Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tammy and Dane Davenport were granted an irreconcilable-differences divorce in 2012. Tammy appealed the final judgment of divorce, arguing the trial court erred in dividing the couple's assets, and in excluding certain evidence, and not making certain on-record findings with regard to Tammy's ability to pay alimony awarded to Dane. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Davenport v. Davenport" on Justia Law

This case involves a familial dispute between two sisters. Jackie charged her sister Caron with unduly influencing their mother to obtain a greater share of the family property. Upon review of the facts in record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's sua sponte award of an additional $100,000 post-judgment, was reversed. The trial court’s judgment was otherwise supported by substantial evidence on all other issues and was affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Administration of the Estate of Norma Allene Cloud Crowell" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia Casualty Company and Continental Casualty Company, finding there was no wrongdoing in denying coverage to four former insureds (Ex-Agents) and Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company. The trial court also denied the Ex-Agents’ and Minnesota Life’s motion to strike certain affidavits and exhibits submitted by Columbia in support of its motions for summary judgment and in defense of the Ex-Agents’ and Minnesota Life’s summary judgment motions. The dispute arose over the Agents' purchase of Errors & Omissions insurance coverage. The Agents sold Minnesota Life insurance products, and found that one of their colleagues was embezzling funds from their agency. The Mississippi Secretary of State’s office began investigating the records of the Agency and, from that investigation, determined that an agent had misappropriated client funds. Cases were filed against the agent, the Agency, Minnesota Life, and the Ex-Agents. Each complaint alleged that the wrongful acts occurred while the Ex-Agents were employed by Minnesota Life. Each complaint alleged causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation and concealment, breach of implied covenant of good faith, continuing breach of contract, negligence, negligent infliction of mental and emotional distress, misrepresentation, and malpractice. As to Minnesota Life, each complaint specifically alleged that Minnesota Life participated in and/or had knowledge of the intentional taking of monies. As to the Ex-Agents, the complaints specifically alleged that they should have known that Minnesota Life and/or the colleague were misappropriating funds. The agents and Minnesota Life made a claim on their E&O insurance policy to defend the suit. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly denied the motion to strike and properly granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia as to Minnesota Life’s claim but erred in granting summary judgment as to the Ex-Agents’ claims. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded. View "Minnesota Life Insurance Company v. Columbia Casualty Company" on Justia Law

Following his divorce, Vennit Mathis, individually and as next friend of his two minor children, sued Dr. Charles Brent for tortious interference of a marriage contract stemming from the relationship that Brent developed with Mathis' then-wife, Nicole, shortly after the doctor treated Mrs. Mathis for neck pain. Mr. Mathis also sued on grounds of alienation of affection, and reckless infliction of emotional distress. Brent moved for summary judgment on the children’s claims, but the trial court denied the motion. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The judge let the parties discuss only standing (of the children) at the hearing. The order denying summary judgment consisted of one sentence, thus, there was no insight into the trial court's rationale on any issues. The Supreme Court granted Brent’s petition for interlocutory appeal. Brent argued that the minor children’s claim that he alienated the affection of their mother failed as a matter of law because the children lacked standing to bring such a claim: only an aggrieved spouse has standing to bring a claim of alienation of affection. This issue was of first impression; in every other case considered by the Mississippi Supreme Court, a husband or wife has brought the claim for alienation of affection. Mathis argued that "some of the earliest recognitions of alienation of affection involve claims having nothing to do with extra-marital affairs," but deal with intrusion into the family unit by an outside party. The Supreme Court was not persuaded: "[g]iven that Mississippi does not view marriage as a judicially enforced contract," the children’s claim for tortious interference with a marriage contract was dismissed. Furthermore, the children failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a claim of intention infliction of emotional distress. The trial court’s denial of Brent’s motion for summary judgment as to all of the minor children’s claims was reversed. View "Brent v. Mathis, II" on Justia Law

Donald Smith was indicted for two counts of kidnapping, one count of armed carjacking, and one count of felony evading a police officer. His case was set for trial on November 13, 2008. On that date, Smith orally moved for a continuance and a psychiatric examination. Under Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice 9.06, a mental evaluation and competency hearing are mandatory if the trial court has a reasonable ground to believe the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Before Smith entered a guilty plea, the trial court ordered a mental evaluation of Smith that never was performed. The record was silent as to the reason the trial court ordered the mental evaluation. The Supreme Court granted Smith’s petition for certiorari on his postconviction claim that the trial court had erred by accepting his guilty plea without a completed mental evaluation and competency hearing. Because a mental evaluation and hearing were required if the trial court ordered the mental evaluation to assess Smith’s competence to stand trial, the Court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of why the trial court ordered a mental evaluation. View "Smith v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Jeremy Cage appealed his conviction for statutory rape, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence and in denying his motion for a new trial. Cage also claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Cage’s conviction and sentence. View "Cage v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

On June 24, 2014, Thad Cochran, a Republican nominee for United States Senator, won the Republican primary runoff. His opponent, Chris McDaniel, filed an election contest with the State Republican Executive Committee (SREC) on August 4, 2014 – forty-one days after the election. The SREC declined to consider McDaniel’s complaint, and McDaniel appealed. The trial judge found that McDaniel did not meet the twenty-day deadline to file his election contest and dismissed the case. On appeal, McDaniel argued that no deadline existed to contest a primary election. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, the Supreme Court found that there indeed was a deadline, and McDaniel failed to file his election contest within twenty days. The dismissal was affirmed. View "McDaniel v. Cochran" on Justia Law

In this replevin action, a tenant sued his landlord and a towing company, alleging wrongful possession of several vehicles towed from the property he leased from the landlord. The County Court granted the defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal, and also found that the landlord's use of self-help was lawful. The Circuit Court affirmed. Finding that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to maintain the replevin action, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the replevin action for a trial de novo between the plaintiff and the towing company. It also found the landlord's use of self-help to be unlawful, and reversed and rendered that issue in favor of the plaintiff. Because the Supreme Court find that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals improperly addressed the issue of the landlord's use of self-help, it reversed the judgments and remanded the replevin action to the trial court for a trial de novo. View "Crowell v. Butts" on Justia Law

In 2011, Gerald Collins granted Garrett Prestenbach a one-year option to purchase about 150 acres of Collins's farm and pasture land for $500,000. Prestenbach agreed to make a $25,000 down payment on the property and finance the remaining $475,000 through a combination of a $225,000 USDA loan and $250,000 financing agreement with Collins. The option contract included the following details: (1) a recital of $100 consideration; (2) a township-and-range description of the property; (3) a reference to the buyer's intent to obtain a USDA loan; (4) the total purchase price; and (5) a recital that the option was irrevocable for the first three months and, after three months, the option could be revoked by giving ten days' written notice. The parties also agreed that Collins would allow the USDA to inspect the property before closing. About a month after giving Prestenbach the option to purchase his land, another buyer offered to buy Collins's property immediately. Collins attempted to persuade Prestenbach to give up his option so he could sell to the other party, but Prestenbach refused and quickly recorded the option contract to prevent the sale. By early December, relations between Collins and Prestenbach had deteriorated. Collins's attorney sent Prestenbach a letter attempting to terminate the one-year option "upon the latter to occur of December 15th, its date of expiration, or ten (10) days after receipt of this notice." Prestenbach responded by hand-delivering a letter exercising his option to purchase. At that time, the USDA loan process was nearly complete, and on December 22, 2011, the USDA conditionally approved Prestenbach's loan. Prestenbach tried to set a closing date for the loan, but Collins refused to move forward with the closing. Claiming that the option to purchase had been terminated, Collins denied the USDA's request to inspect the property. He then filed a quiet-title action against Prestenbach. Prestenbach filed an answer and a counterclaim for specific performance, stating he was "ready, willing, and able" to close the deal. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The chancellor granted Collins's motion for summary judgment and denied Prestenbach's motion, finding that Prestenbach was not entitled to specific performance because, at the time he exercised his option, he could not pay the entire purchase price. Prestenbach appealed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case "to correct a fundamental misunderstanding of the law on option contracts and specific performance." The option holder timely exercised his option to purchase and is entitled to specific performance, so the Court reversed and remanded. View "Prestenbach, Jr. v. Collins" on Justia Law

When Monsanto Company sued Mitchell Scruggs and his various agricultural entities for patent infringement in federal court, Scruggs made a demand on his commercial general liability insurer, Farmland Mutual Insurance Company. Farmland denied coverage based on Scruggs's alleged intentional conduct. Scruggs then sued Farmland, Greg Bost (the insurance agent), and Nowell Insurance Agency in state court. The circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment for Bost and Nowell. Scruggs appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, arguing, among other things, that Bost and Nowell negligently failed to advise him that he needed to purchase patent infringement insurance. Because the Supreme Court found Scruggs's conduct was uninsurable as a matter of law, it affirmed. View "Scruggs v. Bost" on Justia Law