Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Troy Lofton alleged he suffered from asbestosis as a result of exposure to the Defendant's product, Flosal, during the course of his employment on various oil and gas drilling rigs. Petitioner filed suit in 2004, alleging two theories of product liability (design defect and inadequate warning), as well as claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Petitioner on his claims of design defect and negligent infliction of emotional distress, with one hundred percent of the liability assigned to Chevron Phillips Chemical Company LP, successor-in-interest to ConocoPhillips Company, formerly known as Phillips Petroleum Company, and Phillips 66 Company, formerly doing business as Drilling Specialties Company (CPChem) and total damages in the amount of $15,200,000. CPChem's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and its motion for new trial and/or remittur were denied. Aggrieved, CPChem filed this appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial due to the trial court's error in allowing Petitioner's counsel to read from drilling records that were not admitted into evidence during the cross-examination of CPChem’s expert pulmonologist. View "Phillips 66 Co. v. Lofton" on Justia Law

Defendant Justin Springer was convicted of capital murder by a jury in the Circuit Court of Lee County on May 6, 2011. The underlying felony was burglary. For this conviction, he was sentenced to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, without the possibility of parole. After the trial court's denial of his post-trial motions, Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging that the verdict was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Finding that the verdict against him was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, the Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Springer v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Ernest and Bonnie Harland filed suit in the Chancery Court of Lafayette County seeking to have a "corrected" warranty deed set aside; to vacate three lots from the official plat of Long Meadow subdivision; or to validate the protective covenants included with their original deed. The chancellor set aside the "corrected" deed and validated the Harlands' original covenants. The Long Meadow Homeowners' Association appealed the chancellor's judgment, and the Supreme Court assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, found no error and affirmed the judgment of the chancery court. The Supreme Court granted Long Meadow’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Having reviewed the briefs and record in this appeal, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, and used the opportunity of this case to discuss precedent as it related to the Harlands' equitable-estoppel claim. View "Long Meadow Homeowners' Association, Inc. v. Harland" on Justia Law

In 2009, Charles Larry McGraw filed a personal-injury action against four sand suppliers: Clark Sand Company, Inc.; Mississippi Valley Silica Co., Inc.; Precision Packaging, Inc.; and Custom Aggregates and Grinding, Inc. McGraw alleged the four defendants' sand caused his lung disease, silicosis. On the day of the trial, after the jury had heard the parties' opening statements, the court recessed, and the parties reached a settlement agreement. Subsequently, McGraw filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to add his wife as a plaintiff and American Optical Corporation as an additional defendant. He then filed an amended motion for leave to amend his complaint (First Amended Complaint) to modify his request to add four more defendants: Lonestar Industries, Inc.; Specialty Sand Company; Pearl Sands, Inc.; and Pearl Specialty Sand, Inc. In early 2010, the trial court granted McGraw's amended motion and allowed him to add the five new defendants to the complaint. McGraw later filed a Second Amended Complaint, which added a sixth defendant, Dependable Abrasives, Inc., without seeking leave of court. All six defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal concerning the trial court's order denying their Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alternatively, Motion to Strike Second Amended Complaint and Dismiss First Amended Complaint. The defendants argued that, because the original parties settled with McGraw prior to his motions for leave to amend, the trial court improperly allowed the filing of the First Amended Complaint to add new parties. The defendants also argue that, because McGraw did not seek court approval in filing his Second Amended Complaint, that complaint should be struck. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing McGraw to file his Second Amended Complaint, because he was required to obtain court approval. However, the Court found that the trial court did comply with the rules of procedure when it allowed McGraw to file his First Amended Complaint. The Court therefore affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint and reversed the denial of the motion to strike the Second Amended Complaint. View "Lone Star Industries, Inc. v. McGraw" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Tippah County, Mississippi, fifty-fouryear-old Roger Green was convicted of two counts of sexual battery and two counts of touching a child for lustful purposes involving D.W., Green's ten-year-old stepdaughter. Following denial of Green's "Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative For a New Trial," Green filed this appeal. Before the Supreme Court, Green argued that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other sexual offenses through the testimony of four other minor girls whom he allegedly inappropriately touched. He also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the charges against him. Finding no error from trial nor an abuse of discretion by the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed Green's conviction. View "Green v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The daughter of Mark Fails and Laura Fails transferred from Jefferson Davis County School District to Lamar County School District, after obtaining consent from the school boards of both districts. Four years later, the School Board passed a resolution that Jefferson Davis County residents would no longer be permitted to transfer to other school districts. The following year, the Superintendent of Education for the School District published an announcement in the local newspaper informing parents of Jefferson Davis County School District students that all transfers had been revoked. Although three of the School Board members represented to Mark Fails that this did not affect his daughter's transfer status, an interim conservator, appointed by the governor to oversee Jefferson Davis County Schools, represented to Mark Fails that it was the intent of the School Board to revoke all previously granted transfer petitions. Mark Fails attended a School Board meeting to appeal the revocation of his daughter's petition for transfer. However, the conservator prohibited the School Board from voting on the child's petition for transfer. Prior to the School Board meeting, the Failses had obtained Lamar County residency, and the student had continued to attend Lamar County Schools legally, and without interruption. Despite this fact, the Failses appealed the School Board's decision to the Circuit Court of Jefferson Davis County. The circuit court and the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the School Board's decision. Given that the Failses have represented to the circuit court and the Supreme Court that they have since moved into the Lamar County School District, and that fact was not disputed the issue of revocation was considered moot. View "Fails v. Jefferson Davis County Public School Board" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal challenged the dismissal of plaintiffs' Deborah and Harold Knapp's medical malpractice claim related to a slip and fall in a hospital bathroom. The Knapps sued the hospital after a 2006 incident that had her admitted. She slipped and fell on a wet bathroom floor, allegedly from a leaky toilet. She was transferred to the Behavioral Health Unit, and while there, was attacked by another patient. Based on these two events, the Knapps listed "negligence," "breach of warranty" and "gross negligence, punitive damages, etc." as grounds for their complaint. Finding that the claim at issue did not involve professional negligence, and that the trial court properly recognized the parties' discovery obligations, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Knapp v. St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

A corporation settled its delinquent tax liability to the State of Mississippi by paying $100 million to the State, $4.2 million to a private charity, and $14 million to a private law firm hired by the Attorney General to pursue the claim. Mississippi's Auditor demanded that, because the $18.2 million paid to the private charity and the law firm constituted public funds, it must be turned over to the State. The charity complied; but the law firm refused, claiming the payment of its fees was not made with public funds and, in any case, the Auditor had waived the State’s claim. The Auditor filed suit and the trial court granted summary judgment to the law firm. The state Auditor appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that when the Attorney General pays special assistants, Mississippi statutory law requires that they be paid from the Attorney General’s contingent fund or from other funds appropriated to the Attorney General's office by the Legislature. Furthermore, the Mississippi constitution requires obligations and liabilities to the State to be paid "into the proper treasury." Neither of these requirements was met in this case. Neither the Attorney General nor the Langston Firm provided sufficient evidence to establish that the Auditor waived the State’s claim to the funds. The Court therefore reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Pickering v. Langston Law Firm, P.A." on Justia Law

A corporation settled a lawsuit by agreeing to pay the State of Mississippi $50 million, $10 million of which it disbursed directly to outside counsel retained by Attorney General Hood to pursue the litigation. The chancery court held that the payment was proper. But because the law requires that outside counsel retained by the Attorney General to pursue litigation in "the state or federal courts" be paid from his contingent fund or from other funds the Legislature appropriates to his office, and because the Mississippi Constitution requires obligations and liabilities to the State to be paid "into the proper treasury," the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Attorney General failed to use his contingent fund. View "Pickering v. Hood" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was an appeal by the City of Cleveland of a judgment by the DeSoto County Chancery Court which denied the City's motion for attorney fees. The chancery court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the City's appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that, after the Court of Appeals rendered the underlying case and the Supreme Court denied certiorari review, the case was at its end. The chancery court did not thereafter have jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the lower court did not have jurisdiction. View "City of Cleveland, Mississippi v. Mid-South Associates, LLC" on Justia Law