Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Death-row inmate Anthony Carr raised an Eighth Amendment challenge to this conviction for the deaths of Carl Bobbie Jo Parker and the Parkers' two children. Their feet and ankles were bound, and their wrists were tied behind their backs. Nine-year-old Charlotte was found naked from the waist down under her dress, and there was evidence of sexual battery (both vaginally and anally). The Circuit Court found that Carr had failed to prove that he was "intellectually disabled" within the purvey of the Eighth Amendment. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit judge’s ruling and remanded this case for new factual findings because the court concluded the circuit court applied an incorrect legal standard when it ruled previously. View "Carr v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Defendant Gregory Colburn was convicted by jury on two counts of exploitation of a vulnerable person. Colburn met Ruby Frances Hill in 1990 when he began servicing her burial-insurance policy; Colburn would visit the policyholders’ houses each month to collect the premiums. In October 2011, Hill executed a general power of attorney and an advanced healthcare directive, naming Colburn as her agent in both documents. Both documents were notarized, and the notary testified that Hill knew what she was doing when she executed them. In January 2012, Hill moved into Heritage House, an assisted-living facility in Rankin Count, sometime after she was diagnosed with dementia. Colburn was with Hill when she opened a joint checking account at Community Bank in April 2012. Hill wrote several large checks to Colburn in 2012, ranging from around $3,000 to more than $52,000. She also moved $125,000 from a Trustmark account into the joint checking account she shared with Colburn and ultimately closed that Trustmark account. Trustmark officials came across these transactions when they were investigating Hill’s account for an unrelated issue having to do with a Social Security check. Trustmark notified the Attorney General’s Office, which in turn initiated an investigation. After the investigation, a Rankin County grand jury indicted Colburn on three counts of exploitation of a vulnerable person. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years: ten years on each count, running consecutively. Colburn now appeals and argues that the exploitation statute was unconstitutionally vague, that his indictment should have been quashed, that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions, and that his defense was hampered by the judge’s evidentiary rulings. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Colburn v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Linde Health Care Staffing, Inc., received a favorable arbitration award in Missouri against the Claiborne County Hospital. Linde reduced the award to a Missouri judgment, then enrolled the foreign judgment in two Mississippi counties. The Hospital successfully moved to set aside the foreign judgment in both Mississippi counties, since it never contracted with Linde and, thus, was not bound by the contract’s arbitration agreement. On appeal, Linde argued the Hospital’s motions to set aside the foreign judgment were filed too late and were time-barred by the Federal Arbitration Act’s procedural rules. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the FAA could not bind an entity that neither agreed to arbitrate nor contracted with the arbitration claimant. Therefore the Court affirmed the two Mississippi judgments setting aside the enrollment of the foreign judgment. View "Linde Health Care Staffing, Inc. v. Claiborne County Hospital" on Justia Law

While visiting the DeSoto County Civic Center, Cynthia Crider stepped in a hole that was obscured by grass. She was attending a high-school graduation at the Civic Center, operated by the DeSoto County Convention and Visitors Bureau. At the ceremony’s conclusion, Crider exited the Civic Center and proceeded across a grassy area to her car. As she crossed, Crider stepped in a hole obscured by overgrown grass. She fell and broke her ankle. Crider sued the Bureau, alleging that it failed to maintain the grassy area in a safe condition. The Bureau moved for summary judgment, claiming it enjoyed Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(v)’s immunity from certain premises-liability claims. In granting summary judgment, the trial judge reasoned that the Bureau enjoyed discretionary-function immunity because no statute mandated that it operate a civic center and because Crider failed to show any “laws or regulations . . . which would remove the Defendants’ particular acts (or inaction) from the ‘umbrella of discretionary function immunity.’” Crider appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Crider v. DeSoto County Convention & Visitors Bureau" on Justia Law

Perry Armstead was convicted of two counts of sale of cocaine and was sentenced as a habitual offender and subsequent drug offender to thirty-two years’ imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Armstead appealed, arguing that the was denied his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. Finding no error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Armstead’s convictions and sentences. View "Armstead v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

In January 1993, four days before his trial for the unrelated charges of aggravated assault and rape was set to begin, Charles Crawford broke into the home of Kristy Ray, kidnapped her, left a ransom note, and took her to a secluded barn in the woods. Crawford then raped and killed her. He claimed to have had two blackouts, one immediately before abducting Kristy, and one before her death. Crawford described everything he claims he could remember and that after he awoke from the second blackout, Kristy was dead at his feet. Crawford said he must have killed Kristy, but he could not remember doing so. He told the investigators that he sometimes had blackouts and could not control himself. This matter went before the Mississippi Supreme Court on Crawford’s Application for Leave to File Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief attacking his conviction for capital murder and death sentence. Also before the Court was the Response by the State and Crawford’s pro se Application for Leave to File Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. After review, the Court concluded Crawford showed neither first PCR counsel nor trial counsel was deficient, nor has he shown prejudice due to any of the alleged errors raised in his appeal. The Court therefore denied both Crawford’s application for leave to proceed and his pro se application for leave. View "Crawford v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Gay St. Mary Williams and her husband, Larry Williams, filed a complaint against William Tucker and two insurance companies. The Williamses alleged that Mrs. Williams had been severely injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by Tucker. When Tucker failed to answer, the circuit clerk entered a default. The trial court denied Tucker’s motion to set aside the entry of default and his motion for reconsideration. After a hearing, the trial court awarded damages in the amount of $2,962,984.60, plus $300,000 to Larry Williams for loss of consortium, and entered a default judgment in favor of the Williamses. Tucker appealed, arguing that the trial court’s refusal to set aside the entry of default was an abuse of discretion. Alternatively, he challenged portions of the damages award. The Supreme Court found that under a liberal standard applicable to setting aside default judgments, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the entry of default in this case. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Tucker v. Williams" on Justia Law

After a year of bullying and intimidation by a small group of students, Yahenacy Smith was beaten and severely injured while riding the school bus home. Smith sued the Leake County School District, alleging negligence and negligence per se. The circuit court found that the school district was entitled to discretionary-function immunity and granted the school district’s motion for summary judgment. Smith appealed. Finding that the broad governmental function of the school district here was ministerial, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for Smith to proceed with her claims. View "Smith v. Leake County School District" on Justia Law

The property of Riverboat Corporation, an ad valorem taxpayer, was subject to assessment by the Harrison County Board of Supervisors (“the Board”) because Riverboat owned certain personal and real property in Harrison County. The Mississippi Supreme Court was asked "to abandon the common law of this state, pronouncements of this Court, and customs and practices of trial courts across this state, all dating back to the nineteenth century, under the guise that today’s issue has not yet been squarely before" it and to "overrule a learned trial judge who, [. . .] determined a jury trial should be had in an appeal of a county’s ad valorem tax assessment." When Riverboat appealed its tax assessment, the Board requested a jury trial. Riverboat then moved for a bench trial, averring that there was no right to a jury trial in tax appeals. The trial court denied Riverboat's motion. The Supreme Court declined to rule against Mississippi precedent, and affirmed the trial court's denial of Riverboat's motion. View "Riverboat Corporation of Mississippi v. Harrison County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

Bay Point Properties Inc. filed inverse condemnation proceedings against the Mississippi Transportation Commission (MTC), claiming the easement MTC had across Bay Point’s property had terminated and that MTC was required to pay Bay Point the unencumbered value of the property. A jury determined the easement, for which the Commission had paid $50,000, continued to encumber the property, but that the use by MTC was not a highway purpose. The jury awarded Bay Point the encumbered value of $500. Bay Point appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that trial court failed to follow Section 43-37-9’s mandate to “determine and award or allow . . . such sum as will, in the opinion of the court[,] . . . reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs, disbursements and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal and engineering fees, actually incurred because of such proceeding.” Thus, the Court remanded with instructions to the trial court to hold a hearing in compliance with Section 43-37-9. View "Bay Point Properties, Inc. v. Mississippi Transp. Comm'n" on Justia Law