Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dr. Steven Hayne appealed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former medical malpractice insurer, The Doctors Company and The Doctors Company Insurance Services (collectively, “The Doctors”). The Doctors refused to cover Hayne for lawsuits brought by exonerated criminal defendants against whom Hayne had testified as a State’s witness. Kennedy Brewer sued Hayne for malicious prosecution, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation in the Circuit Court of Noxubee County, Mississippi, and later in federal district court. Hayne sought coverage under a medical malpractice insurance policy he had purchased from The Doctors. The Doctors declined to provide coverage, arguing that Brewer was not a "patient" under Hayne’s medical malpractice insurance policy, and that the company therefore was under no obligation to cover Hayne in relation to the suit brought by Brewer. Hayne argued in his suit against The Doctors that The Doctors knew when it issued the policy exactly what kind of medicine he practiced, and that the insurance policy covered him for the types of medical malpractice suits he might face, including the suit filed by Brewer. The Doctors moved for summary judgment, arguing that the policy language was clear and unambiguous in the kind of coverage provided, and that the suit by Brewer did not fall within the policy’s coverage. The Circuit Court agreed, and, despite a lack of in-depth discovery, granted the motion for summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hayne v. The Doctors Company" on Justia Law

Bronwyn Benoist Parker and William Benoist were siblings who litigated the will of their father, Billy Dean "B.D." Benoist. In 2010, B.D. executed a will which granted significantly more property to William and consequently, less to Bronwyn than did a previous will that B.D. had executed in 1998. Bronwyn alleged that William had unduly influenced their father, who was suffering from dementia and drug addiction, into making the new will, which included a forfeiture clause that revoked benefits to any named beneficiary who contested the will. Bronwyn lost the will contest and her benefits under the new will were revoked by the trial court. In this appeal, the issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether Mississippi law should recognize a good faith and probable cause exception to a forfeiture in terrorem clause in a will. The Court held that it should, and that Bronwyn has sufficiently shown that her suit was brought in good faith and was founded upon probable cause. Accordingly, the decision of the chancery court that excluded Bronwyn from the will was reversed, and granted judgment in her favor to allow her to inherit in accordance with her father’s 2010 will. The Court affirmed the chancellor’s decisions to permit William to pay attorneys with funds obtained from his father’s estate and to permit William to continue as executor, and the chancery court’s decision to deny attorney fees to the estate. View "Parker v. Benoist" on Justia Law

George Dukes and Joe Jordan sued Union Insurance Company Inc. as surety on the public official bond of Newton County Circuit Clerk Rodney Bounds. Union filed a crossclaim against Bounds for indemnity. The Circuit Court dismissed the case against Bounds, but found Union liable to Dukes and Jordan. However, it also found Bounds liable to Union for indemnity. Union appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Union was not liable to Dukes and Jordan, and that Bounds was not liable to Union for indemnity. The Supreme Court granted Union’s petition for certiorari. Union argued the Court of Appeals erred by finding that Bounds was not liable to Union for indemnity for its attorneys fees and costs incurred in defending the lawsuits filed on Bounds’s public official bond. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court of Appeals erred to the extent it found that Bounds was not obligated to indemnify Union for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Newton County v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Troy Chaupette was convicted of fondling his four-year-old great-niece. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) allowing two fact witnesses to provide expert testimony; (2) permitting an improper comment on the victim’s truthfulness; and (3) admitting cumulative, hearsay testimony from six witnesses under the tender-years exception. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Chaupette's convictions.View "Chaupette v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Karmjit Virk appealed an increase in his tax liability to the Mississippi Department of Revenue’s Board of Review. When Virk failed to appear at his Board of Review hearing, his appeal was involuntarily withdrawn. Virk’s appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals and the Chancery Court; both were dismissed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Board of Review, the Board of Tax Appeals, and the Chancery Court.View "Virk v. Mississippi Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2011, defendant was pulled over for suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) after an officer observed him weaving between lanes. He resisted arrest and subsequently was indicted on two counts of assaulting a law-enforcement officer, possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine, and a first DUI. The indictment later was amended to reflect his habitual-offender status. The assault charges eventually were dropped. Defendant engaged Gerald Green, a Tennessee attorney, to represent him. Green submitted a verified application and affidavit to appear pro hac vice, listing the enumerated requirements of Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(b)(5), including the statement that Green "has associated Attorney Daniel O. Lofton, a member in good standing of the Mississippi Bar as local counsel in this case . . . ." The application included a Certificate of Local Attorney signed by Daniel Lofton and a Certificate of Payment for the pro hoc vice fee of $200 to the Clerk of the Mississippi Supreme Court. Green submitted a Motion to Dismiss Prosecution and a Request for Discovery on defendant's behalf. These two motions were signed and submitted only by Green. Additionally, Green's bar number as listed next to his signature on these motions did not indicate in which state Green was licensed. Green represented defendant at an August 7, 2012, hearing in which the court denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted the State's Motion to Amend the Indictment charging defendant as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-81. Green had not at that time been approved to proceed pro hac vice, and associated attorney Lofton was not present at the hearing. The court subsequently denied an August 17, 2012, Motion to Continue Trial filed by Green. After the jury was selected, the court approved Green's application to proceed pro hac vice and waived the requirement that local counsel be present during trial. The State had no objection to the trial proceeding without the presence of local counsel. After a one-day trial, defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine, and first-offense DUI. The Supreme Court never received an order approving Green's admission to proceed pro hac vice. Green stated at the post-trial motions hearing that "I didn't submit any order. I didn't think anything else was required after we had our proceedings in this court. They [Mississippi Supreme Court Clerk] sent back the cases that I had been in, and they approved that I had paid the money." Daniel Lofton, the associated attorney, testified at the post-trial motions hearing that he understood his role and obligations to be limited to certifying that Green was an attorney in good standing in Tennessee on Green's pro hoc vice application, and that he would be notified if his involvement was further required. Lofton never met or communicated with defendant. At the post-trial motions hearing, defendant asserted that he never knew Green was not licensed to practice in Mississippi. Defendant hired a new attorney immediately following the trial and was represented by the new attorney at the post-trial motions hearing, sentencing hearing, and on this appeal. The Supreme Court reversed defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial due to the trial court's and counsel's failure to comply with Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 governing the admission of foreign attorneys to practice pro hoc vice. Most significantly, the trial court erred in waiving the now-mandatory requirement that associated local counsel be present at trial. View "Newberry v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In 1987, Joseph Bagley purchased a cancer and dread-disease policy through his friend and insurance agent, Jackie McPhail. The policy was issued by American Heritage Life Insurance Company. McPhail worked as an independent insurance broker, and she was a registered agent with American Heritage at the time the policy was written. The policy indicated that Bagley purchased coverage concerning cancer and dread disease, a home-recovery rider, and a hospital intensive-care rider. Bagley also had an option to purchase life insurance; however, McPhail testified that Bagley did not purchase life insurance under this policy because he had purchased a separate life-insurance policy. In 2008, Bagley was diagnosed with cancer. Bagley contacted McPhail to file a claim under the policy and to "change the beneficiary" of the policy from his estate to Michael and Betty Strait. McPhail testified that she had ceased writing policies for American Heritage; however, she still retained the authority to service Bagley's policy, and she acquired his written consent to receive information regarding his policy from the insurance company. While Bagley was in the hospital, McPhail presented an American Heritage change-of-beneficiary form, which Bagley ultimately signed. The signature was witnessed by Bagley's physician, a nurse, and McPhail. Bagley orally communicated that he wished for the beneficiary to be changed from his estate to the Straits. At the time that Bagley signed the form, the Straits had yet to be listed as beneficiaries on the form. McPhail met with the Straits after the form was signed to confirm their correct legal names to be placed on the change-of-beneficiary form at a later time. McPhail provided that she did not fully complete the form because she was attempting to contact American Heritage to confirm the correct procedure for completing the process; however, American Heritage's office was closed because of Hurricane Fay, and McPhail never succeeded in speaking with American Heritage regarding the matter. Bagley's physician, who witnessed Bagley signing the form, later communicated to Betty Strait that his attorney advised that the form could not be used because the Straits' names were not listed on the form prior to Bagley's signature. Betty Strait relayed this to McPhail, who then attempted to contact American Heritage's legal department. McPhail called the company on multiple occasions, but she never received a return phone call. Soon thereafter, Bagley passed away, and the form was never completed. The estate was probated and the Straits did not contest the passage of the policy proceeds to the estate at the time that the estate was being settled. The executor of Bagley's will, William Kinstley, petitioned for the approval of the estate's final accounting, which included the policy proceeds. The Straits initiated legal action against McPhail and American Heritage in Hinds County Circuit Court, arguing that Bagley intended for them to receive the proceeds from the cancer policy. The Straits alleged breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, negligence and gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duties and the duty of good faith and fair dealing, bad-faith refusal to pay benefits and to promptly and adequately investigate the claim, misrepresentation and/or failure to procure, promissory and/or equitable estoppel, and they sought a claim for declaratory relief. McPhail filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the circuit court. The circuit court found that the issue had been previously litigated and resolved in chancery court, and that no appeal had been taken from the chancery court judgment. Likewise, the circuit court granted American Heritage's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case, finding that genuine issues of material fact did exist and that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar the Straits' claims. Because the Straits failed to raise any issues upon which relief may be granted, the circuit court's grant of McPhail's motion to dismiss was proper. However, the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. Furthermore, the circuit court properly granted American Heritage's motion for summary judgment: the Straits were never eligible to be third-party beneficiaries under the policy, and they have failed to show any equitable entitlement to reimbursement. For those reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court's judgment. View "Strait v. McPhail " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review of this personal-injury negligence action to clarify state law on the doctrine of claim-splitting. After new defendants were identified during discovery on her original complaint, Plaintiff Jeanette Carpenter filed a motion to amend her complaint to include the newly discovered defendants. A hearing could not be scheduled in time for the trial court to approve the amendment before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. In an effort to avoid losing the opportunity to bring the new defendants into the litigation, Carpenter filed a second action before the statute of limitations ran, based on the exact same set of facts, in the same court, and naming the same new defendants named in the motion to amend. The trial court dismissed both cases. The cases were consolidated for purpose of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held that Carpenter’s procedural actions constituted impermissible claim-splitting as outlined in "Wilner v. White," (929 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 2006)). The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgments of the Circuit Court. View "Carpenter v. Kenneth Thompson Builder, Inc." on Justia Law

Charlotte Perkins appealed a Circuit Court’s decision to dismiss her appeal claiming the Mississippi Department of Human Services (DHS) wrongly deprived her of receiving food stamps and that such deprivation was the result of a DHS hearing in which Perkins was deprived of procedural safeguards. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court found no statutory authority created a right of appeal to the circuit court from an administrative decision by DHS regarding food-stamp qualification(s) or disqualification(s). The Supreme Court found that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Mississippi caselaw provides, however, that where there is no statutory scheme for appeal from an agency decision and the injured party does not have a full, plain, complete and adequate remedy at law, the chancery court has jurisdiction for judicial review of the agency decision. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded with instructions to the circuit court to transfer the case to the Monroe County Chancery Court. View "Perkins v. Mississippi Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Herbert Lee Jr., the attorney who handled the 2001 settlement of thirteen diet-drug claims (for approximately $32 million), agreed that six percent of the gross settlement would be used to pay for “common benefit” discovery materials generated in the federal multi-district litigation (MDL) of the claims. Lee billed the MDL fee to the plaintiffs. After the settlement, the MDL court ordered a partial refund of the fee. Two of the plaintiffs, Gloria Thompson and Deborah Dixon, sued Lee, alleging that his attorney’s fee had exceeded the amount set out in the retainer agreement and that he had failed to accurately refund their portions of the MDL fee. The trial court granted summary judgment to Lee on the contract issue and to the plaintiffs on the MDL fee issue. Both Lee and the plaintiffs appealed, and in "Lee I)," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a trial on the contract issue. The Court affirmed summary judgment on the MDL fee issue, but remanded for the trial court to “determine if the MDL fees were paid in accordance a MDL Pre-Trial Order . . . and if not, to order such distribution.” On remand, the jury found in favor of Lee. The trial court determined that the MDL fees had not been paid in accordance with the MDL pretrial order, and ordered that Lee pay Thompson $420,000 and Dixon $180,000. Lee appealed, arguing: (1) the Supreme Court erred in "Lee I" by finding that the MDL order required him to pay the entire MDL fee from his attorney’s fees; (2) the plaintiffs were entitled to only $140,000 and $60,000 based on a prior representation of their attorney as to the amount owed; and (3) the plaintiffs’ warranted dismissal with prejudice due to their wrongful conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Lee’s assertion that the pretrial orders did not require to him to pay the entire MDL fee was decided in the first appeal and was barred by the law of the case doctrine. Furthermore, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ letter brief did not constitute a binding admission on the amount of damages and that Lee’s assertion that the plaintiffs should have been sanctioned for misconduct was procedurally barred. View "Lee v. Thompson" on Justia Law