Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Jordan Davis was indicted for one count of auto theft, one count of grand larceny of a tractor, and one count of receiving stolen property concerning the same tractor. Davis was acquitted of auto theft and grand larceny but convicted of receiving stolen property. On appeal, the State confessed error because Claiborne County's dual charges against Davis for stealing and receiving the same property violated Mississippi Code Section 97-17-70(3)(a). The Court of Appeals reversed the receiving-stolen-property conviction, but remanded for further proceedings. Under Section 97-17-70(3)(a), when a defendant can be charged with either stealing or receiving the same property, the State must opt to charge the defendant with either stealing or receiving the property. Thus, he could not be retried for receiving the property under the plain terms of Section 97-17-70(3)(a). The Court of Appeals erred by remanding for further proceedings rather than rendering judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Claiborne County and rendered judgment in Davis's favor. View "Davis v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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In, 2008, emergency personnel responded to reports of a house fire in Biloxi. In their efforts to extinguish the flames, firefighters discovered the remains of a human body in a bedroom of the house. Dental records would later identify the body as thirty-seven-year-old Michelle Lynn Craite. Craite's autopsy revealed multiple stab wounds to her back in addition to severe burns that destroyed her flesh down to the bone. Evidence indicated that Craite was still alive and breathing during the fire. A forensic pathologist opined that the stab wounds likely were the cause of Craite's death, however, he noted that the stab wounds also incapacitated Craite so that she could not escape from the fire. A Harrison County jury found Timothy Ronk guilty of capital murder of Craite and sentenced him to death. The jury also found Ronk guilty of armed robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment. Ronk appealed his convictions and sentences to the Supreme Court. Finding no error in the culpability phase or in the sentencing phase, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ronk v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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The conservators of Soon San Pak's estate filed suit against their two attorneys, Harrison County, the Harrison County Chancery Clerk, John McAdams, and the guardian ad litem appointed for Mrs. Pak, after the previously appointed conservator, Woodrow W. Pringle III, embezzled money from the estate. The claims were dismissed when the circuit court found that the applicable statutes of limitation had lapsed. The conservators appealed. McAdams cross-appealed, asserting that the trial court improperly held that the conservators asserted a Section 1983 claim by implication against him and that Pringle was a state actor for whom McAdams and Harrison County could be vicariously liable. In affirming the circuit court, the Supreme Court concluded that the Conservators should have discovered, by reasonable diligence, that Pringle was misappropriating funds from the estate no later than January 24, 2008, when the coconservators (using due diligence) would have received an accounting and bank statements regarding Pak's estate, and would have “by reasonable diligence. . . discovered the injury.” The statute of limitations issue was not a question of fact for the jury because reasonable minds could not differ as to when the Conservators knew or should have known of Pringle's failure to file an accounting and, thus, Harrison County's and McAdams's failure in requiring an accounting to be filed. Based on the circuit court record, the trial court properly held that the Conservators' claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. View "Benvenutti v. McAdams" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates
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Kyle and Marla Moore timely filed a medical malpractice suit against St. Dominic Hospital, Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic, and several physicians, claiming that the physicians and hospital had been negligent in treating Kyle in May 2004. Kyle complained of lower back pain. Kyle was diagnosed with an epidural abscess. Kyle went to the emergency room at St. Dominic on the morning of May 23, 2004; within a 24-hour period, Kyle was seen by a series of doctors at the hospital before getting an operation on May 24. The Moores contended that surgery should have been done sooner and that the delay in treatment resulted in neurological injury to Kyle. In March 2011, the Moores added Dr. Howard Holaday as a defendant. Dr. Holaday moved for summary judgment, asserting that the two-year statute of limitations had expired. The trial court denied summary judgment, and Dr. Holaday petitioned the Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal. The issue this appeal presented for the Court's review was whether the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations against Dr. Holaday. The Court held that whether the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations required a determination by the trier of fact (here, the jury) regarding the “date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first discovered.” The trial court, therefore, properly denied summary judgment to Dr. Holaday. View "Holaday v. Moore" on Justia Law

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Michael Taylor was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to five years. In 2007, Michelle Finney arrived at a child’s birthday party and parked her car on the street, blocking Taylor’s car in a driveway. An argument and fistfight ensued. After bystanders broke up the fight, Taylor shot Finney in the arm and fled. Two days later, Taylor was at friend’s house when law enforcement officers arrived to execute unrelated arrest warrants. Taylor was detained after he tried to flee out a window in the back of the house. An investigator noticed a black coat on the couch, which Taylor claimed. Upon discovering a handgun and narcotics in the jacket, the officers arrested Taylor for possessing the narcotics and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Later that day, police obtained an arrest warrant for Taylor’s alleged aggravated assault on Finney. On appeal, Taylor’s counsel filed a "Lindsey" brief, stating that she had identified no appealable issues. After an independent review of the record and the briefs, the Supreme Court concluded that there were no reversible issues. View "Taylor v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Vincent Castigliola, a Mississippi resident, bought a yacht in Florida from Mark Fallon, an Ohio resident. Fallon, who is not in the business of buying or selling boats, sold the boat to Castigliola, who also is not in the boat trade. This transaction involved marketing services from Galati Yacht Sales, a yacht broker, which Fallon hired. Castigliola did not pay sales tax on the boat in Florida or use tax in Mississippi. Aggrieved, MDOR audited Castigliola and subsequently assessed use tax and penalties regarding the boat purchase, totaling $7,588. Castigliola challenged the tax, exhausted his administrative remedies without relief, and ultimately appealed to the Chancery Court. Before the chancery court, Castigliola filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the sale was a casual sale and therefore not subject to Mississippi use tax. The Court denied his motion, and Castigliola appealed. This case presented two issues: (1) who has the burden to prove use tax is applicable to a transaction; and (2) does the use of a broker make a casual sale taxable? The Supreme Court held that: (1) the Department of Revenue (MDOR) had the burden to prove that a tax applied, and the taxpayer had the burden to prove an exemption from tax applied; and (2) casual sales are excluded from sales and use tax in Mississippi. In this case, because MDOR’s argument for taxation was not supported by its own regulations and relied on an improper and erroneous application of Florida law, the Supreme Court found MDOR’s position was arbitrary and capricious. Furthermore, MDOR admitted the sale was from one individual to another, not in the ordinary course of business. Accordingly, the Court reversed summary judgment and render judgment in favor of Castigliola. View "Castigliola v. Mississippi Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

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Tyrone Boyd was convicted under Mississippi Code section 9705033(6) for the exploitation of a child. He was sentenced to twelve years in prison with seven to serve, five suspended and probation. Boyd appealed that sentence, claiming the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Facebook and texts into evidence, and that the State failed to properly authenticate them (the evidence linking him to the messages at issue was not sufficient to prove that he wrote them). The Supreme Court found Boyd's contention meritless, as he failed to preserve his objections at trial. Therefore, the Court affirmed Boyd's conviction and sentence. View "Boyd v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Jason Isham was convicted on one count of felonious child abuse. His wife’s two-year-old son, Tommy, was for a severe, traumatic brain injury, which caused severe swelling of the child’s brain, stroke, and permanent weakness on his right side. Because Isham was alone with Tommy when this occurred, he was charged with felonious child abuse of Tommy. At trial, expert medical witnesses for the State testified that Tommy’s injuries resulted from severe blunt trauma. Isham, who was represented by a public defender and a pro bono attorney, requested funds with which to hire his own expert to testify about possible alternative causes for Tommy’s injuries. The trial court denied the request. On appeal, Isham raised one issue: that the trial court erred when it refused him the funds necessary to hire an expert in his defense. In light of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s holding in "Brown v. Mississippi," (152 So. 3d 1146 (Miss. 2014)), the Court reversed Isham’s conviction and remanded the case for a new trial in which the trial court must order public funds for such defense experts as are necessary for the accused to prepare and present an adequate defense. View "Isham v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Thirty-eight years after going to work for T.P. Groome, breaking up concrete culverts with a jackhammer, plaintiff Huey Holmes was diagnosed with silicosis. In six years that Homles worked for Groome, he was exposed to dusty work conditions. Groome provide a respirator that was manufactured by defendant Mine Safety Appliances (MSA). Holmes testified that, although he wore the mask, he often ingested so much dust while jackhammering that his mouth would fill with dirt and his spit would become black. Holmes filed a products-liability suit against MSA, claiming, among other things, that the respirator failed to protect him from overexposure to respirable silica. Holmes was dismissed from the suit without prejudice in light of the then-recent changes to Mississippi joinder rules. Holmes refiled his suit against MSA on May 16, 2007. In its answer, MSA asserted that Holmes filed his second suit after the statute of limitations had run. This case was a direct appeal of the trial court's judgment awarding Holmes, $875,000 for silicosis-related injuries allegedly caused by the respirator. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s ruling that the complaint was filed within the statute of limitations, and that Holmes was exposed to a harmful level of silica during the relevant time period. But the Court found that the trial judge erred in denying MSA’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) regarding Holmes’s warnings claim. Additionally, the Court found MSA was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law regarding Holmes’s design-defect claim because misuse of the respirator materially changed the product’s condition after it left MSA’s control. The Court therefore reversed and remanded on these issues. View "Mine Safety Appliance Company v. Holmes" on Justia Law

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Ricky Chase filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing that he was intellectually disabled under "Atkins v. Virginia," (536 U.S. 304 (2002)), and exempt from execution. The circuit court denied relief, finding that Chase had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is intellectually disabled. Chase appealed, arguing that the circuit court made legal errors and that its fact-findings were clearly erroneous. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Chase v. Mississippi" on Justia Law