Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Karla Bailey, former court administrator to Hinds County Circuit Court Judge Jeffrey A. Weill Sr., filed a complaint against Judge Weill in his individual capacity, alleging that he had committed libel against her. Bailey’s complaint was based on language in a footnote contained in four orders entered by Judge Weill in separate criminal cases that were before him. The alleged libel in the orders provided that Bailey had been reprimanded by Judge Weill for engaging in improper ex parte communications while she was his court administrator and she had added a certain public defender as counsel of record in her current position as deputy clerk. Judge Weill filed a motion to dismiss Bailey’s complaint and amended complaint, raising several grounds for dismissal, including judicial immunity. The trial court denied the motion and ordered the parties to commence discovery. Judge Weill filed a petition for interlocutory appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held the trial court erred by failing to correctly apply the doctrine of judicial immunity to Bailey’s claim that Judge Weill libeled her via the underlying orders. Accordingly, the trial court’s order was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Weill v. Bailey" on Justia Law

The issue presented by this interlocutory appeal arose out of a will contest between the testator’s brother, Larry Lyons, and her nephew, Anthony Lobred. Larry filed a motion to strike the deposition testimony of Dr. Lara Clement, a treating physician of the testator, due to Lobred’s counsel’s alleged ex parte communication with Dr. Clement prior to her deposition. The trial court ordered that any testimony of Dr. Clement that was not discernable from the testator’s medical records would be inadmissible at trial. Lobred sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal and the Court granted Lobred’s petition. After review, the Supreme court held that the communication between Dr. Clement and Lobred’s attorney was acceptable ex parte communication; accordingly, reversed and remanded. View "In re Estate of Lyons" on Justia Law

The Town of Terry sought to annex five territories adjacent to the existing Town: Territory 1 to the north, Territory 2 to the west, Territory 3 to the east, Territory 4 to the northeast, and Territory 5 to the south. The Chancery Court of Hinds County determined such an extensive annexation was unreasonable. However, the chancellor partially granted the Town’s annexation request, finding their request for Territories 2 and 3 was reasonable. Some of the objectors appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Enlargement & Extension of the Municipal Boundaries of the Town of Terry" on Justia Law

Tasha Dillon contested the results of the August 4, 2015, Democratic primary for Mississippi House of Representatives (“House”) District 98. The Pike County Circuit Court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Dillon appealed. Finding that the circuit court erred in finding it lacked jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dillon v. Myers" on Justia Law

The issue this interlocutory appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether, pursuant to Mississippi’s venue statute, a corporation may have only one national principal place of business or may have a principal place of business in multiple or all states. Cleveland Smith, a resident of Lowndes County, filed suit against his employer, Kansas City Southern Railway Company (“KCS”), at the Lowndes County Circuit Court. The trial court granted KCS’s Motion for a Change of Venue, holding that, although KCS’s national principal place of business was in Kansas City, Missouri, KCS also did business in Mississippi and that its principal place of business in Mississippi was Rankin County. Because holding that a corporation has a single, principal place of business follows the plain language of the statute and promoted simplicity, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case. View "Smith v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company" on Justia Law

Cynthia Kuljis appealed the chancery court’s dismissal of her Bill of Discovery for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Bill sought discovery related to a prospective premises liability and personal-injury claim. Finding the actions of the chancery court were correct as a matter of law, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and the chancery court’s dismissal of this case. View "Kuljis v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, LLC" on Justia Law

Citing the 2014 State Health Plan, Methodist Healthcare - Olive Branch Hospital (Methodist) applied for a certificate of need (CON) - seeking approval to perform percutaneous coronary intervention(s), at its Olive Branch hospital. But Baptist Memorial Hospital - DeSoto (Baptist) - a competing hospital from the same service area - contested Methodist’s application. The Mississippi State Department of Health (MSDH) held a hearing and ultimately approved Methodist’s application. Baptist appealed to the Chancery Court. And after review, the chancellor affirmed MSDH’s decision. Baptist appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found substantial evidence that Methodist’s application substantially complied with the State Health Plan and was consistent with its requirements. So it affirmed. View "Baptist Memorial Hospital-Desoto, Inc. v. Mississippi Dept. of Health" on Justia Law

Herman Grant Company (“Herman Grant”) filed an interlocutory appeal, asking the Mississippi Supreme Court to determine if the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Jasper County abused its discretion by denying its motion to transfer venue to the Second Judicial District of Jones County. The Court found venue was proper in the Second Judicial District of Jones County, where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred. Because the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to transfer venue, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Herman Grant Co., Inc. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Janice Wilcher appealed her conviction for retaliation against a public servant for making a false representation of rape against Deputy Michael Townsend of the Scott County Sheriff’s Department. Wilcher claimed Section 97-9-127 was unconstitutionally vague. Wilcher further claimed the State failed to prove that Deputy Townsend suffered any actual harm, as alleged in the indictment. Finding no merit in either issue, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wilcher v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court’s review centered on the interplay between the wrongful-death statute and the minors savings clause. In 1999, the Court held “[t]here is no question now that the savings clause, set out in [Section] 15-1-59 of the Mississippi Code, applies to a wrongful death action” brought under Section 11-7-13 of the Mississippi Code. Three years later, the Court found reason not to apply the minors savings clause to the wrongful-death action filed in “Curry v. Turner,” (832 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 2002)). Instead, the Court found the two statutes to be “at irreconcilable odds with one another where there exists a person qualified under the wrongful death statute to bring suit.” In the present wrongful-death lawsuit, the defendants relied on “Curry” to claim the action was time-barred. They argued the minor savings clause did not apply because the minor beneficiaries had a maternal aunt who “qualified under the statute to bring suit.” Notwithstanding that, the Supreme Court found a material distinction between “Curry” and this case: in “Curry,” not only was the minor beneficiaries’ mother qualified to bring suit, but she also in fact filed a wrongful-death action. Thus, under Section 11-7-13’s “one-suit” requirement, the Supreme Court found the minor beneficiaries could not rely on the application of the minor savings clause to file what essentially would be a second wrongful-death action. But here, by contrast, the minor beneficiaries’ aunt never filed a wrongful-death action, though Section 11-7-13 authorized her to do so as the deceased’s sister. Instead, the first and only suit filed was by the deceased’s children. In this case, the Court held that only when someone who is qualified to bring a wrongful-death suit actually files a wrongful-death suit on the minor beneficiaries’ behalf will the minor savings clause not apply, because, once the suit is filed, the running of the statute of limitations is immaterial. The minor savings statute clearly applied in this case; the deceased’s oldest child had two years from when she reached the age of majority to file a wrongful-death suit based on medical negligence. Because she timely filed within this two-year period, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Pioneer Community Hospital of Newton v. Roberts" on Justia Law