Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After hearing all the evidence in a medical-malpractice trial, the jury retired to deliberate. At some point during their deliberations, they requested a copy of the jury instructions, which the bailiff provided. But instead of providing the approved set of instructions, the bailiff mistakenly provided a set that the defendants previously had proffered, which included a peremptory instruction. The jury returned a unanimous defense verdict, and the parties left the courthouse. When the trial judge discovered the instruction mistake, he called the parties back to the courthouse and later ordered a new trial. But the defendants then filed a motion to enforce the high/low settlement agreement that the parties had entered into prior to trial. The trial judge agreed with the defendants that a new trial was not allowed under the agreement and rescinded his previous order granting it. Plaintiff appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the jury verdict lacked validity, and as such, no verdict was "achieved," leaving the condition precedent to the high/low agreement unsatisfied. Furthermore, the Court found the term "appeal rights" in the agreement was not ambiguous, and nothing else in the agreement precluded a new trial. The Court therefore reversed the trial judge’s decision to void his initial order, and remanded the case with instructions to the trial court to reinstate that order, which denied a mistrial but granted a new trial. View "Reynolds v. Allied Emergency Services, PC" on Justia Law

Herbert Williams sued the City of Vicksburg after he had been arrested after informing police officers that he had discharged a firearm to prevent an attack by a neighbor’s dog. The city moved for dismissal, which the Circuit Court denied. The city was granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal. Because it could not be said beyond doubt that Williams would have been unable to prove any set of facts in support of his claim, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court’s denial of the city’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "City of Vicksburg v. Williams" on Justia Law

John Hale was convicted on four counts of sale or transfer of a controlled substance and was sentenced as a habitual offender to serve a total of sixteen years’ imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Hale, represented by the Office of Indigent Appeals, argued that the trial court erred in denying his proffered jury instructions on the defenses of involuntary intoxication and entrapment. Hale also has filed a pro se supplemental brief, in which he raised various other issues. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed Hale’s convictions and sentences. View "Hale v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Archie Quinn of capital murder, and the trial judge sentenced him to life in prison, without the possibility of parole. Quinn appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) that the jury was incompletely instructed on the elements of the crime; and (2) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court found that the trial judge properly instructed the jury and therefore affirmed on that issue. The Court also found that the record in this case did not “affirmatively show” ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, the Court affirmed Quinn’s conviction, but dismissed his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without prejudice to his right to raise it in a proper petition for post-conviction relief. View "Quinn v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This was an interlocutory appeal involving a premises-liability case. Cynthia Adams, one of the defendants in the case, filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. Plaintiff Anthony Hughes brought a negligence claim against multiple parties: BKB, LLC d/b/a the Electric Cowboy; Jonathan Self, manager of the Electric Cowboy; and Adams, the owner of the property on which Electric Cowboy operates. Hughes alleged that he was “attacked and assaulted by a third party assailant” at the Electric Cowboy in 2011. Hughes claimed that all the defendants “had either actual or constructive knowledge of the third party’s violent nature or actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence existed on the premises of the Electric Cowboy.” Adams was an absentee landlord, who did not physically occupy, possess, or exercise control over the Electric Cowboy and/or the leased premises prior to or at the time of the incident in question; Adams did not frequent or visit the Electric Cowboy; Adams had no control or involvement in the operations or management of the Electric Cowboy; she was never employed by the Electric Cowboy; she did not supervise the Electric Cowboy, and she did not have the right to supervise the Electric Cowboy. Adams petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal when her motion for summary judgment was denied. A panel of the Supreme Court issued an order granting the petition and staying the trial court proceedings. Finding that Adams was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the Court reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of Adams. View "Adams v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Three and a half years after his divorce was final, Dr. Chad Wigington filed a complaint to reopen. He alleged that the divorce settlement agreement between him and his ex-wife, Dr. Laura McCalop, was procedurally and substantively unconscionable and specifically requested that the chancellor modify the child support and visitation provisions. After trial, the chancellor issued an opinion and order in which he declined to set aside the divorce settlement agreement, including the child support provisions, but in which he established a procedure by which Chad and the couple’s minor child, L.P., might be reunited and begin a father-child relationship. Chad appealed the chancellor’s decision to uphold the divorce settlement agreement provisions. Laura cross-appealed the chancellor’s order to modify the visitation arrangement. The Supreme Court dismissed these appeals and remanded, finding that because the chancellor retained jurisdiction to supervise the reunification process and to revisit the case in six months for further review, the order and opinion did not constitute a final, appealable judgment. View "Wigington v. McCalop" on Justia Law

Charlene Ivy was admitted to East Mississippi State Hospital (“EMSH”) in May 2012, and she died on July 17, 2012. Alleging medical negligence by EMSH staff, Ivy’s son Spencer sent a Notice of Claim letter via certified mail dated July 11, 2013, to EMSH Director Charles Carlisle. Carlisle signed for the letter on July 15, 2013, as evidenced by a return receipt. The definitive question in this appeal was whether Carlisle, as the Director of the East Mississippi State Hospital (“EMSH”), was the proper “chief executive officer” for notice purposes under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (“MTCA”), as opposed to the Executive Director of the Department of Mental Health (“DMH”). The trial judge found that “proper pre-suit notice” required service “upon the executive director of [DMH], not a facility manager of one of the institutions under its jurisdiction and control.” The trial judge found further that the statute of limitations was not tolled because Ivy had “failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 11-46-11(1)” and dismissed Ivy’s complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that EMSH’s Director was the CEO under the MTCA, and that Ivy provided the "proper pre-suit notice. View "Ivy v. East Mississippi State Hospital" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Preston Overton of possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The day before trial, the defense disclosed its intent to call two witnesses, but the circuit judge excluded their testimony as a discovery sanction. Because the record lacked any evidence that the defense made its late disclosure to gain a tactical advantage, the circuit judge erred by excluding Overton’s witnesses. So the Supreme Court reversed Overton’s convictions and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Overton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Hinds County Youth Court found that three-year-old J.T. had been sexually abused by her father, based on a statement she made which could describe either sexual abuse or innocent contact between a father and daughter. Because the State produced no evidence to show that the child’s facially ambiguous statement described abuse, and because the youth-court judge openly and admittedly disregarded the Mississippi Rules of Evidence throughout the adjudication, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Interest of: J.T." on Justia Law

The Gulfport City Council approved the City of Gulfport’s application to use the historic Grass Lawn Home as a recreation center upon its reconstruction after Hurricane Katrina. Peter and Fay Barrett appealed the City Council’s decision, arguing that Grass Lawn was zoned exclusively for residential use and that the City had abandoned any nonconforming use on the property in question. The circuit court dismissed the Barretts’ claim as moot, and the Barretts then appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court correctly found that the Barretts’ appeal was rendered moot by the City’s withdrawal of its application, and the Barretts’ appeal did not meet an exception to the mootness doctrine. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of the Barretts’ appeal. View "Barrett v. City of Gulfport" on Justia Law