Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Minor O.D. filed a petition for approval of a settlement her parents had negotiated with car insurance companies for injuries she had suffered in a car accident. On the day of the hearing, O.D.'s health insurance coverage provider Ashley Healthcare Plan, which had a subrogation lien against the proceeds of O.D.'s claim, removed the case to federal court, arguing that Mississippi Code Section 93-13-59 (which requires chancery court approval of settlement claims) was preempted by the federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). The federal district court held that ERISA did not preempt the state law and remanded the case to the chancery court without awarding attorney's fees to O.D. On motion from O.D.'s parents, the Pontotoc County Chancery Court awarded O.D. attorney's fees, holding that Ashley Healthcare Plan's removal to federal court was contrary to clearly established law and that it was done for the purpose of delaying litigation. Ashley Healthcare Plan appealed the grant of attorney fees. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Although O.D. could have sought recovery of attorney's fees under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, frivolous removals to federal court were also subject to the Mississippi Litigation Accountability Act. Furthermore, Ashley Healthcare Plan's removal to federal court was contrary to two decades of case law which uniformly held that Mississippi's law requiring chancery court approval of minors' settlements was not preempted by ERISA and that Ashley Healthcare Plan was seeking a remedy in federal court that was unavailable to it under the ERISA Civil Enforcement Clause. View "In the Matter of the Guardianship of O. D." on Justia Law

In 2009, Plaintiff Barry White went to Memorial Hospital at Gulfport's emergency room complaining of slurred speech and left-sided numbness. White told the nurses there he thought he was having a stroke. He was diagnosed with hypertension, given medicine and sent home. He returned the next day, and after testing, White was diagnosed with having had a completed stroke. White underwent a battery of outpatient occupational therapy, speech therapy and physical therapy. White then brought a medical negligence lawsuit against Memorial Hospital regarding the alleged misdiagnosis and won at trial. On appeal, the hospital challenged White's expert witnesses' testimony, claiming they failed to provide medical literature to support their opinions. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the experts were not required to provide medical literature to support their opinions, and affirmed. View "Memorial Hospital at Gulfport v. White" on Justia Law

In 2004, Luther McLain sued the Illinois Central Railroad, alleging that Illinois Central’s negligence caused his degenerative back injury. At trial, McLain had improper contact with a juror, committed perjury on the stand, and solicited a witness to commit perjury on the stand to corroborate his story. The trial judge reserved sanctioning McLain until after the jury verdict. The jury found for McLain, assessed his damages as $150,000, and judgment was entered accordingly. Thereafter, the trial judge sanctioned McLain $500 for juror contact and $10,000 for solicitation of a witness. Illinois Central filed a motion for additional sanctions, claiming that the sanctions were not harsh enough. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the existing sanctions, but held that the trial judge abused her discretion in failing to impose further sanctions. Given the severity of committing perjury and solicitation and the cumulative effect of the violations taken as a whole, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment against Illinois Central, and rendered judgment in its favor. View "Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co. v. McLain" on Justia Law

This action was brought by Inn By the Sea Homeowner’s Association, Inc. (“IBTS”) against various defendants involved in the development, design, and construction of Inn By the Sea Condominiums when the condominiums were rebuilt after being destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. Within a year of reconstruction, significant problems with the building began to manifest, problems allegedly related to defects in the design and construction of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants after excluding the damages testimony of IBTS’s expert witnesses. IBTS hired Michael Bailey of Kyle Associates, LLC, as its expert structural engineer and Alfred Hayes of Hayes Architect as its expert architect to investigate and identify defects in the design and construction of the property. IBTS timely designated its experts and produced a copy of the witnesses’ reports and cost estimates. In late August 2012, IBTS learned that Michael Bailey had suddenly left his job, moved out town, and could not be located or further made available as an expert on this case. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court orally continued the case without a new trial date in order for IBTS to find a new engineering expert. IBTS hired Ashton Avegno to replace Bailey. Avegno provided his report on November 2, 2012. In addition to largely agreeing with Bailey’s original report, Avegno also expressed concern that the foundation pilings “as designed” were overloaded by as much as “2.82 times its safe capacity and the as built piling would be loaded 2.16 times its capacity.” Avegno was unwilling, however, to provided exact itemized cost estimates for the items of engineering defects he identified. IBTS informed the court that IBTS had been unable to depose any of the defendants’ witnesses, including any of the defendants, and that a new scheduling order should be issued to allow IBTS to conduct depositions and to seasonably supplement its expert reports. The defendants objected to the proposed new scheduling order, arguing that the deadline for expert designations had passed and that Avegno should not be allowed to offer any new opinions, including his opinion that the foundation piles were overloaded. The court granted the motion to exclude Avegno. At some point, Hayes was asked to supplement his report. The defendants moved to strike Hayes’s supplementation and renewed their motion for summary judgment. The court granted the defendants’ motion to exclude Alfred Hayes’s damages testimony as well as the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and final judgment. Inn By the Sea timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s witnesses, and therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Inn By The Sea Homeowner's Association, Inc. v. SeaInn, LLC" on Justia Law

This action was brought by Inn By the Sea Homeowner’s Association, Inc. (“IBTS”) against various defendants involved in the development, design, and construction of Inn By the Sea Condominiums when the condominiums were rebuilt after being destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. Within a year of reconstruction, significant problems with the building began to manifest, problems allegedly related to defects in the design and construction of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants after excluding the damages testimony of IBTS’s expert witnesses. IBTS hired Michael Bailey of Kyle Associates, LLC, as its expert structural engineer and Alfred Hayes of Hayes Architect as its expert architect to investigate and identify defects in the design and construction of the property. IBTS timely designated its experts and produced a copy of the witnesses’ reports and cost estimates. In late August 2012, IBTS learned that Michael Bailey had suddenly left his job, moved out town, and could not be located or further made available as an expert on this case. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court orally continued the case without a new trial date in order for IBTS to find a new engineering expert. IBTS hired Ashton Avegno to replace Bailey. Avegno provided his report on November 2, 2012. In addition to largely agreeing with Bailey’s original report, Avegno also expressed concern that the foundation pilings “as designed” were overloaded by as much as “2.82 times its safe capacity and the as built piling would be loaded 2.16 times its capacity.” Avegno was unwilling, however, to provided exact itemized cost estimates for the items of engineering defects he identified. IBTS informed the court that IBTS had been unable to depose any of the defendants’ witnesses, including any of the defendants, and that a new scheduling order should be issued to allow IBTS to conduct depositions and to seasonably supplement its expert reports. The defendants objected to the proposed new scheduling order, arguing that the deadline for expert designations had passed and that Avegno should not be allowed to offer any new opinions, including his opinion that the foundation piles were overloaded. The court granted the motion to exclude Avegno. At some point, Hayes was asked to supplement his report. The defendants moved to strike Hayes’s supplementation and renewed their motion for summary judgment. The court granted the defendants’ motion to exclude Alfred Hayes’s damages testimony as well as the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and final judgment. Inn By the Sea timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s witnesses, and therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Inn By The Sea Homeowner's Association, Inc. v. SeaInn, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was one of first impression regarding the interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 91-5-33, known as the “Slayer Statute.” John Armstrong, a severely mentally ill man, killed Joan Armstrong, his eighty-year-old mother. This fact was not disputed by any party. The Circuit Court determined that John was not competent to stand trial for the murder of Joan, and John was committed to the state hospital at Whitfield. Based on the Slayer Statute, John’s four siblings requested that the devise to John in their mother’s will be declared void. The chancellor granted their motion, and John, through his court-appointed guardian ad litem, appealed. Finding that a hearing to determine John’s mental status at the time of the murder was necessary prior to granting the motion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Joan Armstrong" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was one of first impression regarding the interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 91-5-33, known as the “Slayer Statute.” John Armstrong, a severely mentally ill man, killed Joan Armstrong, his eighty-year-old mother. This fact was not disputed by any party. The Circuit Court determined that John was not competent to stand trial for the murder of Joan, and John was committed to the state hospital at Whitfield. Based on the Slayer Statute, John’s four siblings requested that the devise to John in their mother’s will be declared void. The chancellor granted their motion, and John, through his court-appointed guardian ad litem, appealed. Finding that a hearing to determine John’s mental status at the time of the murder was necessary prior to granting the motion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Joan Armstrong" on Justia Law

In October 2013, William “Bill” Stone moved from Ashland in Benton County to Holly Springs in Marshall County. He sought the Democratic Party nomination for the newly-created Senate District 10, a district which encompassed parts of Marshall County, including Stone’s home in Holly Springs, and parts of Tate County. In 2015, Steve Hale, a resident of Tate County who also sought the Democratic nomination for District 10, filed an objection to Stone’s candidacy with the State of Mississippi Democratic Executive Committee, arguing that Stone was ineligible to run for that office because he did not meet the two-year residency requirement enunciated in Article 4, Section 42, of the Mississippi Constitution. After a hearing, the Executive Committee rejected Hale’s objection and certified that Stone satisfied the qualifications for candidacy. Hale sought judicial review at the Circuit Court. That court held affirmed. Hale then appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court, finding it was not manifest error in that the Circuit Court held Stone had proven that he had established his domicile in Marshall County and that he therefore was qualified to run for the office of senator for District 10. View "Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic Executive Committee" on Justia Law

Franklin Fitzpatrick was found guilty of the murder Sheriff’s Deputy Dewayne Crenshaw. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in giving jury instruction that allowed for conviction without a proper showing of the requisite mental state; (2) the trial court erred when it overruled Fitzpatrick’s motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in ruling Fitzpatrick was procedurally barred from challenging the elements jury instruction on appeal because he did not object to it at trial. Because the jury instruction was a correct statement of the law, and Fitzpatrick’s arguments were otherwise without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed Fitzpatrick’s conviction and sentence. View "Fitzpatrick v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Timothy Carr’s conviction and sentence and denied his motion for rehearing. Carr twice sought leave from the Supreme Court to file motions for post-conviction relief (PCR) (first in May 2008, then in September 2010). The Supreme Court denied both applications. Carr filed a third application, which a panel of the Supreme Court granted in 2013. Carr then filed his PCR motion, claiming that the habitual-offender portion of his sentence should have been vacated for two reasons: (1) because the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in "Gowdy v. Mississippi," (56 So. 3d 540 (Miss. 2010)) prohibited post-conviction indictment amendments; and (2) because the prosecution failed to reintroduce evidence of his prior convictions during the sentencing phase of his trial. Carr does not here contest the validity or admissibility of his prior convictions. Finding that Gowdy did not apply to his case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Carr v. Mississippi" on Justia Law