Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lawrence Elliott owned and operated the Black Creek Water and Wastewater systems in Forrest County from the 1990s until 2005. The systems are a few miles upstream of an area of Black Creek that is designated as a National Wild and Scenic River. The systems suffered numerous violations of environmental regulations, including multiple illegal sewage discharges. Bell Utilities purchased the systems from Elliott in 2005 and vastly improved the situation, expending its own money in an attempt to bring the system into compliance. Bell entered into an Agreed Order with the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality in which compliance issues were addressed, and in which Bell agreed to put up a financial assurance that would be returned to Bell after two years of adequate compliance. In 2010, Bell sought to sell the Black Creek systems to Utility One, LLC, and to transfer the attendant permits to it. MDEQ refused to transfer Bell’s wastewater permit to Utility One unless Utility One put up a similar financial assurance. Bell appealed the denial of the permit transfer to the chancery court. The chancery court reversed the Permit Board, finding that its actions were arbitrary and capricious because it has not promulgated regulations on how to conduct a regulatory hearing and on when and whether to demand financial assurances prior to permit transfer. It ordered MDEQ and the Permit Board to promulgate such regulations. MDEQ appealed. Because the Supreme Court found that the Permit Board’s demand of the financial assurance from Utility One to transfer the permit was beyond its power, the Court affirmed the portion of the chancery court judgment that reversed the Permit Board. However, because the agencies were not required under the APA to promulgate rules and regulations for formal Permit Board hearings, the Court vacated the portion of the trial court’s judgment that required them to do so.View "Mississippi Comm'n on Environmental Quality v. Bell Utilities of Mississippi, LLC" on Justia Law

Mississippi Power Company filed documents asserting confidentiality with the Mississippi Public Service Commission related to a certificate-of-public-convenience-and-necessity proceeding in January 2009. In July 2012, Bigger Pie Forum (BPF) requested three of those documents from the Commission, and Mississippi Power sought a protective order. Following a hearing, the Chancery Court ordered that the documents be produced. Mississippi Power appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Chancery Court to the extent that it ordered disclosure of the January 2009 gas price forecasts and CO2 cost assumptions that were similar in kind to those already published (by news media). However, the Court remanded this case to the Chancery Court to should consider the documents under seal and order that information pertaining to natural gas price forecasts and CO2 costs assumptions be produced by Mississippi Power. View "Mississippi Power Company v. Mississippi Public Service Comm'n" on Justia Law

The residence of Brent and Amy Hubbard secured a note and deed of trust held by Trustmark National Bank. Additionally, the Hubbards obtained a second loan, which was secured by a note and second deed of trust held by BancorpSouth on the same residence. Trustmark foreclosed on the first deed of trust and sold the property. More than a year later, BancorpSouth sued the Hubbards for money due under the second note. The Hubbards admitted they were in default, but asserted as an affirmative defense that BancorpSouth’s claim was time barred under the one-year statute of limitations prescribed in Mississippi Code Section 15-1-23. After a hearing on the motion, the circuit court found Section 15-1-23 inapplicable and ruled instead that Mississippi Code Section 15-1-49 provides the proper limitations period (three years). The circuit court entered judgment in favor of BancorpSouth. On appeal, the Hubbards argued that the circuit court erred in granting BancorpSouth’s judgment on the pleadings because the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by Section 15-1-23. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings. However, the three-year statute of limitations provided under Section 15-1-49 was inapplicable in this case; the proper limitations period for suits on promissory notes for nonforeclosing lenders is Mississippi Code Section 75-3-118, which provided a six-year statute of limitations, rather than the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Section 15-1-49.View "Hubbard v. BancorpSouth Bank " on Justia Law

Michael Huseth (Mike) appealed a Chancery Court judgment which granted his wife Tavia Huseth an award of separate maintenance, full physical custody of their son, and attorney fees. Tavia requested attorney fees on appeal equal to half of the fees she was awarded at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment in part, reversed in part and remanded the case to the chancery court, and the Court denied Tavia’s request for attorney fees on appeal. The chancellor’s grant of separate maintenance and child support was supported by substantial evidence and was not manifestly wrong. The chancellor’s determination of the amount of imputed income was not supported by sufficient findings by the chancellor, and in the absence of her specific computation of the amount, was reversed and remanded for specific findings detailing how the chancellor arrived at that amount, and upon what she relied. Because the Court reversed and remanded for a new finding of imputed income, the Court also reversed and remanded the chancellor’s determination of child support, in which the chancellor shall consider all of the facts and circumstances regarding the parties’ ability to support the child, rather than relying on the statutory guidelines. Further, the chancellor’s award of separate maintenance did not take into account Mike’s necessary living expenses, and therefore was reversed. The amount of separate maintenance may be based upon imputed income, but the amount of that income that goes towards living expenses must be considered. View "Huseth v. Huseth" on Justia Law

Robert Reith was convicted by jury for the murder of his ex-wife and sentenced to life. He appealed, but his conviction and sentence was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Reith argued the trial court erred in granting pattern jury instruction S-5, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to that instruction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court erred in granting instruction S-5, and that the error was not harmless. "Deliberate design may not be presumed, and we overrule our prior cases to the extent that they conflict with this principle. We admonish the circuit courts not to grant an instruction which relies upon a presumption of intent, as it conflicts with the presumption of innocence, relieving the State of its burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on an essential element of the offense." View "Reith v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After suffering a severe electrical shock while working as a lineman for Tippah Electric Power Association, Lonnie Smith filed a petition to controvert with the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission. Tippah denied that Smith's claim was compensable and raised the affirmative defense that Smith had intentionally injured himself. The administrative judge (AJ) found that Smith had intentionally injured himself and that his injury was not compensable; the Commission affirmed the AJ's denial of the claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because it found that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded this case to the Commission for a determination of benefits.View "Smith v. Tippah Electric Power Association" on Justia Law

Kenyatta Cheeks was entering an AutoZone store when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Jason Johnson. The jury returned a verdict for Cheeks in the amount of $2.5 million, finding that AutoZone was forty-five percent at fault and Johnson was fifty-five percent at fault. Later, the trial court granted AutoZone’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Cheeks appealed, arguing that granting AutoZone's motion was made in error. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to non-movant Cheeks, the jury had credible evidence to determine that an injury was reasonably foreseeable. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the trial court’s grant of JNOV in favor of AutoZone and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Cheeks v. AutoZone, Inc." on Justia Law

While walking through the Imperial Palace Casino’s parking garage in the space between the garage wall and the front of the parking spaces Joseph Jones was injured when he tripped over a concrete parking bumper and fell to the concrete floor. Jones filed suit alleging that the parking bumper was misaligned, jutted into the path, and proximately caused both his fall and his injury. The trial judge granted Imperial Palace’s motion for summary judgment. Jones appealed, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed, finding sufficient evidence to create a jury question as to whether Imperial possessed actual as well as constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition, and whether it had failed to conduct reasonable inspections. Imperial appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed, finding plaintiff presented insufficient evidence that the defendant created or knew of a dangerous condition on its premises. The trial court's judgment was reinstated and affirmed. View "Jones v. Imperial Palace of Mississippi, LLC" on Justia Law

Leslie Shumake, Jr. and Katarina Shumake were granted a divorce in 2009. In the judgment, the chancellor ordered Leslie to pay Katarina $5,750 per month in periodic alimony. Shortly thereafter, Katarina filed a complaint for citation for contempt, claiming that Leslie had not paid the amount of alimony ordered by the chancellor. From the time Katarina filed her initial contempt complaint in 2009 until April 2012, the chancery court held hearings and entered various orders addressing the alimony and Leslie’s arrearage. In the end, the chancellor concluded that Leslie owed Katarina $58,550, plus interest, in arrearage. Leslie appealed the chancellor’s order. The Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that "on [the] unique facts [of the present case], we find that it would be fundamentally unfair and unjust to charge Leslie with a $58,550 arrearage." The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded that portion of the chancellor’s order. Katarina appealed. The Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in holding the arrearage award should have been reversed and remanded. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Shumake v. Shumake" on Justia Law

Craig Williams was convicted by jury of armed robbery. Williams appealed his conviction, claiming: (1) a broken "BB gun" did not meet the definition of a deadly weapon for purposes of Mississippi's armed-robbery statute; (2) the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the legal definition of a deadly weapon; and (3) because the jury was instructed that they "need not actually see a deadly weapon," they were misinstructed on the legal necessity of the use of a deadly weapon. Finding no merit in any of these contentions, the Supreme Court affirmed Williams's armed robbery conviction. View "Williams v. Mississippi" on Justia Law