Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1987, Joseph Bagley purchased a cancer and dread-disease policy through his friend and insurance agent, Jackie McPhail. The policy was issued by American Heritage Life Insurance Company. McPhail worked as an independent insurance broker, and she was a registered agent with American Heritage at the time the policy was written. The policy indicated that Bagley purchased coverage concerning cancer and dread disease, a home-recovery rider, and a hospital intensive-care rider. Bagley also had an option to purchase life insurance; however, McPhail testified that Bagley did not purchase life insurance under this policy because he had purchased a separate life-insurance policy. In 2008, Bagley was diagnosed with cancer. Bagley contacted McPhail to file a claim under the policy and to "change the beneficiary" of the policy from his estate to Michael and Betty Strait. McPhail testified that she had ceased writing policies for American Heritage; however, she still retained the authority to service Bagley's policy, and she acquired his written consent to receive information regarding his policy from the insurance company. While Bagley was in the hospital, McPhail presented an American Heritage change-of-beneficiary form, which Bagley ultimately signed. The signature was witnessed by Bagley's physician, a nurse, and McPhail. Bagley orally communicated that he wished for the beneficiary to be changed from his estate to the Straits. At the time that Bagley signed the form, the Straits had yet to be listed as beneficiaries on the form. McPhail met with the Straits after the form was signed to confirm their correct legal names to be placed on the change-of-beneficiary form at a later time. McPhail provided that she did not fully complete the form because she was attempting to contact American Heritage to confirm the correct procedure for completing the process; however, American Heritage's office was closed because of Hurricane Fay, and McPhail never succeeded in speaking with American Heritage regarding the matter. Bagley's physician, who witnessed Bagley signing the form, later communicated to Betty Strait that his attorney advised that the form could not be used because the Straits' names were not listed on the form prior to Bagley's signature. Betty Strait relayed this to McPhail, who then attempted to contact American Heritage's legal department. McPhail called the company on multiple occasions, but she never received a return phone call. Soon thereafter, Bagley passed away, and the form was never completed. The estate was probated and the Straits did not contest the passage of the policy proceeds to the estate at the time that the estate was being settled. The executor of Bagley's will, William Kinstley, petitioned for the approval of the estate's final accounting, which included the policy proceeds. The Straits initiated legal action against McPhail and American Heritage in Hinds County Circuit Court, arguing that Bagley intended for them to receive the proceeds from the cancer policy. The Straits alleged breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, negligence and gross negligence, breach of fiduciary duties and the duty of good faith and fair dealing, bad-faith refusal to pay benefits and to promptly and adequately investigate the claim, misrepresentation and/or failure to procure, promissory and/or equitable estoppel, and they sought a claim for declaratory relief. McPhail filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the circuit court. The circuit court found that the issue had been previously litigated and resolved in chancery court, and that no appeal had been taken from the chancery court judgment. Likewise, the circuit court granted American Heritage's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact to be resolved. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded the case, finding that genuine issues of material fact did exist and that res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar the Straits' claims. Because the Straits failed to raise any issues upon which relief may be granted, the circuit court's grant of McPhail's motion to dismiss was proper. However, the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. Furthermore, the circuit court properly granted American Heritage's motion for summary judgment: the Straits were never eligible to be third-party beneficiaries under the policy, and they have failed to show any equitable entitlement to reimbursement. For those reasons, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court's judgment. View "Strait v. McPhail " on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted review of this personal-injury negligence action to clarify state law on the doctrine of claim-splitting. After new defendants were identified during discovery on her original complaint, Plaintiff Jeanette Carpenter filed a motion to amend her complaint to include the newly discovered defendants. A hearing could not be scheduled in time for the trial court to approve the amendment before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. In an effort to avoid losing the opportunity to bring the new defendants into the litigation, Carpenter filed a second action before the statute of limitations ran, based on the exact same set of facts, in the same court, and naming the same new defendants named in the motion to amend. The trial court dismissed both cases. The cases were consolidated for purpose of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court held that Carpenter’s procedural actions constituted impermissible claim-splitting as outlined in "Wilner v. White," (929 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 2006)). The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgments of the Circuit Court. View "Carpenter v. Kenneth Thompson Builder, Inc." on Justia Law

Charlotte Perkins appealed a Circuit Court’s decision to dismiss her appeal claiming the Mississippi Department of Human Services (DHS) wrongly deprived her of receiving food stamps and that such deprivation was the result of a DHS hearing in which Perkins was deprived of procedural safeguards. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The circuit court found no statutory authority created a right of appeal to the circuit court from an administrative decision by DHS regarding food-stamp qualification(s) or disqualification(s). The Supreme Court found that the circuit court was correct in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Mississippi caselaw provides, however, that where there is no statutory scheme for appeal from an agency decision and the injured party does not have a full, plain, complete and adequate remedy at law, the chancery court has jurisdiction for judicial review of the agency decision. Accordingly, the case was reversed and remanded with instructions to the circuit court to transfer the case to the Monroe County Chancery Court. View "Perkins v. Mississippi Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Herbert Lee Jr., the attorney who handled the 2001 settlement of thirteen diet-drug claims (for approximately $32 million), agreed that six percent of the gross settlement would be used to pay for “common benefit” discovery materials generated in the federal multi-district litigation (MDL) of the claims. Lee billed the MDL fee to the plaintiffs. After the settlement, the MDL court ordered a partial refund of the fee. Two of the plaintiffs, Gloria Thompson and Deborah Dixon, sued Lee, alleging that his attorney’s fee had exceeded the amount set out in the retainer agreement and that he had failed to accurately refund their portions of the MDL fee. The trial court granted summary judgment to Lee on the contract issue and to the plaintiffs on the MDL fee issue. Both Lee and the plaintiffs appealed, and in "Lee I)," the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a trial on the contract issue. The Court affirmed summary judgment on the MDL fee issue, but remanded for the trial court to “determine if the MDL fees were paid in accordance a MDL Pre-Trial Order . . . and if not, to order such distribution.” On remand, the jury found in favor of Lee. The trial court determined that the MDL fees had not been paid in accordance with the MDL pretrial order, and ordered that Lee pay Thompson $420,000 and Dixon $180,000. Lee appealed, arguing: (1) the Supreme Court erred in "Lee I" by finding that the MDL order required him to pay the entire MDL fee from his attorney’s fees; (2) the plaintiffs were entitled to only $140,000 and $60,000 based on a prior representation of their attorney as to the amount owed; and (3) the plaintiffs’ warranted dismissal with prejudice due to their wrongful conduct. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Lee’s assertion that the pretrial orders did not require to him to pay the entire MDL fee was decided in the first appeal and was barred by the law of the case doctrine. Furthermore, the Court found that the plaintiffs’ letter brief did not constitute a binding admission on the amount of damages and that Lee’s assertion that the plaintiffs should have been sanctioned for misconduct was procedurally barred. View "Lee v. Thompson" on Justia Law

A mother sued the Department of Human Services (DHS) after the death of her son in the home in which DHS placed him. Austin Watkins was removed from the home of his mother, Tammy Watkins, and placed in the home of his paternal grandmother, Janice Mowdy. Approximately a year and a half after Mowdy was awarded durable legal custody of Austin, Austin died from starvation. The trial court granted DHS’s motion for summary judgment, determining that DHS enjoyed sovereign immunity from liability for the acts alleged in the complaint. Upon review of the facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Watkins v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services" on Justia Law

Zachariah Stennis sued Moss Point School District (MPSD) and several school-district officials for injuries she sustained in an off campus assault by a fellow student and the student’s mother. MPSD filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion to dismiss, which were denied by the circuit court. Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, MPSD filed this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the circuit court erroneously found that MPSD’s duty of ordinary care to provide a safe school environment applied in this case. However, the student handbook evidence presented at trial arguably imposed a duty on the school to report the threat. Based on the record before it, the Supreme Court could not make that determination. As such, the case was remanded for consideration of whether the student handbook imposed such a duty. View "Moss Point School Districtv. Stennis" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a grand jury subpoena duces tecum served upon Entergy Mississippi, Inc., that requested the names and billing addresses of all of Entergy's residential customers in two zip codes in Madison County. The subpoena followed Entergy's refusal to provide its customer list to the Madison County Tax Assessor's Office for those geographic areas which the tax assessor had requested in an effort to identify and combat homestead exemption fraud. Entergy appealed the Circuit Court's denial of Entergy's Motion to Quash. But finding not reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Entergy Mississippi, Inc. v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Paul and Terri Broome purchased a 2010 Chevrolet Equinox from a Chevrolet dealership in April 2010. The vehicle came with a three-year or 36,000 mile warranty. According to the Broomes, the vehicle had various defects which they attempted to have repaired through the dealership. When the dealership was unable to fix the defects, in December 2011, the Broomes filed suit against General Motors, the manufacturer of the vehicle, for breach of written and implied warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Act. This case was one of first impression to the Supreme Court: whether Mississippi Code Section 63-17-159(6) (Rev. 2013), the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act, or Mississippi Code Section 75-2-101 (Rev. 2012), et seq. (the Uniform Commercial Code, the “UCC”) was the most analogous state statute to the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act for the purposes of determining the statute of limitations for Magnuson-Moss Act claims filed in Mississippi. The trial court found that the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act was the most analogous state law to the Magnuson-Moss Act and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim as barred by the statute of limitations. The Court held that Mississippi’s UCC was the most analogous state statute to the Magnuson-Moss Act. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim. View "Broome v. General Motors, LLC " on Justia Law

David Ashmore and his wife Debra sued for injuries they alleged resulted from a motor-vehicle accident with a vehicle driven by an employee of the Mississippi Authority on Educational Television. David sought damages for personal injuries that he allegedly suffered to his right and left knees, back, neck, and upper arms. Debra sought damages for loss of David’s services, companionship, and consortium; rendering of nursing care and services to David; emotional distress; and loss of enjoyment of life. The trial court dismissed the Ashmores’ claims with prejudice for willful discovery violations. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ashmore v. Mississippi Authority on Educational Television" on Justia Law

Hattie Hawkins was a nursing assistant at Heritage House Nursing Center. Deserie Edwards, a resident at Heritage House, suffered injuries while under Hawkins’s care. An investigation revealed that Hawkins had lifted Edwards by herself, knowing that two people were required to lift Edwards. Hawkins then improperly placed Edwards into a lift/sling and left her unattended. Edwards fell from the sling and suffered injuries, but Hawkins did not call for assistance. Hawkins was indicted for simple assault of a vulnerable person. Several days before trial, defense counsel demurred to the indictment on the grounds that it did not comport with Mississippi Code Section 97-3-7(1) and was an improper statement of the law. The circuit court dismissed the case saying the indictment failed to state a cause of action against the defendant. The State filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the indictment was sufficient and that the trial judge erred by granting the demurrer. View "State of Mississippi v. Hattie Hawkins a/k/a Hattie M. Hawkins" on Justia Law