Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This consolidated appeal stemmed from a lawsuit in which Mark Wolgin sued various entities alleging wrongdoing surrounding his 2006 purchase of a condominium on the Gulf Coast. In case #2010-CA-00653-SCT, Wolgin appealed the Chancery Court's decision to dismiss two credit reporting agencies (Trans Union LLC and Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian")), finding that claims against them were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). In case #2010-CA-01177-SCT, the broker for the sale, The Power Broker, Inc. ("Power Broker"), appealed the Chancery Court's decision to order discovery on the scope of the mandatory arbitration clause in the "Contract for the Sale and Purchase of Real Estate" instead of fully granting its "Motion to Compel Arbitration." Regarding Wolgin's appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the credit reporting agencies, as Wolgin's claims are preempted by the FCRA. As to Power Broker's appeal, the Court reversed the trial court judgment ordering discovery and remanded the case with instructions to stay the proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration. View "Wolgin v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Lessadolla Sowers was convicted in the Tunica County Circuit Court of ten counts of voter fraud as a habitual offender. Mississippi Bureau of Investigations officers determined that a significant number of absentee ballots had been mailed to a post office box held in Sowers's name. She was sentenced to five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections for each count, with each sentence ordered to run concurrently with the others. Sowers appealed, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to sustain the jury's verdicts of guilt on the ten counts of voter fraud and her habitual-offender status. Finding otherwise, the Supreme Court affirmed Sowers's convictions and sentence. View "Sowers v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The two subscribing witnesses to Lela W. Holmes’s will testified that they did not know they were witnessing a will; that Lela did not request they witness a will; and that they did nothing to satisfy themselves that Lela was of sound and disposing mind when she executed the will. Still, the chancellor admitted the will to probate, and the contestants appealed, raising numerous issues. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that because the two subscribing witnesses did not satisfy the legal requirements of "attesting" witnesses. The Court reversed the chancery court's ruling, and rendered a decision in favor of the contestants. View "In The Matter of The Estate of Lela W. Holmes" on Justia Law

This case concerned whether preneed contracts for funeral services were unilaterally transferable by customers from the original service provider, Waller Funeral Home (Waller), to another service provider, Coleman Funeral Home (Coleman). Customers who had contracted with Waller had prepaid the costs of their funeral services and merchandise, and Waller had placed their money in a trust maintained by the Mississippi Funeral Directors Association ("the Trust"). Coleman, along with Aubrey Parham, who previously had contracted with Waller for prepaid funeral services, filed a declaratory action asking the trial court to find that the prepaid funeral services contracts issued by Waller to its customers were unilaterally transferable by those customers to Coleman. Waller filed a counterclaim that alleged tortious interference with its contracts, false advertising, and defamation. Waller argued in its motion for partial summary judgment, and the trial court agreed, that the contracts were valid, enforceable, irrevocable and nontransferable, and, thus, granted Waller’s motion. Ultimately, the jury found in favor of Waller on all issues presented at trial and awarded both actual and punitive damages. Post-trial, upon the motion of Coleman, the circuit court reduced the punitive damages to $0 due to Coleman’s representation to the court that it had a negative net worth. Waller was awarded attorneys’ fees. Both parties have appealed the trial court’s final judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in allowing Waller to adduce speculative evidence about its alleged damages (future lost profits) for its contracting customers who are living, for whom no goods or services have been provided, on behalf of whom no payment from the Trust has been made to Coleman, and whose preneed funeral services contracts with Waller were found to be valid, binding, and nontransferrable. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for a new trial on damages. View "Coleman & Coleman Enterprises, Inc. v. Waller Funeral Home" on Justia Law

Jonathan and Lea Ann Byrd were married in 1991. They had four children together. The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was the chancellor's financial awards of property division, alimony, and child support. Much of the dispute centered upon a Trust in which Jonathan was a one-third beneficiary and also was a cotrustee. All assets from the Trust will be distributed to Jonathan and his two brothers, Keith, and Barry in September 2014. Lea Ann raised numerous issues on appeal, all relating to the valuation of the marital property, taking into consideration Jonathan's interest in the trust. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the chancellor erred in failing to take into account certain expenses for the children, and whether it was necessary that Jonathan maintain life insurance in order to protect the children in the event of his death. The Court affirmed the chancellor in all other respects. View "Byrd v. Byrd" on Justia Law

James A. Burley filed a wrongful-death action on June 7, 2004, for the deaths of his daughter and grandchildren resulting from a vehicular accident between his daughter and an employee of Yazoo Valley Electric Power Association (collectively "YVEPA"). During the course of discovery, YVEPA attempted to determine whether Burley would support his theory of liability with expert testimony. Following two motions to compel for Rule 26(b)(4)1 disclosures, Burley's withdrawal of his liability expert, the close of discovery, and four trial settings, Burley supplemented his interrogatory response with a new liability expert on October 7, 2010. YVEPA then moved to strike Burley's designation as untimely and substantively insufficient. The trial court allowed the designation and moved the trial to its fifth setting. Aggrieved by the trial court's order, YVEPA filed an interlocutory appeal. Finding the trial court abused its discretion, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a trial without the plaintiffs' expert testimony on liability. View "Douglas v. Burley" on Justia Law

In this sexual-harassment, due-process, gender-discrimination, and retaliation case, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the Circuit Court of Forrest County properly ruled on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The Court found that the circuit court properly granted JNOV on the due-process, gender-discrimination, and retaliation claims, but improperly denied JNOV on the sexual-harassment claims. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mollaghan v. Varnell" on Justia Law

An underground culvert system failed and caused a large sinkhole behind the Carraway residence. The culvert system drains Eastover Lake, which is owned by the surrounding property owners (collectively, "the Lake Owner Defendants") and maintained by the Eastover Lake Association (ELA). T.L. Carraway Jr. filed suit against the Lake Owner Defendants and ELA. The Lake Owner Defendants and ELA filed third-party complaints for indemnity against the City of Jackson, alleging that the City's sewer-line repairs had caused the sinkhole. The chancellor found the Lake Owner Defendants, ELA, and the City jointly and severally liable for the repair. The Lake Owner Defendants, ELA, and the City appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, finding that the issues raised by the Lake Owner Defendants and ELA were without merit, except that the chancellor erred by ordering joint and several liability. The Court reversed and remanded for apportionment of liability in accordance with Mississippi Code Section 85-5-7 (Rev. 2011). The City correctly argued that, because the chancellor rejected the indemnity claims brought by the Lake Owner Defendants and ELA against the City, there was no basis for the chancellor's apportionment of liability to the City. Therefore, the Court reversed the chancellor's apportionment of liability to the City and rendered judgment in favor of the City. View "Borne v. Estate of T. L. Carraway, Jr." on Justia Law

Vicksburg Chemical Company (VCC) filed for bankruptcy in 2002. Included in its bankruptcy estate was over 500 acres of real property, a portion of which was contaminated. Pursuant to an agreed order, the bankruptcy court allowed VCC to abandon the property and allowed the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) to choose the purchaser. Without the aid of any guidelines or statutory law regarding this process, MDEQ, at the suggestion of the Attorney General's Office (AG), published a Request for Proposals (RFP) to identify interested parties capable of removing the contamination. The plaintiff, Pacific Chlorine, Inc. (PCI), was one of several companies to submit a proposal. MDEQ did not select PCI's proposal, but instead selected Harcros Chemicals, Inc. (Harcros), a company which worked closely with the City of Vicksburg (the City) on its proposal. Aggrieved, PCI sued MDEQ and the City. PCI settled with the City. Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered a judgment against MDEQ. MDEQ appealed to the Supreme Court, raising six assignments of error that fall into three categories: whether PCI is required to exhaust its administrative remedies, whether the trial court erred by denying MDEQ's motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment, and whether MDEQ is immune from suit under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). This case presented an issue of first impression, the issue being whether MDEQ acted within the scope of its authority when assisting a bankruptcy court with finding a purchaser for contaminated land. The Court found that it was. View "Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality v. Pacific Chlorine, Inc." on Justia Law

After Robert Allcock died at a hospital, his mother sued the hospital, the treating doctor, and the doctor's clinic. Allcock failed to designate an expert, and the trial court denied her motion to amend the pretrial order. Still, a jury found for Allcock, but the trial court granted the defendants' motion for a new trial because of a faulty jury instruction. Before the second trial, Allcock again moved to amend the pretrial order. The trial court again denied her motion, and the jury found for the defendants. Because the jury instruction stated an incorrect rule of law; and because Allcock was on sufficient notice of the defendants' expert testimony, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rulings. View "Allcock v. Bannister" on Justia Law