Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this custody battle between a child's mother and grandparents, the chancellor heard evidence that the child's mother was sexually promiscuous, that she had failed drug tests, and that she planned to move with the child to Chicago to live with a convicted sex-offender. The chancellor also heard evidence to the contrary. Based on this evidence, and judging the credibility of the witnesses before him, the chancellor found that the natural-parent presumption had been overcome and, after conducting a proper "Albright" analysis, that the best interests of the child would be served by granting custody to the grandparents. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Irle v. Foster" on Justia Law

Limestone Products, Inc., jointly owned by Ronald (Ronnie) Lampkin and James Oldrum (J.O.) Smith, Jr., operated with a line of credit personally guaranteed by Lampkin and Smith. Limestone was in the business of selling rock, predominantly to Lampkin's company, Lampkin Construction. Following Smith's death and his estate's subsequent refusal to guarantee Limestone's line of credit, Lampkin formed Delta Stone, a new corporation which operated on the same property, made use of the same facilities, and sold rock to the same clients to whom Limestone had sold. Lampkin sought a declaratory judgment against the Smith estate's executors that he was violating no fiduciary duties in continuing to sell Limestone's inventory. The executors counterclaimed, seeking lost profits and attorneys' fees. The chancellor bifurcated the trial and determined, in the liability stage, that Lampkin had breached his fiduciary duty to Limestone by usurping a corporate opportunity. In the damages phase of the trial, the chancellor heard expert testimony, assigned an award of damages to the Smith estate, and denied the executors' request for attorneys' fees, expert witness fees, and punitive damages. The executors appealed, and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Finding that the chancellor erred in his calculation of damages, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Lane v. Lampkin" on Justia Law

In this premises-liability case, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the trial judge erred in holding, as a matter of law, that the owners and management of an apartment complex where Bobby Batiste murdered his roommate, Andreas Galanis, could not be held liable for failing to warn Galanis about Batiste's violent tendencies. According to the trial judge, a resident concern form describing Batiste's violent intent toward a former roommate "alone is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact" as to whether the complex management knew of Batiste's violent nature. When viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Supreme Court concluded this was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, the Court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the apartment complex, reverseed and remanded for trial. View "Galanis v. CMA Management Company" on Justia Law

In 2008, James Newell was convicted of manslaughter for the shooting death of Adrian Boyette. After this Court reversed Newell's conviction, he was retried and again convicted of manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed this conviction, finding that the trial court erred in its admission of certain expert testimony. The Mississippi Supreme Court granted Newell's petition for writ of certiorari to address his remaining claims that the Court of Appeals declined to address. Finding those arguments to be without merit, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversed the judgment of the trial court, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Newell v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Elchoses purchased a 1.11 acre parcel of a fifty-acre tract of largely undeveloped land located near and on the Jourdan River in Hancock County near Kiln, Mississippi, from Kevin and Lisa Haas in 2004. The Elchoses proceeded to construct a house partially on property the Haases did not sell or convey to the Elchoses. After an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the dispute, the Haases sued, claiming the Elchoses were trespassing and violating restrictive covenants to which they had agreed at the time of the sale and conveyance. The Elchoses answered and claimed, among other things, that the dispute resulted from a mutual mistake and that the Haases' claims were barred by the doctrines of estoppel and laches. After receiving evidence and testimony at trial, the chancellor found that the Elchoses, who had received a deed, complete with an attached property description and survey, knew or should have known the boundaries of the property they had purchased. The chancellor further found that the Haases were without knowledge of the encroachment until December 2007. Thus, he decreed that the Elchoses had to move the structure off of the Haases' property and onto the property the Elchoses purchased. Aggrieved, the Elchoses appealed the chancellor's judgment to this Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Elchos v. Haas" on Justia Law

Randy Braswell sued Ergon Oil Purchasing, Inc. in Amite County over some oil contracts. Two days later, Ergon brought a declaratory judgment action against Braswell in Rankin County over those same contracts. Ergon removed the Amite County action to federal court, where it remained for eighteen months before it was remanded. In the meantime, Ergon obtained summary judgment against Braswell in Rankin County. Braswell appealed, arguing that the Rankin County judge erred when he granted summary judgment in Ergon's favor and when he refused to transfer the action to Amite County. The Supreme Court agreed with Braswell that the action should have been transferred to Amite County, and reversed the judgment of the Rankin County circuit judge based on the doctrine of priority jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the circuit court. View "Braswell v. Ergon Oil Purchasing, Inc." on Justia Law

This case was a latent-injury silicosis case filed against a Florida corporation that was dissolved. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Florida corporate-survival statute applied to a Mississippi plaintiff, or whether the discovery rule for latent injuries permitted claims to be brought against the foreign corporation after dissolution. Sixteen plaintiffs sued Clark Sand Company, Inc. more than four years after the corporation’s dissolution. The circuit court judge sustained Clark Sand’s motion for summary judgment. "At common law, when a corporation dissolved, it no longer existed, and it could not be sued. But because of the harshness of this rule, Florida, like most states, has adopted a corporate-survival statute that allows plaintiffs to bring suit against a Florida corporation for up to four years after dissolution." Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Williams v. Clark Sand Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Anthony Windless was convicted by jury for the 2011 death of Charles Presley. Windless was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Windless appealed, arguing the trial court erred in instructing the jury, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. With respect to Windless' claim of improper jury instructions, the Supreme Court found no merit to his argument. With respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Supreme Court found it more appropriate for Windless to make his argument in a petition for post-conviction relief. The Court dismissed Windless' ineffective-assistance claim without prejudice. View "Windless v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A wrongful-death beneficiary failed to prosecute this medical-malpractice case for four years, so, on the defendant’s motion, the circuit judge dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff refiled, and the defendant twice moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had lapsed. Both motions were denied, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal. Because the statute of limitations was not tolled when cases are dismissed for lack of prosecution, the second complaint was untimely. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for dismissal. View "Thornhill v. Ingram" on Justia Law

Erik Hollie walked into a pawn shop in Wesson, Mississippi, and killed the owner because he didn’t follow "the Lord." Hollie claimed "the Lord" led him there to kill the man. A couple of days before the murder, Hollie robbed a gas-station attendant at knife point because, according to Hollie, the two men had argued about religion. Shortly after the murder, Hollie turned himself in and confessed to both the armed robbery and the capital murder. The trial judge appointed an attorney to represent Hollie, and he filed a motion for a mental evaluation. A state doctor evaluated Hollie, but before a competency hearing was held, Hollie pleaded guilty to both crimes. The trial judge accepted the guilty pleas without any adjudication on Hollie’s mental status. At sentencing, Hollie put on no mitigating evidence, and he specifically instructed his attorney to put on no defense. The only thing before the jury from the defense was Hollie’s own statement to the jury, which was just one sentence. "I ask that you let the Lord deal with me and sentence me to death." The jury indeed found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Hollie filed no appeal or any motions for post-conviction relief. The matter came before the Mississippi Supreme Court on mandatory review of Hollie's death sentence. Finding that the trial court erred in ordering a mental evaluation but failing to hold a hearing on Hollie’s competency, the Court vacated Hollie’s guilty pleas, convictions, and his sentences, and remanded this case for a competency determination. View "Hollie v. Mississippi" on Justia Law