Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, Gerald Collins granted Garrett Prestenbach a one-year option to purchase about 150 acres of Collins's farm and pasture land for $500,000. Prestenbach agreed to make a $25,000 down payment on the property and finance the remaining $475,000 through a combination of a $225,000 USDA loan and $250,000 financing agreement with Collins. The option contract included the following details: (1) a recital of $100 consideration; (2) a township-and-range description of the property; (3) a reference to the buyer's intent to obtain a USDA loan; (4) the total purchase price; and (5) a recital that the option was irrevocable for the first three months and, after three months, the option could be revoked by giving ten days' written notice. The parties also agreed that Collins would allow the USDA to inspect the property before closing. About a month after giving Prestenbach the option to purchase his land, another buyer offered to buy Collins's property immediately. Collins attempted to persuade Prestenbach to give up his option so he could sell to the other party, but Prestenbach refused and quickly recorded the option contract to prevent the sale. By early December, relations between Collins and Prestenbach had deteriorated. Collins's attorney sent Prestenbach a letter attempting to terminate the one-year option "upon the latter to occur of December 15th, its date of expiration, or ten (10) days after receipt of this notice." Prestenbach responded by hand-delivering a letter exercising his option to purchase. At that time, the USDA loan process was nearly complete, and on December 22, 2011, the USDA conditionally approved Prestenbach's loan. Prestenbach tried to set a closing date for the loan, but Collins refused to move forward with the closing. Claiming that the option to purchase had been terminated, Collins denied the USDA's request to inspect the property. He then filed a quiet-title action against Prestenbach. Prestenbach filed an answer and a counterclaim for specific performance, stating he was "ready, willing, and able" to close the deal. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The chancellor granted Collins's motion for summary judgment and denied Prestenbach's motion, finding that Prestenbach was not entitled to specific performance because, at the time he exercised his option, he could not pay the entire purchase price. Prestenbach appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case "to correct a fundamental misunderstanding of the law on option contracts and specific performance." The option holder timely exercised his option to purchase and is entitled to specific performance, so the Court reversed and remanded. View "Prestenbach, Jr. v. Collins" on Justia Law

When Monsanto Company sued Mitchell Scruggs and his various agricultural entities for patent infringement in federal court, Scruggs made a demand on his commercial general liability insurer, Farmland Mutual Insurance Company. Farmland denied coverage based on Scruggs's alleged intentional conduct. Scruggs then sued Farmland, Greg Bost (the insurance agent), and Nowell Insurance Agency in state court. The circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment for Bost and Nowell. Scruggs appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that Bost and Nowell negligently failed to advise him that he needed to purchase patent infringement insurance. Because the Supreme Court found Scruggs's conduct was uninsurable as a matter of law, it affirmed. View "Scruggs v. Bost" on Justia Law

Columbus Cheer Company ("CCC") entered into a rental contract for the use of school facilities. Subsequently, CCC was informed that Columbus Municipal School District ("CMSD") would not honor the contract with CCC. CCC filed a complaint against CMSD. The complaint read in part: "[p]laintiff Columbus Cheer Company is a profit corporation licensed to due [sic] business in the state of Mississippi . . . ." The prayer sought judgment for plaintiff (CCC). Defendants filed their motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, asserting that CCC was an administratively dissolved corporation; therefore, CCC could not have entered into a valid contract with CMSD, and CCC did not possess the requisite legal status to initiate suit. The trial court entered an order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. CCC appealed, and the issues on appeal were: (1) whether a dissolved corporation could pursue a legal action; and if not, (2) could the corporation's shareholders pursue the same action in their own name? The Supreme Court answered both questions "no." View "Columbus Cheer Company v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Arch Specialty Insurance Company, finding that Arch's general liability policy did not provide coverage for the claims asserted by the wrongful death beneficiaries of William Gray. The Grays' claimed negligent hiring, negligent training, and failure to implement appropriate triage protocols arose from the performance of or failure to perform medical services, against Arch's insured. The Grays appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gray v. Arch Specialty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

EDW Investments, LLC, obtained a judgment against Techtronics, Inc. in 2007. In 2011, EDW sued Michelle Barnett ("Michelle"), the wife of Techtronics' president, Kevin Barnett ("Kevin"); Spectrum Wireless, LLC; MWB Holdings, LLC; and L4, LLC, claiming that: (1) these limited liability companies "are alter ego entities created solely to conceal the assets and income of Techtronics, Inc. from EDW" and that "Michelle Barnett knowingly participated in these efforts"; (2) "[t]he assets and income of Techtronics, Inc. were fraudulently conveyed to Michelle Barnett and the shell entities to avoid paying EDW"; and (3) "[t]he actions of the [Defendants] were grossly negligent, willful and/or intentional and constitute violation of common law duties under Mississippi law." The trial judge granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, and EDW appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision to dismiss. View "EDW Investments, LLC v. Barnett" on Justia Law

Following the May 7, 2013, Democratic primary for the Ward 5 seat on the Greenwood City Council, the Greenwood Municipal Democratic Executive Committee certified Dorothy Ann Glenn as the winner and thus the Democratic nominee for the Ward 5 seat on the City Council. Runner-up Andrew Powell challenged the election results, contending that Glenn was not a resident of Ward 5 at the time of the election and that she consequently was ineligible to run for that office. Powell sought a special primary runoff election, without Glenn's name on the ballot. The Circuit Court of Leflore County, Special Election Tribunal, found that Glenn was not a resident of Ward 5, held that she was not qualified to hold the position of Greenwood City Council Member for Ward 5, set aside the results of the election, and ordered a special primary runoff election without Glenn's name on the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and vacated the order of the circuit court for a special primary runoff election. View "Glenn v. Powell" on Justia Law

A.A. was electrocuted while playing on the farmland of David and Sherry Melton. Riley Berry, who worked for the Meltons, had parked a cotton picker under an allegedly sagging power line, which was owned by Entergy Mississippi, Inc. Ultimately, A.A. climbed onto the cotton picker, touched the power line, and was electrocuted. At the time of the accident, A.A.'s mother, Mary Bethanne Acey, was en route to Moon Lake, in Coahoma County with her son and Charles Graves. A 911 dispatcher called Graves to inform him of the accident. Graves immediately turned the car around to proceed to the Meltons' home. Acey then spoke with the dispatcher, who explained the gravity of the situation to Acey and informed her that A.A. had been "shocked." Emergency medical responders arrived shortly after Acey's arrival. A.A. suffered severe burns to both of her arms and her hip. A.A. subsequently was airlifted to Le Bonheur Children's Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, and was later transferred to Shriners Hospitals for Children in Cincinnati, Ohio, which specializes in treating burn patients. Thereafter, Acey commenced legal action on behalf of A.A., and individually, against defendants Entergy, David and Sherry Melton, Melton Farms, Mary Mac, Inc., and Norfleet Investments, LP. Defendants settled all claims on behalf of A.A. Regarding Acey's individual bystander claims for emotional distress, Entergy moved for summary judgment and moved to strike the affidavits of Acey and Dr. William Hickerson. The trial court subsequently denied each motion. According to the trial court, based on the nature of A.A.'s injuries, this case "cries out for the expansion of" the factors provided by the California Supreme Court in "Dillon [v. Legg," 441 P. 2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)], adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in "Entex, Inc. v. McGuire,"(414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982)). Thereafter, Entergy was granted interlocutory appeal. Because the Mississippi Court found that Entergy's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Acey" on Justia Law

Carl Cook was convicted of misdemeanor driving under the influence (“DUI”), first offense, in the Rankin County Justice Court. Cook appealed to the County Court of Rankin County. At a trial de novo before the county court, Cook’s counsel moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the investigatory stop which led to Cook’s arrest was an illegal search and seizure because it was based on an anonymous tip that lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. The county court denied the motion and entered a judgment of conviction. Cook then appealed to the Rankin County Circuit Court, and the circuit court affirmed the county court’s conviction. Finding that the investigatory stop was legally justified, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Rankin County. The Supreme Court granted Cook's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to consider the issue of whether an investigatory stop, which was based on an anonymous tip and led to Cook’s arrest, violated Cook’s Fourth-Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that reasonable suspicion to stop Cook existed this case. Therefore, the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Rankin County Circuit Court were reversed. Without the evidence gathered as a result of the stop, the evidence against Cook was insufficient to sustain a DUI conviction. The Court therefore reversed and entered a judgment of acquittal. View "Cook v. Rankin County" on Justia Law

Eric Foster was indicted for “. . . wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously tak[ing] . . . the personal property of the Bank of Franklin, against [the victims’] will by violence to [the victims] or by putting [the victims] in fear of immediate injury . . . by the exhibition of a deadly weapon. . . .” The jury found the defendant guilty of armed robbery and was not instructed to recommend a sentence. Foster was sentenced to forty years after his conviction of armed robbery. Foster appealed his sentence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Foster v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Tommy Hampton Hampton was indicted for the “. . . tak[ing] of . . . $2,190.00 . . . by violence to [the victim’s] person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon . . .” and “having been previously convicted of at least two (2) felony offenses . . . , and having been sentenced to serve at least one (1) year with a state or federal penal institution. . . .”1 The jury found the defendant guilty of robbery by use of a deadly weapon and was not instructed to recommend a sentence. At his sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence that Hampton previously had been convicted of possession of cocaine and of burglary of a dwelling (twice) and the State had sought an enhanced sentence. Defendant offered evidence that he was sixty-three years old and an alcoholic. The trial judge sentenced Hampton to twenty years as a habitual and credited him with 199 days for time served. Hampton filed a motion for a new trial and/or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) arguing, inter alia, that “the sentence . . . is unreasonable, harsh and not in conformity with the applicable facts and law, and is inequitable and unjust to this Defendant.” Once again, Hampton presented no actuarial, mortality, or life-expectancy tables to the trial judge and offered no argument that the failure of the trial court to consider same was error. The motion was denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals4 Hampton raised, for the first time, that his sentence exceeded his life expectancy. The Court of Appeals held that Hampton’s claim was procedurally barred, based on his failure to raise the issue before the trial court. Notwithstanding the bar, the Court of Appeals found that his sentence did not amount to a life sentence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hampton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law