Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Zachary Barnes was convicted of burglary of a dwelling and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison, with twenty years to serve and five years' post-release supervision. He appealed that conviction to the Supreme Court, arguing that his statement to the fire investigator should have been suppressed and that at trial, his request to instruct the jury on trespass should have been granted. After review, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge should have granted his trespass instruction. Therefore, the Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Barnes v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Ted Boroujerdi’s home and yard were flooded with sewage that backed onto his property in February 2009. Boroujerdi sued the City of Starkville, alleging that he had suffered property damage and personal injuries as a result of the City’s negligent maintenance of its sewage system. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the maintenance of the sewage system is a discretionary function and that the City was immune from suit pursuant to statute and Supreme Court precedent, "Fortenberry v. City of Jackson," (71 So. 3d 1196 (Miss. 2011)). Boroujerdi appealed, arguing that the maintenance of the sewage system was ministerial and the City is not immune from suit, that summary judgment was therefore inappropriate, and that this Court should overrule its plurality opinion in Fortenberry. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. Recently, in "Brantley v. City of Horn Lake," (152 So. 3d 1106 (Miss. 2014)), the Supreme Court overhauled its analysis of discretionary function immunity. Accordingly, the Court revisited the issue of sewage-system maintenance as a discretionary function. The Court held that, while the overall function of maintaining a sewage system may be discretionary, certain narrower functions and duties involved with sewage maintenance may be rendered ministerial through applicable statutes, regulations, and/or ordinances. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case back to the trial court for plaintiff to address whether his premises flooded as a result of the City’s fulfilling or its failing to fulfill a ministerial function or duty. View "Boroujerdi v. City of Starkville" on Justia Law

Thomas Blanton sought judicial review of certain rate increases approved by the Public Service Commission for Mississippi Power Company (“MPC”). An examination of controlling law and statutes, the Constitutions of the United States and Mississippi, and a comprehensive review of Commission proceedings revealed that Commission failed to comply with the language of the Base Load Act, inter alia, and exceeded its authority granted by the Act. The increased rates were achieved by including “mirror CWIP” in the rate base and rates. Following the inclusion of “mirror CWIP,” the Commission “approve[d] the retail revenue adjustment over 2013 and 2014 . . . allow[ing] the Company an annual rate designed to collect $125,000,000 for 2013, escalating to $156,000,000 in 2014. This represented a 15% and 3% increase, respectively.” The Supreme Court found that the increased rates on 186,000 South Mississippi ratepayers failed to comport with the Act or, otherwise, with Mississippi law. Accordingly, the order granting rate increases was reversed, and the matter remanded to the Commission for further proceedings. View "Mississippi Power Company, Inc. v. Mississippi Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

Attorneys representing the administratrix of an estate settled wrongful-death claims under two insurance policies without filing a wrongful-death lawsuit. The proceeds of the settlement of the first policy were distributed equally to the wrongful-death beneficiaries. The attorneys submitted the proceeds of the second policy to the chancery court and moved for an unequal distribution, arguing that two half-siblings should recover nothing or, if allowed to recover, less than the three other claimants. The chancellor determined that the half-siblings were entitled to recover, and that she had no authority to apportion the wrongful-death settlement proceeds unequally. She divided the proceeds equally among the wrongful-death beneficiaries after awarding attorneys’ fees of forty percent of the amount of recovery. Two of the beneficiaries argued that they should not have been required to pay attorneys’ fees because the attorneys had made numerous attempts to exclude them from any recovery, and then to reduce their share. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor’s determination that the half-siblings were entitled to an equal distribution but remanded for factual findings on the amount of attorneys’ fees they should be required to pay. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and the trial court that the proceeds must be equally divided. On the issue of attorney fees, four justices held that because the attorneys had an actual conflict of interest with the half-siblings and acted adverse to their interests; and because they could not satisfy the requirements for quantum meruit, they were not entitled to recover any attorneys’ fees from the half-siblings shares. Four justices would have affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Dane Richard Eubanks" on Justia Law

After divorce, a chancellor awarded physical custody of two minor children to their father. The mother appealed, claiming the guardian ad litem’s investigation was inadequate. Because after review, the Supreme Court found the chancellor’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, it affirmed. View "Gateley v. Gateley" on Justia Law

Sheila Ealey gave birth to a baby boy in a hotel room, wrapped the baby in a comforter, put him in a suitcase, and left the suitcase behind her church. A jury found her guilty of capital murder with the underlying felony of child abuse, and the circuit court sentenced her to life without parole. Among other things argued on appeal, Ealey argued that the trial court erred in refusing an accident-or-misfortune jury instruction and that the evidence was insufficient to support the guilty verdict. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ealey v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Larry Wells was convicted of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute. The trial court sentenced Wells to sixty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections without parole, as a recidivist under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81 and as a subsequent drug offender under Section 41-29-147. The Supreme Court reviewed Wells' arguments on appeal, and affirmed his conviction and mandatory thirty-year sentence under Section 99-19-81. The Court found, however, that the trial court erred in reading Section 41-29-147 as requiring that Wells be sentenced to twice the time authorized for a second or subsequent drug conviction. Section 41-29-147 provided for discretionary (not mandatory) sentencing. Therefore, the Court vacated that portion of Wells’s sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. View "Wells v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Willie Manning appealed a trial court order denying him post-conviction relief. This appeal stemmed from Manning’s conviction of brutally murdering two elderly women in Starkville. The only witness to testify that he saw Manning entering the women’s apartment shortly before their bodies were discovered was Kevin Lucious, a convict serving two life sentences without parole in Missouri. No witness testified to seeing Manning leave the apartment. Considerable evidence was presented to the jury, which found Manning guilty, and Manning was sentenced to death. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Manning’s convictions and sentences. Manning filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). The Supreme Court granted Manning leave to proceed with post-conviction proceedings on three grounds: (1) withheld evidence; (2) Kevin Lucious’ testimony; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel related to those two claims. The trial court denied Manning relief, and appealed that order. Upon further review, the Supreme Court found that the State violated Manning’s due-process rights by failing to provide favorable, material evidence. The Court therefore reversed the denial of post-conviction relief, reversed Manning’s conviction and sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. View "Manning v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Terry Hye, Jr. was convicted of capital murder, for which he received a life sentence without the possibility of parole. The Court of Appeals affirmed Hye’s conviction but vacated and remanded his sentence as unconstitutional, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). Hye was sixteen years old at the time of the crime. Hye filed a petition for writ of certioriari with the Mississippi Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court violated his right to a fair trial by denying him an accessory-after-the-fact instruction and an accomplice instruction. Hye also claimed that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the underlying felony of armed robbery, which resulted in a constructive amendment of the indictment. The Mississippi Court granted Hye’s petition, and, pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 17(h), addressed only the question of whether the trial court erred by denying Hye an accessory-after-the-fact instruction. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court properly denied Hye’s request for an accessory-after-fact instruction because there was no evidentiary basis for it. The Court also found that a criminal defendant no longer has the unilateral right under Mississippi law to insist upon an instruction for lesser-related offenses which are not necessarily included in the charged offense(s) ("lesser-non included-offense instructions"). And the Court overruled "Griffin v. Mississippi," (533 So. 2d 444 (1988)), and its progeny, to the extent they held otherwise. View "Hye, Jr. v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Marvin Kirk was tried and convicted of aggravated domestic violence. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The State alleged that Kirk twice had strangled his wife, Casey. At trial, witnesses testified that Casey had red marks on her neck shortly after the alleged assaults had occurred, and Casey testified that Kirk had strangled her. Kirk denied the allegations, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in permitting law enforcement to testify to medical causation with regard to Casey's injuries appearing to be the result of strangulation, since the crime charged was in the indictment; (2) the trial court erred by denying Kirk's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (or in the alternative, for a new trial); (3) the trial court erred in excluding certain letters and a text message; (4) the trial court erred by prohibiting defense counsel from cross examining Casey on a drug hair follicle test on grounds of relevancy; and (5) the trial court erred with regard to jury deliberations after the trial. Finding Kirk’s assignments of error to be without merit, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Kirk v. Mississippi" on Justia Law