Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Joe Cook was convicted on two counts of sexual battery on his girlfriend’s daughter and for one count of directing or causing a felony to be committed by the girlfriend’s son. Cook was sentenced as an habitual offender to a life sentence for each of the two sexual battery counts and to twenty years for the single count of causing a felony to be committed by a minor. The three sentences were made to run concurrently. Cook argued on appeal that the children’s statements to a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) constituted inadmissible hearsay, that the children’s statements to their great-grandmother and to a forensic interviewer constituted inadmissible hearsay, and that the trial court erred by sentencing him as an habitual offender. Finding no merit to Cooks arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. View "Cook v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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A domestic dispute led a justice court judge to issue an arrest warrant for T.D., and then cancel the warrant after she complied with the judge’s order to attend an anger-management course. However, because the justice court clerk failed to send a cancellation notice to the local sheriff’s office, DeSoto County deputies later arrested T.D. and held her in jail until they discovered the mistake. Plaintiffs sued DeSoto County for the clerk’s negligence. DeSoto County moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The circuit judge denied that motion, and DeSoto County appealed. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that, for the negligent act complained of in this case, the county has immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The Court reversed the trial court’s failure to grant summary judgment, and rendered a judgment in DeSoto County’s favor. View "DeSoto County v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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In its prosecution of Larry Collier for selling controlled substances, the State called a seasoned felon-turned-confidential-police-informant who provided untruthful testimony about previous criminal convictions, and whom the trial court refused to allow the defendant to fully cross-examine about those prior criminal convictions. Although the trial court erred in limiting the cross-examination, the Supreme Court found that, in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, the error was harmless. View "Collier v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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The narrow question presented by this case for the Supreme Court's review was whether the expungement of a misdemeanor, fourth-degree, sexual-offense conviction in another state by the court that entered the conviction entitled the petitioner to relief from his duty to register as a sex offender in Mississippi. The Circuit Court denied the requested relief. But, because expungement of a conviction requires the courts to “restore one to the status occupied prior thereto,” the Supreme Court reversed. View "Stallworth v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Jamil Chancellor was convicted by jury of armed robbery and armed carjacking. He was sentenced to twenty-five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) with ten years suspended on each count and the sentences to run concurrently. He was sentenced to an additional five years pursuant to the gun-enhancement statute. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Chancellor appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed Chancellor’s convictions and sentences. View "Chancellor v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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At trial, a defendant referred to a document that should have been produced in discovery but was not. In view of this revelation, the plaintiff filed two post-trial motions: one asking for new trial, judgment as a matter of law, or to reconsider; and one asking for sanctions for the discovery violation. The trial judge granted the motion for a new trial and recused from it, but he declined to rule on the sanctions issue, leaving that open for the next judge to determine. The defendants subsequently admitted liability, leaving damages the sole issue for the new trial. Plaintiff appealed, claiming the trial judge ruled on the case after he had recused from it. The plaintiff also argued that the trial court abused its discretion by not granting judgment as a matter of law as a sanction for alleged discovery violations. Finding no merit in either argument, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barnes v. Jefferson Davis Cty Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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Janet Olier was attacked and chased by a domestic goose in Donna Bailey's yard. In attempting to flee, she fell and broke her arm. Olier sued Bailey under a theory of premises liability and, alternatively, under the "dangerous propensity" rule. The trial court granted summary judgment because it found that Olier was a licensee on Bailey's property and that Bailey did not breach her duty of care toward Olier. It also denied relief under the dangerous-propensity rule because there was no evidence that the particular goose that bit Olier ever had exhibited dangerous propensities prior to the incident. Olier appealed to the Circuit Court, which affirmed. Olier then filed this appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held that, while Olier could not, as a matter of law, pursue her claim under her theory of general premises liability, she could proceed under the dangerous propensity theory. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Olier v. Bailey" on Justia Law

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This appeal arose out of the tax sale of a piece of property located in the City of Horn Lake in DeSoto County. Until August 2003, Millennium of Mississippi, LLC, owned the property in question. On August 4, 2003, Millennium conveyed the property to DeSoto County Development, LLC, by warranty deed. At that time, DeSoto Development granted Marshall Investments Corporation, and Fred Spencer, as trustee, a deed of trust lien and mortgage on the property. Marshall Investments then appointed Franklin Childress Jr., Spencer Clift III, and K. David Waddell as substitute trustees for the deed of trust. Subsequently, DeSoto Development defaulted on its mortgage, and Marshall Investments foreclosed on the property. Marshall Investments purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and, in December 2007, executed a substitute trustee's deed to MIC-Rocky, LLC. DeSoto County and the City of Horn Lake levied $520,508 in ad valorem taxes on the property for the tax year ending December 31, 2007. These taxes were never paid and became delinquent on February 1, 2008. The property was offered for sale at public auction by the DeSoto County tax collector on August 25, 2008, to collect the delinquent taxes. SASS Muni-V, LLC was the successful bidder at the auction. No purported property owner or lienholder attempted to redeem the property within the two-year statutory redemption period. Approximately a year after the expiration of the redemption period, SASS filed a complaint in DeSoto County Chancery Court, asking the court to declare the tax sale void and to order a refund of the purchase price. SASS Muni-V appealed the Chancery Court's order dismissing its complaint seeking to void its 2008 tax-sale purchase of real property. Because the trial court erred in finding that SASS Muni-V lacked standing to pursue its claims, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of SASS's complaint and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Sass Muni-V, LLC v. DeSoto County" on Justia Law

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Abutting landowners Clyde Gunn, D. Neil Harris, and Vecie Harris, filed suit to confirm title to a sand beach located to the south of a road and seawall in Ocean Springs. The State, Jackson County, and the City of Ocean Springs claimed title to the same land. The lower court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Gunn and Neil and Vecie Harris, and found that the sand beach was not public trust tidelands. The chancellor then vested title to the sand beach in fee simple in Gunn and Harris, subject to prescriptive easements to the City and County for maintenance. The court held the State, County, and City failed to prove adverse possession or public prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. The court found that the County had a prescriptive easement in maintaining the sand beach for seawall protection and the City had a prescriptive easement for road maintenance. The court denied the City's Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment or in the Alternative for New Trial. The State, County, and City each appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion by its omission of certain evidence, and in its interpretation of case and statutory authority. Accordingly, summary judgment was improvidently granted. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hosemann v. Harris" on Justia Law

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Robert Terrell was indicted on twenty counts of mail fraud, conspiracy to commit mail fraud, fraudulent use of identity, conspiracy to commit fraudulent use of identity, timber theft, conspiracy to commit timber theft, false pretense, and conspiracy to commit false pretense. Terrell filed six motions to quash, consolidate, or dismiss various counts. The trial court denied the motions. Terrell appealed, claiming double jeopardy and that the trial court erred by not staying his trial. The State argued that Terrell’s appeal was not properly before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Terrell v. Mississippi" on Justia Law