Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Carolyn McAdams, mayor of the City of Greenwood, appealed a decision of the Leflore County Circuit Court, which held that the Greenwood City Council’s decision to hire legal counsel to represent the city’s interest in an election contest exceeded its power and violated the Mississippi Constitution. Finding error in the trial judge’s interpretation of Mississippi Code Sections 25-1-47 and 21-17-5, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "McAdams v. Perkins" on Justia Law

The State appealed the Circuit Court’s order granting partial relief on Michael Drankus’s motion for declaratory and injunctive relief. Drankus, an inmate in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), sought a declaratory judgment that Mississippi Code Section 47-7-3.1 was a mandate to MDOC which required MDOC to develop a “case plan” for all parole-eligible inmates and that MDOC was in violation of that section. Drankus also sought an order that would reverse an adverse decision by MDOC’s Administrative Remedy Program (ARP); an injunction directing MDOC to promulgate policies and procedures that comply with Section 47-7-3.1; and an order directing MDOC to develop a case plan for Drankus. The circuit court ruled only on MDOC’s adverse ARP decision, found that, based on the circuit court’s interpretation of Section 47-7-3.1, Drankus was entitled to receive a case plan pursuant to Section 47-7-3.1. MDOC appealed that decision. Finding that Drankus was not entitled to a case plan, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s order. View "Fisher v. Drankus" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Kelvin Jordan of two counts of capital murder in 1996, for which he received the death penalty. Jordan was denied post-conviction relief (PCR). He filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief in which he argued that his previous attorneys were constitutionally ineffective, that the death sentence is disproportionate, and that the trial judge erred in evidentiary decisions at trial. The Supreme Court held that all of Jordan’s claims except his claim of ineffective post-conviction relief counsel are barred as untimely, as successive, by res judicata, or a combination of all three. His claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction relief counsel was not permitted to proceed because attorneys were not permitted to raise claims of their own ineffectiveness. View "Jordan v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 2007, the State of Mississippi, through the Attorney General’s office, filed suit against Louisville Tire Center, Inc. d/b/a Fair Oil Company (Fair Oil) for violating Mississippi’s price-gouging statute. Fair Oil filed a successful motion for summary judgment on the basis that the price-gouging statute was unconstitutional as written; however, on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for the Chancery Court to examine Fair Oil’s conduct in light of the statute’s language. After remand, several years passed without activity in the case, and in July 2015, the Chancery Court granted Fair Oil’s motion to dismiss for want of prosecution pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The State appealed that decision. Finding no error in the dismissal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mississippi, Ex Rel. Hood, Attorney General v. Louisville Tire Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Following court-ordered mediation, spouses Gary Rolison and Martha Rolison and Caleb Fryar and his father, Robert Fryar, entered into a mediation settlement agreement that resolved four lawsuits pending between the Rolisons and the Fryars. After a bench trial, the Circuit Court found that the Rolisons had breached the settlement agreement, and the court entered a final judgment pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and postponed hearing the issue of damages. The Rolisons appealed the final judgment but later dismissed the appeal voluntarily. After the trial on damages, the trial court awarded the Fryars $399,733.02 in damages, including lost profits and attorney fees. The Rolisons appealed, arguing that their jury trial waiver was ineffective, the trial court’s Rule 54(b) certification was erroneous, and the trial court erroneously denied a motion to intervene filed by two interested parties. Because the Rolisons dismissed their appeal from the Rule 54(b) final judgment, those issues were not at issue before the Supreme Court. After further review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court committed no error by finding that the Rolisons had waived their right to a jury trial on damages and attorney fees. Further, the Court rejected the Rolisons’ challenges to the trial court’s awards of damages and attorney fees because those awards were supported by substantial, credible evidence. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court. View "Rolison v. Fryar" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Jelani Miles for shooting into a vehicle, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and murder. The case proceeded to trial but, after the State had called two witnesses, the circuit judge declared a mistrial. When the parties appeared at a hearing to argue the State’s motion to revoke Miles’s bond while awaiting a new trial, the judge transferred the case to a different county over Miles’s objection. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted Miles’s petition for interlocutory appeal to consider the circuit judge’s authority to transfer venue over Miles’s objection. Because the circuit judge lacked that power, the Court reversed and remanded for a trial in Yazoo County. View "Miles v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 2011, Jennifer and Josh Carter divorced, and Jennifer was granted legal and physical custody of their daughter Delaney. A year later, Josh filed a motion for modification of custody. The Chancery Court awarded Josh physical custody of Delaney, with the parties sharing joint legal custody. Jennifer appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the chancery court. Jennifer sought review of that judgment on certiorari, arguing that the chancellor erred in not appointing a guardian ad litem, because allegations of neglect arose during the course of the proceedings, making such appointment mandatory. Because there were no charges of neglect or abuse as required under Mississippi Code Section 93-5-23, and because insufficient proof was adduced of abuse or neglect, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and Chancery Court. View "Carter v. Carter" on Justia Law

In 2012 a jury found James Johnson guilty of aggravated domestic violence against his ex-wife. Johnson’s appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment and remanded the case, finding that the trial court had erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts without conducting a proper balancing test. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court did not consider the facts contained in offense reports, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed Johnson’s conviction. View "Johnson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Before his capital-murder trial, Laqunn Gary moved to suppress his confession, arguing he had not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The trial court denied his motion without a hearing. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred: because Gary had questioned the voluntariness of his confession, he had a due-process right to a suppression hearing. And the State had the burden to prove his confession was in fact voluntary. The Court therefore remanded this case to the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine the admissibility of Gary’s confession. View "Gary v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 1992, Arvin Rochell was indicted for two counts of capital murder for killing Hazel and Nell McMahan, and for one count of arson. Arvin Rochell, acting pro se, appealed the Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Rochell styled his petition as a “Motion to Clarify Parole Eligibility” and argued that he was “being unlawfully held in custody due to [the] Mississippi Department of [Corrections’] holding that he is ineligible for parole under [Mississippi Code Section] 47-7-18(1)[.]” Rochell cited the first part of Section 47-7-18(1), which stated that “Each inmate eligible for parole pursuant to Section 47-7-3, shall be released from incarceration to parole supervision on the inmate’s parole eligibility date, without a hearing before the board, if . . .” Relying on this language, Rochell argued that all parole-eligible inmates like himself “are now subject to the new parole release procedures in 47-7-18.” He further argued that the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) was incorrect when it determined that Section 47-7-18 applied only to inmates sentenced after July 1, 2014, the date that Section 47-7-18 took effect. Rochell argued Section 47-7-18 applied retroactively to all parole-eligible offenders. The Supreme Court concluded that 47-7-18(1) did not apply retroactively to Rochell's case, and affirmed the Circuit Court's denial of post-conviction relief. View "Rochell v. Mississippi" on Justia Law