Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This is the third appeal from the City of Gulfport’s taking of the Dedeaux Utility Company via eminent domain. Dedeaux appealed after the first two trials, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded both times. The parties have since held a third trial, and Gulfport appealed and Dedeaux cross-appealed issues raised from the third trial. Gulfport raised thirteen issues on appeal. And while the Court gave careful consideration to each, the Court found only five warranted discussion, and yet none warranted reversal of the third trial's final judgment. Gulfport asked the trial judge to “determine a fair and equitable interest rate to be paid on the Final Judgment based upon the rates paid on invested funds during the time period in which the eminent domain action was pending.” The Supreme Court reversed the trial judge’s post-trial order denying Gulfport’s motion to establish the interest rate, and remanded this action to the Harrison County Special Court of Eminent Domain for the limited purpose of determining the applicable interest rate and entering an order requiring payment of that interest. The Court declined to address Dedeaux’s cross-appeal. View "City of Gulfport v. Dedeaux Utility Company, Inc." on Justia Law

This is the third appeal from the City of Gulfport’s taking of the Dedeaux Utility Company via eminent domain. Dedeaux appealed after the first two trials, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded both times. The parties have since held a third trial, and Gulfport appealed and Dedeaux cross-appealed issues raised from the third trial. Gulfport raised thirteen issues on appeal. And while the Court gave careful consideration to each, the Court found only five warranted discussion, and yet none warranted reversal of the third trial's final judgment. Gulfport asked the trial judge to “determine a fair and equitable interest rate to be paid on the Final Judgment based upon the rates paid on invested funds during the time period in which the eminent domain action was pending.” The Supreme Court reversed the trial judge’s post-trial order denying Gulfport’s motion to establish the interest rate, and remanded this action to the Harrison County Special Court of Eminent Domain for the limited purpose of determining the applicable interest rate and entering an order requiring payment of that interest. The Court declined to address Dedeaux’s cross-appeal. View "City of Gulfport v. Dedeaux Utility Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Mississippi law to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Robert Swindol sued his employer, Aurora Flight Sciences Corporation, in federal court for wrongful discharge and defamation. Swindol alleged that Aurora had terminated him for having a firearm inside his locked vehicle in the company parking lot. Aurora filed a motion to dismiss, and the district court dismissed Swindol’s wrongful-discharge claim with prejudice,1 stating that it “[could not] say that the Mississippi Supreme Court would recognize a third exception to the doctrine of at-will employment,” as proposed by Swindol. As such, the district court found that Swindol had failed to state a claim for wrongful discharge. Swindol appealed, and the Fifth Circuit asked the Supreme Court whether an employer could be liable for a wrongful discharge of an employee for storing a firearm in a locked vehicle on company property in a manner that is consistent with Mississippi Code Section 45-9-55. The Supreme Court found that an employer could be liable and that Section 45-9-55(5) did not shield Aurora from liability under the facts of this case. View "Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sciences Corporation" on Justia Law

Early in the morning on November 7, 2011, Arnoldo Moreno, Juan Estrada, and Jose Garcia-Guillan were killed in a motor-vehicle collision when Arnoldo’s pickup truck collided with an eighteen-wheeler tractor-trailer, owned by TLSL and driven by Randall Walker. Ana Moreno (“Moreno”), Arnoldo’s widow, filed a wrongful-death action. At trial, after Moreno rested, TLSL and Walker moved for a directed verdict on improper inspection, damages for pain and suffering, medical bills, final expense and burial, hedonic damages, current net loss value of wages, punitive damages, and liability. Moreno stipulated that the directed verdict be granted on all the issues except the current net-loss-value issue, the inspection issue, and the liability issue. The trial court granted directed verdict on each issue. Moreno appealed, arguing the trial court erred in granting TLSL's motion as to negligence. Finding that Moreno failed to provide any evidence demonstrating negligence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moreno v. TLSL, Inc." on Justia Law

The Northeast Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission challenged the validity of a ninety-nine-year fixed-lease agreement with a private contractor, V.M. Cleveland. The Commission contracted to pay Cleveland $18,000 per month over a ninety-nine-year period to build and to lease a facility on land owned by the Commission. Payments continued uninterrupted for ten years, until the Commission became concerned about the agreement’s legality. The Commission stopped making payments and sought to rescind the agreement. The chancellor found that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the Commission to pay Cleveland $612,000 in back rent. The Commission appealed, arguing that the agreement’s ninety-nine-year duration rendered the agreement voidable at the Commission’s discretion as a matter of law due to the rule against binding successors. The Commission also argued that the specific terms of the agreement were unreasonable, illegal, or both, and thus void ab initio as a matter of law. The Supreme Court found that the agreement at issue here violated the common-law rule against binding successors, and as such reversed the chancellor’s judgment and rendered judgment in the Commission’s favor. View "Northeast Mental Health - Mental Retardation Commission v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Eddie Hall was convicted of murdering Johnny “Tubby” Hubbard in the Black Cat community of Covington County. The jury heard eyewitness testimony that when a fight broke out at the end of a horse show, Hall retrieved a gun from his trailer and shot Tubby twice as Tubby attempted to break up the fight and leave the scene. On appeal, Hall argued that the judge made errors during the jury selection process and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Hall’s conviction and life sentence. View "Hall v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A jury found Patrick Giles guilty of statutory rape and sexual battery, for which he was sentenced to ten years for statutory rape and twenty-five years for sexual battery, to run consecutively. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Giles argued that he was entitled to a new trial because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and the prosecutor made improper closing arguments. Finding no merit to Giles' claims of ineffective assistance, nor any other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Giles v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The special court of eminent domain granted Todd and Angela Kuhn’s petition for a private road across Cheryl High’s property in Gulfport. As grounds for their claim, the Kuhns utilized Mississippi Code Section 65-7-201 (Rev. 2012), which created a statutory right for private citizens to petition the special court of eminent domain when a private road over the land of another is necessary for ingress and egress. Section 110 of the Mississippi Constitution empowered the Legislature to create the statutory right to “private roads, where necessary for ingress and egress” upon “due compensation” to the property owners, this section was equally clear “such rights of way shall not be provided for in incorporated cities and towns.” Because the private property the Kuhns sought to condemn for a private road was in the incorporated City of Gulfport, the special court of eminent domain could not condemn High’s property for the Kuhns’ private benefit. So the Supreme Court reversed the special court of eminent domain’s order granting the Kuhns a private road under Section 65-7-201. View "High v. Kuhn" on Justia Law

Jason Hall appealed a circuit court order dismissing his petition for statutory compensation under Mississippi’s Compensation Act for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment. After review of the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court found the circuit court erred in finding Hall had failed to establish his innocence as required by Mississippi Code Section 11-44-7(1)(b) because the Order Passing to Inactive Files was neither a dismissal nor a nolle prosequi pursuant to Section 11-44-3(c). Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Hall v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Ann Doe was treated at Rankin Medical Center after she was sexually assaulted. Doe claimed that when she returned to school, fellow students teased her about the sexual assault. According to Doe, unidentified classmates said they had heard about the incident from a classmate, who was the daughter of Gina McBeth, a nurse who worked in the emergency room at Rankin Medical. Doe sued McBeth and Rankin Medical, alleging breach of confidentiality and damages. The trial court granted summary judgment in McBeth’s and Rankin Medical’s favor. Doe appealed, arguing that circumstantial evidence and McBeth’s credibility created a genuine issue of material fact. She also argued first on appeal that the trial-court judge should have recused himself, since he was the prosecutor in the underlying rape case. Because Doe did not present any admissible evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact under any actionable theory of recovery and failed to file a motion for recusal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Doe v. Rankin Medical Center" on Justia Law