Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

More than three years after learning his insurance policy had expired and his agent had not procured a replacement, Joe Tally sued his insurance agent, Ronald McMorris, claiming he “breached a standard of care recognized in the State of Mississippi to the insured for not notifying [him] of the cancellation of [his insurance] policy.” Because Tally failed to bring his claims within the three-year statute of limitations, his claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s denial of McMorris’s motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment in his favor. View "McMorris v. Tally" on Justia Law

The City of Richland began enforcing a zoning ordinance that regulated nonconforming uses, and as a result, prohibited Cleveland MHC, LLC from replacing mobile homes that were removed from its property. The circuit court upheld the City’s decision, and Cleveland MHC appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. The City petitioned for certiorari review. The Supreme Court found that the City’s interpretation of the nonconforming use ordinance in its July 2011 resolution was both arbitrary and capricious and violated Cleveland MHC’s constitutional right to enjoy its property. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The circuit court's decision was reversed and remanded. View "Cleveland MHC, LLC v. City of Richland" on Justia Law

The DeSoto County School District entered into a contract with a private entity called the Mississippi High School Activities Association (“MHSAA”). The terms of the contract allowed MHSAA to decide whether School District students were eligible to play high school sports. In making its decisions, MHSAA applied its own rules and regulations, and neither the School District nor its school board had input into the process. In 2012, R.T. was a star quarterback for Wynne Public School in Wynne, Arkansas. His parents, the Trails, decided that a change of school districts would be in R.T.’s best interests, so in January 2013 they bought a house in Olive Branch and enrolled R.T. in Olive Branch High School. Their daughter was to remain in Wynne until the school year ended. MHSAA determined that R.T. was eligible to compete in spring sports and allowed R.T. to play baseball. MHSAA conditioned R.T.’s continuing eligibility on the Trails’ daughter also enrolling in the School District at the start of the 2013-2014 school year. But, because the Trails’ daughter did not want to leave her friends behind in Arkansas, the family decided that one parent would stay in Arkansas with their daughter, as they had done during the spring semester, and the other parent would move to Mississippi and remain with R.T. On the eve of the 2013 football season, MHSAA notified the school and R.T. that, under its interpretation of its rules and regulations, R.T. was ineligible to play because it had determined that his family had not made a bona fide move to the School District. Neither the School District nor Olive Branch High School appealed through MHSAA’s internal procedure, so the Trails immediately filed a petition for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction in the DeSoto County Chancery Court. The chancellor signed an ex-parte order granting the TRO and revoking MHSAA’s adverse eligibility determination. "While it generally is true that high school students have no legally protected right to participate in high school athletics,25 once a school decides to create a sports program and establish eligibility rules, the school—or as in this case, MHSAA—has a duty to follow those rules; and it may be held accountable when it does not do so. . . . And where, as here, the school delegates its authority to control student eligibility through a contract with a private entity, we hold that students directly affected by the contract are third-party beneficiaries of that contract. For us to say otherwise would run contrary to the very reason for extracurricular activities, which is to enrich the educational experience of the students." R.T. had standing to challenge MHSAA's eligibility decision that prevented him from playing high school sports. The Court affirmed the chancery court in this case, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mississippi High School Activities Association, Inc. v. R.T." on Justia Law

After Nekole Bennett and her children suffered personal injuries during a home-invasion robbery, they filed this premises-liability action against their apartment complex (Highland Park) and the complex's manager (Sharon Sampson). The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' failure to provide adequate security measures at Highland Park proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries in the robbery. To support that claim, the plaintiffs designated John Tisdale as an expert in security measures. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs' expert testimony failed to establish a triable issue on proximate causation. The Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment and affirmed the circuit judge's refusal to recuse. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to expand on the Court of Appeals' analysis on the summary-judgment issue, and to explain why the expert testimony created a triable issue. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and reversed the trial court judgment and remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Bennett v. Highland Park Apartments, LLC" on Justia Law

Jordan Davis was indicted for one count of auto theft, one count of grand larceny of a tractor, and one count of receiving stolen property concerning the same tractor. Davis was acquitted of auto theft and grand larceny but convicted of receiving stolen property. On appeal, the State confessed error because Claiborne County's dual charges against Davis for stealing and receiving the same property violated Mississippi Code Section 97-17-70(3)(a). The Court of Appeals reversed the receiving-stolen-property conviction, but remanded for further proceedings. Under Section 97-17-70(3)(a), when a defendant can be charged with either stealing or receiving the same property, the State must opt to charge the defendant with either stealing or receiving the property. Thus, he could not be retried for receiving the property under the plain terms of Section 97-17-70(3)(a). The Court of Appeals erred by remanding for further proceedings rather than rendering judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Claiborne County and rendered judgment in Davis's favor. View "Davis v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In, 2008, emergency personnel responded to reports of a house fire in Biloxi. In their efforts to extinguish the flames, firefighters discovered the remains of a human body in a bedroom of the house. Dental records would later identify the body as thirty-seven-year-old Michelle Lynn Craite. Craite's autopsy revealed multiple stab wounds to her back in addition to severe burns that destroyed her flesh down to the bone. Evidence indicated that Craite was still alive and breathing during the fire. A forensic pathologist opined that the stab wounds likely were the cause of Craite's death, however, he noted that the stab wounds also incapacitated Craite so that she could not escape from the fire. A Harrison County jury found Timothy Ronk guilty of capital murder of Craite and sentenced him to death. The jury also found Ronk guilty of armed robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment. Ronk appealed his convictions and sentences to the Supreme Court. Finding no error in the culpability phase or in the sentencing phase, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ronk v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The conservators of Soon San Pak's estate filed suit against their two attorneys, Harrison County, the Harrison County Chancery Clerk, John McAdams, and the guardian ad litem appointed for Mrs. Pak, after the previously appointed conservator, Woodrow W. Pringle III, embezzled money from the estate. The claims were dismissed when the circuit court found that the applicable statutes of limitation had lapsed. The conservators appealed. McAdams cross-appealed, asserting that the trial court improperly held that the conservators asserted a Section 1983 claim by implication against him and that Pringle was a state actor for whom McAdams and Harrison County could be vicariously liable. In affirming the circuit court, the Supreme Court concluded that the Conservators should have discovered, by reasonable diligence, that Pringle was misappropriating funds from the estate no later than January 24, 2008, when the coconservators (using due diligence) would have received an accounting and bank statements regarding Pak's estate, and would have “by reasonable diligence. . . discovered the injury.” The statute of limitations issue was not a question of fact for the jury because reasonable minds could not differ as to when the Conservators knew or should have known of Pringle's failure to file an accounting and, thus, Harrison County's and McAdams's failure in requiring an accounting to be filed. Based on the circuit court record, the trial court properly held that the Conservators' claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. View "Benvenutti v. McAdams" on Justia Law

Kyle and Marla Moore timely filed a medical malpractice suit against St. Dominic Hospital, Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic, and several physicians, claiming that the physicians and hospital had been negligent in treating Kyle in May 2004. Kyle complained of lower back pain. Kyle was diagnosed with an epidural abscess. Kyle went to the emergency room at St. Dominic on the morning of May 23, 2004; within a 24-hour period, Kyle was seen by a series of doctors at the hospital before getting an operation on May 24. The Moores contended that surgery should have been done sooner and that the delay in treatment resulted in neurological injury to Kyle. In March 2011, the Moores added Dr. Howard Holaday as a defendant. Dr. Holaday moved for summary judgment, asserting that the two-year statute of limitations had expired. The trial court denied summary judgment, and Dr. Holaday petitioned the Supreme Court for an interlocutory appeal. The issue this appeal presented for the Court's review was whether the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations against Dr. Holaday. The Court held that whether the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations required a determination by the trier of fact (here, the jury) regarding the “date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first discovered.” The trial court, therefore, properly denied summary judgment to Dr. Holaday. View "Holaday v. Moore" on Justia Law

Michael Taylor was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to five years. In 2007, Michelle Finney arrived at a child’s birthday party and parked her car on the street, blocking Taylor’s car in a driveway. An argument and fistfight ensued. After bystanders broke up the fight, Taylor shot Finney in the arm and fled. Two days later, Taylor was at friend’s house when law enforcement officers arrived to execute unrelated arrest warrants. Taylor was detained after he tried to flee out a window in the back of the house. An investigator noticed a black coat on the couch, which Taylor claimed. Upon discovering a handgun and narcotics in the jacket, the officers arrested Taylor for possessing the narcotics and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Later that day, police obtained an arrest warrant for Taylor’s alleged aggravated assault on Finney. On appeal, Taylor’s counsel filed a "Lindsey" brief, stating that she had identified no appealable issues. After an independent review of the record and the briefs, the Supreme Court concluded that there were no reversible issues. View "Taylor v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Vincent Castigliola, a Mississippi resident, bought a yacht in Florida from Mark Fallon, an Ohio resident. Fallon, who is not in the business of buying or selling boats, sold the boat to Castigliola, who also is not in the boat trade. This transaction involved marketing services from Galati Yacht Sales, a yacht broker, which Fallon hired. Castigliola did not pay sales tax on the boat in Florida or use tax in Mississippi. Aggrieved, MDOR audited Castigliola and subsequently assessed use tax and penalties regarding the boat purchase, totaling $7,588. Castigliola challenged the tax, exhausted his administrative remedies without relief, and ultimately appealed to the Chancery Court. Before the chancery court, Castigliola filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the sale was a casual sale and therefore not subject to Mississippi use tax. The Court denied his motion, and Castigliola appealed. This case presented two issues: (1) who has the burden to prove use tax is applicable to a transaction; and (2) does the use of a broker make a casual sale taxable? The Supreme Court held that: (1) the Department of Revenue (MDOR) had the burden to prove that a tax applied, and the taxpayer had the burden to prove an exemption from tax applied; and (2) casual sales are excluded from sales and use tax in Mississippi. In this case, because MDOR’s argument for taxation was not supported by its own regulations and relied on an improper and erroneous application of Florida law, the Supreme Court found MDOR’s position was arbitrary and capricious. Furthermore, MDOR admitted the sale was from one individual to another, not in the ordinary course of business. Accordingly, the Court reversed summary judgment and render judgment in favor of Castigliola. View "Castigliola v. Mississippi Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law