Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Howard Carney III and Andrea Leigh Bell Carney obtained a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. They asked the chancery court to determine child support, alimony, equitable distribution of assets, and attorney's fees. The chancery court determined child support, divided the marital estate, considered alimony but declined to award it, and ordered Howard to pay $5,000 toward Andrea's attorney's fees. Howard appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Howard appealed, claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the chancery court judgment because the chancery court manifestly: (1) failed to divide the marital estate equitably and (2) erred by listing his unvalued social security benefits under his share of the equitable distribution. The Supreme Court agreed with Howard as to the first issue, thus reversed and remanded on that issue. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the chancery court on the second issue. View "Carney v. Carney" on Justia Law

Carl Patterson Jr. sustained serious injuries in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident. He sued T. L. Wallace Construction, Inc. and Turtle Creek Development, Inc. for damages. T. L. Wallace and Turtle Creek both filed motions for summary judgment. The Circuit Court of Marion County granted each motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, finding the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment, reversed and remanded for a trial. Both defendants filed writs of certiorari, which were granted. After considering the parties' arguments and applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and reinstated and affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment. View "Patterson, Jr. v. T. L. Wallace Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the proper procedure by which a workers' compensation insurer may enforce a subrogation claim arising under Mississippi Code Section 71-3-71. Richard Shoemake was injured in Alabama but received workers' compensation benefits from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company under Mississippi law. He brought and settled a third-party action in Alabama state court and reimbursed Liberty Mutual only the amount it was entitled to under Alabama law. Liberty Mutual, which knew of but did not join or intervene in the Alabama lawsuit, then sued Shoemake in the Circuit Court of Newton County, seeking full reimbursement as allowed under Section 71-3-71. In granting Shoemake summary judgment, the circuit court held that Alabama law applied and further concluded that res judicata and Liberty Mutual's failure to intervene in the Alabama action barred Liberty Mutual's claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Mississippi law governed the amount of Liberty Mutual's subrogation claim and that Liberty Mutual was not required to intervene in the Alabama action to become entitled to reimbursement under Mississippi law. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court found that 71-3-71 requires a workers' compensation insurer to join or intervene in a third-party action to become entitled to reimbursement, it reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the circuit court. View "Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Shoemake" on Justia Law

Melvin Grayer was convicted of burglary and sentenced as a habitual offender to seven years without the possibility of parole or probation. Grayer appealed, claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to request a circumstantial-evidence jury instruction and that he was sentenced as a habitual offender without competent evidence of his prior felony convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Grayer's conviction and sentence of seven years, but vacated his habitual-offender sentence enhancement, because the State failed to prove Grayer was a habitual offender by competent evidence. View "Grayer v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Swain and Mona Cates lived together from 2000 until 2006. After they severed their relationship, Swain filed an action seeking the repayment of funds she first had invested in a property in Washington State, which were then used to purchase a residence in Mississippi. The chancellor rejected Swain's claim of a constructive trust or a resulting trust. The chancellor found that Cates had been unjustly enriched by Swain's contributions and awarded Swain a judgment in that amount. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor's rejection of the trust claim but reversed the decision of the chancellor, which was based on unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals held that, because “cohabitation alone cannot form the basis of an equitable remedy between non-married cohabitants,” the remedy of unjust enrichment was outside the bounds of the chancery court's equitable powers. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor was empowered to award relief on the basis of unjust enrichment. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it affirmed the chancellor's rejection of Swain's claim of a constructive trust or a resulting trust. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals with regard to the unjust-enrichment award. Because the chancellor made a mathematical error in the calculation of the unjust-enrichment award, the Court vacated the chancellor's judgment in part, and remanded the case to the chancery court for entry of judgment in the correct amount. View "Cates v. Swain" on Justia Law

Kenton and Katherine McNeese executed a consent agreement to an irreconcilable differences divorce, and the chancellor granted the divorce on that ground. Kenton filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. Kenton appealed the denial of his post-trial motion to reconsider as well as the grant of divorce based on irreconcilable differences. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court. View "McNeese v. McNeese" on Justia Law

Martin Vance filed a medical-malpractice/wrongful-death action on behalf of Mamie Vance Hemphill, alleging that Dr. Charles H. Laney was negligent in his treatment of the decedent, Hemphill. Vance initially sued other medical providers, but all but Dr. Laney were dismissed. Trial was held; Dr. Laney was the sole defendant. The jury returned a verdict of $1,000,000 to Vance. In response, Dr. Laney filed this appeal, presenting three issues to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in remitting plaintiff's economic damage award to $103,688 when the substantial weight of the evidence proved that the award should have been zero; (2) whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions; and, (3) whether plaintiff's counsel made inappropriate comments, and, when taken with the erroneous jury instructions, should have warranted Dr. Laney a new trial. Because the trial judge committed reversible error in instructing the jury that they could consider the "value of life" of the deceased in awarding damages, and because counsel for Vance made improper and prejudicial comments to the jury during closing arguments, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Laney v. Vance" on Justia Law

Blayde Grayson was indicted for capital murder while in the commission of burglary with the intent to steal personal property. A jury found him guilty of capital murder and, in a separate sentencing proceeding, sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court affirmed Grayson's conviction and death sentence. In early 2003, Grayson filed his first petition seeking post-conviction collateral relief (PCR). The Supreme Court denied relief. Grayson then filed his "Motion for Leave to File Successor Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" and "Motion for Access." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that PCR petitioners who have been sentenced to death do have a right to the effective assistance of PCR counsel. Grayson's counsel in his first PCR proceedings before the Supreme Court rendered deficient performance. However, Grayson failed to show that this deficient performance prejudiced him. Therefore, Grayson's claim that he received ineffective assistance of PCR counsel was deemed without merit. Furthermore, Grayson failed to show that his claims met any exceptions to the procedural bars, and his "Motion for Leave to File Successor Petition for Post-Conviction Relief" was dismissed as procedurally barred. Grayson was hereby granted leave to proceed in the circuit court with a motion for access. "As a matter of due process, Grayson should be allowed access to his experts, subject to the rules and regulations of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Because MDOC's rules and regulations presently require a court order, MDOC should be noticed with the request for access and afforded an opportunity to show cause why its present policies do not violate petitioner's due-process rights." View "Grayson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned premises liability in the context of a wrongful death action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that the deceased was an invitee at the time of his death and that the plaintiff breached no duty to the deceased under the standard applied to those classified as invitees while on the property of another. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed the grant of summary judgment was appropriate but disagreed with the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to the reason. The Court found that the injured party was not an invitee at the time of the incident, but a trespasser. Because both the Court of Appeals and the trial court incorrectly classified the decedent as an invitee, the Court affirmed only the result. View "Handy v. Nejam" on Justia Law

Travis Keithley was convicted for aggravated assault. On appeal, he argued that it was plain error to admit into evidence the "statements" of two anonymous people, that the verdict was not supported by the evidence, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Keithley's conviction and sentence, and dismissed his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims without prejudice. View "Keithley v. Mississippi" on Justia Law