Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When the Humphreys County Board of Supervisors notified the public of its intention to issue a $1.2 million tax anticipation note, taxpayers filed a petition containing signatures of qualified electors requesting that the matter be submitted to the public for an election. The Board determined that the number of qualified electors who had signed the petition was insufficient to require an election. The Board, therefore, authorized the note’s issuance. The matter then was submitted to the Humphreys County Chancery Court for validation. The day before the hearing, Glenn Russell filed a written objection. At the hearing, Russell appeared pro se to oppose validation. Nevertheless, the chancellor entered a judgment validating the tax anticipation note. Russell appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that the Humphreys County Board of Supervisors did not exceed statutory limits in obtaining the tax anticipation note. However, the chancellor’s refusal at the validation hearing to consider the sufficiency of signatures of qualified electors, who signed a petition protesting the tax anticipation note, constituted error. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Humphreys County Chancery Court and remanded this case to the chancellor for further proceedings. View "In Re: Validation of Tax Anticipation Note, Series 2014, by Humphreys County v. Humphreys County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

This case arose out of property damage suffered by Borries Construction when Grand Casino’s gambling barges broke loose from their moorings and collided with the Schooner Pier and surrounding structures during Hurricane Katrina. Following the hurricane, K.R. Borries filed suit on behalf of himself and his construction company against Grand Casino. Grand Casino filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. Borries appealed, arguing that Grand Casino breached its duty of care to Borries by negligently mooring its casino and failing to take precautions to prevent foreseeable harm to nearby property owners. After review, the Supreme Court Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment because there was a "battle of experts," and the issue should have been presented to a jury. View "Borries v. Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc. Biloxi" on Justia Law

Shirley Warren (a/k/a Oliver) was convicted for possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility. The trial court sentenced her to seven years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with four years suspended and five years of supervised probation. The Supreme Court assigned Warren’s appeal to the Court of Appeals, which reversed it, ruling that Warren’s indictment was fatally defective because it failed to identify the controlled substance that Warren allegedly possessed. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and held that Warren’s indictment sufficiently charged her with possession of a controlled substance in a correctional facility. Furthermore, the Court held that Warren’s other appellate issues lacked merit. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. View "Warren a/k/a Oliver v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Aundray Isaac filed his complaint against the State in 2012, seeking compensation for wrongful conviction and imprisonment. During the early morning hours of March 11, 1991, a towel draped over the front door of Shannon Jackson’s apartment caught fire. The towel had been placed there purposefully for privacy, as covering the windows at the top of the door prevented bypassers from seeing up the interior stairwell just beyond the door. That night, Jackson was at home and upstairs with her and Isaac’s two young children. Isaac lived at the apartment with Jackson but had spent most of the night at issue away from the apartment. He knocked on the door after midnight, but, though she was home, Jackson refused to let him in. Jackson testified that the two of them had agreed that “If he was going to continue to live there, he was going to be in before 12:00 or no later than 12:00.” Isaac testified at his wrongful conviction trial that he set the towel on fire, but he maintained that it was an accident. Isaac would be charged with arson, and convicted by jury. In 1994, the Supreme Court determined that the State had failed to prove the malice and willfulness elements of first-degree arson beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore had produced insufficient evidence to support Isaac’s conviction. The Court reversed Isaac’s conviction and discharged him from the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. He then sued for wrongful conviction and imprisonment. The trial court found in favor of the State and dismissed Isaac’s complaint with prejudice. Aggrieved, Isaac appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Isaac v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This is the third appeal from the City of Gulfport’s taking of the Dedeaux Utility Company via eminent domain. Dedeaux appealed after the first two trials, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded both times. The parties have since held a third trial, and Gulfport appealed and Dedeaux cross-appealed issues raised from the third trial. Gulfport raised thirteen issues on appeal. And while the Court gave careful consideration to each, the Court found only five warranted discussion, and yet none warranted reversal of the third trial's final judgment. Gulfport asked the trial judge to “determine a fair and equitable interest rate to be paid on the Final Judgment based upon the rates paid on invested funds during the time period in which the eminent domain action was pending.” The Supreme Court reversed the trial judge’s post-trial order denying Gulfport’s motion to establish the interest rate, and remanded this action to the Harrison County Special Court of Eminent Domain for the limited purpose of determining the applicable interest rate and entering an order requiring payment of that interest. The Court declined to address Dedeaux’s cross-appeal. View "City of Gulfport v. Dedeaux Utility Company, Inc." on Justia Law

This is the third appeal from the City of Gulfport’s taking of the Dedeaux Utility Company via eminent domain. Dedeaux appealed after the first two trials, and the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and remanded both times. The parties have since held a third trial, and Gulfport appealed and Dedeaux cross-appealed issues raised from the third trial. Gulfport raised thirteen issues on appeal. And while the Court gave careful consideration to each, the Court found only five warranted discussion, and yet none warranted reversal of the third trial's final judgment. Gulfport asked the trial judge to “determine a fair and equitable interest rate to be paid on the Final Judgment based upon the rates paid on invested funds during the time period in which the eminent domain action was pending.” The Supreme Court reversed the trial judge’s post-trial order denying Gulfport’s motion to establish the interest rate, and remanded this action to the Harrison County Special Court of Eminent Domain for the limited purpose of determining the applicable interest rate and entering an order requiring payment of that interest. The Court declined to address Dedeaux’s cross-appeal. View "City of Gulfport v. Dedeaux Utility Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Mississippi law to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Robert Swindol sued his employer, Aurora Flight Sciences Corporation, in federal court for wrongful discharge and defamation. Swindol alleged that Aurora had terminated him for having a firearm inside his locked vehicle in the company parking lot. Aurora filed a motion to dismiss, and the district court dismissed Swindol’s wrongful-discharge claim with prejudice,1 stating that it “[could not] say that the Mississippi Supreme Court would recognize a third exception to the doctrine of at-will employment,” as proposed by Swindol. As such, the district court found that Swindol had failed to state a claim for wrongful discharge. Swindol appealed, and the Fifth Circuit asked the Supreme Court whether an employer could be liable for a wrongful discharge of an employee for storing a firearm in a locked vehicle on company property in a manner that is consistent with Mississippi Code Section 45-9-55. The Supreme Court found that an employer could be liable and that Section 45-9-55(5) did not shield Aurora from liability under the facts of this case. View "Swindol v. Aurora Flight Sciences Corporation" on Justia Law

Early in the morning on November 7, 2011, Arnoldo Moreno, Juan Estrada, and Jose Garcia-Guillan were killed in a motor-vehicle collision when Arnoldo’s pickup truck collided with an eighteen-wheeler tractor-trailer, owned by TLSL and driven by Randall Walker. Ana Moreno (“Moreno”), Arnoldo’s widow, filed a wrongful-death action. At trial, after Moreno rested, TLSL and Walker moved for a directed verdict on improper inspection, damages for pain and suffering, medical bills, final expense and burial, hedonic damages, current net loss value of wages, punitive damages, and liability. Moreno stipulated that the directed verdict be granted on all the issues except the current net-loss-value issue, the inspection issue, and the liability issue. The trial court granted directed verdict on each issue. Moreno appealed, arguing the trial court erred in granting TLSL's motion as to negligence. Finding that Moreno failed to provide any evidence demonstrating negligence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moreno v. TLSL, Inc." on Justia Law

The Northeast Mental Health-Mental Retardation Commission challenged the validity of a ninety-nine-year fixed-lease agreement with a private contractor, V.M. Cleveland. The Commission contracted to pay Cleveland $18,000 per month over a ninety-nine-year period to build and to lease a facility on land owned by the Commission. Payments continued uninterrupted for ten years, until the Commission became concerned about the agreement’s legality. The Commission stopped making payments and sought to rescind the agreement. The chancellor found that the agreement was enforceable and ordered the Commission to pay Cleveland $612,000 in back rent. The Commission appealed, arguing that the agreement’s ninety-nine-year duration rendered the agreement voidable at the Commission’s discretion as a matter of law due to the rule against binding successors. The Commission also argued that the specific terms of the agreement were unreasonable, illegal, or both, and thus void ab initio as a matter of law. The Supreme Court found that the agreement at issue here violated the common-law rule against binding successors, and as such reversed the chancellor’s judgment and rendered judgment in the Commission’s favor. View "Northeast Mental Health - Mental Retardation Commission v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

Eddie Hall was convicted of murdering Johnny “Tubby” Hubbard in the Black Cat community of Covington County. The jury heard eyewitness testimony that when a fight broke out at the end of a horse show, Hall retrieved a gun from his trailer and shot Tubby twice as Tubby attempted to break up the fight and leave the scene. On appeal, Hall argued that the judge made errors during the jury selection process and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Hall’s conviction and life sentence. View "Hall v. Mississippi" on Justia Law