Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant James Wayland Mosley was sentenced to a total of 126 years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) after a jury convicted him on one count of selling cocaine, one count of selling methamphetamine, and one count of selling marijuana (less than thirty grams). Mosley appealed the sentence to the Supreme Court claiming that the trial court’s sentencing order is disproportionate to the crimes he committed and violated his constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment. Because the Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, Mosley’s sentences were neither disproportionate to the crimes he committed nor outside the limits prescribed by statute, the Court affirmed the trial court’s sentencing order. View "Mosley v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Latrice Westbrooks filed a Qualifying Statement of Intent with the Secretary of State's Office to declare her intent to be a candidate for the office of Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi, District 2, Position 2. The State Board of Election Commissioners in a unanimous vote, determined that Westbrooks did not meet the qualifications to seek election. Westbrooks sought judicial review, and the circuit court entered an Order Granting Permanent Injunction and Order Granting Declaratory Judgment. The circuit court ordered the Board immediately to add Westbrooks's name to the ballot as a candidate for the office. Aggrieved, the Board appealed to the Supreme Court via a Bill of Exceptions and a Notice of Appeal. Upon review, the Court found that Westbrooks did not meet the residency requirement. Therefore, the circuit court erred in finding that Westbrooks was a qualified candidate for the position as required for candidacy. The circuit court's Order Granting Permanent Injunction and Order Granting Declaratory Judgment was vacated. View "Bryant v. Westbrooks" on Justia Law

Glenn Wane Hawkins was convicted by a jury of murdering his girlfriend, Rita Fair, and given a mandatory life sentence. Hawkins timely filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. Hawkins also raised issues regarding a jury instruction which outlined the distinctions between depraved heart murder and culpable negligence manslaughter. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Hawkins v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Mississippi Department of Human Services ("DHS") retained a law firm for a large number of paternity and child-support cases. The law firm contracted process-service companies to serve defendants in the DHS cases. Individual process servers were instructed to serve process on a defendant, complete a proof-of-service affidavit, and send it to the owners of the process-service companies. In four cases, the DHS defendants testified that they had not been served personally. The chancellor then issued show-cause orders for a hearing and issued subpoenas instanter, requiring the process servers (the appellants in this case) to appear and demonstrate why they should not be held in contempt for failing to serve process as set forth in their proof-of-service affidavits and for signing the affidavits outside the notary's presence. Appellants directly appealed criminal contempt orders for failing to serve or improperly serving process on defendants in paternity and child-support proceedings and for notarizing proof-of-service affidavits outside the presence of the affiants. The chancellor initially found Appellants in civil contempt and ordered a sentencing hearing. However, after conducting that hearing, he proceeded to hold all in direct criminal contempt. Appellants submitted, and the State conceded, that the alleged conduct was not direct criminal contempt, but constructive criminal contempt. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the conduct was not civil contempt or direct criminal contempt, the chancellor should have recused himself from the proceedings. The Appellants were entitled to the due-process safeguards required for constructive criminal contempt proceedings. Accordingly, the Court reversed the contempt judgments and remanded the cases for entry of an order of recusal, and for further proceedings. View "Corr v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Peggy Thornton filed a wrongful death action in 2007 against Woodall Electric Company, Inc. (her deceased husband's employer), as well as several fictitious defendants. Thornton later added Defendants Tanfield Group, PLC, Tanfield Engineering Systems, Inc. ("Tanfield Engineering"), and Bidgood Enterprises, Inc. After having served Tanfield Group, Thornton had an alias summons issued for Tanfield Engineering and served Tanfield Engineering via certified mail. Tanfield Engineering filed a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint based on the plaintiff's failure to serve process, pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4)-(5). Thornton's response to the motion contended that Tanfield Group was the parent company of Tanfield Engineering; thus, according to Thornton, Tanfield Engineering had been put on notice of Thornton's claims because its parent company had been served in a timely manner. The trial court denied Tanfield Engineering's Motion to Dismiss based on a finding that Tanfield Engineering was an alter ego of Tanfield Group and that service upon Tanfield Group constituted effective service upon Tanfield Engineering. Tanfield Engineering filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal and a motion to stay proceedings in the trial court, both of which the Supreme Court granted. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court's decision was contrary to its precedent that classifies subsidiaries which are wholly owned by their parent corporations and share common officers with their parent corporations, as separate and distinct from their parent corporations. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tanfield Engineering Systems, Inc. v. Thornton" on Justia Law

In late 2011, the Bolivar County prosecuting attorney filed a petition in the county Youth Court, seeking an adjudicatory hearing, after receiving a complaint that two minor girls, S.G.M. and C.D.M., ages thirteen and eleven, respectively, had been sexually abused by their father. The youth court conducted an adjudicatory hearing. Those present at the hearing, apart from the attorneys, were Jim Warrington, the guardian ad litem (GAL) assigned to the case; Johnnie Rushing, a social worker with the Department of Human Services; David Monroe, the girls' biological father; Peggy Monroe, the girls' stepmother; K.T.M., the girls' older brother, age fourteen; Tammy and Tawanda Latham, the girls' maternal aunts; and Marie Miller, the girls' maternal grandmother. At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. were in the custody of Peggy, as David had allowed Peggy to obtain custody of the children sometime after the children's biological mother had passed away. Shortly into the hearing, the youth court became aware that only Tammy and Tawanda had been issued summonses to appear at the hearing. All others agreed to waive service of process, and the court allowed David to waive service of process for S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. At the conclusion of the hearing, the youth court found there was no basis to support the sexual-abuse allegation. The youth court then proceeded to conduct a disposition hearing. At that point, the prosecuting attorney informed the youth court that the court was without authority to conduct a disposition hearing because the two girls had not been adjudicated sexually abused. The youth court had this matter placed on the court docket and held a hearing in the court's chambers. Tammy, Tawanda, Marie, and Peggy were the only parties present. The youth court stated on the record that, during the adjudicatory hearing, it had ordered that S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M. were to be placed in the custody and care of their maternal aunt Tammy. Both the county prosecutor and legal counsel for Peggy disputed that such an order had been issued by the youth court at the hearing. The youth court entered an adjudicatory order, placing all three minor children in the custody of Tammy. Peggy thereafter filed a notice of appeal, asserting that: (1) the youth court had no jurisdiction to conduct the adjudicatory hearing because of lack of service of process on the children; (2) the youth court had no jurisdiction to conduct a subsequent adjudicatory hearing because of failure to give proper notice of the hearing; (3) the youth court could not conduct a disposition hearing after finding that the abuse allegations were unsubstantiated; and (4) the order to remove the children from their home was not supported by the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the children did not receive process, and accordingly vacated the youth court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Interest of S.G.M., C.D.M., and K.T.M." on Justia Law

Dr. Jerry Pratt slipped and fell down a set of stairs at the Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport. Pratt filed suit against the Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport Authority (GBRAA) in the Circuit Court for the First Judicial District of Harrison County, alleging negligence and claiming he suffered injuries as a result of the fall. GBRAA moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA), and the circuit court granted the motion. Pratt appealed, and we assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed, reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case. GBRAA filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that GBRAA was entitled to immunity under the MTCA, and accordingly reversed the appellate court, reinstated and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of GBRAA. View "Pratt v. Gulfport-Biloxi Regional Airport Authority" on Justia Law

Parham Pointe North, LLC and K. Wayne Rice & Associates together appealed, and Ballard Realty Company separately appealed, (collectively "Defendants") a decision from the Hinds County Circuit Court which awarded damages of $3,603,712 to apartment-complex tenants for loss of intellectual property and personal injuries arising from claims that the Defendants were negligent in maintaining and/or repairing a leaking pipe in their apartment. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting unreliable expert testimony, allowing a lay witness to give opinion testimony, and not excluding evidence of the cost of restoration where the fair market value of the property before it was damaged was not established. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a new trial on damages, as an award of lost profits without proof of past profits was not only contrary to the established law of this state, it was also contrary to the weight of evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment and remand to the Hinds County Circuit Court for a new trial on damages. View "Ballard Realty Company, Inc. v. Ohazurike" on Justia Law

Twenty-year-old Xavier Zurndell Moore pled guilty to manslaughter for the shooting death of his mother's live-in boyfriend, Robert Williams. The fatal bullet had been purchased from the Walmart in Indianola, Mississippi. Robert's daughter and his estate filed a wrongful-death suit against Walmart, alleging that it unlawfully had sold ammunition to the underage Moore and that the sale proximately had caused Robert's death. The trial court granted summary judgment for Walmart based on this Court's decision in "Robinson v. Howard Brothers of Jackson, Mississippi," (372 So. 2d 1074 (Miss. 1979)). In that case, the Supreme Court held that, even though the store had violated federal law by selling a firearm and ammunition to a minor, the minor's subsequent murder of a third party had not been foreseeable; the seller, therefore, was not civilly liable for the death. Based on "Robinson," the Court found that Moore's criminal act was not foreseeable and that Walmart reasonably could assume that Moore would follow the law. Therefore, the Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Walmart. View "Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P." on Justia Law

n 1993, AT&T Corporation and affiliate corporations (collectively, AT&T) filed an affiliated group, Mississippi income tax return with the Mississippi Department of Revenue f/k/a Mississippi State Tax Commission, using the statutorily-permissible "combined method" of reporting. But from 1994 to 1996, AT&T filed its returns under the "consolidated method" of reporting, which was then statutorily available only to affiliated groups with members doing business and taxable solely in Mississippi, ostensibly to challenge the constitutionality of this distinction. Following an audit in 1997, the Commission issued an Assessment of Income Taxes of more than $5 million against AT&T. After unsuccessful administrative appeals before the Commission, AT&T filed a "Petition for Appeal of Additional Income Tax Assessment Ordered by State Tax Commission, For Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and For Refund of Overpayment of Tax" in the Chancery Court of Hinds County. The Petition challenged the constitutionality of several tax statutes under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and sought associated relief. But AT&T's Petition was not 'accompanied with a bond, to be approved by the clerk . . . , in a sum double the amount in controversy[,]" as then required by Mississippi Code Section 27-7-73. Rather, AT&T paid the Assessment, then filed the Petition. Preliminarily, the chancery court found that AT&T had "properly appealed" the full Commission's Order. The chancery court then held that the subject tax statutes violated the Commerce Clause; that the"offensive limitations" were to be struck so that AT&T was granted the "tax benefits" enjoyed by other taxpayers; and, based thereon, that AT&T was entitled to an award of $12,727,174. Thereafter, the Commission appealed those rulings, while AT&T appealed only the chancery court's interest calculations. Because AT&T did not follow the then-applicable procedure for appeal, the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to hear its appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the chancery court and reinstated the Commission's order. View "Mississippi Department of Revenue v. AT&T Corporation" on Justia Law