Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The Mississippi Department of Transportation hired Joe McGee Construction Company, Inc., for a road construction and bridge replacement project. The Department designed the temporary traffic control plan for the project, which provided for the placement of temporary traffic signs. McGee Construction then subcontracted with Riverside Traffic Systems, Inc. for the placement of the signs leading up to and around the site. Hattie Brown drove down the closed portion of Highway 245 and collided with a stationary crane, resulting in her death. Responding Mississippi Highway Patrol Trooper Jonathan Ragan’s report stated Brown’s vehicle “collided with the barricade on the southbound lane and traveled approximately 200 yards colliding head on with a crane parked on a bridge.” His report also noted that “[t]here was adequate warning signage of the road being closed with barricades across both lanes” and that “[t]he southbound side barricade was destroyed.” Dianne Brown-Bowens, Hattie Brown’s daughter, filed a wrongful death suit against McGee Construction, and later amended the complaint to include the Department and Riverside as defendants, asserting claims of negligence and strict liability, and sought to recover punitive damages. McGee Construction moved for summary judgment, asserting it “provided legally sufficient notice to motorists, including [Hattie] Brown, that the section of Highway 245 South where the accident occurred was closed and that McGee Construction therefore, breached no duty owed to [Hattie] Brown” and that it was not negligent because none of its actions proximately caused the accident. The trial court entered an order granting Riverside’s motion for summary judgment and granting in part and denying in part the Department’s and McGee Construction’s motions for summary judgment, ruling that the Department’s and McGee Construction’s summary judgment motions were denied as to Brown-Bowens’s negligence claim but granted as to her claims for strict liability and for punitive damages. On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court, defendants argued the trial court erred by denying their motions for summary judgment because Brown-Bowens failed to present evidence that either party, by act or omission, contributed to the death of Hattie Brown. The Court agreed with this and reversed the trial court. View "Joe McGee Construction Company, Inc. v. Brown-Bowens" on Justia Law

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Le Papillon Homeowner’s Association Inc. sought to collect homeowners’ association fees from Loblolly Properties LLC for the nine lots it owned in the Le Papillon development. Loblolly argued that it did not have to pay HOA fees because a nonjudicial foreclosure sale extinguished all restrictive covenants on the subject lots. The trial court disagreed, finding that the covenants were on record when Loblolly purchased the subject lots in the Le Papillon property. The trial court also held that Loblolly’s Special Warranty Deed’s language clearly stated that the “conveyance and the warranty hereof is subject to any and all Covenants and Restrictions of record.” The trial court later granted summary judgment for Le Papillon. Loblolly appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether the foreclosure sale made the covenants and restrictions not binding, despite the language of the Special Warranty Deed; and (2) whether the foreclosure extinguished the covenants and restrictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that Loblolly was bound to the covenants through the language in the Special Warranty Deed and that the foreclosure did not extinguish the covenants and restrictions. Upon a review of the record and law in this state, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial and appellate courts. View "Loblolly Properties LLC v. Le Papillon Homeowner's Association Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Jackie and Debra Aycock sued the University of Mississippi Medical Center for medical negligence, alleging injuries Jackie suffered occurred as a result of the hospital’s negligence. The medical center sought summary judgment seeking dismissal of the negligence action based on the Aycocks’ failure to serve its chief executive officer with their notice of claim as required by Mississippi Code Section 11-46-11(2)(a)(ii) (Rev. 2019). The hospital argued that the Aycocks’ failure to serve proper notice resulted in the running of the one-year statute of limitations under Mississippi Code Section 11-46-11(3)(a) (Rev. 2019). The circuit court denied summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed. The hospital appealed. but the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of UMMC's motion for summary judgment. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Aycock" on Justia Law

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Larry Stuart was convicted of felony filming a person without her knowledge when she had an expectation of privacy. He was sentenced to serve five years, day for day, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, and he was ordered to register as a sex offender. He appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Stuart's conviction. View "Stuart v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Aggrieved by a chancellor’s decision, Pamela Brownlee (Pam) appeals to the Mississippi Supreme Court, averring that the chancellor erred by failing to extend in loco parentis visitation rights to her as a former live-in romantic partner. Jessica Powell had two children, A.M.P. and E.R.L., born to different fathers. A.M.P.’s father maintained no relationship with the child; E.R.L.’s father was an active parent in his child’s life. Pam and Jessica began their romantic relationship in early 2014, just before E.R.L.’s birth, and the couple lived together throughout their relationship until their breakup in 2019. Even though Pam and Jessica cohabited from 2014 to 2019, they did not marry. On December 19, 2019, approximately two months after the couple’s breakup in October 2019, Pam filed her Petition to Establish Custody and Visitation, in which Pam initially sought custody of E.R.L. and visitation with A.M.P. At the initial hearing in October 2020, Pam withdrew her request for custody of E.R.L., revising her request to seek only visitation with Jessica’s children under the doctrine of in loco parentis. Although the chancellor did not find any legal basis for Pam’s request, given her status as an unmarried non-parent and former live-in partner to the children’s natural mother. The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed: “we also recognize special circumstances exist…in which justice so requires and the child’s well-being demands a relationship with a person who has stood in loco parentis in his or her life. The floodgates are not open for any third party visitation if the circumstances do not rise to this level, but Pam deserves an opportunity, at least, to provide proof of whether she meets this ‘very limited, unique situation.’” View "Brownlee v. Powell, et al." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Katy Blagodirova and Jose Schrock married in November 2006 and had one child, J.R., in October 2007. In 2013 the couple filed a joint complaint for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The divorce agreement provided that Blagodirova had primary physical custody of the child subject to Schrock’s visitation. Schrock agreed to pay $500 monthly in child support payments. Following the divorce, Blagodirova began a romantic relationship with Andres Maldonado De La Rosa (Maldonado), J.R.’s soccer coach and an undocumented immigrant. Blagodirova and Maldonado married in August 2014, divorced in 2015 and remarried in 2018. While she worked, Blagodirova entrusted J.R.’s care to Maldonado. Maldonado testified that after remarrying Blagodirova, he obtained an illegal driver’s license to drive J.R. around. Blagodirova had not provided alternatives for childcare for J.R., and instead relied on Maldonado to care for the child despite her awareness that Maldonado could have been taken into custody and deported. Schrock filed to a modification of custody, requesting physical custody of J.R. and the termination of his child support obligation. He alleged there has been a material change in circumstances adverse to J.R.’s best interests. A chancery court granted Schrock’s petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Schrock appealed. Finding the chancellor’s decision to modify child custody was supported by substantial evidence, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and reinstated the chancery court’s judgment. View "Blagodirova v. Schrock" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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While responding to an emergency, City of Oxford Police Officer Matthew Brown collided with Patricia Phillips’s vehicle at an intersection. Phillips filed suit to recover for injuries suffered in the collision. After a bench trial, the circuit court found that Officer Brown did not act with reckless disregard in response to the emergency and determined that the City of Oxford was entitled to police-protection immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Phillips appealed; the Court of Appeals reversed. The majority of the appellate court held that the trial court’s finding that Officer Brown’s actions did not rise to the level of reckless disregard is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and that Oxford was not entitled to police-protection immunity. IThe dissent’s opinion said that the circuit court’s judgment was supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, the Court of Appeals lacked the power to disturb the trial judge’s findings. After its review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found the record contained substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the decision of the trial court. View "Phillips v. City of Oxford" on Justia Law

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Earl Young was indicted for gratification of lust and was sentenced to fifteen years without the possibility of parole as a habitual offender. The trial court held a sentencing hearing; prior to the hearing, a “Pre-Post Sentence Investigation” report was submitted to the court, containing a section detailing Young’s prior criminal record. The report did not contain any information regarding the length of Young’s prior sentences for these felony convictions or the dates on which the incidents took place. Based on the report, the court found that Young had been convicted of two prior felonies and, therefore, sentenced Young as a habitual offender. On appeal, Young challenged the sufficiency of both the indictment and the evidence presented at sentencing used as grounds for his sentence. The Mississippi Supreme Court found Young's indictment argument was not preserved for appeal: because the indictment was defective as to its form and could have been amended in the trial court, Young’s failure to object at trial waived the issue, and Young was barred from raising it for the first time on appeal. The Court found that the pre-post sentence investigation report only included generalities regarding Young’s alleged prior convictions. It did not specify the statutes under which Young was convicted, the term of any sentences or whether the convictions clearly arose out of separate incidents at different times. "In fact, that information is completely absent from the record in this case." Because the State failed to prove that Young had at least two prior felony convictions that were brought and arose out of separate incidents at different times and that Young was sentenced to separate terms of at least one year for the prior convictions, Young was improperly sentenced as a habitual offender. Therefore, the Court reversed Young’s habitual offender sentence and remanded the case for his resentencing as a nonhabitual offender. View "Young v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Daryl Redd was indicted on two counts of aggravated assault. A jury found Redd guilty of the first count—aggravated assault, causing bodily injury to April Stevenson by shooting her in the leg with a deadly weapon. The jury found Redd not guilty of the second count—aggravated assault, attempting to cause bodily injury to Jordan Gaston by shooting at him with a deadly weapon. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgments, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Redd's convictions and sentence. View "Redd v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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Aaron Mitchell shot and killed Marty Moore. Evidence indicated Moore was the initial aggressor, and Mitchell argued that he shot Moore in self-defense. Mitchell moved for the State to produce the autopsy report for Moore’s body. When it became clear that an autopsy report was not forthcoming because an autopsy had not been completed, Mitchell moved for an autopsy to be conducted, but the trial court denied his motion. The State’s representations on whether a partial or preliminary autopsy was performed were unclear and contradictory. Mitchell argued that the lack of autopsy violated his due process right to present a complete defense. Because the record did not contain sufficient information for it to make a determination that reversible error was committed, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Mitchell’s conviction. View "Mitchell v. Mississippi" on Justia Law