Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Before January 1, 2015,Mississippi Code Section 27-77-7 required taxpayers wishing to appeal tax assessments affirmed by the Board of Tax Appeals to post surety bonds for half the assessed taxes or pay the taxes under protest. But the Legislature amended the statute to remove that bonding requirement for appeals from assessments imposed after the amendment’s effective date of January 1, 2015. Marlena Robinson failed to post a bond or pay her taxes when she appealed a February 4, 2014, tax assessment, so the chancellor dismissed her appeal. Finding no reversible error in the chancellor’s dismissal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Robinson v. Morgan" on Justia Law

After a legislative overhaul of the probation and parole statutes, John Booker, a parole-eligible inmate, requested a case plan pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 47-7-3.1. The Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) denied Booker’s request, stating that the statute did not apply retroactively. The Circuit Court reversed the MDOC’s denial of Booker’s request and found that the statute applied retroactively and that Booker was eligible for a case plan. On December 8, 2016, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that Mississippi Code Section 47-7-3.1 “does not clearly and unequivocally express an intention for retroactive applicability.” Thus, pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, because Booker was convicted prior to July 1, 2014, Booker was not eligible to receive a parole case plan under Section 47-7-3.1. View "Lee v. Booker" on Justia Law

This case presented an issue stemming from an interlocutory appeal of the registration of an Ohio-issued divorce decree and the subsequent petition for modification by the obligee, a Mississippi resident. Asserting the continuing and exclusive jurisdiction of the Ohio court in matters involving the modification and alteration of the decree, the obligor-father appealed the chancery court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the obligee-mother’s complaint for modification of the decree. Reviewing the procedural history and the facts of the case, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that: (1) neither the Ohio court nor the parties consented in writing to the transfer of jurisdiction; and (2) because evidence indicated that the Ohio court never relinquished jurisdiction, that court was the proper forum for proceedings on modification. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court’s ruling and entered judgment in favor of the father, dismissing the mother’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. View "Hamilton v. Young" on Justia Law

Thomas Saul and Jon Swartzfager initially reached a verbal agreement for Saul’s purchase of a piece of property located within a larger tract of land Swartzfager owned. But another person came along and offered Swartzfager a significant sum to buy the whole tract. Swartzfager approached Saul and asked if he would forego their original land deal and in exchange accept a separate parcel within a different tract of land. Saul agreed to Swartzfager’s new offer, and Swartzfager reduced their agreement to writing, stating that for “good and valuable consideration” already received, he would transfer the second parcel to Saul upon request. However, Swartzfager later backed out and never transferred any land to Saul. Saul filed suit against Swartzfager seeking damages and specific performance. The chancellor found a valid contract existed between Saul and Swartzfager, and awarded him damages, attorney’s fees, and prejudgment interest. After review, the Supreme Court found the chancellor correctly ruled that Saul and Swartzfager had a contract, and Swartzfager was equitably estopped from denying the land deal. Furthermore, the Court found the chancellor’s awards for intentional infliction of emotional distress and attorney’s fees are supported. But Court found the chancellor erred in awarding prejudgment interest, because Saul did not plead a request for prejudgment interest. View "Swartzfager v. Saul" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court of Sunflower County directed the Mississippi Department of Corrections to issue Benjamin Cook (pro se) a parole case plan under Mississippi Code Section 47-7-3.1(1), which went into effect on July 1, 2014. The Department of Corrections appealed, arguing that Cook was not entitled to a parole case plan because he was convicted and sentenced prior to July 1, 2014. The sole issue on appeal was whether Cook was entitled to a parole case plan under Section 47-7-3.1(1). Because the Supreme Court held in “Fisher v. Drankus,” (204 So. 3d 1232 (Miss. 2016)) that a parole-eligible inmate convicted and sentenced prior to July 1, 2014 was not entitled to receive a parole case plan under Section 47-7-3.1(1), the decision to issue the parole case plan was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Department of Corrections v. Cook" on Justia Law

Article 4, Section 59 of the Mississippi Constitution provided that in the Mississippi Legislature “every bill shall be read in full immediately before the vote on its final passage upon the demand of any member.” When Representative J. P. Hughes Jr. requested that certain bills be read as required by that article, Speaker Philip Gunn had the bills read by a machine at a speed that Rep.Hughes claims was incomprehensible and therefore a constitutional violation, leading him to file suit to stop the practice. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal and held that it was without constitutional authority to resolve this dispute. The Court therefore remanded this case to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the petition. View "Gunn v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Under Mississippi law, a person wishing to appeal the adoption of a city’s ordinance must do so within ten days. The primary question presented for the Supreme Court’s review here was whether, as the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the City of Pearl (the “City”) argued, the appeal period began to run from the day of the ordinance’s adoption, or as the appellants argued, from its effective date. The Supreme Court found the appeal period for city ordinances began on the date an ordinance is adopted, and because the appellants’ bill of exceptions was presented to the City outside the ten-day period following the date of adoption, the circuit judge in this case properly dismissed the complaint for writ of mandamus. View "Pemberton Properties, LTD v. City of Pearl" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Public Service Commission (MPSC) adopted a rule requiring utilities to waive utility deposits for certified domestic violence victims for a period of sixty days. The rule also required the utilities to keep the information regarding the domestic violence victims confidential and established penalties for violating that confidentiality. The Mississippi Rural Water Association, Inc. (“Water Association”) objected to the promulgation of the new rule, but the chancery court affirmed the MPSC’s decision. The Supreme Court found that the MPSC lacked statutory authority to adopt any rule regulating the rates of nonprofit water utility associations and corporations. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment vacating the MPSC’s order adopting the new rule. View "Mississippi Rural Water Association, Inc. v. Mississippi Public Service Commission" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal of the Lincoln County Circuit court’s Order Denying the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Although the plaintiff’s overarching claim was framed in negligence, it factually sounded in intentional tort and was subsequently barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s Order Denying Summary Judgement and rendered a verdict in favor of the Defendant. View "Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. McCullough" on Justia Law

Caleb Corrothers was convicted of two counts of capital murder and one count of aggravated assault. For the two capital-murder convictions, he received the death penalty. Corrothers appealed, and the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence. He petitioned the Court for permission to proceed in the trial court with a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), citing ten alleged violations of his constitutional rights. For nine of Corrothers’s ten claims, the Court found Corrothers failed to present claims that were both procedurally alive and substantially showed the denial of a state or federal right. But for Corrothers’s claim of juror bias through improper contact, the Court found further proceedings in the trial court were necessary. Thus, the Court granted him leave to proceed in the trial court on this issue only. The rest of the petition was denied. View "Carothers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law