Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Frederick Bell of capital murder and sentenced him to death in 1993. He was later declared mentally retarded and, therefore, his death sentence was unconstitutional under "Atkins v. Virginia," (536 U.S. 304 (2002)). The circuit court resentenced Bell to life without parole pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-19-107. Bell appealed, arguing that Section 99-19-107 did not apply to his case. After review, the Supreme Court agreed, vacated Bell’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "Frederick Bell v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Tallahatchie General Hospital moved to dismiss a medical malpractice claim filed against it because the plaintiffs failed to provide it with proper presuit notice before the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the filing of the complaint tolled the statute of limitations, despite the plaintiffs’ failure to provide proper presuit notice. Finding no reversible error to the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tallahatchie General Hospital v. Howe" on Justia Law

Defendant LeeVester Brown was arrested and indicted for the capital murder of his son, Le’Anthony Brown. In 2003, mother Shirley Myles left for work, leaving Le'Anthony and defendant home alone. She had just put the baby down with milk and a little cereal mixed in. Defendant called Myles early in the afternoon, stating that the baby was choking. The child was taken to the hospital, and a determination was made that he needed to be flown to Memphis for emergency care. The child died en route to the hospital. Investigators determined the child died from Shaken Baby Syndrome, and not choking as was originally reported. Defendant was later charged with the death. The jury found him guilty and sentenced him to life in prison without parole. Brown appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that the trial judge improperly denied his request for expert funds. The Supreme Court agreed on this contention, reversed, and remanded for a new trial. View "Leevester Brown v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

Democratic candidate Bobbie Miller successfully challenged independent incumbent Dimp Powell for the office of mayor of Isola. Prior to the election, the Municipal Election Commission of Isola approved the placement of Miller’s name on the ballot despite the fact that a Democratic Municipal Executive Committee was not in existence by the time of the qualifying deadline for candidates. Powell challenged the Election Commission’s decision in circuit court via a writ of mandamus, requesting the court to order the Commission not to place Miller’s name on the ballot or, in the alternative, to order that any votes cast for Miller not be counted. After an emergency evidentiary hearing, held the week prior to the election, the court denied relief. Powell appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear Powell’s challenge via a writ of mandamus. The appropriate procedural mechanism for challenging the decision of a municipal authority was through a bill of exceptions under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75. The Court affirmed the outcome of the circuit court’s holding. Because the Court affirmed on jurisdictional grounds, it did not reach the merits of whether Miller’s name should not have been permitted on the ballot when there was no Democratic Municipal Executive Committee in existence at the time of the qualifying deadline. View "Powell v. Municipal Election Comm'n Town of Isola" on Justia Law

In October 2010, Clara Dees filed a medical malpractice suit against Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees and against River Region Medical Center and its employees. River Region was owned by Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC. Dees also filed, with her complaint, a certificate of consultation. Dees filed an amended complaint in January 2011, also accompanied by a certificate. No summonses were issued until after February 16, 2011, the same date Dees moved the court for an enlargement of time (which was granted). Dees issued a number of summonses from February 22 to March 3, 2011. In May, an agreed order staying the proceedings and compelling binding arbitration was entered concerning defendants Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees. Vicksburg Healthcare moved to set aside the order allowing additional time to serve process. Vicksburg Healthcare also moved to dismiss and, alternatively, moved for summary judgment, while also asserting its affirmative defenses and answering the amended complaint. In February 2012, Heritage House Nursing Home filed its motion to confirm the arbitrator’s ruling. Dees failed to submit a response, and failed to request additional time in which to respond, and did not request a continuance of the scheduled hearing. The circuit court confirmed the decision of the arbitrator, dismissing with prejudice all claims against Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees. Subsequently, a notice of service of discovery requests was filed by Vicksburg Healthcare in September of 2012. In December, Vicksburg Healthcare filed a motion to compel discovery and for sanctions, and shortly thereafter filed a new a motion for summary judgment on the basis that Dees had failed to designate any expert witness and had failed to provide expert-witness testimony to establish a prima facie case in support of her claim. Dees then responded, requesting that the motion for summary judgment be denied, and designating her expert. No affidavit signed by the expert was attached. The motion for summary judgment was heard by the circuit court in January 2013, and was denied based on Dees’s designation. The circuit court granted Dees an additional sixty days in which to provide a sworn affidavit of the expert’s testimony. The circuit court provided that Vicksburg Healthcare could renew its motion for summary judgment once the expert opinion had been submitted. Vicksburg Healthcare petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment; and (2) that the trial court erred in granting Dees additional time to submit her expert's affidavit establishing her claim. The Supreme Court concluded the record was clear that the trial court erred in not granting Vicksburg Healthcare’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC v. Dees" on Justia Law

Jimmy Chism Jr. (Jim) challenged the termination of his parental rights to his son, Johnny. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that Jim’s parental rights were wrongfully terminated, it reversed the judgments of Court of Appeals and the chancery court and remanded this case back to the chancery court for further proceedings. View "Chism v. Chism Bright" on Justia Law

Anthony Carothers was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and sentenced to consecutive twenty-year terms in the Mississippi Department of Corrections for each count. On direct appeal to the Court of Appeals, Carothers argued that the trial court erred by allowing the State to treat Sheena Carothers (Carothers’s half-sister and victim) as a hostile witness. Finding merit to Carothers’s argument, the Court of Appeals reversed his convictions and remanded for a new trial. The State petitioned for certiorari, arguing the Court of Appeals had misapprehended material facts, including testimony of other witnesses. After review, the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals erred in reversing Carothers’s convictions and sentences. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the Circuit Court’s judgment of conviction and sentences were reinstated and affirmed. View "Carothers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from Amy Waites Ritchie's petition to modify a custody agreement created by Jeffrey Scott Waites (“Scott”) and herself following their divorce two years earlier. Amy petitioned for modification, seeking to move with her two children to Iowa, as Amy planned to remarry there. Although Amy and Scott had agreed to joint physical and legal custody, Amy’s proposed move to Iowa would make the provisions of the agreement unworkable. After initiating the petition, Amy contacted T.J. Sanford (“T.J.”) to let him know she believed him to be her eldest child’s biological father; a DNA test proved T.J.’s paternity and he joined the matter seeking custody. After excluding Scott from consideration as a non-natural parent, the chancellor awarded full physical and legal custody to Amy rather than T.J. The chancellor allowed visitation for both Scott and T.J., with respect to the eldest child. Scott appealed the court’s order, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Finding Scott’s fatherly actions did rebut the natural-parent presumption afforded to Amy and T.J., the Court of Appeals found Scott should have been considered on equal footing with the natural parents. The Court of Appeals remanded this case to the chancery court with instructions to consider Scott. Amy and T.J. appealed. The Supreme Court found, after review, that the chancellor properly excluded Scott from consideration under Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983).. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and reinstated and affirmed the judgment of the chancery court. View "In the Interest of a Minor Victoria Denise Waites" on Justia Law

Charles William White (“Bill”) and his son Charles Thomas White (“Tommy”), were partners in a business that owned and operated convenience stores. In 2000, during the course of the partnership, Bill married Anita White. In 2005, Tommy bought his father’s share of the partnership for $42,600, but in dissolving the partnership, Bill and Tommy neglected to execute and file deeds transferring the partnership’s real property. In early 2009, Bill’s health declined rapidly, and Anita and Tommy began to clash over Bill’s healthcare. During this time, Tommy realized that he and his father had failed to execute deeds transferring the partnership’s real-property assets. Tommy used a durable power of attorney his father had given him years before to execute quit-claim deeds transferring the partnership property to himself. Bill and Anita continued to clash over who had authority to make healthcare decisions for Bill, so Tommy filed a petition for a conservatorship for his father’s benefit and sought appointment as his father’s conservator. Anita filed a counterclaim to challenge Tommy’s fitness to serve as his father’s conservator and sought to have Tommy return all assets he had transferred to himself using his father’s power of attorney. The chancellor agreed that a conservatorship was appropriate, but he appointed a third party as Bill’s conservator. Bill died in 2009, and at that time, the conservator filed a motion asking to be discharged from his duties and to be allowed to distribute the assets of the conservatorship to Bill’s estate. The parties agreed to an order discharging the conservator and to a distribution of funds held by the conservator to Bill’s estate. The chancellor’s order made no mention of Anita’s action to set aside the deed transfers. In 2010, Anita filed suit to set aside the quit-claim deeds and to redeem the real property Tommy had acquired using his father’s power of attorney. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The chancellor held that Anita’s action was barred by res judicata, granted Tommy’s motion, and denied Anita’s cross-motion. The Supreme Court found that the judgment dismissing the conservatorship was not a final judgment on the merits, and reversed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Charles William White" on Justia Law

Tanya and Hobson Sanderson divorced after seventeen years of marriage. When Tanya and Hobson married in 1994, Tanya signed a prenuptial agreement the day before their marriage, and upon divorce, the chancellor enforced the terms of the agreement. Tanya appealed. She argued the prenuptial agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Furthermore, she argued that the chancellor erred in not finding a joint bank account contained commingled, marital property. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on its finding that the prenuptial agreement was not procedurally unconscionable. However, the Court reversed and remanded on whether the prenuptial agreement was substantively unconscionable. The Court also held that certain funds, used for familial purposes, kept in a joint bank account created after the marriage began, did not fall within the parameters of the prenuptial agreement. View "Sanderson v. Sanderson" on Justia Law