Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Business Communications, Inc. (BCI) asserted two breach-of-contract claims against its former employee, Albert Banks: breach of BCI's business-protection agreement (BPA), which included a noncompetition provision, and breach of BCI's reimbursement-of-costs agreement (RCA). At trial, the jury awarded BCI $1,000 for breach of the BPA and $9,000 for breach of the RCA. Thereafter, the Circuit Court of Madison County granted Banks’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). Subsequently, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant of JNOV as to the RCA, but reversed regarding the BPA, "reinstat[ing] the jury's verdict [of $1,000], and remand[ing the] case to the trial court to consider BCI's motion for attorney's fees." The Supreme Court granted Banks's petition for writ of certiorari to address the elements of a breach-of-contract claim involving a noncompete agreement and the nature of the damages to which BCI was entitled. Regarding the elements of a breach-of-contract claim, the Court held that monetary damages were a remedy for breach of contract, not an element of the claim. As to damages for breach of the BPA, BCI acknowledged it had sustained no identifiable loss. But because (1) the jury was instructed on both compensatory and nominal damages, (2) the special-verdict form did not specify the type of damages awarded, and (3) the jury's award of $1,000 was well within the continuum of legitimate nominal damage awards, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reinstatement of that jury verdict. The Court also affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision to remand to the circuit court to consider BCI's motion for attorney's fees. View "Business Communications, Inc. v. Banks" on Justia Law

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Defendant Rene Levario appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss an indictment against him for felony Driving Under the Influence (DUI) Causing Death. In 2008, Defendant was involved in an automobile accident that resulted in the death of Gary Coulliette. At the scene, Defendant received five traffic tickets, one of them for DUI. Defendant posted a $25,000 bond for felony DUI Causing Death; he pled not guilty in justice court. His case was continued to October, 2008. Defendant again appeared, the charges against him were reduced to a misdemeanor, and that he pled guilty to the reduced charge. Defendant was convicted and ordered to pay a $300 fine and to attend Mississippi Alcohol Safety Education Program classes. In 2009, the State filed a "Motion to Set Aside Criminal Judgment" in justice court, arguing that the justice court had no jurisdiction to accept Defendant's plea on a charge of DUI Causing Death. After conducting a hearing on the issue, the justice court issued an order setting aside the conviction, found that Defendant had pled guilty to felony DUI Causing Death and that the felony charge had not been reduced to a misdemeanor. On October 13, 2009, the Jackson County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Defendant with felony DUI Causing Death for the 2008 incident. On April 29, 2010, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming double jeopardy. The circuit court overruled the motion, and Defendant appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that double jeopardy did not prohibit the State from indicting and prosecuting Defendant for felony DUI Causing Death in circuit court because the justice court did not have jurisdiction to convict him of the felony. Further, the Court concluded that the State did not violate Defendant's due-process rights in seeking to set aside his conviction in justice court and in prosecuting him in circuit court. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence. View "Levario v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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A Madison County jury convicted Carla Hughes of two counts of capital murder. The jury declined to impose the death penalty, and the Circuit Court of Madison County imposed two sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, with both sentences to run concurrently. Hughes raised six issues on appeal: (1) whether the jury committed misconduct by submitting a note to the judge during deliberations asking whether the State could have called Hughes to the stand; (2) whether the verdicts were against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; (3) whether the trial court erred during jury selection when it denied one of Hughes's peremptory challenges; (4) whether the trial court erred in overruling Hughes's motion for a directed verdict; (5) whether the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress the evidence found in Hughes's house; and (6) whether the trial court erred in admitting DNA evidence from a pair of shoes. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Hughes v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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At Anthony Lafayette's murder trial, when the jury informed the trial judge that it could not reach a unanimous verdict, the judge responded to the jurors that if they could not reach a verdict, he would call a new jury that would be "reasonable and fair" and that he hoped not to put the "County and State to the expense" if he could get around it. Lafayette moved for a mistrial, but the judge denied the motion, and Lafayette was convicted of manslaughter. On review, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge's instruction was inappropriate, and it "require[d]" that the Court reverse and remand the case for a new trial. View "Lafayette v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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The Mississippi State Department of Health (MDH) entered a final order disapproving the certificate of need application of Dialysis Solutions, LLC. Pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 41-7-201, Dialysis Solutions filed a direct appeal of the MDH's final order with the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the Court entered an order on its own motion, seeking briefing from the parties and the Attorney General regarding whether Section 41-7-201, as amended, was "constitutional under Mississippi Constitution article 6, section 146 and whether [the Supreme] Court [had] appellate jurisdiction over this direct appeal from a decision of the [MDH]." After due consideration, the Court concluded that Section 41-7-201, as amended, was unconstitutional under Article 6, Section 146 of the Mississippi Constitution. Accordingly, the Court refused to exercise appellate jurisdiction over Dialysis Solutions' direct appeal from the final order of the MDH. View "Dialysis Solutions, LLC v. Mississippi Dept. of Health" on Justia Law

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David Anthony Jackson appeals his house-burglary conviction and twenty-five-year penitentiary sentence. The home of former United States Senator Trent Lott was burglarized in 2009 for which Jackson was indicted by a grand jury. On October 29, 2010, Jackson filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Or In The Alternative, For A New Trial. The circuit court denied this motion. Jackson filed this appeal, raising three assignments of error: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, specifically that the State failed to establish Jackson’s intent to commit the crime of larceny once inside the house; (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to give Jackson’s proffered jury instruction for the lesser-included offense of trespass; and (3) that the trial court erred in denying Jackson’s Motion for a Directed Verdict and his Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed Jackson's conviction and sentence. View "Jackson v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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In 2005, Eddie Mitchell shot and killed Cliff Patterson while both were working as mechanics at Anglin Tire in Jackson, Mississippi. Mitchell claimed that he killed Patterson in self-defense. A jury found Mitchell guilty of murder, and as a result, the trial court sentenced Mitchell to life in prison. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on self-defense and manslaughter; whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a past physical altercation between Mitchell and a former coworker; whether prosecutorial misconduct existed in cross-examination and closing arguments; and whether trial counsel was ineffective. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly instructed the jury on self-defense and manslaughter, and did not err in allowing the prosecution to question Mitchell about a past physical altercation with a former coworker. The Court could not find evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, nor could it substantiate Mitchell's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Mitchell's conviction and sentence. View "Mitchell v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

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This interlocutory appeal involved two consolidated actions in which the trial court denied competing summary judgment motions. The case arose from University of Mississippi Medical Center's (UMMC) intent to purchase a platform linear accelerator system and to make renovations to its basement to house the new accelerator. UMMC represented that the accelerator would be an important aspect to the planned radiation oncology residency program. UMMC applied for a Certificate of Need (CON) to get the project started. Jackson HMA (HMA) and St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital (St. Dominic) filed a request for a public hearing in response to UMMC's CON application. The Mississippi State Department of Health (MSDH) thereafter sought an official opinion from the Attorney General (AG) on the issue of the CON statutes' applicability to UMMC. The Attorney General issued an opinion opining that UMMC was not subject to CON laws, and that it did not have to file an application for a CON. The AG issued a second opinion opining that there was no express exemption for UMMC within the CON laws, but that it was within the MSDH's power to make determinations of reviewability under the CON laws which carve out exemptions for equipment and/or services deemed necessary by UMMC. HMA and St. Dominic's filed a complaint with the Chancery Court requesting declaratory relief over the issue of whether the CON statutes applied to UMMC, and that MSDH had no authority to exempt UMMC from obtaining a CON. UMMC countered with its motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning (IHL) approved the project and had exclusive authority to" manage and control" UMMC, and was not subordinate to the MSDH. Finding genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the CON statutes applied to UMMC, the chancellor denied both motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the CON statues applied to UMMC and that MSDH does have authority to create a "teaching" exception regarding when UMMC is required to apply for a CON. Therefore, the Court did not reach the question of whether the application of the CON statutes to UMMC unconstitutionally infringed on IHL's constitutionally vested authority to "manage and control" UMMC. View "Jackson HMA, LLC v. Miss. St. Dept. of Health" on Justia Law

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The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Southern Health Corporation of Houston, Inc. d/b/a Trace Regional Hospital, and Marcia Morgan, a registered nurse. Aggrieved, Ruth Crosthwait appealed to the Supreme Court, which in turn assigned this case to the Court of Appeals. In a four-four plurality opinion (two judges not participating), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The case arose from a slip and fall incident at the hospital: Crosthwait was admitted to Trace Regional Hospital for treatment of fluctuating blood sugar stemming from diabetes. Crosthwait was eighty-two years old, lived alone, and generally could walk without assistance. While she was hospitalized, Crosthwait's attending physician instructed her to ring a bell to have a nurse assist her when she rose from her hospital bed. In 2008, Crosthwait was preparing to leave the hospital, and she decided to take a shower. Crosthwait called for Marcia Morgan to assist her with undressing. Crosthwait walked into the bathroom unassisted. Morgan offered Crosthwait a shower stool, which she accepted. Morgan then left and returned with a chair, which she placed in the shower. While Crosthwait showered, Morgan told Crosthwait she would have to leave to attend another patient. When Morgan returned, she turned off the shower and Crosthwait exited the shower. It was undisputed that the fall caused Crosthwait significant injury, including a broken hip and a loss of mobility and independence. Crosthwait filed suit against the hospital and Morgan. The hospital and Morgan filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Crosthwait's action was for medical malpractice, and summary judgment was proper because, among other things, Crosthwait needed expert testimony to establish the duty of care owed to her by the hospital and to show whether that duty had been breached. Crosthwait responded that the claim was for ordinary negligence, for which expert testimony was not required. The circuit court granted the hospital’s motion, and Crosthwait appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. View "Crosthwait v. Southern Health Corporation of Houston, Inc." on Justia Law

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Laura Shontelle Barnes was employed as an elementary school teacher with the Taylorsville Elementary School in the Smith County School District (District) for eleven years before she was terminated in 2009. Barnes was terminated for refusing to take a drug test, which was a violation of the District’s drug and alcohol policy. The Smith County School Board (Board) held a hearing and later affirmed the District’s Superintendent of Education’s decision to terminate Barnes’s employment. Aggrieved, Barnes appealed the Board’s decision to the chancery court. The chancery court reversed the Board’s decision and reinstated Barnes’s employment, finding that the Board’s decision was arbitrary or capricious and was not supported by substantial evidence. The Board appealed. In a six-four decision, the Court of Appeals reversed and rendered the chancery court’s holding, finding that the Board’s decision to affirm the superintendent’s termination of Barnes based on her refusal to submit to a drug test was not arbitrary or capricious. Barnes filed a motion for rehearing, which was denied. Barnes appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals failed to properly consider all relevant evidence that would have precluded termination of Barnes. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Smith County Sch. Dist. v. Barnes" on Justia Law