Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Northeast Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission challenged the validity of a ninety-nine-year fixed-lease agreement with a private contractor, V.M. Cleveland. The Commission contracted to pay Cleveland $18,000 per month over a ninety-nine-year period to build and to lease a facility on land owned by the Commission. Payments continued uninterrupted for ten years, until the Commission became concerned about the agreement’s legality. The Commission stopped making payments and sought to rescind the agreement. The chancellor found that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the Commission to pay Cleveland $612,000 in back rent. The Commission appealed, arguing that the agreement’s ninety-nine-year duration rendered the agreement voidable at the Commission’s discretion as a matter of law due to the rule against binding successors. The Commission also argued that the specific terms of the agreement were unreasonable, illegal, or both, and thus void ab initio as a matter of law. The Supreme Court found that the agreement at issue here violated the common-law rule against binding successors, and as such reversed the chancellor’s judgment and rendered judgment in the Commission’s favor. View "Northeast Mental Health - Mental Retardation Commission v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Eddie Hall was convicted of murdering Johnny “Tubby” Hubbard in the Black Cat community of Covington County. The jury heard eyewitness testimony that when a fight broke out at the end of a horse show, Hall retrieved a gun from his trailer and shot Tubby twice as Tubby attempted to break up the fight and leave the scene. On appeal, Hall argued that the judge made errors during the jury selection process and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Hall’s conviction and life sentence. View "Hall v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A jury found Patrick Giles guilty of statutory rape and sexual battery, for which he was sentenced to ten years for statutory rape and twenty-five years for sexual battery, to run consecutively. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Giles argued that he was entitled to a new trial because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and the prosecutor made improper closing arguments. Finding no merit to Giles' claims of ineffective assistance, nor any other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Giles v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The special court of eminent domain granted Todd and Angela Kuhn’s petition for a private road across Cheryl High’s property in Gulfport. As grounds for their claim, the Kuhns utilized Mississippi Code Section 65-7-201 (Rev. 2012), which created a statutory right for private citizens to petition the special court of eminent domain when a private road over the land of another is necessary for ingress and egress. Section 110 of the Mississippi Constitution empowered the Legislature to create the statutory right to “private roads, where necessary for ingress and egress” upon “due compensation” to the property owners, this section was equally clear “such rights of way shall not be provided for in incorporated cities and towns.” Because the private property the Kuhns sought to condemn for a private road was in the incorporated City of Gulfport, the special court of eminent domain could not condemn High’s property for the Kuhns’ private benefit. So the Supreme Court reversed the special court of eminent domain’s order granting the Kuhns a private road under Section 65-7-201. View "High v. Kuhn" on Justia Law

Jason Hall appealed a circuit court order dismissing his petition for statutory compensation under Mississippi’s Compensation Act for Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment. After review of the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court found the circuit court erred in finding Hall had failed to establish his innocence as required by Mississippi Code Section 11-44-7(1)(b) because the Order Passing to Inactive Files was neither a dismissal nor a nolle prosequi pursuant to Section 11-44-3(c). Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Hall v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Ann Doe was treated at Rankin Medical Center after she was sexually assaulted. Doe claimed that when she returned to school, fellow students teased her about the sexual assault. According to Doe, unidentified classmates said they had heard about the incident from a classmate, who was the daughter of Gina McBeth, a nurse who worked in the emergency room at Rankin Medical. Doe sued McBeth and Rankin Medical, alleging breach of confidentiality and damages. The trial court granted summary judgment in McBeth’s and Rankin Medical’s favor. Doe appealed, arguing that circumstantial evidence and McBeth’s credibility created a genuine issue of material fact. She also argued first on appeal that the trial-court judge should have recused himself, since he was the prosecutor in the underlying rape case. Because Doe did not present any admissible evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact under any actionable theory of recovery and failed to file a motion for recusal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Doe v. Rankin Medical Center" on Justia Law

Bobby Gibson filed a legal-malpractice action against Joe Montgomery and his law firm, Williams, Williams and Montgomery, P.A. (“WWM”), alleging wrongful conduct in connection with the administration of his late wife Debbie's estate. The trial court granted summary judgment to Montgomery and WWM. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Bobby timely filed his Notice of Appeal and raised four issues: 1) whether the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel barred his claims, 2) whether judicial estoppel precluded his malpractice action, 3) whether the thirty-day period provided in Section 11-1-39 required dismissal, and 4) whether there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of his legal-malpractice and fiduciary-duty claims. After review, the Supreme Court concluded: Bobby's claims were not precluded by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; judicial estoppel did not preclude Bobby's legal-malpractice action; there was no merit to Montgomery's Section 11-1-39 argument; and there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an attorney-client relationship existed. View "Gibson v. Williams, Williams & Montgomery, P.A." on Justia Law

A female corrections officer in a juvenile-detention facility in Lee County was fired for refusing to wear the proper uniform. After she filed for unemployment benefits, the Mississippi Department of Employment Security (MDES) Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found in her favor and awarded her benefits, and the MDES Board of Review affirmed. But the circuit court reversed the Board of Review on appeal. After review, the Supreme Court found that Finnie did not commit misconduct as Mississippi law defined it, so it reversed the circuit court’s judgment and reinstated the Board of Review’s decision. View "Finnie v. Lee County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) audited Hotel and Restaurant Supply (Hotel) and concluded that Hotel owed hundreds of thousands of dollars in underpaid sales tax. Hotel appealed the assessment to MDOR’s Board of Review, which upheld the assessment but reduced the amount owed. Hotel appealed to the Mississippi Board of Tax Appeals (MBTA), and MBTA abated the assessment in full. MDOR appealed MBTA’s decision; both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the chancery court granted Hotel’s motion. MDOR appealed the chancery court’s decision to grant Hotel’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the chancery court’s grant of Hotel’s motion for summary judgment. View "Mississippi Department of Revenue v. Hotel & Restaurant Supply" on Justia Law

Marcus and Patricia Byrd’s home, in The Timbers of Crossgates subdivision in Brandon, was managed by Ridgway, Lane & Associates (Ridgway). The Byrds claimed that mold began growing inside the home when Ridgway and the Timbers Homeowners’ Association (HOA) failed to repair a leak in the dining room ceiling, that the influx of water damaged the home and property inside, and that Marcus Byrd developed breathing problems as a result of mold exposure. Both Ridgway and the HOA filed motions for summary judgment asserting that the statute of limitations had expired. The trial court granted the defendants’ motions with regard to the property damage claims but denied their motions respecting the personal injury claims. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted Ridgway and the HOA leave to file an interlocutory appeal. Because no assignment of error regarding the Byrds’ property damage claims was raised on appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment with regard to those claims. Finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the time at which Marcus Byrd knew or by reasonable diligence should have known of his illness, the Court affirmed the denial of summary judgment and remanded this case for trial. View "Ridgway Lane & Associates, Inc. v. Watson" on Justia Law