Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Janet Olier was attacked and chased by a domestic goose in Donna Bailey's yard. In attempting to flee, she fell and broke her arm. Olier sued Bailey under a theory of premises liability and, alternatively, under the "dangerous propensity" rule. The trial court granted summary judgment because it found that Olier was a licensee on Bailey's property and that Bailey did not breach her duty of care toward Olier. It also denied relief under the dangerous-propensity rule because there was no evidence that the particular goose that bit Olier ever had exhibited dangerous propensities prior to the incident. Olier appealed to the Circuit Court, which affirmed. Olier then filed this appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held that, while Olier could not, as a matter of law, pursue her claim under her theory of general premises liability, she could proceed under the dangerous propensity theory. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Olier v. Bailey" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the tax sale of a piece of property located in the City of Horn Lake in DeSoto County. Until August 2003, Millennium of Mississippi, LLC, owned the property in question. On August 4, 2003, Millennium conveyed the property to DeSoto County Development, LLC, by warranty deed. At that time, DeSoto Development granted Marshall Investments Corporation, and Fred Spencer, as trustee, a deed of trust lien and mortgage on the property. Marshall Investments then appointed Franklin Childress Jr., Spencer Clift III, and K. David Waddell as substitute trustees for the deed of trust. Subsequently, DeSoto Development defaulted on its mortgage, and Marshall Investments foreclosed on the property. Marshall Investments purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and, in December 2007, executed a substitute trustee's deed to MIC-Rocky, LLC. DeSoto County and the City of Horn Lake levied $520,508 in ad valorem taxes on the property for the tax year ending December 31, 2007. These taxes were never paid and became delinquent on February 1, 2008. The property was offered for sale at public auction by the DeSoto County tax collector on August 25, 2008, to collect the delinquent taxes. SASS Muni-V, LLC was the successful bidder at the auction. No purported property owner or lienholder attempted to redeem the property within the two-year statutory redemption period. Approximately a year after the expiration of the redemption period, SASS filed a complaint in DeSoto County Chancery Court, asking the court to declare the tax sale void and to order a refund of the purchase price. SASS Muni-V appealed the Chancery Court's order dismissing its complaint seeking to void its 2008 tax-sale purchase of real property. Because the trial court erred in finding that SASS Muni-V lacked standing to pursue its claims, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of SASS's complaint and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Sass Muni-V, LLC v. DeSoto County" on Justia Law

Abutting landowners Clyde Gunn, D. Neil Harris, and Vecie Harris, filed suit to confirm title to a sand beach located to the south of a road and seawall in Ocean Springs. The State, Jackson County, and the City of Ocean Springs claimed title to the same land. The lower court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Gunn and Neil and Vecie Harris, and found that the sand beach was not public trust tidelands. The chancellor then vested title to the sand beach in fee simple in Gunn and Harris, subject to prescriptive easements to the City and County for maintenance. The court held the State, County, and City failed to prove adverse possession or public prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. The court found that the County had a prescriptive easement in maintaining the sand beach for seawall protection and the City had a prescriptive easement for road maintenance. The court denied the City's Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment or in the Alternative for New Trial. The State, County, and City each appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by its omission of certain evidence, and in its interpretation of case and statutory authority. Accordingly, summary judgment was improvidently granted. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hosemann v. Harris" on Justia Law

Robert Terrell was indicted on twenty counts of mail fraud, conspiracy to commit mail fraud, fraudulent use of identity, conspiracy to commit fraudulent use of identity, timber theft, conspiracy to commit timber theft, false pretense, and conspiracy to commit false pretense. Terrell filed six motions to quash, consolidate, or dismiss various counts. The trial court denied the motions. Terrell appealed, claiming double jeopardy and that the trial court erred by not staying his trial. The State argued that Terrell’s appeal was not properly before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Terrell v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Sherwood Brown of one count of capital murder and two counts of murder and sentenced him to death. The Court granted Brown’s successive petition for post-conviction relief and allowed Brown to proceed in the trial court on his claim that he was mentally retarded and exempt from execution. After a hearing, the trial court held that Brown had failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he was mentally retarded. Brown appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the trial judge heard the testimony, considered the testimony and evidence presented, followed the applicable case law procedure, and applied the correct legal standard for determining whether Brown was mentally retarded. Giving deference to the trial judge as the finder of fact, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Brown v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A nursing home employee filed a wrongful-discharge suit more than a year after she claimed she was fired for reporting suspected patient abuse. Although wrongful-discharge suits in Mississippi generally must be based upon written employment contracts, she the employee claimed her suit falls under the public-policy exceptions this Court announced in "McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., Inc" The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether (as the employee argued) her wrongful discharge suit was governed by the general three-year statute of limitations governing torts, or (as the nursing home argued) it was governed by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to unwritten employment contracts. The trial court held "McArn" wrongful discharge claims are tort actions, subject to the general three-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court agreed. View "Community Care Center of Aberdeen v. Barrentine" on Justia Law

Greater Fairview Missionary Baptist Church’s pastor, Danny Ray Hollins, was placed on paid administrative leave after he was accused of inappropriate sexual contact with a minor. The church decided to hold a vote on whether to retain Hollins as pastor. That vote originally was scheduled to take place in early 2013. But tensions arose in the church about Hollins’s status, giving rise to a “chaotic situation,” and the vote did not take place as planned. Instead, the church voted to allow the Deacons’ Ministry to form a legal committee and to hire outside legal counsel for assistance in resolving the internal conflict. On March 1, 2013, the day before the vote, Hollins filed a petition with the Chancery Court seeking “to enjoin any unauthorized and improper meetings and/or actions taken outside a properly called membership meeting.” The petition named the church and five deacons as defendants. Hollins asserted that the church planned to have a meeting on March 2 “to vote on a resolution discharging [him] as pastor.” He claimed that the vote would be invalid because (1) “there ha[d] been no certification of the list of members in good standing who would be entitled to vote . . .”; (2) absent such certification, adequate notice to eligible members could not be accomplished; and (3) the state denominational guidelines had not been followed because “there ha[d] been no attempts at Conciliation or other notice given to Plaintiff as pastor as required.” Hollins also claimed that he would be irreparably harmed if he was “voted out as Pastor,” in that his reputation would suffer, he would lose his income, and he would suffer emotionally. Finally, Hollins asserted that there was “a high likelihood [that he would succeed] in the merits of his case, namely that any meeting of church membership without proper certification of voter rolls and notice and adherence to all established guidelines is void . . . .” Hollins’s counsel certified that a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) was needed, that he had been unable to notice the defendants, that the defendants would not be prejudiced by the TRO, and that on “information and belief [the church] is not represented by counsel duly hired by the church membership.” The chancellor issued the TRO, "apparently without reading it." Five deacons and the church were named as defendants, the TRO was served on only four of the deacons (the agent for service of process for the church was deceased and could not be served). The TRO purported to enjoin “any membership meeting,” but the chancellor later explained it was intended to “restrain any vote that may take place.” The chancellor issued the TRO, but the church voted anyway and dismissed Hollins. The chancellor then vacated the vote and ordered the church to conduct another vote, this time with certain court-ordered procedures regarding notice, eligibility, vote-counting, and security. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for interlocutory appeal, and vacated Chancery Court’s orders in this case. Because Hollins’s request for a TRO presented a purely ecclesiastical controversy, the chancery court was without jurisdiction to hear it. As such, the Chancery Court erred in issuing the TRO and in vacating the vote and ordering a new one. View "Greater Fairview Missionary Baptist Church v. Hollins" on Justia Law

Lamar County wanted to withdraw from the Pat Harrison Waterway District, but a dispute arose over how much money the County needed to pay to get out. The chancery court found that Lamar County owed $337,088, excluding the District’s perpetual park operating and maintenance obligations as “contractual obligations . . . that are outstanding” under the statute. Finding no reversible error with the chancery court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pat Harrison Waterway District v. Lamar County" on Justia Law

Willie Kinzie sued Belk Department Stores, L.P., Belk, Inc., David Flowers, Shanay Grant, Kathy Coffey, Donald Smith, Nikki Daggins, Ray Faja, Staffmark Investment, LLC, and John Does 1-5 (Belk Defendants) for injuries he sustained while unloading a trailer that had transported merchandise to a Belk retail store. The trial court dismissed Kinzie’s lawsuit with prejudice, finding that Kinzie had misrepresented his injuries during discovery. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case, holding that Kinzie had not misrepresented his injuries and that the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice was not warranted. "Dismissal is appropriate only under the most extreme circumstances and only where lesser sanctions will not suffice." The Supreme Court, after review, concluded that this was not an extreme case, and lesser sanctions could deter misleading responses without dismissing Kinzie’s claims altogether. The Court therefore affirmed that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals which held that dismissal with prejudice was not warranted. However, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ finding that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that Kinzie had committed a discovery violation. The Court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for trial. View "Kinzie v. Belk Department Stores, L.P." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Lawrence Byrd appealed his conviction for manslaughter and the twenty-year sentence he received. Byrd's appellate counsel certified to the Supreme Court that the record presented no arguable issues for appeal, but filing pro se, defendant argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Finding no merit to any of defendant's issues on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Byrd v. Mississippi" on Justia Law