Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Columbus Cheer Company ("CCC") entered into a rental contract for the use of school facilities. Subsequently, CCC was informed that Columbus Municipal School District ("CMSD") would not honor the contract with CCC. CCC filed a complaint against CMSD. The complaint read in part: "[p]laintiff Columbus Cheer Company is a profit corporation licensed to due [sic] business in the state of Mississippi . . . ." The prayer sought judgment for plaintiff (CCC). Defendants filed their motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, asserting that CCC was an administratively dissolved corporation; therefore, CCC could not have entered into a valid contract with CMSD, and CCC did not possess the requisite legal status to initiate suit. The trial court entered an order granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment. CCC appealed, and the issues on appeal were: (1) whether a dissolved corporation could pursue a legal action; and if not, (2) could the corporation's shareholders pursue the same action in their own name? The Supreme Court answered both questions "no." View "Columbus Cheer Company v. City of Columbus" on Justia Law

The Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Arch Specialty Insurance Company, finding that Arch's general liability policy did not provide coverage for the claims asserted by the wrongful death beneficiaries of William Gray. The Grays' claimed negligent hiring, negligent training, and failure to implement appropriate triage protocols arose from the performance of or failure to perform medical services, against Arch's insured. The Grays appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gray v. Arch Specialty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

EDW Investments, LLC, obtained a judgment against Techtronics, Inc. in 2007. In 2011, EDW sued Michelle Barnett ("Michelle"), the wife of Techtronics' president, Kevin Barnett ("Kevin"); Spectrum Wireless, LLC; MWB Holdings, LLC; and L4, LLC, claiming that: (1) these limited liability companies "are alter ego entities created solely to conceal the assets and income of Techtronics, Inc. from EDW" and that "Michelle Barnett knowingly participated in these efforts"; (2) "[t]he assets and income of Techtronics, Inc. were fraudulently conveyed to Michelle Barnett and the shell entities to avoid paying EDW"; and (3) "[t]he actions of the [Defendants] were grossly negligent, willful and/or intentional and constitute violation of common law duties under Mississippi law." The trial judge granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, and EDW appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision to dismiss. View "EDW Investments, LLC v. Barnett" on Justia Law

Following the May 7, 2013, Democratic primary for the Ward 5 seat on the Greenwood City Council, the Greenwood Municipal Democratic Executive Committee certified Dorothy Ann Glenn as the winner and thus the Democratic nominee for the Ward 5 seat on the City Council. Runner-up Andrew Powell challenged the election results, contending that Glenn was not a resident of Ward 5 at the time of the election and that she consequently was ineligible to run for that office. Powell sought a special primary runoff election, without Glenn's name on the ballot. The Circuit Court of Leflore County, Special Election Tribunal, found that Glenn was not a resident of Ward 5, held that she was not qualified to hold the position of Greenwood City Council Member for Ward 5, set aside the results of the election, and ordered a special primary runoff election without Glenn's name on the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and vacated the order of the circuit court for a special primary runoff election. View "Glenn v. Powell" on Justia Law

A.A. was electrocuted while playing on the farmland of David and Sherry Melton. Riley Berry, who worked for the Meltons, had parked a cotton picker under an allegedly sagging power line, which was owned by Entergy Mississippi, Inc. Ultimately, A.A. climbed onto the cotton picker, touched the power line, and was electrocuted. At the time of the accident, A.A.'s mother, Mary Bethanne Acey, was en route to Moon Lake, in Coahoma County with her son and Charles Graves. A 911 dispatcher called Graves to inform him of the accident. Graves immediately turned the car around to proceed to the Meltons' home. Acey then spoke with the dispatcher, who explained the gravity of the situation to Acey and informed her that A.A. had been "shocked." Emergency medical responders arrived shortly after Acey's arrival. A.A. suffered severe burns to both of her arms and her hip. A.A. subsequently was airlifted to Le Bonheur Children's Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, and was later transferred to Shriners Hospitals for Children in Cincinnati, Ohio, which specializes in treating burn patients. Thereafter, Acey commenced legal action on behalf of A.A., and individually, against defendants Entergy, David and Sherry Melton, Melton Farms, Mary Mac, Inc., and Norfleet Investments, LP. Defendants settled all claims on behalf of A.A. Regarding Acey's individual bystander claims for emotional distress, Entergy moved for summary judgment and moved to strike the affidavits of Acey and Dr. William Hickerson. The trial court subsequently denied each motion. According to the trial court, based on the nature of A.A.'s injuries, this case "cries out for the expansion of" the factors provided by the California Supreme Court in "Dillon [v. Legg," 441 P. 2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)], adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in "Entex, Inc. v. McGuire,"(414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982)). Thereafter, Entergy was granted interlocutory appeal. Because the Mississippi Court found that Entergy's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Acey" on Justia Law

Carl Cook was convicted of misdemeanor driving under the influence (“DUI”), first offense, in the Rankin County Justice Court. Cook appealed to the County Court of Rankin County. At a trial de novo before the county court, Cook’s counsel moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the investigatory stop which led to Cook’s arrest was an illegal search and seizure because it was based on an anonymous tip that lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. The county court denied the motion and entered a judgment of conviction. Cook then appealed to the Rankin County Circuit Court, and the circuit court affirmed the county court’s conviction. Finding that the investigatory stop was legally justified, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Rankin County. The Supreme Court granted Cook's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to consider the issue of whether an investigatory stop, which was based on an anonymous tip and led to Cook’s arrest, violated Cook’s Fourth-Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that reasonable suspicion to stop Cook existed this case. Therefore, the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Rankin County Circuit Court were reversed. Without the evidence gathered as a result of the stop, the evidence against Cook was insufficient to sustain a DUI conviction. The Court therefore reversed and entered a judgment of acquittal. View "Cook v. Rankin County" on Justia Law

Eric Foster was indicted for “. . . wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously tak[ing] . . . the personal property of the Bank of Franklin, against [the victims’] will by violence to [the victims] or by putting [the victims] in fear of immediate injury . . . by the exhibition of a deadly weapon. . . .” The jury found the defendant guilty of armed robbery and was not instructed to recommend a sentence. Foster was sentenced to forty years after his conviction of armed robbery. Foster appealed his sentence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Foster v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Tommy Hampton Hampton was indicted for the “. . . tak[ing] of . . . $2,190.00 . . . by violence to [the victim’s] person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon . . .” and “having been previously convicted of at least two (2) felony offenses . . . , and having been sentenced to serve at least one (1) year with a state or federal penal institution. . . .”1 The jury found the defendant guilty of robbery by use of a deadly weapon and was not instructed to recommend a sentence. At his sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence that Hampton previously had been convicted of possession of cocaine and of burglary of a dwelling (twice) and the State had sought an enhanced sentence. Defendant offered evidence that he was sixty-three years old and an alcoholic. The trial judge sentenced Hampton to twenty years as a habitual and credited him with 199 days for time served. Hampton filed a motion for a new trial and/or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) arguing, inter alia, that “the sentence . . . is unreasonable, harsh and not in conformity with the applicable facts and law, and is inequitable and unjust to this Defendant.” Once again, Hampton presented no actuarial, mortality, or life-expectancy tables to the trial judge and offered no argument that the failure of the trial court to consider same was error. The motion was denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals4 Hampton raised, for the first time, that his sentence exceeded his life expectancy. The Court of Appeals held that Hampton’s claim was procedurally barred, based on his failure to raise the issue before the trial court. Notwithstanding the bar, the Court of Appeals found that his sentence did not amount to a life sentence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hampton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A property dispute between neighbors came before the Supreme Court in this case. The issue centered on the rights of the various parties as to Nicola Road, a road that allows the various property owners access to Highway 603. Plaintiffs Jourdan River Estates, LLC, and Jourdan River Resort and Yacht Club, LLC (together, "JRE") owned of a 269-acre tract of land in a rural area in Hancock County. Nicola Road leads from Highway 603 to the JRE tract, and passes by and provides access to three parcels. In its Final Judgment, the Chancery Court of Hancock County determined that Jourdan River Estates held a private 947-foot right-of-way, and it shared a public 340-foot right-of-way with neighbors and surrounding property owners Scott and Cindy Favre, Jefferson and Constance Parker and Hancock County. The neighbors constructed a gate that limited JRE's access to Nicola Road. The trial court entered an injunction against the Favres and Parkers forbidding them from erecting any gates which would impede JRE and from further harassment, and they appealed. Finding the trial court’s judgment to be "well reasoned," the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "Favre v. Jourdan River Estates" on Justia Law

Brandon Q. Gales was convicted of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery for the 2011 robbery of a Hyatt Food Mart convenience store. Gales received sentences of life and five years. On appeal, he argued: (1) the trial court erred in not suppressing fruits of an impermissible stop of his vehicle shortly after the robbery, and that police conducted an illegal search of his person following the stop; (2) the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest and conduct a subsequent warrantless search; (3) the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony of witnesses and the arresting officer; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the jury verdict (or in the alternative, a new trial) due to insufficient evidence. The Mississippi Supreme Court, after careful consideration of each issues raised on appeal, found no reversible error and affirmed Gales' convictions and sentences. View "Gales v. Mississippi" on Justia Law