Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A.A. was electrocuted while playing on the farmland of David and Sherry Melton. Riley Berry, who worked for the Meltons, had parked a cotton picker under an allegedly sagging power line, which was owned by Entergy Mississippi, Inc. Ultimately, A.A. climbed onto the cotton picker, touched the power line, and was electrocuted. At the time of the accident, A.A.'s mother, Mary Bethanne Acey, was en route to Moon Lake, in Coahoma County with her son and Charles Graves. A 911 dispatcher called Graves to inform him of the accident. Graves immediately turned the car around to proceed to the Meltons' home. Acey then spoke with the dispatcher, who explained the gravity of the situation to Acey and informed her that A.A. had been "shocked." Emergency medical responders arrived shortly after Acey's arrival. A.A. suffered severe burns to both of her arms and her hip. A.A. subsequently was airlifted to Le Bonheur Children's Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, and was later transferred to Shriners Hospitals for Children in Cincinnati, Ohio, which specializes in treating burn patients. Thereafter, Acey commenced legal action on behalf of A.A., and individually, against defendants Entergy, David and Sherry Melton, Melton Farms, Mary Mac, Inc., and Norfleet Investments, LP. Defendants settled all claims on behalf of A.A. Regarding Acey's individual bystander claims for emotional distress, Entergy moved for summary judgment and moved to strike the affidavits of Acey and Dr. William Hickerson. The trial court subsequently denied each motion. According to the trial court, based on the nature of A.A.'s injuries, this case "cries out for the expansion of" the factors provided by the California Supreme Court in "Dillon [v. Legg," 441 P. 2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968)], adopted by the Mississippi Supreme Court in "Entex, Inc. v. McGuire,"(414 So. 2d 437 (Miss. 1982)). Thereafter, Entergy was granted interlocutory appeal. Because the Mississippi Court found that Entergy's motion for summary judgment should have been granted, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Acey" on Justia Law

Carl Cook was convicted of misdemeanor driving under the influence (“DUI”), first offense, in the Rankin County Justice Court. Cook appealed to the County Court of Rankin County. At a trial de novo before the county court, Cook’s counsel moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the investigatory stop which led to Cook’s arrest was an illegal search and seizure because it was based on an anonymous tip that lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. The county court denied the motion and entered a judgment of conviction. Cook then appealed to the Rankin County Circuit Court, and the circuit court affirmed the county court’s conviction. Finding that the investigatory stop was legally justified, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Rankin County. The Supreme Court granted Cook's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to consider the issue of whether an investigatory stop, which was based on an anonymous tip and led to Cook’s arrest, violated Cook’s Fourth-Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that reasonable suspicion to stop Cook existed this case. Therefore, the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Rankin County Circuit Court were reversed. Without the evidence gathered as a result of the stop, the evidence against Cook was insufficient to sustain a DUI conviction. The Court therefore reversed and entered a judgment of acquittal. View "Cook v. Rankin County" on Justia Law

Eric Foster was indicted for “. . . wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously tak[ing] . . . the personal property of the Bank of Franklin, against [the victims’] will by violence to [the victims] or by putting [the victims] in fear of immediate injury . . . by the exhibition of a deadly weapon. . . .” The jury found the defendant guilty of armed robbery and was not instructed to recommend a sentence. Foster was sentenced to forty years after his conviction of armed robbery. Foster appealed his sentence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Foster v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Tommy Hampton Hampton was indicted for the “. . . tak[ing] of . . . $2,190.00 . . . by violence to [the victim’s] person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon . . .” and “having been previously convicted of at least two (2) felony offenses . . . , and having been sentenced to serve at least one (1) year with a state or federal penal institution. . . .”1 The jury found the defendant guilty of robbery by use of a deadly weapon and was not instructed to recommend a sentence. At his sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence that Hampton previously had been convicted of possession of cocaine and of burglary of a dwelling (twice) and the State had sought an enhanced sentence. Defendant offered evidence that he was sixty-three years old and an alcoholic. The trial judge sentenced Hampton to twenty years as a habitual and credited him with 199 days for time served. Hampton filed a motion for a new trial and/or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) arguing, inter alia, that “the sentence . . . is unreasonable, harsh and not in conformity with the applicable facts and law, and is inequitable and unjust to this Defendant.” Once again, Hampton presented no actuarial, mortality, or life-expectancy tables to the trial judge and offered no argument that the failure of the trial court to consider same was error. The motion was denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals4 Hampton raised, for the first time, that his sentence exceeded his life expectancy. The Court of Appeals held that Hampton’s claim was procedurally barred, based on his failure to raise the issue before the trial court. Notwithstanding the bar, the Court of Appeals found that his sentence did not amount to a life sentence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hampton v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

A property dispute between neighbors came before the Supreme Court in this case. The issue centered on the rights of the various parties as to Nicola Road, a road that allows the various property owners access to Highway 603. Plaintiffs Jourdan River Estates, LLC, and Jourdan River Resort and Yacht Club, LLC (together, "JRE") owned of a 269-acre tract of land in a rural area in Hancock County. Nicola Road leads from Highway 603 to the JRE tract, and passes by and provides access to three parcels. In its Final Judgment, the Chancery Court of Hancock County determined that Jourdan River Estates held a private 947-foot right-of-way, and it shared a public 340-foot right-of-way with neighbors and surrounding property owners Scott and Cindy Favre, Jefferson and Constance Parker and Hancock County. The neighbors constructed a gate that limited JRE's access to Nicola Road. The trial court entered an injunction against the Favres and Parkers forbidding them from erecting any gates which would impede JRE and from further harassment, and they appealed. Finding the trial court’s judgment to be "well reasoned," the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "Favre v. Jourdan River Estates" on Justia Law

Brandon Q. Gales was convicted of armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery for the 2011 robbery of a Hyatt Food Mart convenience store. Gales received sentences of life and five years. On appeal, he argued: (1) the trial court erred in not suppressing fruits of an impermissible stop of his vehicle shortly after the robbery, and that police conducted an illegal search of his person following the stop; (2) the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest and conduct a subsequent warrantless search; (3) the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony of witnesses and the arresting officer; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the jury verdict (or in the alternative, a new trial) due to insufficient evidence. The Mississippi Supreme Court, after careful consideration of each issues raised on appeal, found no reversible error and affirmed Gales' convictions and sentences. View "Gales v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Zachary Polk was indicted on three counts for the sale of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), hydrocodone, and alprazolam. Polk entered a plea of guilty as to Count I for the sale of MDMA, and he was sentenced to serve ten years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine. The district attorney “retired to files” Count II and Count III, based upon Polk entering a plea of guilty as to Count I. In 2012, Polk received a “full, complete, and unconditional pardon” from Governor Haley Barbour. Thereafter, Polk filed a petition for expungement seeking to have all records expunged relating to his earlier arrest and indictment. The trial court determined that it was without statutory or constitutional authority to expunge Polk’s record. There being no statutory basis for expungement of the record of the criminal conviction for which Polk was pardoned, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court correctly denied Polk’s petition to expunge the record(s) pertaining to his criminal conviction. As to Polk’s criminal records pertaining to Counts II and III, the Court found that those records were eligible for expungement pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-15-26(5). View "Polk v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In a divorce and child-custody dispute between Shannon and Mary Jane Borden, the chancellor awarded custody of their two sons to father-Shannon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Finding that the chancellor gave undue weight to Mary Jane’s misconduct under three separate "Albright" factors, and that the chancellor erred in rejecting the guardian ad litem’s recommendation without providing reasons and a summary of the guardian’s report, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the lower courts and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Borden v. Borden" on Justia Law

Danielle Hingle was convicted of sale of morphine, and sentenced to fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. On appeal, Hingle argued that admission of the testimony of a crime laboratory analyst who reviewed and signed the lab report but did not test the pills violated her Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Furthermore, she argued that the trial court erred by admitting the pills due to flaws in the chain of custody. Upon further review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err by allowing the reviewing analyst to testify or by allowing the pills to be admitted. View "Hingle v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Marlon Howell was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. Howell then sought post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming he was entitled to a new trial. The Court granted Howell’s petition for PCR in part, holding that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on certain delineated issues. The trial court held the evidentiary hearing and, finding no merit in the issues, denied Howell’s request for a new trial. Howell appealed. Howell’s claims regarding recanted testimony and witness statements were without merit, and the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying his motion for a new trial. Howell was not under arrest for capital murder at the time of a police lineup, and he was not entitled to counsel at the pre-indictment lineup (even if Howell had been entitled to counsel, the failure to provide counsel during the lineup would have been harmless error because the lineup was not suggestive, and the witness' identification was reliable). Howell’s claims about Attorney General Hood participating in his trial lacked merit, and the trial court did not err in allowing him to participate. And finally, the Supreme Court concluded the trial judge did not err in denying Howell’s motion to supplement the record with new evidence after the evidentiary hearing. View "Howell v. Mississippi" on Justia Law