Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death suit against Illinois Central for the death of their father. The case was dismissed because the three-year statute of limitations had run. Plaintiffs appealed, claiming that the statute of limitations had not expired, because it was tolled while the first suit, filed by the plaintiffs’ mother, was pending. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case on the grounds that, because the doctrine of equitable tolling did not apply, the statute of limitations had expired by the time plaintiffs filed the second complaint. View "Burch v. Illinois Central Railroad Company" on Justia Law

Robert Reeves, an employee of Illinois Central Railroad, sued Mississippi Valley Silica, Inc. for lung injuries that allegedly were caused by his inhalation of silica while employed with Illinois Central. The case was dismissed without prejudice in 2006, and this suit was filed against thirty-two named defendants in 2007. Robert Reeves died in 2010, before the litigation was concluded, and the case then was pursued by his wrongful death beneficiaries. After trial in May 2012 against the sole remaining defendant, Valley, the jury found economic damages in the amount of $149,464.40 and noneconomic damages of $1.5 million, with Valley 15% at fault. The jury also awarded punitive damages of $50,000, and the trial court awarded attorney fees of $257,701.50. Although Valley was found only 15% at fault, the trial court determined that the law in place in 2002, when the original complaint was filed, should have applied. Accordingly, the statutory caps on punitive and noneconomic damages enacted in 2004 were inapplicable and Valley was jointly and severally liable for 50% of the judgment. Ultimately, the court determined that Valley owed the Reeves beneficiaries $824,732.20, plus $50,000 in punitive damages, and $257,701.50 in attorney fees, for a total of $1,132,433.70. Valley appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to identify Valley’s sand as the proximate cause of Robert Reeves’s injuries as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court and rendered judgment in favor of Mississippi Valley Silica. View "Mississippi Valley Silica Company, Inc. v. Reeves" on Justia Law

Scott Smith was convicted of capital murder for the death of seventeen-month-old child and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Smith appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting several Facebook messages and that the testimony of an investigator violated the Confrontation Clause. The Court of Appeals found no reversible error and affirmed. Smith then appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in holding that the Facebook messages were sufficiently authenticated; (2) that the Court of Appeals erred by finding that an email from Facebook was not inadmissible hearsay; and (3) that the Court of Appeals erroneously applied a harmless-error analysis to the violation of Smith’s confrontation rights. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and limited its review to Smith’s claim that the Facebook messages were not sufficiently authenticated. The Court found that Smith’s claim had merit; however, because the error was harmless, the Court affirmed Smith’s conviction and sentence.View "Smith v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Levon Flowers made a workers' compensation claim against his former employer Crown Cork & Seal USA. The Supreme Court granted Crown’s petition for certiorari to review the compensability of a foot injury Flowers sustained in 2007. The Workers’ Compensation Commission denied Flowers’s request for permanent disability benefits for this injury and awarded temporary total disability benefits for the period between the injury and the date Flowers was cleared by his doctor to return to work. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Flowers was entitled to receive temporary total disability benefits until he reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) for his foot injury, which had not yet been determined by his doctors. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals reached the correct result in this case, but the Supreme Court reached that conclusion based on different precedent. The record in this case reflected that Crown refused to reinstate or rehire Flowers after his doctors released him to return to work. There was also evidence that Flowers underwent an unsuccessful search for alternative employment after Crown refused to rehire him. However, the ALJ and the Commission did not determine when Flowers reached MMI for his foot injury. From the testimony of Flowers' doctor, Flowers had not yet reached MMI as of January 14, 2008. Therefore, this case was not controlled by the Court's holding in "Jordan:" "[the Court] reiterate[d] that it is a primary duty of the Commission to analyze the evidence and determine whether and when a claimant has reached MMI. [. . .] After determining when Flowers reached MMI for his foot injury, the Commission must decide from the evidence presented whether Flowers is entitled to permanent disability benefits." View "Flowers v. Crown Cork & Seal USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Charles Ferguson rode as a back-seat passenger with Lazeric Yarbrough and Oratio Robinson, unaware of Yarbrough’s and Robinson’s intent to purchase marijuana once the car arrived in West Point. On their return to Starkville, the men approached a Mississippi Highway Patrol checkpoint. As they approached the checkpoint, Yarbrough (in the front seat) opened the door and threw the bag of marijuana from the vehicle. The officers at the checkpoint watched as the bag was thrown from the vehicle and subsequently arrested all three men. Ferguson was indicted for possession of marijuana in an amount greater than 250 grams but less than 500 grams, with the intent to distribute. The State presented that it had learned during the break that Ferguson was a habitual offender, and it had just then filed its motion to amend the indictment to reflect his habitual-offender status. The trial court moved forward with a hearing on the State’s motion to amend the indictment. Defense counsel argued that, because of the timing of the motion, an amendment would unfairly prejudice Ferguson. The trial court recessed to give defense counsel an opportunity to speak with Ferguson; during the recess, the State communicated its plea offer to Ferguson for his consideration. Thereafter, the trial court allowed the amendment. An additional “brief recess” was taken to give Ferguson and defense counsel one last chance to confer. Ferguson chose to reject the State’s plea offer. Ferguson was convicted of the lesser-included offense of possession of marijuana in an amount of 250 grams but less than 500 grams, and sentenced to serve eight years as a habitual offender. On appeal, he argued that: (1) the verdict was against the sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the indictment to be amended after jury selection had been completed; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance; and (4) his counsel was ineffective. The Supreme Court concluded after review, the trial court erred in allowing the amendment to the indictment, because Ferguson did not receive proper notice and was unfairly surprised. Accordingly, the Court reversed in part the judgments of the Court of Appeals and trial court that ruled otherwise. The Court vacated only the portion of Ferguson’s sentence that was based on his status as an habitual offender. The case was remanded for resentencing.View "Ferguson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Derrick Henley appealed his conviction by jury of possession of burglary tools. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that the tools were intended to be used in aiding the commission of a burglary. The Court therefore reversed and remanded Henley's conviction and sentence. View "Henley v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Lawrence Elliott owned and operated the Black Creek Water and Wastewater systems in Forrest County from the 1990s until 2005. The systems are a few miles upstream of an area of Black Creek that is designated as a National Wild and Scenic River. The systems suffered numerous violations of environmental regulations, including multiple illegal sewage discharges. Bell Utilities purchased the systems from Elliott in 2005 and vastly improved the situation, expending its own money in an attempt to bring the system into compliance. Bell entered into an Agreed Order with the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality in which compliance issues were addressed, and in which Bell agreed to put up a financial assurance that would be returned to Bell after two years of adequate compliance. In 2010, Bell sought to sell the Black Creek systems to Utility One, LLC, and to transfer the attendant permits to it. MDEQ refused to transfer Bell’s wastewater permit to Utility One unless Utility One put up a similar financial assurance. Bell appealed the denial of the permit transfer to the chancery court. The chancery court reversed the Permit Board, finding that its actions were arbitrary and capricious because it has not promulgated regulations on how to conduct a regulatory hearing and on when and whether to demand financial assurances prior to permit transfer. It ordered MDEQ and the Permit Board to promulgate such regulations. MDEQ appealed. Because the Supreme Court found that the Permit Board’s demand of the financial assurance from Utility One to transfer the permit was beyond its power, the Court affirmed the portion of the chancery court judgment that reversed the Permit Board. However, because the agencies were not required under the APA to promulgate rules and regulations for formal Permit Board hearings, the Court vacated the portion of the trial court’s judgment that required them to do so.View "Mississippi Comm'n on Environmental Quality v. Bell Utilities of Mississippi, LLC" on Justia Law

Mississippi Power Company filed documents asserting confidentiality with the Mississippi Public Service Commission related to a certificate-of-public-convenience-and-necessity proceeding in January 2009. In July 2012, Bigger Pie Forum (BPF) requested three of those documents from the Commission, and Mississippi Power sought a protective order. Following a hearing, the Chancery Court ordered that the documents be produced. Mississippi Power appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court to the extent that it ordered disclosure of the January 2009 gas price forecasts and CO2 cost assumptions that were similar in kind to those already published (by news media). However, the Court remanded this case to the Chancery Court to should consider the documents under seal and order that information pertaining to natural gas price forecasts and CO2 costs assumptions be produced by Mississippi Power. View "Mississippi Power Company v. Mississippi Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

The residence of Brent and Amy Hubbard secured a note and deed of trust held by Trustmark National Bank. Additionally, the Hubbards obtained a second loan, which was secured by a note and second deed of trust held by BancorpSouth on the same residence. Trustmark foreclosed on the first deed of trust and sold the property. More than a year later, BancorpSouth sued the Hubbards for money due under the second note. The Hubbards admitted they were in default, but asserted as an affirmative defense that BancorpSouth’s claim was time barred under the one-year statute of limitations prescribed in Mississippi Code Section 15-1-23. After a hearing on the motion, the circuit court found Section 15-1-23 inapplicable and ruled instead that Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49 provides the proper limitations period (three years). The circuit court entered judgment in favor of BancorpSouth. On appeal, the Hubbards argued that the circuit court erred in granting BancorpSouth’s judgment on the pleadings because the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by Section 15-1-23. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings. However, the three-year statute of limitations provided under Section 15-1-49 was inapplicable in this case; the proper limitations period for suits on promissory notes for nonforeclosing lenders is Mississippi Code Section 75-3-118, which provided a six-year statute of limitations, rather than the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 15-1-49.View "Hubbard v. BancorpSouth Bank " on Justia Law

Michael Huseth (Mike) appealed a Chancery Court judgment which granted his wife Tavia Huseth an award of separate maintenance, full physical custody of their son, and attorney fees. Tavia requested attorney fees on appeal equal to half of the fees she was awarded at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment in part, reversed in part and remanded the case to the chancery court, and the Court denied Tavia’s request for attorney fees on appeal. The chancellor’s grant of separate maintenance and child support was supported by substantial evidence and was not manifestly wrong. The chancellor’s determination of the amount of imputed income was not supported by sufficient findings by the chancellor, and in the absence of her specific computation of the amount, was reversed and remanded for specific findings detailing how the chancellor arrived at that amount, and upon what she relied. Because the Court reversed and remanded for a new finding of imputed income, the Court also reversed and remanded the chancellor’s determination of child support, in which the chancellor shall consider all of the facts and circumstances regarding the parties’ ability to support the child, rather than relying on the statutory guidelines. Further, the chancellor’s award of separate maintenance did not take into account Mike’s necessary living expenses, and therefore was reversed. The amount of separate maintenance may be based upon imputed income, but the amount of that income that goes towards living expenses must be considered. View "Huseth v. Huseth" on Justia Law