Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case was a latent-injury silicosis case filed against a Florida corporation that was dissolved. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Florida corporate-survival statute applied to a Mississippi plaintiff, or whether the discovery rule for latent injuries permitted claims to be brought against the foreign corporation after dissolution. Sixteen plaintiffs sued Clark Sand Company, Inc. more than four years after the corporation’s dissolution. The circuit court judge sustained Clark Sand’s motion for summary judgment. "At common law, when a corporation dissolved, it no longer existed, and it could not be sued. But because of the harshness of this rule, Florida, like most states, has adopted a corporate-survival statute that allows plaintiffs to bring suit against a Florida corporation for up to four years after dissolution." Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Williams v. Clark Sand Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Anthony Windless was convicted by jury for the 2011 death of Charles Presley. Windless was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Windless appealed, arguing the trial court erred in instructing the jury, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. With respect to Windless' claim of improper jury instructions, the Supreme Court found no merit to his argument. With respect to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Supreme Court found it more appropriate for Windless to make his argument in a petition for post-conviction relief. The Court dismissed Windless' ineffective-assistance claim without prejudice. View "Windless v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A wrongful-death beneficiary failed to prosecute this medical-malpractice case for four years, so, on the defendant’s motion, the circuit judge dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff refiled, and the defendant twice moved to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations had lapsed. Both motions were denied, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal. Because the statute of limitations was not tolled when cases are dismissed for lack of prosecution, the second complaint was untimely. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for dismissal. View "Thornhill v. Ingram" on Justia Law

Erik Hollie walked into a pawn shop in Wesson, Mississippi, and killed the owner because he didn’t follow "the Lord." Hollie claimed "the Lord" led him there to kill the man. A couple of days before the murder, Hollie robbed a gas-station attendant at knife point because, according to Hollie, the two men had argued about religion. Shortly after the murder, Hollie turned himself in and confessed to both the armed robbery and the capital murder. The trial judge appointed an attorney to represent Hollie, and he filed a motion for a mental evaluation. A state doctor evaluated Hollie, but before a competency hearing was held, Hollie pleaded guilty to both crimes. The trial judge accepted the guilty pleas without any adjudication on Hollie’s mental status. At sentencing, Hollie put on no mitigating evidence, and he specifically instructed his attorney to put on no defense. The only thing before the jury from the defense was Hollie’s own statement to the jury, which was just one sentence. "I ask that you let the Lord deal with me and sentence me to death." The jury indeed found him guilty and sentenced him to death. Hollie filed no appeal or any motions for post-conviction relief. The matter came before the Mississippi Supreme Court on mandatory review of Hollie's death sentence. Finding that the trial court erred in ordering a mental evaluation but failing to hold a hearing on Hollie’s competency, the Court vacated Hollie’s guilty pleas, convictions, and his sentences, and remanded this case for a competency determination. View "Hollie v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After a new trial was ordered, Brian Holliman was retried for the murder of his wife. The jury found Holliman guilty of first-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. He appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence of deliberate design was insufficient to support the verdict; (2) the jury instructions were improper; (3) the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay statements made by the victim; (4) the trial court erroneously denied a motion to suppress his two written statements; and (5) the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash the indictment. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Holliman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Wayne Kelly was killed while working at a construction site in Hattiesburg. His family sued, among other defendants, Hanco Corporation, Inc., the general contractor for the project on which Wayne Kelly had been working at the time he died, and American Air Specialists of Mississippi, Inc., the subcontractor that had leased the services of Kelly and his coworkers from Landrum Professional Employer Services, Inc. The Kellys and Hanco/American Air moved separately for summary judgment. The circuit court denied summary judgment to Hanco and American Air. Hanco filed a petition for interlocutory appeal and the Kellys filed a cross-petition for interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal and consolidated the cases. After review, the Court affirmed the denial of summary judgment because Hanco waived its exclusive-remedy affirmative defense despite section 71-3-6 of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act provided an exclusive remedy to claimants for on-the-job injuries. View "Hanco Corporation v. Goldman" on Justia Law

Michael Gardner was tried and convicted of possession of more than thirty grams but less than one kilogram of marijuana, with intent to distribute. The trial judge sentenced him to ten years, day for day, as an enhanced habitual offender. Gardner appealed, arguing that “a penalty for [his] convicted offense no longer appeared” in the relevant drug statutes when he was sentenced. After review, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. View "Gardner v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This negligence suit arose out of a single-car accident that allegedly occurred due to an improperly performed bridge repair. In 2011, the Logans were traveling south on Highway 49 in Tallahatchie County when they drove over a bridge that recently had undergone repairs. Both lanes were open, and no warning signs were present indicating ongoing repairs or a dangerous condition. Two protruding crisscrossed metal plates caught the undercarriage of their car, causing the car to spin out of control and to come to rest facing south in the northbound lane. According to MDOT, flat metal plates routinely are bolted to bridge decks during structural repairs temporarily to cover fresh concrete while the concrete cures, with the bolt head and steel plate not extending more than two inches above the bridge deck. The Logans alleged that these particular metal plates were not properly attached to the bridge, had bent upward and were projecting dangerously above the road surface. The Logans sued MDOT and the Mississippi Transportation Commission. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under multiple provisions of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the maintenance of the bridge is a discretionary function under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-9(1)(d) and that the defendants therefore were entitled to immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the failure-to-maintain claim, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the failure-to-warn claim. The Supreme Court also affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the trial court and Court of Appeals erred in concluding that no disputed fact existed regarding the Logan’s failure-to-warn claim. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for the trial court to perform a more detailed summary-judgment immunity analysis of the Logan’s failure-to-warn claim. View "Logan v. Miss. Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance (the Commission) filed a “Formal Complaint” against Chancery Court Judge Joe Dale Walker alleging conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Commission recommended that Judge Walker be removed from office following various allegations regarding Judge Walker's mismanagement of a conservatorship. Due to various irregularities occurring in his handling of the conservatorship, the matter was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as the Commission. As a result of that investigation, a grand jury was convened and witnesses called to testify regarding the administration of the conservatorship. In association therewith, Judge Walker entered a guilty plea related to a charge of attempting to corruptly influence a witness subpoenaed to appear before a Federal Grand Jury proceeding and attempting to impede the provision of documents by the witness to the Federal Grand Jury with the intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding. "Due to the seriousness of his admitted criminal acts and judicial misconduct," the Mississippi Supreme Court removed Judge Joe Dale Walker from the office of Chancery Court Judge, Post Two, of the Thirteenth Chancery Court District of Mississippi. View "Mississippi Comm'n on Jud. Perf. v. Walker" on Justia Law

"For more than one hundred and thirty years," the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that an insurance company may void a policy when the insured made material misrepresentations during the application process. While driving his mother’s 2003 Chevy Silverado in Rankin County, sixteen-year-old William Busby crashed into Kenneth Tarlton’s car, which in turn collided with a car driven by Katrice Jones-Smith. When William’s mother, Michelle, applied to Safeway Insurance Company for an insurance policy on the Silverado, the application required her to warrant that she had provided the names of all regular frequent drivers of the covered vehicles, as well as all residents of her household fourteen years old or older. Michelle failed to disclose that fifteen-year-old William resided in her home, and Safeway issued her a policy on the Silverado at a premium that was lower than the premium would have been had Safeway known about William. When Safeway learned that Michelle made a material misrepresentation when she applied for the motor-vehicle-liability policy at issue here, it had the policy declared void. The Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the trial court's grant of summary judgment in this case in favor of Safeway, so it affirmed. View "Jones-Smith v. Safeway Insurance Company" on Justia Law