Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this interlocutory appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether, pursuant to Mississippi’s venue statute, a corporation may have only one national principal place of business or may have a principal place of business in multiple or all states. Cleveland Smith, a resident of Lowndes County, filed suit against his employer, Kansas City Southern Railway Company (“KCS”), at the Lowndes County Circuit Court. The trial court granted KCS’s Motion for a Change of Venue, holding that, although KCS’s national principal place of business was in Kansas City, Missouri, KCS also did business in Mississippi and that its principal place of business in Mississippi was Rankin County. Because holding that a corporation has a single, principal place of business follows the plain language of the statute and promoted simplicity, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case. View "Smith v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company" on Justia Law

Cynthia Kuljis appealed the chancery court’s dismissal of her Bill of Discovery for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Bill sought discovery related to a prospective premises liability and personal-injury claim. Finding the actions of the chancery court were correct as a matter of law, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and the chancery court’s dismissal of this case. View "Kuljis v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, LLC" on Justia Law

Citing the 2014 State Health Plan, Methodist Healthcare - Olive Branch Hospital (Methodist) applied for a certificate of need (CON) - seeking approval to perform percutaneous coronary intervention(s), at its Olive Branch hospital. But Baptist Memorial Hospital - DeSoto (Baptist) - a competing hospital from the same service area - contested Methodist’s application. The Mississippi State Department of Health (MSDH) held a hearing and ultimately approved Methodist’s application. Baptist appealed to the Chancery Court. And after review, the chancellor affirmed MSDH’s decision. Baptist appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found substantial evidence that Methodist’s application substantially complied with the State Health Plan and was consistent with its requirements. So it affirmed. View "Baptist Memorial Hospital-Desoto, Inc. v. Mississippi Dept. of Health" on Justia Law

Herman Grant Company (“Herman Grant”) filed an interlocutory appeal, asking the Mississippi Supreme Court to determine if the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Jasper County abused its discretion by denying its motion to transfer venue to the Second Judicial District of Jones County. The Court found venue was proper in the Second Judicial District of Jones County, where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred. Because the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to transfer venue, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Herman Grant Co., Inc. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Janice Wilcher appealed her conviction for retaliation against a public servant for making a false representation of rape against Deputy Michael Townsend of the Scott County Sheriff’s Department. Wilcher claimed Section 97-9-127 was unconstitutionally vague. Wilcher further claimed the State failed to prove that Deputy Townsend suffered any actual harm, as alleged in the indictment. Finding no merit in either issue, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wilcher v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court’s review centered on the interplay between the wrongful-death statute and the minors savings clause. In 1999, the Court held “[t]here is no question now that the savings clause, set out in [Section] 15-1-59 of the Mississippi Code, applies to a wrongful death action” brought under Section 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code. Three years later, the Court found reason not to apply the minors savings clause to the wrongful-death action filed in “Curry v. Turner,” (832 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 2002)). Instead, the Court found the two statutes to be “at irreconcilable odds with one another where there exists a person qualified under the wrongful death statute to bring suit.” In the present wrongful-death lawsuit, the defendants relied on “Curry” to claim the action was time-barred. They argued the minor savings clause did not apply because the minor beneficiaries had a maternal aunt who “qualified under the statute to bring suit.” Notwithstanding that, the Supreme Court found a material distinction between “Curry” and this case: in “Curry,” not only was the minor beneficiaries’ mother qualified to bring suit, but she also in fact filed a wrongful-death action. Thus, under Section 11-7-13’s “one-suit” requirement, the Supreme Court found the minor beneficiaries could not rely on the application of the minor savings clause to file what essentially would be a second wrongful-death action. But here, by contrast, the minor beneficiaries’ aunt never filed a wrongful-death action, though Section 11-7-13 authorized her to do so as the deceased’s sister. Instead, the first and only suit filed was by the deceased’s children. In this case, the Court held that only when someone who is qualified to bring a wrongful-death suit actually files a wrongful-death suit on the minor beneficiaries’ behalf will the minor savings clause not apply, because, once the suit is filed, the running of the statute of limitations is immaterial. The minor savings statute clearly applied in this case; the deceased’s oldest child had two years from when she reached the age of majority to file a wrongful-death suit based on medical negligence. Because she timely filed within this two-year period, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Pioneer Community Hospital of Newton v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Tameshia Shelton was convicted by jury of the murder of Daniel Young. After the trial, Shelton filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion. Shelton appealed, raising three issues: (1) challenging the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (3) alleging the trial court erred by denying her requested two-theory jury instruction. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed her conviction. View "Shelton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After the Mississippi Supreme Court held in "Jones County School District v. Mississippi Department of Revenue," (111 So. 3d 588 (Miss. 2013)), that a school district was not liable for oil and gas severance taxes on royalties derived from oil and gas production on sixteenth-section land, the Chancery Court of Wayne County held that Wayne County School District (WCSD) was owed interest by the Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) on its overpayment of severance taxes at the rate of one percent (1%) per month. The chancellor determined, based on Section 27-65-53 of the Mississippi Code, that the payment should have started on June 5, 2013, ninety days after the Jones County decision. Finding that the chancellor correctly applied the statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the chancery court. View "Wayne County School District v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Pro se appellant David Jackson appealed the Circuit Court’s denial of his Motion for Transcripts and Records. The Court of Appeals dismissed Jackson’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On certiorari review, the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly recognized the issue was lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but it was the trial court that lacked jurisdiction, not the appellate court. So the Supreme Court modified the Court of Appeals’ disposition and affirmed. View "Jackson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Eugene Martin was convicted of shooting into a dwelling and sentenced as a habitual offender under Section 99-19-81. He claimed one of his two prior qualifying felony convictions resulted in a sentence of less than one year. Section 99-19-81 authorizes the State to seek increased punishment for those charged with a felony offense after having twice been convicted of prior felonies. But for this statutory enhancement to apply, the State must prove each of the defendant’s prior felony convictions resulted in a sentence of one or more years in a state or federal prison. If the State sought enhanced sentencing, and the requirements were met, Section 99-19-81 mandated the court sentence the defendant to the maximum term of imprisonment for the subject offense - in this case ten years. Martin argued he was wrongfully subjected to the sentencing enhancement. After review, the Supreme Court agreed, affirmed Martin’s conviction for shooting into a dwelling, but reversed and remanded for resentencing. View "Martin v. Mississippi" on Justia Law