Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Carl Cook was convicted of misdemeanor driving under the influence (“DUI”), first offense. Cook appealed to the County Court of Rankin County. At a trial de novo before the county court, Cook’s counsel moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the investigatory stop which led to Cook’s arrest was an illegal search and seizure because it was based on an anonymous tip that lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. The county court denied the motion and entered a judgment of conviction. Cook then appealed to the Rankin County Circuit Court, and the circuit court affirmed the county court’s conviction. Cook appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court, and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals. Finding that the investigatory stop was legally justified, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Rankin County. Having granted Cook’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether the stop violated Cook’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in finding that reasonable suspicion to stop Cook existed in this case. The judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Rankin County Circuit Court affirming Cook’s conviction were both reversed. Without the evidence gathered as a result of the stop, the evidence against Cook was insufficient to sustain a DUI conviction. As such, the Supreme Court reversed and rendered a judgment of acquittal. View "Cook v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Ronald Hartfield of conspiracy to murder his wife but acquitted him of her murder. The circuit court sentenced Hartfield to twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Hartfield appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial based on the trial court’s exclusion of a coconspirator’s letters offered as statements against her penal interest. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for certiorari to address that issue. After review, the Court found that the letters were not against the coconspirator’s penal interest and that they were properly excluded by the trial court. Because the Court of Appeals did not address Hartfield’s arguments on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s denial of one of Hartfield’s peremptory challenges, the Court ruled on those issues: (1) the trial court’s denial of the peremptory challenge was not clearly erroneous; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Hartfield’s guilt of conspiracy; and (3) that the verdict of guilt was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. View "Hartfield v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Jerome Totten was tried and convicted in 2013 for burglary of a dwelling and grand larceny. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to terms of twenty-five and ten years respectively, to be served concurrently. Totten argued on appeal that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that the actual fair market value of the items stolen in the burglary equals or exceeds $500, thereby not supporting the conviction for grand larceny. After review, the Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence presented of the value of the items was sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that the value of the items equaled at least $500. Totten also filed a pro se supplemental brief, challenging his burglary conviction in addition to the conviction for grand larceny. The Supreme Court found no merit to his challenge, and therefore affirmed his convictions. View "Totten v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 1982, Antonio Williams pled guilty to two counts of burglary. The trial judge sentenced him to three years' imprisonment on one count, and five years' imprisonment on the other. Then, in 1987, a jury convicted Williams of murder. The trial judge sentenced him to life without parole as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81, based on his two prior burglary convictions. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Williams' murder conviction in 1990. In 2012, Williams filed a motion for post-conviction relief, for the first time challenging his burglary convictions. Williams argued that "during the entry of his guilty pleas," he was "denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel." Specifically, Williams argued that his counsel failed to inform him of an alleged speedy-trial violation before advising him to plead guilty to one of the counts. Williams also argued that his trial counsel "used coercion by promising [him] a suspended sentence" in the second count, when a suspended sentence allegedly was not statutorily available. Williams concluded that, because of the alleged Sixth Amendment violation, his guilty pleas could not "be considered to have been given voluntarily and intelligently." The circuit judge summarily denied Williams' motion, stating that "it plainly appears from the face of the motion, exhibits and prior proceedings in this case, that [Williams] is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief." The circuit judge did not elaborate on his reasons for the denial, but the Supreme Court gathered from the language of his order that the denial was on the merits. It was also clear to the Court that from Williams' motion that he was challenging his burglary convictions and not his murder conviction. Rather than reviewing Williams' appeal on the merits, the Court of Appeals found that the circuit court had lacked jurisdiction to entertain Williams' motion, because he had not obtained permission from the Supreme Court prior to filing there. As such, the Court of Appeals found that it, too, lacked jurisdiction and dismissed Williams' appeal. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with Williams that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear his motion, but found that the circuit judge did not err when he denied it. View "Williams v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 1992, Clarence Jones pleaded guilty to murder for which he was sentenced to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Jones' sentence was indefinitely suspended in 2004 by Governor Musgrove. He was released from prison on parole. In 2008, Governor Barbour granted Jones a pardon. In 2013, Jones moved the Circuit Court to expunge his record because he had received a pardon for his conviction. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Jones' request to have his record expunged, finding that expungements were a creature of statute and that the Legislature has not included "receiving pardons" as grounds for expungement eligibility. Jones then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error in the Circuit Court's analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jones v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the grant of summary judgment and a final judgment against Melanie Bosarge. The trial court found that Bosarge was individually liable for the deficiency balance after foreclosure under the terms of a personal guaranty she executed in relation to a secured loan made to her company, Indian Head Station, LLC ("Indian Head"). On appeal, Bosarge argued that a material issue of fact existed, inter alia, as to the value of the property securing the debt, that LWC MS Properties, LLC (LWC) should not have been permitted to maintain suit as a dissolved corporation, and that Bosarge should have been allowed to amend her pleadings and answer under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that material facts indeed existed, and reversed and remanded the case with respect to summary judgment. Further, the Court found the second and third issues should have been addressed by the trial court upon remand. View "Bosarge v. LWC MS Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Bronwyn Benoist Parker and William Benoist were siblings who litigated the will of their father, Billy Dean "B.D." Benoist. 2010, B.D. executed a will which significantly altered the distributions that were in a previous will that B.D. had executed in 1998. Bronwyn alleged that William had unduly influenced their father, who was suffering from dementia and drug addiction, into making the new will, which included a forfeiture clause that revoked benefits to any named beneficiary who contested the will. Bronwyn lost the will contest and her benefits under the new will were revoked by the trial court. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Mississippi law should recognize a good faith and probable-cause exception to a forfeiture in terrorem clause in a will. The Court held that it should, and that Bronwyn had sufficiently shown that her suit was brought in good faith and was founded upon probable cause. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the chancery court that excluded Bronwyn from the will, and entered judgment in her favor to allow her to inherit in accordance with her father's 2010 will. Because the chancellor applied the wrong legal standard, the Court reversed the chancellor's decision to allow William to continue as executor and remanded for a determination of whether a temporary executor should be appointed. View "Parker v. Benoist" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review stems from a dispute between Sheriff Tyrone Lewis of Hinds County and the judges' chambers of the Hinds County Circuit Court over the role of bailiffs. Lewis attempted to make hiring, firing, and compensation changes affecting bailiffs. In response, the circuit court issued an Order and Opinion in 2012 upholding a previous Order from 1996. The 1996 Order stated that, in several respects, further detailed below, bailiffs fell under the authority of the judiciary rather than the sheriff. Lewis filed a Motion for Relief, and the circuit court subsequently issued another order, granting the power to compensate bailiffs to the sheriff only if he follows the terms of the 1996 Order. Lewis appealed. The Supreme Court held that the 1996 Order and the 2012 Order and Opinion were void in part to the extent they directly violated the Constitution and statutory law. View "Lewis v. Hinds County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Zachary Barnes was convicted of burglary of a dwelling and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, with twenty years to serve and five years' post-release supervision. He appealed that conviction to the Supreme Court, arguing that his statement to the fire investigator should have been suppressed and that at trial, his request to instruct the jury on trespass should have been granted. After review, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge should have granted his trespass instruction. Therefore, the Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Barnes v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Ted Boroujerdi’s home and yard were flooded with sewage that backed onto his property in February 2009. Boroujerdi sued the City of Starkville, alleging that he had suffered property damage and personal injuries as a result of the City’s negligent maintenance of its sewage system. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the maintenance of the sewage system is a discretionary function and that the City was immune from suit pursuant to statute and Supreme Court precedent, "Fortenberry v. City of Jackson," (71 So. 3d 1196 (Miss. 2011)). Boroujerdi appealed, arguing that the maintenance of the sewage system was ministerial and the City is not immune from suit, that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate, and that this Court should overrule its plurality opinion in Fortenberry. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. Recently, in "Brantley v. City of Horn Lake," (152 So. 3d 1106 (Miss. 2014)), the Supreme Court overhauled its analysis of discretionary function immunity. Accordingly, the Court revisited the issue of sewage-system maintenance as a discretionary function. The Court held that, while the overall function of maintaining a sewage system may be discretionary, certain narrower functions and duties involved with sewage maintenance may be rendered ministerial through applicable statutes, regulations, and/or ordinances. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case back to the trial court for plaintiff to address whether his premises flooded as a result of the City’s fulfilling or its failing to fulfill a ministerial function or duty. View "Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville" on Justia Law