So the Court concluded Groundworx could prove no set of facts to show the City breached the contract. View "Groundworx, LLC v. City of Hattiesburg" on Justia Law