Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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This appeal arose over a contract dispute between a yacht owner, an independent contractor hired to paint the yachts, and an unpaid paint supplier. The owner challenged a lien the unpaid paint supplier established and enforced on two multimilliondollar yachts under construction at the owner’s Gulfport shipyard. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the owner on a finding that privity did not exist between the owner and the unpaid paint supplier. View "In RE: Lien against M/Y Areti and M/Y Lady Linda: Trinity Yachts, LLC" on Justia Law

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Following the Supreme Court’s reversal and remand of Harvey Williams' murder conviction, the Hinds County District Attorney Robert Smith sought an order of nolle prosequi, which the circuit court granted. Two days later, and without notice to the accused, the judge sought to vacate his previously entered nolle prosequi order, “recuse” the district attorney, and transfer the case to the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office. A second circuit court judge found that the order of nolle prosequi was not subject to recision, but appointed the Attorney General’s Office as a special prosecutor in the place of the local district attorney, merely because the duly elected and serving local prosecutor had exercised his discretion not to prosecute Williams. The Supreme Court found that the involuntary disqualification of the local district attorney and the substitution of the Office of the Attorney General, over the objection of the local district attorney, were wholly unsupported by any constitutional, common law, or statutory authority of the State of Mississippi, and as such, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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In 2000, a grand jury indicted Rebecca Hentz for one count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and two counts of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. Hentz pleaded guilty to one count of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. The circuit court sentenced Hentz to thirty years, suspended, unsupervised probation, and a $5,000 fine. In 2012, Governor Haley Barbour granted Hentz a “full, complete, and unconditional pardon” for the attempt-to-manufacture-methamphetamine conviction. Later that year, Hentz filed a Motion to Expunge Record, claiming that the records of her conviction should be expunged because she had received a pardon. In 2013, Hentz filed an Amended Motion to Expunge Record, which included additional support for the contention that the records of her conviction should be expunged. The trial court denied her motion. Hentz then appealed to the Supreme Court, raising one issue on appeal: whether a convicted felon may have her criminal record expunged after receiving an executive pardon. Because there was no statutory authority in Mississippi for the courts to order an expungement under these circumstances, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the request for expungement. View "Hentz v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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In 1999 the County Court of Lauderdale County determined that Brian Bronk was the natural father of Margaret Hobson's minor child. In that same judgment, the court granted sole custody to Hobson. Soon after the child's birth, the county court entered a judgment ordering Bronk to pay child support to Hobson in the amount of $400 per month. In 2013, Bronk presented an ore tenus motion in which he contended that all of the orders and judgments related to child custody were invalid because the county court never had jurisdiction to determine custody in the first place. Upon review of this matter, the Supreme Court agreed: county courts do not have jurisdiction to make child custody determinations ab initio. Accordingly, the Court reversed the custody determination of the County Court of Lauderdale County and remanded the case to the county court with instructions to transfer the proceedings to chancery court. View "Bronk v. Hobson" on Justia Law

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William Brantley filed a personal injury action against the City of Horn Lake seeking to recover monetary damages for injuries he sustained due to the alleged negligence of a member of the City's fire department. In 2010, Brantley lacerated his forehead while repairing his pickup truck at his home in Horn Lake. Brantley called for an ambulance to transport him to a nearby hospital. Stephen Lowery was a member of the ambulance crew that responded to Brantley's call. Upon arriving at his home, Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel bandaged Brantley's wound, and he was transported to the hospital in the ambulance. Lowery drove the ambulance. As the ambulance crew was unloading Brantley at the hospital, Lowery lost control of the stretcher Brantley was on and dropped him. As a result, Brantley alleged he sustained damages, including medical bills and expenses. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City, and Brantley appealed. Finding that the City was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brantley v. City of Horn Lake" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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Clayton Gutierrez appealed the Chancery Court's judgment which granted Clayton's wife Trisha lump-sum and periodic alimony incident to the divorce and found Clayton in contempt for failing to make court-ordered support payments to Trisha. Finding a lack of record support in the allocation of marital liabilities, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gutierrez v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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The McTaggarts filed suit against the former trustee and trust advisor of their family trust, alleging improper handling of their trust funds. The former trustee and trust advisor moved to dismiss the case or have the case stayed pending arbitration, based on an arbitration provision in a wealth-management agreement between the former trustee and trust advisor. The trial court found that, because the McTaggarts did not sign the agreement containing the arbitration provision and because the agreement specifically excluded nonsignatories, including third-party beneficiaries, the arbitration provision was not binding on the McTaggarts. The former trustee and trust advisor appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pinnacle Trust Company, L.L.C., EFP Advisors, Inc. v. McTaggart" on Justia Law

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When Booneville Collision Repair (BCR) unknowingly purchased land that had been sold for delinquent municipal taxes, it redeemed the land and sued Prentiss County, the City of Booneville, and the municipal tax collector, Sheila Bolden, for the damages incurred from the failure to provide notice of the tax sales. BCR argued that it had not received notice because Bolden never filed with the chancery clerk the list of properties sold for taxes as required by Mississippi law. BCR appealed the dismissal of its claims against the City and Bolden, asserting that they may be found liable under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and under Section 27-41-79. After review, the Supreme Court found that an action under Section 27-41-79 was a separate statutory action and not a tort action subject to the MTCA, and that BCR stated a claim under the statute. Furthermore, the Court found that, while BCR's negligence claim was subject to the MTCA, no immunity existed. Therefore, the Court reversed the grant of the motions to dismiss and remand for further proceedings. View "Booneville Collision Repair, Inc. v. City of Booneville" on Justia Law

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An action was initiated by certain former members and the board of Mississippi Comp Choice Self-Insurers Fund. Comp Choice was a workers’ compensation group self-insurer operating under a certificate of authority granted by the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission. Defendant Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Group Self-Insurer Guaranty Association (“GGA”) ordered a review of Comp Choice. Based on information revealed in the review, the Commission required Comp Choice to execute a Memorandum of Understanding outlining a plan to “strengthen the financial and operational aspects of the [Comp Choice] Fund under the control and guidance of the Commission.” Six months later, the Commission decided not to approve Comp Choice for future operation. Comp Choice voluntarily surrendered its certificate of authority to operate as a group self-insurer in January 2009. GGA stepped into the shoes of Comp Choice to protect claimants. Comp Choice a complaint against GGA, alleging, inter alia, gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, bad faith, conversion, and a demand for an accounting. GGA filed a motion to dismiss and claimed immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Self-Insurer Guaranty Association Law. The trial court granted the motion, finding that GGA was “covered” by the MTCA, sub silentio ruling that Plaintiffs could not pursue a “cause of action” as referenced in Mississippi Code Section 71-3-179. The trial court held that only the MTCA applied to suits against the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Group Self Insurer Guaranty Association. The trial court dismissed all other claims, granting leave to amend the complaint for an MTCA action only. Comp argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss based on whether GGA as an unincorporated legal entity, was covered by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, and therefore, entitled to its various protections, immunities and exceptions pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. 11-46-7; and (2) the trial court erred in dismissing based on the determination that GGA as an unincorporated legal entity, was covered by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, even where the immunity created in GGA in Miss. Code Ann. 71-3-179 abrogated the immunity afforded under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act in Miss. Code Ann. In the case sub judice, the Supreme Court determined that facts were still undeveloped, precluding the trial court and itself from determining whether Plaintiff’s claims, as alleged in its complaint, could be pursued only under the MTCA, as ordered by the trial court, and Plaintiff could not pursue a cause of action as contemplated by Section 71-3-151, et seq, or otherwise. "Absent factual development, no court at this stage of the proceedings could accurately discern whether GGA is an instrumentality of the Commission, vel non, as argued by GGA." View "The Former Board of Trustees and Members of Mississippi Comp Choice Self-Insurers Fund v. Mississippi Workers' Compensation Group Self-Insurer Guaranty Association" on Justia Law

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Richard Palermo alleged that he was injured by infected tissue surgically placed into his knee. He sued LifeLink Foundation, Inc., under the Mississippi Products Liability Act (“MPLA”), Mississippi Code Section 11-1-63. The trial court and Court of Appeals both found that Mississippi Code Section 41-41-1, which defined the procurement, processing, storage, distribution, and use of human tissue as a “service,” exempted LifeLink from liability under the MPLA. The Supreme Court clarified the analysis surrounding this issue, found no reversible error, and therefore affirmed the trial court and the Court of Appeals. View "Palermo v. LifeLink Foundation, Inc. d/b/a LifeLink Tissue Bank" on Justia Law