Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Charles William White (“Bill”) and his son Charles Thomas White (“Tommy”), were partners in a business that owned and operated convenience stores. In 2000, during the course of the partnership, Bill married Anita White. In 2005, Tommy bought his father’s share of the partnership for $42,600, but in dissolving the partnership, Bill and Tommy neglected to execute and file deeds transferring the partnership’s real property. In early 2009, Bill’s health declined rapidly, and Anita and Tommy began to clash over Bill’s healthcare. During this time, Tommy realized that he and his father had failed to execute deeds transferring the partnership’s real-property assets. Tommy used a durable power of attorney his father had given him years before to execute quit-claim deeds transferring the partnership property to himself. Bill and Anita continued to clash over who had authority to make healthcare decisions for Bill, so Tommy filed a petition for a conservatorship for his father’s benefit and sought appointment as his father’s conservator. Anita filed a counterclaim to challenge Tommy’s fitness to serve as his father’s conservator and sought to have Tommy return all assets he had transferred to himself using his father’s power of attorney. The chancellor agreed that a conservatorship was appropriate, but he appointed a third party as Bill’s conservator. Bill died in 2009, and at that time, the conservator filed a motion asking to be discharged from his duties and to be allowed to distribute the assets of the conservatorship to Bill’s estate. The parties agreed to an order discharging the conservator and to a distribution of funds held by the conservator to Bill’s estate. The chancellor’s order made no mention of Anita’s action to set aside the deed transfers. In 2010, Anita filed suit to set aside the quit-claim deeds and to redeem the real property Tommy had acquired using his father’s power of attorney. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The chancellor held that Anita’s action was barred by res judicata, granted Tommy’s motion, and denied Anita’s cross-motion. The Supreme Court found that the judgment dismissing the conservatorship was not a final judgment on the merits, and reversed. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Charles William White" on Justia Law

Tanya and Hobson Sanderson divorced after seventeen years of marriage. When Tanya and Hobson married in 1994, Tanya signed a prenuptial agreement the day before their marriage, and upon divorce, the chancellor enforced the terms of the agreement. Tanya appealed. She argued the prenuptial agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Furthermore, she argued that the chancellor erred in not finding a joint bank account contained commingled, marital property. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on its finding that the prenuptial agreement was not procedurally unconscionable. However, the Court reversed and remanded on whether the prenuptial agreement was substantively unconscionable. The Court also held that certain funds, used for familial purposes, kept in a joint bank account created after the marriage began, did not fall within the parameters of the prenuptial agreement. View "Sanderson v. Sanderson" on Justia Law

This appeal arose over a contract dispute between a yacht owner, an independent contractor hired to paint the yachts, and an unpaid paint supplier. The owner challenged a lien the unpaid paint supplier established and enforced on two multimilliondollar yachts under construction at the owner’s Gulfport shipyard. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the owner on a finding that privity did not exist between the owner and the unpaid paint supplier. View "In RE: Lien against M/Y Areti and M/Y Lady Linda: Trinity Yachts, LLC" on Justia Law

Following the Supreme Court’s reversal and remand of Harvey Williams' murder conviction, the Hinds County District Attorney Robert Smith sought an order of nolle prosequi, which the circuit court granted. Two days later, and without notice to the accused, the judge sought to vacate his previously entered nolle prosequi order, “recuse” the district attorney, and transfer the case to the Mississippi Attorney General’s Office. A second circuit court judge found that the order of nolle prosequi was not subject to recision, but appointed the Attorney General’s Office as a special prosecutor in the place of the local district attorney, merely because the duly elected and serving local prosecutor had exercised his discretion not to prosecute Williams. The Supreme Court found that the involuntary disqualification of the local district attorney and the substitution of the Office of the Attorney General, over the objection of the local district attorney, were wholly unsupported by any constitutional, common law, or statutory authority of the State of Mississippi, and as such, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 2000, a grand jury indicted Rebecca Hentz for one count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and two counts of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. Hentz pleaded guilty to one count of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. The circuit court sentenced Hentz to thirty years, suspended, unsupervised probation, and a $5,000 fine. In 2012, Governor Haley Barbour granted Hentz a “full, complete, and unconditional pardon” for the attempt-to-manufacture-methamphetamine conviction. Later that year, Hentz filed a Motion to Expunge Record, claiming that the records of her conviction should be expunged because she had received a pardon. In 2013, Hentz filed an Amended Motion to Expunge Record, which included additional support for the contention that the records of her conviction should be expunged. The trial court denied her motion. Hentz then appealed to the Supreme Court, raising one issue on appeal: whether a convicted felon may have her criminal record expunged after receiving an executive pardon. Because there was no statutory authority in Mississippi for the courts to order an expungement under these circumstances, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the request for expungement. View "Hentz v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 1999 the County Court of Lauderdale County determined that Brian Bronk was the natural father of Margaret Hobson's minor child. In that same judgment, the court granted sole custody to Hobson. Soon after the child's birth, the county court entered a judgment ordering Bronk to pay child support to Hobson in the amount of $400 per month. In 2013, Bronk presented an ore tenus motion in which he contended that all of the orders and judgments related to child custody were invalid because the county court never had jurisdiction to determine custody in the first place. Upon review of this matter, the Supreme Court agreed: county courts do not have jurisdiction to make child custody determinations ab initio. Accordingly, the Court reversed the custody determination of the County Court of Lauderdale County and remanded the case to the county court with instructions to transfer the proceedings to chancery court. View "Bronk v. Hobson" on Justia Law

William Brantley filed a personal injury action against the City of Horn Lake seeking to recover monetary damages for injuries he sustained due to the alleged negligence of a member of the City's fire department. In 2010, Brantley lacerated his forehead while repairing his pickup truck at his home in Horn Lake. Brantley called for an ambulance to transport him to a nearby hospital. Stephen Lowery was a member of the ambulance crew that responded to Brantley's call. Upon arriving at his home, Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel bandaged Brantley's wound, and he was transported to the hospital in the ambulance. Lowery drove the ambulance. As the ambulance crew was unloading Brantley at the hospital, Lowery lost control of the stretcher Brantley was on and dropped him. As a result, Brantley alleged he sustained damages, including medical bills and expenses. The trial court granted summary judgment to the City, and Brantley appealed. Finding that the City was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Brantley v. City of Horn Lake" on Justia Law

Clayton Gutierrez appealed the Chancery Court's judgment which granted Clayton's wife Trisha lump-sum and periodic alimony incident to the divorce and found Clayton in contempt for failing to make court-ordered support payments to Trisha. Finding a lack of record support in the allocation of marital liabilities, the Supreme Court reversed the chancery court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gutierrez v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The McTaggarts filed suit against the former trustee and trust advisor of their family trust, alleging improper handling of their trust funds. The former trustee and trust advisor moved to dismiss the case or have the case stayed pending arbitration, based on an arbitration provision in a wealth-management agreement between the former trustee and trust advisor. The trial court found that, because the McTaggarts did not sign the agreement containing the arbitration provision and because the agreement specifically excluded nonsignatories, including third-party beneficiaries, the arbitration provision was not binding on the McTaggarts. The former trustee and trust advisor appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pinnacle Trust Company, L.L.C., EFP Advisors, Inc. v. McTaggart" on Justia Law

When Booneville Collision Repair (BCR) unknowingly purchased land that had been sold for delinquent municipal taxes, it redeemed the land and sued Prentiss County, the City of Booneville, and the municipal tax collector, Sheila Bolden, for the damages incurred from the failure to provide notice of the tax sales. BCR argued that it had not received notice because Bolden never filed with the chancery clerk the list of properties sold for taxes as required by Mississippi law. BCR appealed the dismissal of its claims against the City and Bolden, asserting that they may be found liable under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and under Section 27-41-79. After review, the Supreme Court found that an action under Section 27-41-79 was a separate statutory action and not a tort action subject to the MTCA, and that BCR stated a claim under the statute. Furthermore, the Court found that, while BCR's negligence claim was subject to the MTCA, no immunity existed. Therefore, the Court reversed the grant of the motions to dismiss and remand for further proceedings. View "Booneville Collision Repair, Inc. v. City of Booneville" on Justia Law