Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a complaint charging Tate County Youth Court Referee, Drug Court Judge, and Family Master Leigh Ann Darby with judicial misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Commission and Judge Darby entered into an “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation” providing that Judge Darby had violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution, and recommended that she be removed from office, prohibited from holding judicial office in the future, and assessed costs of $200. The Commission unanimously accepted and adopted the “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation.” In this latest incident, Judge Darby stipulated to multiple incidents in which she denied citizens their due-process rights. Between 2008 and 2010, she “unlawfully ordered the incarceration of” eight parents and denied each his or her “constitutional right of due process” prior to being “order[ed] . . . to jail for conduct allegedly occurring outside of court.” In 2011, three fifteen-year-old minors (two girls and one boy) were arrested by Senatobia police after a neighbor of one of the children complained that they had walked across her yard. Judge Darby, in her official capacity as youth court referee and youth court judge, but without authority of law, ordered that the three minors be drug-tested while in custody. Without conducting any hearings, Judge Darby ordered the minors to be taken into custody and transported to a detention facility in Alcorn County, Mississippi. Unrepresented by counsel and denied due process, the minors spent Friday until the following Monday in the detention facility. On October 3, 2011, the Tate County Board of Supervisors passed a “No Confidence Resolution” regarding Judge Darby. That resolution declared that it was not in the best of interest of Tate County that she continue in her judicial capacity and called upon the senior chancellor of the district to remove her from all Tate County judicial offices. Judge Darby was suspended from office for a period of sixty days. Thereafter, she tendered her resignation to the senior chancellor. The Supreme Court performed its mandated review of the Commission’s recommendation consistent with Miss. Const. art. 6, section 177A, Miss. Comm’n on Jud. Perf. R. 10, M.R.A.P. 16(a), and Mississippi case law. The Supreme Court concluded Judge Darby’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Court ordered that Judge Darby be removed from office, fined $1,000, and assessed costs of $200. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Darby" on Justia Law

Marcus Wallace sought to run as an independent candidate in the June 4, 2013, mayoral election in Edwards, Mississippi. The Edwards Municipal Election Commission declined to place his name on the ballot, questioning the validity of certain signatures on Wallace’s petition for candidacy. Following an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court and a granted writ of mandamus directing the Commission to conduct a hearing, the Commission again denied Wallace’s petition to be placed on the ballot. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the determination of the Special Circuit Judge of the Second Judicial District of Hinds County that the Commission improperly applied Mississippi Code Section 1-3-76 (Rev. 2005), and because the Court found Wallace’s name should have been placed on the mayoral ballot, the Court affirmed. View "Election Commission of the Town of Edwards v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Sam Woodruff owned land in Rankin County. He agreed to sell a part of that land to Rita Thames, his first cousin’s daughter, who was also a neighbor. Woodruff claimed that he agreed to sell Thames one acre from a tract of land for the purchase price of $9,750. Thames claims that Woodruff agreed to sell her 6.53 acres from a different tract of land for that amount. Woodruff claimed that Thames then brought him a blank contract of sale to sign, which he did. Thames appears to claim that the blank contract of sale included attachments that described the land; however, the appellate record contained no evidence of this. The trial court entered a default judgment awarding specific performance in favor of the Thames. Woodruff moved to have the default judgment set aside, and the trial court denied the motion, finding that Woodruff lacked good cause for the default and lacked a “compelling defense.” The Supreme Court concluded after its review of the trial court record that serious question remained regarding whether a valid contract existed between the parties, giving the seller a colorable defense. Because the trial court abused its discretion by failing to set aside the default judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for proceedings on the merits. View "Woodruff v. Thames" on Justia Law

In June 2011, fourteen-year-old Jean-ah Leon was seriously injured while operating a Bad Boy Buggy ( an off-road vehicle used for outdoor recreation). A year later, Jean-ah’s parents, Vincent and Mandi Leon, filed a products liability and personal injury lawsuit in Louisiana against the owner of the Bad Boy Buggy, a Louisiana resident. They also named the owner’s insurer, the Textron Parties, and several other entities and individuals. Within a few days, the Leons dismissed all parties except the vehicle owner and his insurer from the Louisiana case. The Leons filed suit in Adams County, Mississippi, against the Textron Parties and the others previously named in the Louisiana suit, seeking damages of “an amount not yet determined” but greater than $10,000,000. The Leons served that complaint and summonses on the Textron Parties through their registered agents in Mississippi. They amended their complaint, adding claims for gross negligence and punitive damages. The Leons did not issue new summonses to the Textron Parties with the amended complaint; instead, they sent copies to the Textron Parties’ headquarters by certified mail with accompanying letters addressed “To Whom it May Concern.” The Textron Parties’ attorney in the Louisiana case also requested and received a copy of the amended complaint by email. The Textron Parties’ answer was due thirty days after they were served with the original complaint. They did not file an answer to the original complaint or the amended complaint. The Leons then sought a default judgment against the Textron Parties based on the amended complaint. An entry of default and default judgment were entered the same day. The issue this case presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review arose from that default judgment: the Textron Parties claimed that the default judgment was void and should have been set aside because they did not receive proper service of the amended complaint, they were not given notice of the default judgment, and the plaintiffs failed to state a claim against them. Additionally, the Textron Parties asserted that a three-pronged balancing test for relief from default judgments required that it be set aside because they had a colorable defense and the plaintiffs would not be prejudiced. The Supreme Court held that the default judgment was not void, but it should have been set aside under the three-pronged test. View "BB Buggies, Inc. v. Leon" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Yeatman pled guilty to one count of simple assault on a law-enforcement officer and two counts of third-offense driving under the influence. Each of the three counts had a separate cause number. The Circuit Court sentenced him: for simple assault on a law-enforcement officer (cause number 2006-0161-CR), five years imprisonment and a fine of $5,000 as a habitual offender; for third-offense DUI (cause number 2006-0327-CR), five years imprisonment and a fine of $5,000 as a habitual offender; and for third-offense DUI (cause number 2006-0328-CR), one year imprisonment, four years of post-release supervision, and a fine of $100. All sentences were to run consecutively. Yeatman sought post-conviction relief from his convictions for simple assault on a law-enforcement officer and third-offense DUI. The trial court denied post-conviction relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Yeatman's petition for a writ of certiorari. Because, by statute, the fine for simple assault on a law-enforcement officer was a maximum of $1,000, the Supreme Court vacated the $5,000 fine imposed on Yeatman for that crime, and remanded that case to the trial court for a determination of whether the criminal information in cause number 2006-0327-CR charged Yeatman as a habitual offender. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Yeatman v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Alisha Vanwey pled guilty in 2007 to three counts of selling hydrocodone, and the trial court sentenced her as a habitual offender to eleven years on each count, to run concurrently, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Vanwey filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) arguing, inter alia, that one of the two prior predicate felonies listed in her indictment alleging habitual-offender status did not meet the requirements of Section 99-19-81. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision based on the finding that Vanwey's motion was procedurally barred as a successive writ and time-barred. After its review, the Supreme Court found Vanwey waived whatever contention she might have had with her habitual-offender status when she failed to challenge the sufficiency or validity of her two prior felony convictions and sentences at her plea hearing and then voluntarily and intelligently entered her guilty plea to three counts of selling hydrocodone as a habitual offender. View "Vanwey v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Edward Myers appealed his conviction for the armed robbery of Gabriel Lewis. Upon review of the trial court record, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of a defense witness where there was no evidence of a willful discovery violation. Accordingly, the Court reversed Myers’s conviction and remanded for a new trial. On remand, the Court directed the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine whether Myers’s right to a speedy trial was violated. View "Myers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Ricky Franklin was convicted on one count of kidnapping and on one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to thirty years and twenty years, respectively, to run consecutively. A mistrial was entered for one count of forcible rape, and a not-guilty verdict was entered for one count of sexual Franklin was denied his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or, in the alternative, for a new trial. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred: (1) in refusing to instruct the jury on simple assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault, (2) in allowing improper opinion testimony from numerous witnesses concerning whether a bottle could cause serious bodily injury, (3) in allowing prejudicial hearsay statements allegedly made to police; (4) in allowing inflammatory statements in the prosecution's closing argument to violate his right to a fair trial; and (5) in denying Franklin's motion to dismiss for violation of his right to a speedy trial. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded Franklin's conviction of aggravated assault under issue one; the Court did not reach issue two, and affirmed the trial court on all other issues raised on appeal. View "Franklin v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Martin and Star Pierce were married in Mississippi in 2000, and divorced in Washington state in 2007. Because the Washington court lacked personal jurisdiction over Star, it did not divide the parties' assets. Subsequently, Martin brought an action in Mississippi requesting sale of the parties' Biloxi home and determination of the parties' financial obligations incurred during the marriage. Star filed a counterclaim requesting equitable distribution of the marital assets, alimony, and attorney's fees. The chancellor equitably divided the parties' assets and awarded Star alimony and attorney's fees. Martin appealed the chancellor's judgment, and the Court of Appeals reversed the property division and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, Martin raised two jurisdictional challenges for the first time: (1) he argued that the Washington judgment was res judicata as to Star's claims for equitable distribution and alimony, therefore the chancery court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to divide the parties' assets.; (2) he also argued that because he never consented to the chancery court's jurisdiction, the chancery court lacked personal jurisdiction to divide his military retirement benefits under the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error. Accordingly the Court affirmed the chancery court's decision. View "Pierce v. Pierce" on Justia Law

When legendary blues musician Robert Johnson died intestate in 1938, he had no money and appeared to have left no assets to distribute to heirs, so no estate was opened at that time. But the increasing popularity of Johnson's music over the years following his death led Steven LaVere, a music producer from Tennessee who owned Delta Haze Corporation, to contact Johnson's half-sister, Carrie Thompson, about previously unpublished photographs of Johnson. Believing Thompson to be Johnson's only heir, LaVere requested the photographs to launch a new release of Johnson's music. The legatees of Carrie Thompson sought to recover royalties and fees from the use of two photographs that were ultimately used in the project. Among the several reasons the trial court denied their claim was that the statute of limitations had expired. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Anderson v. LaVere" on Justia Law