Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Shirley Adams and other landowners challenged a petition of the U.S. Oil and Gas Association that proposed amendments to Statewide Rule 681 which authorized the surface and subsurface landspreading of NORM as additional methods of disposal. The Mississippi Oil and Gas Board approved the proposed amendments to Rule 68, and its decision was upheld by the Chancery Court. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court found that the landowners failed to prove that the Board's adoption of amended Rule 68 was arbitrary and capricious or against the weight of the evidence. In addition, the Board's decision did not violate federal law or the landowners' constitutional rights; however, the Board violated state law when it exceeded its statutory authority under Section 53-1-17 by amending Rule 68 without gaining the approval of the Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality. Accordingly, the Chancery Court's decision was reversed and the case remanded for review by the Commission.View "Adams v. Mississippi State Oil & Gas Board" on Justia Law

Walter Tard was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to serve forty-five years, with ten years suspended and five years of post-release supervision, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Tard appealed a Court of Appeals judgment affirming his conviction and sentence, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by failing to review his entire videotaped interrogation and by failing to suppress his statement; and (2) the Court of Appeals erred by not reviewing the videotaped interrogation on appeal and by affirming the trial court’s judgment. Because the record failed to indicate upon what evidence the trial court based its decision to deny Tard’s motion to suppress his interrogation, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and sentence and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial. View "Tard v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Nancy Downey was convicted by a jury of burglary of a dwelling and first-degree and was given two concurrent twelve-year sentences. Following the denial of Downey’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, she appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed her convictions and sentences. In her petition for writ of certiorari, Downey argued that the trial court erred by failing to suppress her statement to law enforcement officers after she had invoked her Miranda rights. Finding that Downey’s constitutional rights were violated, the Supreme Court reversed her convictions and sentences and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Downey v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

This case arose from the City of Hattiesburg’s annexation of property in 2007. Pearson’s Fireworks leased land which was part of the annexed property for the purpose of selling fireworks during the Fourth of July and New Year’s holiday seasons. Prior to the annexation, the City passed an ordinance prohibiting the sale of fireworks within city limits. After the annexation, the City notified Pearson’s that it could no longer sell fireworks on the newly annexed land. Pearson’s then filed suit against the City. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, and Pearson’s appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pearson's Fireworks, Inc. v. City of Hattiesburg" on Justia Law

In a case of first impression, the issue this case presented to the Mississippi Supreme Court was whether money a corporation received as prepayment for future services was subject to franchise taxation during the year in which it was received. The Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) assessed additional franchise tax against Fishbelt Feeds, Inc. for its failure to include a "deferred revenue" account, which represented money it had received through prepaid contracts, in its franchise tax base. Fishbelt appealed MDOR’s order to the chancery court, and the chancellor granted summary judgment to MDOR. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Fishbelt argued that the chancery court erred in granting summary judgment to MDOR and should have conducted a full evidentiary hearing on the issues presented. Fishbelt also argued that its "deferred revenue" account is excepted from franchise taxation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the award of summary judgment to MDOR. View "Fishbelt Feeds, Inc. v. Mississippi Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Department of Revenue (MDOR) audited Mississippi Power Company and assessed use taxes attributed to Mississippi Power’s purchase and installation of low-NOx burners. After unsuccessfully pursuing administrative remedies, Mississippi Power appealed to the chancery court. The chancery court reversed and granted summary judgment in favor of Mississippi Power. The MDOR appealed, arguing: (1) the chancery court lacked jurisdiction over Mississippi Power’s amended petition for appeal and review; and (2) (assuming the chancery court had appellate jurisdiction over Mississippi Power’s appeal) the court erred in finding the definition of “pollution control equipment” in Mississippi Code Section 27-65-101(1)(w)) was unambiguous, and failed to afford deference to the MDOR’s interpretation of “pollution control equipment” in Mississippi Administrative Code 35.IV.7.03(302). The Supreme Court found: (1) the chancery court had jurisdiction over the appeal; and (2) the chancellor correctly concluded that Mississippi Administrative Code 35.IV.7.03(302) was an invalid regulation. The chancellor further was correct that the low-NOx burners qualified for the tax exemption under the plain language of Section 27-65-101(1)(w) and the evidence produced by Mississippi Power. Therefore, the chancellor correctly ordered that the MDOR refund Mississippi Power the use taxes assessed on the low-NOx burners, plus penalties and interest. View "Mississippi Department of Revenue v. Mississippi Power Company" on Justia Law

Mark Matthews was convicted of simple assault and disorderly conduct in Madison County Municipal Court. The decision was affirmed on appeal by the County Court of Madison County and the Madison County Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals found no error and also affirmed. While the Supreme Court also found no error in the Court of Appeals' decision, the Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify the proper burden of proof when the "Castle Doctrine" is asserted as a defense. View "Mathews v. City of Madison" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a complaint charging Tate County Youth Court Referee, Drug Court Judge, and Family Master Leigh Ann Darby with judicial misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute in violation of Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Commission and Judge Darby entered into an “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation” providing that Judge Darby had violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution, and recommended that she be removed from office, prohibited from holding judicial office in the future, and assessed costs of $200. The Commission unanimously accepted and adopted the “Agreed Statement of Facts and Proposed Recommendation.” In this latest incident, Judge Darby stipulated to multiple incidents in which she denied citizens their due-process rights. Between 2008 and 2010, she “unlawfully ordered the incarceration of” eight parents and denied each his or her “constitutional right of due process” prior to being “order[ed] . . . to jail for conduct allegedly occurring outside of court.” In 2011, three fifteen-year-old minors (two girls and one boy) were arrested by Senatobia police after a neighbor of one of the children complained that they had walked across her yard. Judge Darby, in her official capacity as youth court referee and youth court judge, but without authority of law, ordered that the three minors be drug-tested while in custody. Without conducting any hearings, Judge Darby ordered the minors to be taken into custody and transported to a detention facility in Alcorn County, Mississippi. Unrepresented by counsel and denied due process, the minors spent Friday until the following Monday in the detention facility. On October 3, 2011, the Tate County Board of Supervisors passed a “No Confidence Resolution” regarding Judge Darby. That resolution declared that it was not in the best of interest of Tate County that she continue in her judicial capacity and called upon the senior chancellor of the district to remove her from all Tate County judicial offices. Judge Darby was suspended from office for a period of sixty days. Thereafter, she tendered her resignation to the senior chancellor. The Supreme Court performed its mandated review of the Commission’s recommendation consistent with Miss. Const. art. 6, section 177A, Miss. Comm’n on Jud. Perf. R. 10, M.R.A.P. 16(a), and Mississippi case law. The Supreme Court concluded Judge Darby’s conduct violated Canons 1, 2A, 3B(2), 3B(4), and 3B(8) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 177A of the Mississippi Constitution. The Court ordered that Judge Darby be removed from office, fined $1,000, and assessed costs of $200. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Darby" on Justia Law

Marcus Wallace sought to run as an independent candidate in the June 4, 2013, mayoral election in Edwards, Mississippi. The Edwards Municipal Election Commission declined to place his name on the ballot, questioning the validity of certain signatures on Wallace’s petition for candidacy. Following an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court and a granted writ of mandamus directing the Commission to conduct a hearing, the Commission again denied Wallace’s petition to be placed on the ballot. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the determination of the Special Circuit Judge of the Second Judicial District of Hinds County that the Commission improperly applied Mississippi Code Section 1-3-76 (Rev. 2005), and because the Court found Wallace’s name should have been placed on the mayoral ballot, the Court affirmed. View "Election Commission of the Town of Edwards v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Sam Woodruff owned land in Rankin County. He agreed to sell a part of that land to Rita Thames, his first cousin’s daughter, who was also a neighbor. Woodruff claimed that he agreed to sell Thames one acre from a tract of land for the purchase price of $9,750. Thames claims that Woodruff agreed to sell her 6.53 acres from a different tract of land for that amount. Woodruff claimed that Thames then brought him a blank contract of sale to sign, which he did. Thames appears to claim that the blank contract of sale included attachments that described the land; however, the appellate record contained no evidence of this. The trial court entered a default judgment awarding specific performance in favor of the Thames. Woodruff moved to have the default judgment set aside, and the trial court denied the motion, finding that Woodruff lacked good cause for the default and lacked a “compelling defense.” The Supreme Court concluded after its review of the trial court record that serious question remained regarding whether a valid contract existed between the parties, giving the seller a colorable defense. Because the trial court abused its discretion by failing to set aside the default judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for proceedings on the merits. View "Woodruff v. Thames" on Justia Law