Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the circuit court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Nutt & McAlister, PLLC; David Nutt & Associates, PC; David H. Nutt; and Mary Krichbaum McAlister (“Nutt, et al.”) sought to enforce the mandatory arbitration provision in a contract titled “In Re: Katrina Litigation Joint Venture Agreement” (“Katrina JVA”). In a prior appeal, the Supreme Court settled the issue as to whether Appellee Wyatt’s claims were related to the Katrina JVA. The sole issue for determination then was whether the trial court erred by finding that Nutt, et al., waived their right to enforce the provision. Upon review, the Court concluded that Nutt, et al., did not waive their right to compel arbitration. The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded this case with instructions to refer Wyatt’s claims to arbitration. View "Nutt v. Wyatt" on Justia Law

In this Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erred in finding the City of Jackson (the City) liable for the death of Tawanda Sandifer. Tawanda Sandifer was a chronic runaway. Tawanda’s mother, Mildred Sandifer, testified at trial that Tawanda began running away from home for extended periods of time. Tawanda ran away approximately seventeen times before she ran away for the last time in April 2005. Mildred testified that she had filed a runaway petition for Tawanda every time she had run away, and that Jackson Police Department (JPD) had taken Tawanda into custody on a few occasions. In 2006, approximately nine months after running away, a then fifteen-year-old Tawanda died as a result of blunt-force trauma after being beaten by her boyfriend, Toice Wilson. Tawanda’s parents, on behalf of her wrongful-death beneficiaries, filed suit against the City of Jackson and several police officers, in their official and individual capacities, for, among other claims, the wrongful death of Tawanda. The Sandifers alleged that the City caused or contributed to Tawanda’s death by ignoring its own policies with regard to runaways; by failing to investigate Tawanda’s claims in 2004 that she was having sex with a JPD officer; by negligently failing to train, hire, supervise, instruct, monitor or control its employees; by failing to maintain an adequate system to hire, train, supervise, instruct, monitor, and/or control its employees; by allowing Tawanda to be subjected to assault, battery, physical, mental, and sexual abuse; and by failing to timely apprehend Tawanda and deliver her to her parents and other appropriate agencies despite knowledge of her status as a runaway. The circuit court ultimately concluded that the City’s failure to fully investigate Tawanda’s case “caused [Tawanda] to succumb to the brutal and fatal actions of Toice Wilson” and that Wilson and the City were jointly responsible for Tawanda’s death. The circuit court assessed damages in the amount of $1 million. The City then appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the City was immune from liability for the alleged misconduct of its employees at issue in this case under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court. View "City of Jackson, Mississippi v. Sandifer, Jr." on Justia Law

In 2010, Edward Daniels was indicted for burglary of a dwelling. The indictment alleged that he broke and entered a dwelling with the intent to commit grand larceny. Later, the State amended the indictment to charge Daniels as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83. The trial court granted the amendment and the case went to trial. Because Daniels did not appear for trial, the case was tried in his absence. The jury found Daniels guilty, and the court delayed sentencing until Daniels could be located. The court ultimately sentenced Daniels to life without the possibility of parole under Section 99-19-83. Daniels subsequently filed a motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), which the trial court denied. Daniels appealed his conviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court denying Daniels's motion for new trial and remanded the case for further proceedings, because the jury instruction on the elements of burglary "was fatally flawed." View "Daniels v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Holly McKnight and Walter Jenkins were married from 1972 until 2004. The parties have one daughter. After the parties divorced in 2004, they initially shared joint legal custody of their child, with Holly having physical custody. After four years, Walter filed a Petition for Contempt, Modification of Custody and Temporary Visitation. Following a hearing in 2008, custody was modified to give legal and physical custody to Walter, with Holly having regular visitation. Two months after custody was modified, Walter filed a new Petition for Contempt, Modification of Visitation and Temporary Relief in which he accused Holly of not returning all of their child's belongings and sought to make Holly's visitation limited and supervised. As a result, the parties entered into an Agreed Preliminary Injunction, which indefinitely suspended Holly's visitation. A year after the agreed injunction, Holly moved to change physical and legal custody back to her, with Walter having visitation. A hearing was conducted on Walter's contempt petition and on Holly's petition to modify custody. After the hearing, the chancellor denied Holly's petition for modification of custody and child support, held her in contempt, and required her to pay Walter and the guardian ad litem. Holly appealed, alleging the chancellor erred by: (1) not modifying custody; (2) finding her in contempt; (3) not finding Walter in contempt; (4) not awarding her attorneys' fees and assessing her some of Walter's attorneys' fees and the guardian ad litem's fees; (5) excluding evidence preceding the October 2008 custody order; and (6) restricting certain witnesses' testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed the chancellor on all issues. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and the trial court on all issues except the contempt judgment against Holly and the related attorney's fees award. View "McKnight v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2000, Jay McCalpin pled guilty to one count of fondling and two counts of sexual battery involving a child under the age of fourteen and was sentenced to serve a term of fifteen years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), with ten years of his sentence suspended, and five years of post-release supervision upon his release from incarceration. In 2005, the circuit court revoked McCalpin's post-release supervision for the first time due to his failure to reside at the residence given to his supervising officer, failure to notify his supervising officer of at least three changes of residence, and failure of a drug test for marijuana. At that time, the circuit court judge revoked McCalpin's suspended ten-year sentence, ordering McCalpin to serve three years in the custody of the MDOC with seven years to remain suspended, conditioned upon McCalpin's "good behavior and that he does not violate any laws upon his release from custody." After his second release from incarceration, McCalpin's post-release supervision was revoked for a second time. McCalpin filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) which was denied. He appealed the denial of his motion for PCR; the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that McCalpin did not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in seeking rehearing before the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the Court affirmed the appellate court's dismissal of McCalpin's motion for rehearing. View "McCalpin v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance filed a formal complaint against Hancock County Justice Court Judge Tommy Carver. It alleged that Judge Carver had ex parte communication with Steven K. Roche about his pending criminal case; failed to disclose such ex parte communication to the prosecutor; dismissed the charges against Roche without a hearing and without any motion to dismiss by the prosecutor; and falsified court records by noting on the file that two witnesses, Officers Bryce Gex and John Grimsley of the Mississippi Department of Marine Resources Marine Patrol, were absent when Roche's case was called for trial. A three-member committee appointed by the Commission recommended that Judge Carver be suspended thirty days from office without pay, publicly reprimanded, and assessed costs. The Commission adopted the committee's findings. After conducting an independent inquiry of the record and giving careful consideration to the findings of fact and recommendations of the Commission, the Supreme Court ordered that Judge Carver be publicly reprimanded and assessed costs. View "Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance v. Carver" on Justia Law

Tamika Foster died after giving birth at the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC). Her estate filed suit against the Center. After a verdict for the plaintiffs, UMMC appealed, claiming that the plaintiffs produced nothing more than an unreliable autopsy report to establish medical negligence, and that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow two doctors to testify about the autopsy. But because the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence in the record to support the verdict and because UMMC failed to make a proffer of the doctors' expected testimony, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Foster" on Justia Law

Donald Mitchell directly appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and his habitual-offender sentence to the Supreme Court. Finding that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Mitchell's prior convictions for possession of marijuana and cocaine, the Court reversed Mitchell's conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded for a new trial. View "Mitchell v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

An incident occurred at West Lauderdale High School which led to the suspension and eventual expulsion of four male students. The principal notified the four students' parents and/or guardians of the immediate suspension. (The four male students were identified herein as C.D., E.F., G.H., and I.J.) The matter was pending before the school board, and if the board approved the recommendation, the students could request a hearing before the school board to continue the suspension until such hearing occurred. Three of the four students, E.F., C.D., and G.H., requested a hearing. Prior to the disciplinary hearing, parents of E.F. and C.D. applied for separate ex parte temporary restraining orders (TROs) in the Lauderdale County Youth Court. The ex parte temporary restraining orders were granted without notice ordering that E.F. and C.D. be allowed to return to school and enjoining the superintendent and school board from expelling them or assigning them to an alternative school. At the hearing for the TROs, the school district objected to reenrollment because the youth court lacked jurisdiction to order the students' return to school. Nonetheless, the court ordered the reenrollment. After a hearing, the school board expelled all four students for one calendar year on the basis that their presence in school was a safety concern for other students. C.D. and E.F., through counsel, moved the youth court for reenrollment. The youth court granted this motion and treated it as an appeal on the record of the expulsion and "not a matter de novo." The school board timely appealed the youth court's decision to the Supreme Court and moved the youth court to stay its judgment pending appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the youth court exceeded its statutory authority by reenrolling C.D. and E.F. in high school because the discretion in this situation lied with the school board. Accordingly, the Court reversed the youth court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Lauderdale County School Bd. v. Brown" on Justia Law

H. Gordon Myrick, Inc. (Myrick) contracted with Harrison County Commercial Lot (HCCL) to build HCCL an executive office building. The parties' contract contained an arbitration provision, which excluded aesthetic-effect claims from arbitration. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned which, if any, of the parties' claims were subject to arbitration. The trial court determined that the arbitration agreement was valid and ordered arbitration on designated, nonaesthetic claims. HCCL appealed and Myrick cross-appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the parties' claims were without merit, "but it is difficult to determine why the trial court ordered certain punch-list items to arbitration and others not. Thus, [the Court] remand[ed the case] to the trial court to provide further explanation on the punch-list items alone." View "Harrison County Commercial Lot, LLC v. H. Gordon Myrick, Inc." on Justia Law