Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ray Dillard attempted to collect workers' compensation benefits from the president and majority shareholder of his employer. In 1997, The Commission held that Dillard suffered a compensable injury. After the mandate issues, one of Dillard's attorneys filed a lis pendens notice regarding several parcels of real property the company's president owned. Because none of that property belonged to the company itself, Dillard's attorney informed the president that it was asking the Commission to hold the president personally liable for Dillard's benefits because the company failed to carry workers' compensation insurance. Dillard died in 2005 while unresolved issues regarding who would ultimately be responsible for Dillard's benefits was pending before an administrative law judge. Dillard's estate filed a complaint at the circuit court against the president and company, claiming that the company was required to carry workers' compensation insurance but failed to do so. Therefore, the Estate argued the president was personally liable for Dillard's benefits. Among other things, the president argued that the Estate's claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of res judicata. Eventually, the administrative law judge granted the Estate's renewed motion for summary judgment, and entered a judgment of approximately $223,000 against the president and the company "jointly and individually." The president appealed, and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that Dillard's claim against the company president was barred by res judicata and the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals erred in reaching that conclusion, reversed and reinstated the trial court's judgment in favor of Dillard. View "Jarrett v. Dillard" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Vance Drummer of two counts of grand larceny and one count of attempted grand larceny in 2012. The trial court granted the State’s request for a flight instruction because Drummer, after absconding with the stolen goods, fled from police when they attempted to pull him over after he had run a stop sign in Mathiston. The trial court sentenced Drummer as an habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81. One of the felony convictions the State used to prove Drummer’s status as an habitual offender was the felony-fleeing conviction to which he pled guilty as a result of his flight from police in Mathiston. The Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it sentenced Drummer as an habitual offender: "Drummer’s flight from police arose from the same nucleus of operative facts as the larcenies for which he was convicted and therefore should not have been used as a predicate felony pursuant to Section 99-19-81." Accordingly, Drummer’s sentence as an habitual offender was vacated, and ad the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing of Drummer as a nonhabitual offender. View "Drummer v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Richard Chapman was serving a life sentence in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. He never had a direct appeal (through no apparent fault of his own), and his trial record allegedly has been destroyed. While Chapman filed multiple motions for post-conviction relief (PCR), no appellate court has ever addressed the merits of his claims, despite potential violations of his constitutional rights. Under these peculiar circumstances, the Supreme Court found that, in the interests of justice, Chapman was entitled to an evidentiary hearing so that he and the State have an opportunity to reconstruct his trial record. View "Chapman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Milton Harper, the managing partner and president of Banks, Finley, White & Company of Mississippi (“Banks”), suffered a severe stroke in August 2000, and died of another stroke in July 2001. His dependents sued Banks for workers’ compensation benefits. The administrative law judge and the Workers’ Compensation Commission held that Harper’s injuries and death arose out of the scope and course of his employment at Banks. On appeal, the circuit court agreed that substantial evidence in the record supported the Commission’s conclusion that Harper’s stroke arose out of his employment, but that court held that Harper’s dependents were barred from recovering workers’ compensation benefits because Harper had failed to obtain workers’ compensation insurance for Banks. In turn, the Court of Appeals in "Harper v. Banks, Finley, White & Co. of Mississippi," (136 So. 3d 462 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)), held that Harper’s dependents were not barred from recovery because Section 71-3-79 of the Mississippi Code allowed members of partnerships to exempt themselves from workers’ compensation coverage by giving notice in writing. Because Harper had not opted out of coverage in writing, the Court of Appeals held that Banks was required to provide workers’ compensation benefits to Harper’s beneficiaries. On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Section 71-3-79 of the Mississippi Code to the facts of this case. Because Banks did not have workers’ compensation insurance coverage, there was no coverage for Harper to opt out of in writing as contemplated by Section 71-3-79. Instead, the Court held that Section 71-3-52 of the Mississippi Code controlled the analysis of this case: because Banks had more than five employees, it was required to obtain workers’ compensation insurance and provide workers’ compensation benefits to its employees. The Court affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s finding that Harper suffered a fatal injury through the course of his employment at Banks was supported by substantial evidence. View "Harper v. Banks, Finley, White & Co. of Mississippi, P.C." on Justia Law

A former employee claimed he was discharged for reporting his employer’s illegal activity. The employee sought to bring a wrongful-discharge claim under a public-policy exception to his at-will employment status. Because the former employee participated in the allegedly illegal activity, the Supreme Court held that he could not bring that claim, and affirmed summary judgment on his wrongful-discharge claim. View "Galle v. Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc." on Justia Law

David and Kim Cox had two children of their marriage, D.C. and J.C. Cox was the stepfather of Kim's daughter, L.K., born in April 1998. The couple separated in 2009 after L.K. told Kim that Cox had raped her. Kim reported the crime to local law enforcement. In August 2009, Cox was arrested on charges of statutory rape, sexual battery, child abuse, possession of precursors, and possession of methamphetamine. During his nine months in jail prior to posting bond, Cox often would become enraged and would proclaim to his cellmates his hatred for Kim, blaming her for his incarceration. Cox professed to them that he would kill Kim once released. Because Kim feared Cox, she and the children moved in with her sister, Kristie Salmon. Cox was released on bond from the Pontotoc County Jail in April 2010. Cox found work as a commercial truck driver. On his way home one day in spring 2010, Cox purchased a .40 caliber hand gun and two extra magazines, borrowed a van from his sister and brother-in-law and went to Salmon's home. Cox shot his way into the home. Kim, L.K., D.C., J.C., and Salmon were at the home. J.C. and Salmon escaped and called for help. Kim, L.K., and D.C. were taken hostage by Cox for more than eight hours. During the ordeal, Cox shot Kim, and as she lay dying, sexually assaulted L.K. in her presence. The standoff ended when a SWAT team entered the home. Cox was taken into custody. L.K. and D.C. were removed from the scene, and Kim was found dead as a result of her abdominal gunshot wound. Cox was indicted in an eight-count indictment for capital murder, kidnapping (two counts), sexual battery (three counts), burglary, and firing into an occupied dwelling. Cox was declared competent to stand trial, and pleaded guilty to all charges, including capital murder. A jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court entered a death sentence. Cox raised nine issues of error on appeal of that sentence to the Supreme Court. Finding none, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence. View "Cox v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Jourdan Rivers Estates, LLC (JRE) and Jourdan River Resort and Yacht Club (Yacht Club), filed suit for damages in December 2011 against Defendants Scott Favre, Cindy Favre, Jefferson Parker, and CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini. CB Partners, LLC d/b/a Cinque Bambini was later dismissed from the action without prejudice. The complaint alleged multiple claims against Defendants, including slander of title; slander and/or defamation; trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; harassment and intimidation of plaintiffs' agents and intentional infliction of emotional distress upon plaintiffs' agents; assault upon plaintiffs' agents; willful destruction of plaintiffs' property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; unjust enrichment; false imprisonment; and any other applicable theory of law giving rise to a cause of action. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The circuit court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The circuit court dismissed all of Yacht Club's claims in relation to the claim(s) that Defendants made false representations to the Hancock County Board of Supervisors and/or Hancock County employees, finding that such allegations fell under the "Noerr-Pennington" doctrine, expressly adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The circuit court dismissed JRE's claims of slander of title, slander and/or defamation; harassment; assault; and false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress because each claim constituted an intentional tort and was barred under the statute of limitations. The circuit court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss as to JRE's claims for trespass; nuisance; tortious interference with use of property; tortious interference with contractual relationships; willful destruction of property; negligence; gross, willful, and wanton negligence; malicious prosecution; and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs thereafter petitioned for an interlocutory appeal. Because the Supreme Court found that Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion should have been converted into a motion for summary judgment, as provided in Rule 56 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, it reversed the circuit court's order granting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jourdan River Estates, LLC v. Favre" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance determined that Chancellor Talmadge Littlejohn has violated multiple Canons of Judicial Conduct. In March 2012, Chancellor Littlejohn modified a 2001 Agreed Order of Filiation and Support between Ronald Brooks and Janice Fields, and ordered Brooks to pay Fields $15,000 for an automobile for their child within ninety days, and $1,750 in attorney fees within sixty days. Brooks posted a supersedeas bond, which the chancery clerk approved, and appealed Chancellor Littlejohn’s order to this Court. Because he had posted the supersedeas bond, Brooks did not pay the sums ordered while the appeal was pending. Nevertheless, Fields filed a contempt complaint against Brooks. Chancellor Littlejohn acknowledged that Brooks had posted a supersedeas bond but nevertheless held him in contempt for his failure to pay and ordered him incarcerated until he paid the entire amount of $16,750. Brooks spent three days and two nights in jail. During his incarceration, he filed an emergency appeal with the Supreme Court, and the Court vacated the contempt finding and ordered Brooks released. The Commission filed its complaint against Chancellor Littlejohn, alleging violations of Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct. After a formal hearing, the Commission concluded that Chancellor Littlejohn had committed misconduct, and it recommended that the Supreme Court impose a $500 fine and a public reprimand, and assess costs associated with this proceeding. While the Supreme Court agreed with the Commission that Chancellor Littlejohn committed misconduct, it did not adopt the recommended sanctions. The Court found that Chancellor Littlejohn refused to take responsibility for his misconduct, and the recommended sanctions were not commensurate with sanctions imposed for similar misconduct in past cases. The Court suspended Chancellor Littlejohn from office for thirty days without pay, fined him $1,000, order that he be publicly reprimanded, and taxed him with the costs of these proceedings. View "Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Perf. v. Littlejohn" on Justia Law

After a federal court declared Mack Arthur King ineligible for the death penalty under "Atkins v. Virginia," the circuit court sentenced him to life without parole. King filed a motion objecting to being sentenced to life without parole, arguing that the only sentencing options available at the time he committed the crime were death and life. He argued that 1994 sentencing amendments which added life without parole as a sentencing option for capital murder could not properly be applied to him, because they would have violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Mississippi Constitutions. He also argued that his due-process rights would be violated if the circuit court applied Mississippi Code Section 99-19-107 to him. After review, the Supreme Court found that because Section 99-19-107 did not apply when an individual’s death sentence was rendered unconstitutional, King had to be resentenced to life, since death and life were the only two sentencing options available at the time he was convicted and originally sentenced. King’s sentence was vacated, and the case remanded for resentencing. View "King v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court of Copiah County convicted David Dickerson of capital murder, arson, and armed robbery. The jury sentenced him to death for the capital murder conviction; he was sentenced to twenty years for arson and forty years for armed robbery, to run consecutively. Dickerson appeals his convictions and death sentence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dickerson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law