Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved a residence that the plaintiff homeowners allege contained "major structural defects." After discovering these defects and notifying the builder, the parties entered a "tolling agreement" to toll the applicable limitations period, so they could "engage in a review and analysis of the structural settlement issues to determine an agreed upon repair." After the builder refused to correct the defects, the plaintiffs filed suit averring breach of the New Home Warranty Act (NHWA); breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose; implied warranty of construction performed in a workmanlike manner; negligence; and fraud/misrepresentation/and/or omission of fact. In response, the defendant builder asserted the claims were time-barred and that the tolling agreement was void. This appeal arose from the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling that the tolling agreement was void: "Parties should not be discouraged from honest efforts to settle and/or compromise disputes, and thereby avoid incurring the attendant expenses and uncertainty of litigation and further burdening the courts – all laudable and desired goals. . . .parties should be allowed to agree to extend statutes of limitations (or repose) if they believe this to be in their best interest; however, the limitation period should not be shortened, absent an act of the Legislature." View "Townes v. Rusty Ellis Builder, Inc." on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal came before the Supreme Court from the denial of a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, motion for summary judgment. The issue was whether George Poppenheimer, a volunteer firefighter, was immune under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) for claims arising from an automobile accident. The county court found that a volunteer fire department is not a government entity for purposes of the MTCA and denied Poppenheimer's motion. Aggrieved, Poppenheimer appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether the Bridgetown Volunteer Fire Department (BVFD) and its employees receive protection under the MTCA; and (2) whether the county court erred by denying his motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The Supreme Court found that the BVFD is not a governmental entity or instrumentality of the state, but an independent contractor. Also, as a volunteer firefighter, Poppenheimer is not immune from suit arising out of alleged automobile negligence. Thus, the Court affirmed the county court's denial of Poppenheimer's motions. View "Poppenheimer v. The Estate of Coyle, " on Justia Law

In July 2001, Kaye Hankins entered into a home-construction contract with Elite Homes, Inc. ("Elite"). An August 2001 soil-test report on the subject property recommended that "a stabilizing blanket of natural silty clays . . . and/or compacted fill soils having a maximum 7-foot thickness" was required "to minimize the Yazoo Clay . . . swell or heave potential to within limits tolerable to a strong slab foundation . . . ." Hankins received assurances from Elite that the Yazoo clay "was nothing to be concerned about." She moved into the new home in April 2002. During Hankins's first year in the home, she reported to Elite numerous cracks, leaks, and difficulties in closing doors and windows. In September 2009, Hankins filed a complaint against Elite averring "that the damage which has occurred to said house . . . would not have occurred except for the negligence" of Elite. Thereafter, a "Default Judgment" of was entered against Elite. In August 2010, Hankins filed a "Suggestion for Writ of Garnishment" against Elite's commercial general liability ("CGL") insurer, Maryland Casualty Company/Zurich American Insurance Company ("Maryland Casualty"). In October 2010, a default judgment was entered against Maryland Casualty. Subsequently, Maryland Casualty filed a "Motion to Suspend Execution of Default Judgment against Maryland Casualty and For Leave to File Answer to Writ of Garnishment," which argued, inter alia, that because its CGL policy "exclud[ed] coverage for property damage caused by earth movement," then it "has no property or effects in its possession belonging to" Elite. Maryland Casualty then filed a "Motion for Summary Judgment" on the same basis. The circuit court concluded that the "earth movement" endorsement "excludes the damages suffered by [Hankins] from coverage under the policy." Based thereon, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company, and set aside the default judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Maryland Casualty's "earth movement" endorsement was unambiguous and operated to exclude the property damage Hankins suffered from coverage under the CGL policy. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the insurance company, and the setting aside of the default judgment. View "Hankins v. Maryland Casualty Company" on Justia Law

In 1994, while en route to the scene of a fire, volunteer fireman James Hingle collided with a vehicle occupied by Sam and Ruby Anderson. Hingle was driving his personal vehicle at the time of the accident. The Andersons filed suit against Hingle, Marshall County, the volunteer fire department, and the Marshall County Board of Supervisors. The Andersons claimed that their injuries and damages amounted to $4,150,000. At the time of the accident, Hingle had two insurance policies with Guidant: personal automobile liability policy with limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident, and an umbrella protection policy with a $1,000,000 limit. Marshall County had a business automobile liability policy with a $300,000 limit through INA, which covered non-owned automobiles and provided coverage to the volunteer fire department. A dispute arose regarding which insurance company should defend the litigation and which provided primary coverage. INA filed a declaratory-judgment action against Guidant in the Circuit Court of Marshall County. INA asked for a judgment declaring, inter alia, that Guidant had a duty to defend all the defendants and INA did not have any duty to defend, and that Guidant's policies afforded primary coverage for all defendants, while INA provided excess coverage only. INA moved for summary judgment in the declaratory-judgment action, but the trial court held the motion in abeyance pending a final determination on the merits of the underlying lawsuit. Following that ruling, INA provided defense counsel to Marshall County and the fire department in the Anderson lawsuit. Guidant defended Hingle. INA appealed the trial court's decision on remand. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case back to the trial court. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of INA's Rule 56(f) motion for continuance and the denial of INA's request for prejudgment interest. The Court found that INA's claims of procedural errors warranting reversal were without merit. While the Court agreed with the trial court's finding that INA was required to contribute to the settlement, the Court reversed the trial court's determination that INA was required to contribute its policy limit. The Court held that Guidant was required to exhaust its $500,000 per-accident limit before INA's insurance was to be applied. View "Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Guidant Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Concerned with the sufficiency of process in multiple paternity and child-support cases, Chancellor D. Neil Harris conducted a hearing in which he found an individual process-server, Guy Jernigan; a notary, Thomas McDonald; and an owner of a process service company, Edwin Chesire (collectively, "Defendants"), to be in civil contempt of court for causing the filing of false proof-of-service affidavits. Ten days after the initial contempt hearing, the chancellor held a "sentencing hearing" in which he made all the Defendants jointly and severally liable for $88,500 in sanctions, required Jernigan and McDonald to issue written apologizes to the other chancellors in the Sixteenth Chancery Court District, and banned them from ever again serving process or notarizing documents for the Sixteenth Chancery Court District. The chancellor further ordered all the Defendants to be incarcerated every weekend until the reimbursements were received and the apologizes were made. The Supreme Court subsequently found that the judgments were for constructive criminal contempt, as opposed to civil contempt. Thus, Chancellor Harris was bound by the additional due-process safeguards which govern constructive criminal contempt proceedings and erred by neither recusing himself from the proceedings nor notifying the Defendants of the specific criminal charges against them. The Court vacated the contempt judgments on these procedural grounds and remanded the case to the Jackson County Chancery Court for further proceedings. View "In Re: Thomas Corey McDonald and Edwin Cheshire" on Justia Law

Robert Rowland appealed a circuit court judgment that denied his motion for post-conviction collateral relief. Rowland claimed that he was placed in double jeopardy when he was convicted on two counts of armed robbery and two counts of capital murder for killing while engaged in the commission of those same two armed robberies. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, and vacated Rowland's separate armed-robbery convictions and sentences and reversed the circuit court denying Rowland's petition for post-conviction relief. View "Rowland v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Robert Lee Jenkins was convicted for possession of a controlled substance. He was sentenced to life imprisonment under the habitual-offender statute. On appeal, The Supreme Court granted Jenkins's petition for writ of certiorari to examine whether the trial court erred by allowing a laboratory supervisor to testify regarding the results of substance testing, where the supervisor reviewed and verified the results, but another analyst actually performed the tests. Finding no error, the Court affirmed. View "Jenkins v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

In the summer of 2008, Lonnie Young shot and killed his wife's lover at a family reunion. Young was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. Young raised four issues on appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider: (1) whether the trial court should be reversed for denying Young an opportunity to impeach a witness; (2) and/or for denying Young's imperfect-self-defense jury instruction. The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in finding that, although the trial court erred in denying Young the opportunity fully to impeach defense witness Shakitay Harris, this error was harmless. The Court found no error in the trial court's denial of Young's imperfect-self-defense jury instruction. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and Circuit Court. View "Young v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs (collectively "Tellus") alleged that they owned the "shallow gas" rights in a tract of land known as the Bilbo A Lease. While ownership of the shallow gas was disputed, all parties agreed that the defendants (collectively "TPIC") owned the gas rights below 8,000 feet and the oil rights in both the shallow and deep zones. In 2004, Tellus sued TPIC, alleging that it had produced Tellus's shallow gas through one if its wells known as the A-1 well. After much pretrial litigation and a two-month jury trial, the trial judge declared that the plaintiffs were the rightful owners and submitted the plaintiffs' conversion and negligence claims to a jury. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the defendants, and both sides appealed. Finding no reason to reverse, the Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict and the trial court's declaratory judgment. View "Tellus Operating Group, LLC, v. Texas Petroleum Investment Co." on Justia Law

This matter came before the Supreme Court on appeal of a trial court's grant of an irreconcilable-differences divorce in late 2008. David and Helen Rogillio were married for eleven years, living in Vicksburg with their minor son. David filed for a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhumane treatment, or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. He filed an Amended Complaint listing habitual drug use and adultery as additional grounds for divorce. At trial, the parties ultimately consented to a divorce based on irreconcilable differences and entered an Agreed Order Allowing Withdrawal of Contested Allegations. The court entered a Final Judgment of Divorce, dividing the marital assets and awarding lump-sum alimony of $15,000 to Helen. Helen appealed arguing that she should have been awarded periodic-payment alimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Helen then petitioned to the Supreme Court, which held that the chancellor had abused her discretion through errors in her accounting of the marital assets. On remand, the chancellor found that the previous judgment did contain accounting errors. After recalculating the marital assets, the chancellor ordered David to pay Helen lump-sum alimony of $18,204, periodic-payment alimony in the amount of $1,500 per month, and $4,369.50 for her attorney fees. David appealed pro se arguing: (1) the chancery court erred in awarding periodic-payment alimony; and (2) the chancery court erred in ordering David to pay Helen’s attorney fees. Helen did not file a brief in response to David’s claims. Finding that the chancellor did not abuse her discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court. View "Rogillio v. Rogillio" on Justia Law