Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This action was brought by Inn By the Sea Homeowner’s Association, Inc. (“IBTS”) against various defendants involved in the development, design, and construction of Inn By the Sea Condominiums when the condominiums were rebuilt after being destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. Within a year of reconstruction, significant problems with the building began to manifest, problems allegedly related to defects in the design and construction of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants after excluding the damages testimony of IBTS’s expert witnesses. IBTS hired Michael Bailey of Kyle Associates, LLC, as its expert structural engineer and Alfred Hayes of Hayes Architect as its expert architect to investigate and identify defects in the design and construction of the property. IBTS timely designated its experts and produced a copy of the witnesses’ reports and cost estimates. In late August 2012, IBTS learned that Michael Bailey had suddenly left his job, moved out town, and could not be located or further made available as an expert on this case. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court orally continued the case without a new trial date in order for IBTS to find a new engineering expert. IBTS hired Ashton Avegno to replace Bailey. Avegno provided his report on November 2, 2012. In addition to largely agreeing with Bailey’s original report, Avegno also expressed concern that the foundation pilings “as designed” were overloaded by as much as “2.82 times its safe capacity and the as built piling would be loaded 2.16 times its capacity.” Avegno was unwilling, however, to provided exact itemized cost estimates for the items of engineering defects he identified. IBTS informed the court that IBTS had been unable to depose any of the defendants’ witnesses, including any of the defendants, and that a new scheduling order should be issued to allow IBTS to conduct depositions and to seasonably supplement its expert reports. The defendants objected to the proposed new scheduling order, arguing that the deadline for expert designations had passed and that Avegno should not be allowed to offer any new opinions, including his opinion that the foundation piles were overloaded. The court granted the motion to exclude Avegno. At some point, Hayes was asked to supplement his report. The defendants moved to strike Hayes’s supplementation and renewed their motion for summary judgment. The court granted the defendants’ motion to exclude Alfred Hayes’s damages testimony as well as the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and final judgment. Inn By the Sea timely appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s witnesses, and therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Inn By The Sea Homeowner's Association, Inc. v. SeaInn, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was one of first impression regarding the interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 91-5-33, known as the “Slayer Statute.” John Armstrong, a severely mentally ill man, killed Joan Armstrong, his eighty-year-old mother. This fact was not disputed by any party. The Circuit Court determined that John was not competent to stand trial for the murder of Joan, and John was committed to the state hospital at Whitfield. Based on the Slayer Statute, John’s four siblings requested that the devise to John in their mother’s will be declared void. The chancellor granted their motion, and John, through his court-appointed guardian ad litem, appealed. Finding that a hearing to determine John’s mental status at the time of the murder was necessary prior to granting the motion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Joan Armstrong" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was one of first impression regarding the interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 91-5-33, known as the “Slayer Statute.” John Armstrong, a severely mentally ill man, killed Joan Armstrong, his eighty-year-old mother. This fact was not disputed by any party. The Circuit Court determined that John was not competent to stand trial for the murder of Joan, and John was committed to the state hospital at Whitfield. Based on the Slayer Statute, John’s four siblings requested that the devise to John in their mother’s will be declared void. The chancellor granted their motion, and John, through his court-appointed guardian ad litem, appealed. Finding that a hearing to determine John’s mental status at the time of the murder was necessary prior to granting the motion, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Joan Armstrong" on Justia Law

In October 2013, William “Bill” Stone moved from Ashland in Benton County to Holly Springs in Marshall County. He sought the Democratic Party nomination for the newly-created Senate District 10, a district which encompassed parts of Marshall County, including Stone’s home in Holly Springs, and parts of Tate County. In 2015, Steve Hale, a resident of Tate County who also sought the Democratic nomination for District 10, filed an objection to Stone’s candidacy with the State of Mississippi Democratic Executive Committee, arguing that Stone was ineligible to run for that office because he did not meet the two-year residency requirement enunciated in Article 4, Section 42, of the Mississippi Constitution. After a hearing, the Executive Committee rejected Hale’s objection and certified that Stone satisfied the qualifications for candidacy. Hale sought judicial review at the Circuit Court. That court held affirmed. Hale then appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court, finding it was not manifest error in that the Circuit Court held Stone had proven that he had established his domicile in Marshall County and that he therefore was qualified to run for the office of senator for District 10. View "Hale v. State of Mississippi Democratic Executive Committee" on Justia Law

Franklin Fitzpatrick was found guilty of the murder Sheriff’s Deputy Dewayne Crenshaw. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in giving jury instruction that allowed for conviction without a proper showing of the requisite mental state; (2) the trial court erred when it overruled Fitzpatrick’s motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in ruling Fitzpatrick was procedurally barred from challenging the elements jury instruction on appeal because he did not object to it at trial. Because the jury instruction was a correct statement of the law, and Fitzpatrick’s arguments were otherwise without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed Fitzpatrick’s conviction and sentence. View "Fitzpatrick v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Timothy Carr’s conviction and sentence and denied his motion for rehearing. Carr twice sought leave from the Supreme Court to file motions for post-conviction relief (PCR) (first in May 2008, then in September 2010). The Supreme Court denied both applications. Carr filed a third application, which a panel of the Supreme Court granted in 2013. Carr then filed his PCR motion, claiming that the habitual-offender portion of his sentence should have been vacated for two reasons: (1) because the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in "Gowdy v. Mississippi," (56 So. 3d 540 (Miss. 2010)) prohibited post-conviction indictment amendments; and (2) because the prosecution failed to reintroduce evidence of his prior convictions during the sentencing phase of his trial. Carr does not here contest the validity or admissibility of his prior convictions. Finding that Gowdy did not apply to his case, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Carr v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This case was an interlocutory appeal stemming from a law suit by Mautrice Vaughn’s estate and wrongful-death beneficiaries against The Service Companies Inc., (“FSS”), following Vaughn’s fatal heart attack at work. Plaintiffs Vaughn’s estate and wrongful-death beneficiaries sued for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs alleged Vaughn’s supervisor would not let her leave work to see a doctor despite complaints of severe chest pain and a headache. Following the denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Supreme Court granted FSS leave to bring this interlocutory appeal. FSS argued the circuit court erred by finding a factual dispute existed as to whether FSS had “an actual intent to injure” for purposes of determining whether the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act exclusively governed plaintiffs’ claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found plaintiffs’ common-law false-imprisonment claim was insufficient to survive summary judgment because the plaintiffs did not produce evidence of intent to detain. "The plaintiffs may not merely rest on the pleadings and allegations alone." The Court found summary judgment in favor of FSS proper, reversed the trial court’s ruling denying summary judgment, rendered judgment in favor of FSS finally dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint and this action with prejudice. View "The Service Companies, Inc. v. The Estate of Mautrice Vaughn" on Justia Law

John Franklin was found guilty of arson by jury, sentenced to eighteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, ordered to pay a $1,500 fine, make restitution to the dwelling house owners, and make restitution to the victim. The court ordered that the fine and restitutions be made in monthly installments of $150, with the first payment due ninety days following Franklin’s release from confinement. Franklin appealed, arguing two issues: (1) the trial court erred in assessing restitution; and (2) the trial court erred in admitting Franklin’s confession into evidence. Finding no merit in either issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court judgment. View "Franklin v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Michael Taylor was convicted in 2012 of possessing stolen property. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to ten years in prison. Taylor testified in his own defense at trial. During cross-examination, the State questioned Taylor extensively about his numerous past felony convictions without objection from defense counsel. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that defense counsel’s failure to object to the inquiry into Taylor’s prior convictions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court reversed Taylor’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. View "Taylor v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The City of Madison enacted an ordinance requiring landlords to obtain a license for each unit of rental property. The Rental Inspection and Property Licensing Act (RIPLA) conditioned the grant of a license on the landlord’s advance consent to property inspections. Kenneth Crook was convicted in municipal court of two counts of violating RIPLA by maintaining a rental unit without a rental license and sentenced to pay a fine of $300 on each count. After a bench trial, the County Court of Madison County affirmed. Crook then appealed to the Circuit Court of Madison County, which also affirmed. Crook then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court assigned his appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. At each level of review, Crook argued that RIPLA’s inspection provisions violated the ban on unreasonable searches imposed by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals held that RIPLA was not unconstitutional because it required the City to obtain a judicial warrant if the landlord or tenant withheld consent to an inspection. The Supreme Court granted Crook’s petition for certiorari and reversed: RIPLA’s inspection provisions were constitutionally defective because, although RIPLA had a warrant provision, that provision allowed a warrant to be obtained “by the terms of the Rental License, lease, or rental agreement,” which was a standard less than probable cause. The Court reversed the lower courts' judgments affirming Crook's convictions, and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "Crook v. City of Madison" on Justia Law