Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following his convictions for one count of sexual battery and three counts of gratification of lust, Joe Earl Cole argued on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay and evidence of alleged prior unindicted acts of sexual misconduct with two of his minor granddaughters. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cole v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

An interlocutory appeal stemmed from a circuit court's denial of Robert Germany’s motion to sever and transfer claims filed against him by his wife, Ginger Germany, to their pending divorce proceeding. Finding that many of Ginger’s claims against Robert were either equitable in nature or were related to divorce and alimony, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and remanded the case with instructions to sever and transfer those claims to the pending divorce action in the Chancery Court. View "Germany v. Germany" on Justia Law

Rodrique Watson appealed his burglary conviction. When the victim returned home from shopping, she parked her car in an open garage, which was attached to her home. The applicable statute required the State to prove two elements: (1) unlawful breaking and entering the dwelling house and (2) the intent to commit a crime therein. At the jury instruction conference, the State submitted the following: "The Court instructs the Jury that 'breaking' as used in the indictment and in the Court’s instructions, means any act of force, regardless of how slight, which is necessary to be used in entering a building, whether the building be locked or unlocked; The Court further instructs the Jury that the 'force' used to enter the building may be accomplished through the passage of a door, which breaks the plane. Watson objected to the second part of the instruction as a misstatement of the law. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial judge incorrectly instructed the jury that breaking the plane of a door satisfied the force element of burglary of a dwelling. Therefore, the conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Watson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on local ad valorem taxes on real estate developments that use federal tax credits to construct and maintain restrictive properties that rent only to lower-income households. Specifically, the question was whether local governments could include the value of federal tax credits in their valuation of the properties for tax assessment purposes. The Court held that Mississippi Code Section 27-35-50(4)(d) prohibits them from doing so. View "Willow Bend Estates, LLC v. Humphries County Board of Supervisors " on Justia Law

Lisa Sandlin was convicted of murder for the death of her stepson Kirk Sandlin, for which she was sentenced to a term of life in prison. Sandlin appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by allowing Lisa’s husband Sammy Sandlin to testify for the State; and (2) she received ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful consideration, the Supreme Court concluded the first issue was barred from review. But the record was insufficient to consider two of her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, Sammy’s testimony and a 911 call, on direct appeal. Thus, the Court dismissed those two claims without prejudice to Lisa’s right to bring these claims later in a properly filed motion for post-conviction relief. View "Sandlin v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Kenton McNeese appealed the dismissal of his Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment and Other Relief. This Rule 60(b) motion was filed with respect to a judgment of divorce from which he already had perfected an appeal. At that time, his first appeal was pending with the Supreme Court. In response, his former wife Katherine (“Katye”), filed a motion to dismiss and requested that Kenton be required to pay attorneys’ fees. The trial court denied Kenton’s motion for relief and granted Katye’s motion to dismiss and request for attorneys’ fees. The trial court ruled that the Rule 60(b) motion was not timely and that the court lacked jurisdiction “due to the pendency of the case’s appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court. . . .” The trial court also found that Kenton’s motion was frivolous and without substantial justification and that it was interposed for delay and harassment and, therefore, imposed a $1,000 sanction against Kenton to be applied toward Katye’s attorneys’ fees. Finding that the trial court erroneously ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Kenton’s Rule 60(b) motion, but concluding that the trial court did not err in denying the motion, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Kenton Hal McNeese v. Katherine J. McNeese (Graves)" on Justia Law

Anthony Tyrone Thomas was convicted of aggravated assault and of being a felon in possession of a weapon, for which he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of life without parole as a habitual offender. The Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions, and the Supreme Court granted Thomas's petition for writ of certiorari. Because the Supreme Court found that Count II of Thomas's indictment did not charge him with a crime, it reversed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a weapon and dismissed the indictment in Count II. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Thomas v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Circuit Court Judge for the Thirteenth District Eddie H. Bowen failed to disclose a conflict to the parties in a civil lawsuit and failed to rule on counsel's motion to recuse made after the conflict was discovered. The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance recommended that Judge Bowen be publicly reprimanded and assessed $200 in costs. After review of the record, the Supreme Court found that the recommended sanctions were insufficient. The Court ordered that Judge Bowen be publicly reprimanded, fined $500, and assessed $200 in costs. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Felicia Rogers Thomas and Thomas Johnson, Jr. appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of William Pace, M.D. in a medical-malpractice suit they filed against the doctor. The Johnsons' claim stemmed from a surgical procedure Dr. Pace had performed on Felicia Johnson. Dr. Pace filed his Answer and Defenses, denying any negligence. On the same day, Dr. Pace served his first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents to the Johnsons. One interrogatory requested that the Johnsons identify any medical experts they intended to call as witnesses at trial, along with the proposed opinions of those experts. In their response, the Johnsons stated that they had not yet identified an expert to be called as a witness at trial. Dr. Pace then served his first requests for admission and second requests for production of documents to the Johnsons. In response, the Johnsons admitted that they did not have a report from a qualified medical expert stating that Dr. Pace had breached the standard of care applicable to him in any way in his care and treatment of Felicia. Dr. Pace then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the Johnsons had failed to produce any expert testimony to support their claim. The Johnsons moved to quash Dr. Pace's motion, arguing it was premature, because no scheduling order had been entered in the case and no deadline for designating an expert witness had been established. The Johnsons did not respond to the substantive allegations of Dr. Pace's motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered its order granting Dr. Pace's motion for summary judgment. Finding no error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson, Jr. v. Pace" on Justia Law

George Neville filed a petition for modification of a final judgment of divorce seeking to have his ex-wife, Tina Blitz, pay their daughter's college expenses. The chancellor ordered the parties to divide the college expenses equally, after scholarships and a monthly housing stipend from the Post-9/11 GI Bill were deducted. George, who had assigned his Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits to his daughter, appealed arguing the chancellor erred by dividing the monthly housing stipend between Tina and himself. The chancellor found that George should take credit for the payment of the daughter's tuition, fees, and books from the Post-9/11 GI Bill, but not the monthly housing stipend. He ordered that the housing stipend be taken off the top , along with the daughter's scholarships, before the remaining expenses were divided between George and Tina. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the chancellor's allocation of the monthly housing stipend was a violation of 38 U.S.C. 3319(f)(3) because it constituted division of the benefit between parties in a civil proceeding. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case back to the chancellor to modify the order to give George credit for all benefits from the Post-9/11 GI Bill. View "Neville v. Blitz" on Justia Law