Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1994, while en route to the scene of a fire, volunteer fireman James Hingle collided with a vehicle occupied by Sam and Ruby Anderson. Hingle was driving his personal vehicle at the time of the accident. The Andersons filed suit against Hingle, Marshall County, the volunteer fire department, and the Marshall County Board of Supervisors. The Andersons claimed that their injuries and damages amounted to $4,150,000. At the time of the accident, Hingle had two insurance policies with Guidant: personal automobile liability policy with limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident, and an umbrella protection policy with a $1,000,000 limit. Marshall County had a business automobile liability policy with a $300,000 limit through INA, which covered non-owned automobiles and provided coverage to the volunteer fire department. A dispute arose regarding which insurance company should defend the litigation and which provided primary coverage. INA filed a declaratory-judgment action against Guidant in the Circuit Court of Marshall County. INA asked for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that Guidant had a duty to defend all the defendants and INA did not have any duty to defend, and that Guidant's policies afforded primary coverage for all defendants, while INA provided excess coverage only. INA moved for summary judgment in the declaratory-judgment action, but the trial court held the motion in abeyance pending a final determination on the merits of the underlying lawsuit. Following that ruling, INA provided defense counsel to Marshall County and the fire department in the Anderson lawsuit. Guidant defended Hingle. INA appealed the trial court's decision on remand. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case back to the trial court. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of INA's Rule 56(f) motion for continuance and the denial of INA's request for prejudgment interest. The Court found that INA's claims of procedural errors warranting reversal were without merit. While the Court agreed with the trial court's finding that INA was required to contribute to the settlement, the Court reversed the trial court's determination that INA was required to contribute its policy limit. The Court held that Guidant was required to exhaust its $500,000 per-accident limit before INA's insurance was to be applied. View "Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Guidant Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Concerned with the sufficiency of process in multiple paternity and child-support cases, Chancellor D. Neil Harris conducted a hearing in which he found an individual process-server, Guy Jernigan; a notary, Thomas McDonald; and an owner of a process service company, Edwin Chesire (collectively, "Defendants"), to be in civil contempt of court for causing the filing of false proof-of-service affidavits. Ten days after the initial contempt hearing, the chancellor held a "sentencing hearing" in which he made all the Defendants jointly and severally liable for $88,500 in sanctions, required Jernigan and McDonald to issue written apologizes to the other chancellors in the Sixteenth Chancery Court District, and banned them from ever again serving process or notarizing documents for the Sixteenth Chancery Court District. The chancellor further ordered all the Defendants to be incarcerated every weekend until the reimbursements were received and the apologizes were made. The Supreme Court subsequently found that the judgments were for constructive criminal contempt, as opposed to civil contempt. Thus, Chancellor Harris was bound by the additional due-process safeguards which govern constructive criminal contempt proceedings and erred by neither recusing himself from the proceedings nor notifying the Defendants of the specific criminal charges against them. The Court vacated the contempt judgments on these procedural grounds and remanded the case to the Jackson County Chancery Court for further proceedings. View "In Re: Thomas Corey McDonald and Edwin Cheshire" on Justia Law

Robert Rowland appealed a circuit court judgment that denied his motion for post-conviction collateral relief. Rowland claimed that he was placed in double jeopardy when he was convicted on two counts of armed robbery and two counts of capital murder for killing while engaged in the commission of those same two armed robberies. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, and vacated Rowland's separate armed-robbery convictions and sentences and reversed the circuit court denying Rowland's petition for post-conviction relief. View "Rowland v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Robert Lee Jenkins was convicted for possession of a controlled substance. He was sentenced to life imprisonment under the habitual-offender statute. On appeal, The Supreme Court granted Jenkins's petition for writ of certiorari to examine whether the trial court erred by allowing a laboratory supervisor to testify regarding the results of substance testing, where the supervisor reviewed and verified the results, but another analyst actually performed the tests. Finding no error, the Court affirmed. View "Jenkins v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2008, Lonnie Young shot and killed his wife's lover at a family reunion. Young was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. Young raised four issues on appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider: (1) whether the trial court should be reversed for denying Young an opportunity to impeach a witness; (2) and/or for denying Young's imperfect-self-defense jury instruction. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in finding that, although the trial court erred in denying Young the opportunity fully to impeach defense witness Shakitay Harris, this error was harmless. The Court found no error in the trial court's denial of Young's imperfect-self-defense jury instruction. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and Circuit Court. View "Young v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (collectively "Tellus") alleged that they owned the "shallow gas" rights in a tract of land known as the Bilbo A Lease. While ownership of the shallow gas was disputed, all parties agreed that the defendants (collectively "TPIC") owned the gas rights below 8,000 feet and the oil rights in both the shallow and deep zones. In 2004, Tellus sued TPIC, alleging that it had produced Tellus's shallow gas through one if its wells known as the A-1 well. After much pretrial litigation and a two-month jury trial, the trial judge declared that the plaintiffs were the rightful owners and submitted the plaintiffs' conversion and negligence claims to a jury. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants, and both sides appealed. Finding no reason to reverse, the Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict and the trial court's declaratory judgment. View "Tellus Operating Group, LLC, v. Texas Petroleum Investment Co." on Justia Law

This matter came before the Supreme Court on appeal of a trial court's grant of an irreconcilable-differences divorce in late 2008. David and Helen Rogillio were married for eleven years, living in Vicksburg with their minor son. David filed for a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhumane treatment, or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. He filed an Amended Complaint listing habitual drug use and adultery as additional grounds for divorce. At trial, the parties ultimately consented to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences and entered an Agreed Order Allowing Withdrawal of Contested Allegations. The court entered a Final Judgment of Divorce, dividing the marital assets and awarding lump-sum alimony of $15,000 to Helen. Helen appealed arguing that she should have been awarded periodic-payment alimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Helen then petitioned to the Supreme Court, which held that the chancellor had abused her discretion through errors in her accounting of the marital assets. On remand, the chancellor found that the previous judgment did contain accounting errors. After recalculating the marital assets, the chancellor ordered David to pay Helen lump-sum alimony of $18,204, periodic-payment alimony in the amount of $1,500 per month, and $4,369.50 for her attorney fees. David appealed pro se arguing: (1) the chancery court erred in awarding periodic-payment alimony; and (2) the chancery court erred in ordering David to pay Helen’s attorney fees. Helen did not file a brief in response to David’s claims. Finding that the chancellor did not abuse her discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court. View "Rogillio v. Rogillio" on Justia Law

Defendant James Wayland Mosley was sentenced to a total of 126 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) after a jury convicted him on one count of selling cocaine, one count of selling methamphetamine, and one count of selling marijuana (less than thirty grams). Mosley appealed the sentence to the Supreme Court claiming that the trial court’s sentencing order is disproportionate to the crimes he committed and violated his constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment. Because the Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, Mosley’s sentences were neither disproportionate to the crimes he committed nor outside the limits prescribed by statute, the Court affirmed the trial court’s sentencing order. View "Mosley v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Latrice Westbrooks filed a Qualifying Statement of Intent with the Secretary of State's Office to declare her intent to be a candidate for the office of Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi, District 2, Position 2. The State Board of Election Commissioners in a unanimous vote, determined that Westbrooks did not meet the qualifications to seek election. Westbrooks sought judicial review, and the circuit court entered an Order Granting Permanent Injunction and Order Granting Declaratory Judgment. The circuit court ordered the Board immediately to add Westbrooks's name to the ballot as a candidate for the office. Aggrieved, the Board appealed to the Supreme Court via a Bill of Exceptions and a Notice of Appeal. Upon review, the Court found that Westbrooks did not meet the residency requirement. Therefore, the circuit court erred in finding that Westbrooks was a qualified candidate for the position as required for candidacy. The circuit court's Order Granting Permanent Injunction and Order Granting Declaratory Judgment was vacated. View "Bryant v. Westbrooks" on Justia Law

Glenn Wane Hawkins was convicted by a jury of murdering his girlfriend, Rita Fair, and given a mandatory life sentence. Hawkins timely filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Hawkins also raised issues regarding a jury instruction which outlined the distinctions between depraved heart murder and culpable negligence manslaughter. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Hawkins v. Mississippi" on Justia Law