Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1992, Clarence Jones pleaded guilty to murder for which he was sentenced to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Jones' sentence was indefinitely suspended in 2004 by Governor Musgrove. He was released from prison on parole. In 2008, Governor Barbour granted Jones a pardon. In 2013, Jones moved the Circuit Court to expunge his record because he had received a pardon for his conviction. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied Jones' request to have his record expunged, finding that expungements were a creature of statute and that the Legislature has not included "receiving pardons" as grounds for expungement eligibility. Jones then appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error in the Circuit Court's analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jones v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the grant of summary judgment and a final judgment against Melanie Bosarge. The trial court found that Bosarge was individually liable for the deficiency balance after foreclosure under the terms of a personal guaranty she executed in relation to a secured loan made to her company, Indian Head Station, LLC ("Indian Head"). On appeal, Bosarge argued that a material issue of fact existed, inter alia, as to the value of the property securing the debt, that LWC MS Properties, LLC (LWC) should not have been permitted to maintain suit as a dissolved corporation, and that Bosarge should have been allowed to amend her pleadings and answer under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that material facts indeed existed, and reversed and remanded the case with respect to summary judgment. Further, the Court found the second and third issues should have been addressed by the trial court upon remand. View "Bosarge v. LWC MS Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

Bronwyn Benoist Parker and William Benoist were siblings who litigated the will of their father, Billy Dean "B.D." Benoist. 2010, B.D. executed a will which significantly altered the distributions that were in a previous will that B.D. had executed in 1998. Bronwyn alleged that William had unduly influenced their father, who was suffering from dementia and drug addiction, into making the new will, which included a forfeiture clause that revoked benefits to any named beneficiary who contested the will. Bronwyn lost the will contest and her benefits under the new will were revoked by the trial court. In this appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Mississippi law should recognize a good faith and probable-cause exception to a forfeiture in terrorem clause in a will. The Court held that it should, and that Bronwyn had sufficiently shown that her suit was brought in good faith and was founded upon probable cause. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the chancery court that excluded Bronwyn from the will, and entered judgment in her favor to allow her to inherit in accordance with her father's 2010 will. Because the chancellor applied the wrong legal standard, the Court reversed the chancellor's decision to allow William to continue as executor and remanded for a determination of whether a temporary executor should be appointed. View "Parker v. Benoist" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review stems from a dispute between Sheriff Tyrone Lewis of Hinds County and the judges' chambers of the Hinds County Circuit Court over the role of bailiffs. Lewis attempted to make hiring, firing, and compensation changes affecting bailiffs. In response, the circuit court issued an Order and Opinion in 2012 upholding a previous Order from 1996. The 1996 Order stated that, in several respects, further detailed below, bailiffs fell under the authority of the judiciary rather than the sheriff. Lewis filed a Motion for Relief, and the circuit court subsequently issued another order, granting the power to compensate bailiffs to the sheriff only if he follows the terms of the 1996 Order. Lewis appealed. The Supreme Court held that the 1996 Order and the 2012 Order and Opinion were void in part to the extent they directly violated the Constitution and statutory law. View "Lewis v. Hinds County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Zachary Barnes was convicted of burglary of a dwelling and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, with twenty years to serve and five years' post-release supervision. He appealed that conviction to the Supreme Court, arguing that his statement to the fire investigator should have been suppressed and that at trial, his request to instruct the jury on trespass should have been granted. After review, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge should have granted his trespass instruction. Therefore, the Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Barnes v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Ted Boroujerdi’s home and yard were flooded with sewage that backed onto his property in February 2009. Boroujerdi sued the City of Starkville, alleging that he had suffered property damage and personal injuries as a result of the City’s negligent maintenance of its sewage system. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the maintenance of the sewage system is a discretionary function and that the City was immune from suit pursuant to statute and Supreme Court precedent, "Fortenberry v. City of Jackson," (71 So. 3d 1196 (Miss. 2011)). Boroujerdi appealed, arguing that the maintenance of the sewage system was ministerial and the City is not immune from suit, that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate, and that this Court should overrule its plurality opinion in Fortenberry. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. Recently, in "Brantley v. City of Horn Lake," (152 So. 3d 1106 (Miss. 2014)), the Supreme Court overhauled its analysis of discretionary function immunity. Accordingly, the Court revisited the issue of sewage-system maintenance as a discretionary function. The Court held that, while the overall function of maintaining a sewage system may be discretionary, certain narrower functions and duties involved with sewage maintenance may be rendered ministerial through applicable statutes, regulations, and/or ordinances. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case back to the trial court for plaintiff to address whether his premises flooded as a result of the City’s fulfilling or its failing to fulfill a ministerial function or duty. View "Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville" on Justia Law

Thomas Blanton sought judicial review of certain rate increases approved by the Public Service Commission for Mississippi Power Company (“MPC”). An examination of controlling law and statutes, the Constitutions of the United States and Mississippi, and a comprehensive review of Commission proceedings revealed that Commission failed to comply with the language of the Base Load Act, inter alia, and exceeded its authority granted by the Act. The increased rates were achieved by including “mirror CWIP” in the rate base and rates. Following the inclusion of “mirror CWIP,” the Commission “approve[d] the retail revenue adjustment over 2013 and 2014 . . . allow[ing] the Company an annual rate designed to collect $125,000,000 for 2013, escalating to $156,000,000 in 2014. This represented a 15% and 3% increase, respectively.” The Supreme Court found that the increased rates on 186,000 South Mississippi ratepayers failed to comport with the Act or, otherwise, with Mississippi law. Accordingly, the order granting rate increases was reversed, and the matter remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Power Company, Inc. v. Mississippi Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

Attorneys representing the administratrix of an estate settled wrongful-death claims under two insurance policies without filing a wrongful-death lawsuit. The proceeds of the settlement of the first policy were distributed equally to the wrongful-death beneficiaries. The attorneys submitted the proceeds of the second policy to the chancery court and moved for an unequal distribution, arguing that two half-siblings should recover nothing or, if allowed to recover, less than the three other claimants. The chancellor determined that the half-siblings were entitled to recover, and that she had no authority to apportion the wrongful-death settlement proceeds unequally. She divided the proceeds equally among the wrongful-death beneficiaries after awarding attorneys’ fees of forty percent of the amount of recovery. Two of the beneficiaries argued that they should not have been required to pay attorneys’ fees because the attorneys had made numerous attempts to exclude them from any recovery, and then to reduce their share. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor’s determination that the half-siblings were entitled to an equal distribution but remanded for factual findings on the amount of attorneys’ fees they should be required to pay. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and the trial court that the proceeds must be equally divided. On the issue of attorney fees, four justices held that because the attorneys had an actual conflict of interest with the half-siblings and acted adverse to their interests; and because they could not satisfy the requirements for quantum meruit, they were not entitled to recover any attorneys’ fees from the half-siblings shares. Four justices would have affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Dane Richard Eubanks" on Justia Law

After divorce, a chancellor awarded physical custody of two minor children to their father. The mother appealed, claiming the guardian ad litem’s investigation was inadequate. Because after review, the Supreme Court found the chancellor’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, it affirmed. View "Gateley v. Gateley" on Justia Law

Sheila Ealey gave birth to a baby boy in a hotel room, wrapped the baby in a comforter, put him in a suitcase, and left the suitcase behind her church. A jury found her guilty of capital murder with the underlying felony of child abuse, and the circuit court sentenced her to life without parole. Among other things argued on appeal, Ealey argued that the trial court erred in refusing an accident-or-misfortune jury instruction and that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ealey v. Mississippi" on Justia Law