Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendants Phillips Brothers, Kilby Brake Fisheries, LLC, and Harry Simmons appealed a judgment entered in favor of Ray Winstead on numerous shareholder and employment claims. In September 2009, Winstead filed a complaint against Kilby Brake, Harry Simmons, Chat Phillips, Simmons Farm Raised Catfish, Inc., Five Mile Fisheries, Inc., and H.D. Simmons Corp. and Phillips Brothers, LP. Winstead alleged that Simmons and Phillips Brothers had failed to pay him his agreed-upon salary, asserting claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, corporate freeze-out, conversion, slander, slander per se, and tortious interference with business relations. He also requested an accounting and dissolution of the LLC. The issues raised by the three remaining defendants in this appeal fell into six categories: (1) whether the admission of testimony regarding an oral agreement for cash contributions violated the parol evidence rule; (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to support Winstead’s award for fraud; (3) whether there was sufficient evidence to support Winstead’s award for corporate freeze-out; (4) whether there was sufficient evidence to support Winstead’s award for breach of fiduciary duty; (5) whether Kilby Brake was entitled to a new trial; (6) whether Winstead met the requisite elements of slander per se. Finding multiple errors, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded in part; and remanded in part. View "Phillips Brothers v. Winstead" on Justia Law

Petitioner Stephen Johnson was arrested and convicted for driving on a suspended license (in the third degree). His license had been suspended for failing to pay a traffic fine. Johnson appealed his DWLS 3rd conviction, arguing: (1) the former RCW 46.20.342(1)(c)(iv) (2008) did not proscribe his continuing to drive after the suspension of his license for failing to pay a traffic fine; or alternatively, (2) that because he was indigent, the suspension was invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution's due process and equal protection clauses, which required the State to inquire into his ability to pay the fine before suspending his license. Furthermore, Johnson argued the trial court erred by denying him counsel to fight these charges, and wanted reimbursement for attorney fees spent in his defense. The Supreme Court rejected Johnson's arguments on appeal, but remanded the case for further proceedings to determine Johnson's right to reimbursement for attorney fees. The plain meaning of former RCW 46.20.342(1 )( c )(iv) allows the State to convict a driver for DWLS 3rd where the underlying license suspension occurred for failure to pay a fine. Johnson was not constitutionally indigent, but statutorily so; on remand, the Supreme Court instructed the district court to enter an order designating Johnson either as (1) indigent or (2) indigent and able to contribute. If Johnson is able to contribute, the district court would have to enter an order determining the costs he should bear for his appeal. View "Cade v. Beard" on Justia Law

After being convicted by jury for statutory rape and resisting arrest, defendant Toney Jennings was sentenced to fifteen years: ten years to serve and five years suspended. Jennings received six months for resisting arrest. Jennings appealed the statutory-rape conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether the trial court erred in admitting Jennings’s arguably involuntary statement to police into evidence. After review, the Court concluded the State clearly failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jennings’s waiver and statement were voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, given the many problems surrounding the waiver and the "dearth" of evidence supporting its voluntariness. The Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial and a new and reliable suppression hearing in which a specific determination regarding voluntariness could be made, and a record adequately developed. View "Jennings v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Michael Ambrose was indicted for capital murder while in the commission of a robbery in Harrison County, Mississippi. After trial, the jury acquitted Ambrose of capital murder but found him guilty of deliberate design murder. The trial court sentenced Ambrose to life imprisonment. Ambrose appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Ambrose’s conviction and sentence, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support a murder verdict and the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. View "Ambrose v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Helen Schroeder was a passenger in an automobile driven by her husband Harry, when a log truck collided with the rear of the automobile. Harry was killed, and Helen was severely injured. A consequence of the accident was that Helen suffered diminished mental capacity. In a federal lawsuit, Helen claimed the truck driver was at fault and denied that Harry was negligent. After the federal judge denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Helen settled the federal suit. Helen then sued Harry’s estate in state court, claiming Harry was partially at fault. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the estate on judicial estoppel grounds. But, because the federal judge stated his denial of summary judgment was based on his finding of genuine issues of material fact as to the truck driver’s negligence, not “Harry Schroeder’s potential contributory negligence,” the Supreme Court reversed. View "Clark v. Neese" on Justia Law

The State indicted John Bartholomew Lowe on five counts of exploitation of a child, alleging that he had downloaded sexually explicit images and videos of children from the internet to his personal computer. The State had no direct evidence that Lowe had downloaded the images; its case depended on the opinions of its expert witness. On appeal of his eventual conviction, Lowe contended that several others had access to his computer, and that someone else had downloaded the material. He requested funds to hire an expert to help prepare his case to refute the State’s expert. The trial court denied Lowe’s request. The Supreme Court concluded that denial deprived Lowe of the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. Therefore the Supreme Court reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Lowe v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Jason Hall was indicted and tried on an indictment for burglary of a building. After both sides rested, the State requested and was granted a jury instruction for accessory after the fact to burglary (in addition to the burglary instruction). The jury acquitted Hall of burglary but convicted him of accessory after the fact to burglary. Because Hall was convicted of a crime for which he was not indicted, nor did he waive indictment, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and vacate Hall's sentence. View "Hall v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Jackson County Board of Supervisors terminated June Seaman, and she applied to the Mississippi Employment Security Commission (MESC) for unemployment benefits. A claims examiner, an administrative-law judge, and the Board of Review all determined that Seaman was entitled to unemployment benefits because Jackson County had failed to prove by clear and convincing, substantial evidence that Seaman had been terminated for misconduct. The circuit court affirmed the agency’s decision, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the employer had proven misconduct by substantial evidence. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals improperly reweighed the evidence before the MESC. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Jackson County Board of Supervisors v. Mississippi Employment Security Commission" on Justia Law

In 2007, fifteen-year-old Alexandria Miller and sixteen-year-old Kelly Garvin were traveling on a two-lane road when their vehicle collided with two horses that had escaped from a nearby property and were standing in the middle of the road. Garvin sued Miller alleging negligent operation of the vehicle. Garvin asserted claims of negligent entrustment against Miller’s mother and stepfather, Melanie and V. M. Cleveland, and Tupelo Furniture Market, Inc. (TFM), and a claim of negligent training/instruction against V. M. Cleveland. Garvin further asserted that Melanie and V. M. Cleveland were liable for Miller’s negligence because they had signed Miller’s driver’s license application. The circuit court granted summary judgment on the claims of negligent entrustment and negligent training/instruction in favor of the Clevelands and TFM. Garvin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court properly granted summary judgment and accordingly affirmed that court's judgment. View "Guardianship of Kelly Garvin v. Tupelo Furniture Market, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, Edward Miles drove his pickup truck into an intersection in front of Virgil Burcham’s eighteen-wheel fuel truck. Miles died several hours following the accident. Virgil Burcham sued Edward Miles’s estate for negligence and negligence per se. Burcham received a $60,000 judgment, which the Miles estate appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment as to liability, subject to remittitur. View "Estate of Edward Miles v. Burcham" on Justia Law