Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Edna Phillips filed suit against Tich K. Huynh, d/b/a Elegant Nails Salon, asserting negligence in operation, negligence in maintenance, and gross negligence against Elegant Nails based upon a corneal abrasion Phillips allegedly sustained when "something" hit her in the eye while she was having acrylic nails applied at Elegant Nails. Elegant Nails twice moved for summary judgment and twice was denied; the Supreme Court granted Elegant Nails's petition for interlocutory appeal after the second denial. Finding Phillips has not produced sufficient evidence to survive Elegant Nails' motion for summary judgment, the Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and rendered judgment in favor of Elegant Nails. View "Elegant Nails v. Phillips" on Justia Law

James Mallard and Tonya Mallard (now Tonya Mallard Burkart) were divorced on in 2001. Incorporated into the Final Judgment of Divorce was the Child Custody and Support and Property Settlement Agreement executed by the parties. A significant portion of the financial settlement that Burkart received in the property settlement agreement consisted of forty percent of Mallard's "disposable military retirement pay" for ten years. Following the divorce, Mallard elected to adopt a sixty-percent disability rating as part of his retirement pay. Mallard did not provide any of these disability benefits to Burkart. When Mallard filed a Petition for Modification of Judgment of Divorce in chancery court pursuant to child-support and custody matters, Burkart filed a counterpetition for contempt, asserting that Mallard had structured his retirement in such a way as to defeat her forty-percent interest in the total retirement pay. The chancellor determined that Burkart was entitled to forty percent of the disability benefits, but he declined to find Mallard in contempt. Mallard appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since federal law preempts state law, state courts are precluded from allocating military disability benefits to a nonmilitary spouse; therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Mallard v. Burkart" on Justia Law

Cecil Ben was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment by circuit court. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. In his petition for writ of certiorari, Ben argued: (1) that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated; (2) that Otis Mingo's testimony was inadmissible due to a discovery violation by the State; (3) that the admission of Maurice Hines's hearsay testimony was not harmless error; (4) that the admission of Nurse Sharon Hockett's statement concerning Monica's veracity was improper; and (5) that the verdict was contrary to the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed Ben's conviction and sentence. View "Ben v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Henry Taylor and Eddie Ray Jones were tried jointly for aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a felon. Taylor was found guilty on both charges, and Jones was acquitted on the latter charge but convicted on the former charge. Jones appealed his aggravated-assault conviction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed Jones's conviction and sentence. After the Court of Appeals denied his motion for rehearing, Jones filed a petition for writ of certiorari which the Supreme Court granted to consider, inter alia, Jones's claims of inconsistent verdicts and erroneous jury instructions. The Court held that Jones's claims of error were without merit; thus the Court affirmed the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court. View "Jones v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Three death-row inmates, Robert Simon, Rodney Gray, and Benny Stevens, along with the groups, Mississippians Educating for Smart Justice and Mississippi CURE, Inc. (collectively, the petitioners) filed a complaint in circuit court, seeking a writ of mandamus, injunctive relief, and/or a declaratory judgment against the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). The complaint alleged that the MDOC's newly-adopted execution protocol was invalid pursuant to Mississippi Administrative Procedures Law (MAPL) because the MDOC had adopted a new rule with regard to the MDOC's lethal injection protocol without first meeting the notice-and-comment requirements set forth by the MAPL. The circuit court denied relief, finding that the MDOC's lethal injection protocol was exempted from the MAPL because the MAPL specifically excludes matters "directly related to inmates." Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the MDOC execution protocol was a "regulation or statement" related only to inmates of the MDOC and is therefore exempt from the provisions of the MAPL. The protocol is an internal policy concerning lethal injections and the manner in which executions are carried out and is therefore not subject to the notice and comment requirements of the MAPL. Thus, the Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment. View "Mississippians Educating for Smart Justice, Inc. v. Miss. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

In 2005, Appellant Lisa Learmonth received severe injuries in an auto/truck collision with a vehicle owned by Sears, Roebuck & Company and driven by its employee. She filed suit against Sears in federal district court. The jury returned a unanimous general verdict for Learmonth in the amount of $4 million. The "Special Interrogatory and Jury Verdict" form submitted to the jury did not instruct the jury to itemize the compensatory damages into separate categories. In Sears' Motion for New Trial, it contended that $2,218,905.60 of the jury verdict was for noneconomic damages. Learmonth used that same figure in post-trial responses. Sears' figure was accepted by both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in their respective analyses. Regarding Sears' Motion, the district court held, in pertinent part, that it "cannot conclude that the jury verdict is so excessive, so 'contrary to right reason,' as to warrant a new trial or remittitur." Sears appealed that judgment to the Fifth Circuit. Learmonth cross-appealed and challenged the constitutionality of Section 11-1-60(2)(b) (the statutory authority Sears used for its appellate argument) under the separation-of-powers and right-to-jury-trial provisions of the Mississippi Constitution. The Fifth Circuit found that this was an "important question of state law . . . for which there is no controlling precedent from the Supreme Court of Mississippi," and certified the question to the Mississippi Supreme Court: "[i]s Section 11-1-60(2) of the Mississippi Code, which generally limits non-economic damages to $1 million in civil cases, constitutional?" Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court declined to respond: "post-trial pleadings and arguments based on Sears' hypotheses are not a sufficiently reliable basis for us to undertake a decision declaring Section 11-1-60(2)(b) constitutional or unconstitutional." View "Sears Roebuck & Company v. Learmonth" on Justia Law

The "Child Custody, Support and Property Settlement Agreement" between A.M.L. and J.W.L., incorporated into their February 2002 "Final Judgment of Divorce," provided that they would share "joint legal custody" of their four daughters, with A.M.L. having "primary physical custody" and J.W.L. having frequent visitation. The Agreement also provided for, inter alia, child support, medical expenses and reimbursement, college expenses, and life insurance naming the children as beneficiaries. In the following years, J.W.L. became effectively estranged from his two oldest daughters, and ceased overnight and weekend visitation with both. In 2008, A.M.L. filed a "Petition for Modification and/or Clarification of Final Judgment of Divorce" and J.W.L. responded with a "Counterclaim for Modification of Custody and Other Relief." A.M.L.'s Petition requested full "legal and physical custody" of the children, an increase in child support, clarification of several Agreement provisions, contempt orders against J.W.L. for his alleged failure to comply with various Agreement provisions, and attorney fees. J.W.L.'s Counterclaim sought "full legal and physical custody" of their two youngest daughters, with attending modifications of Agreement provisions regarding child support, medical expenses, and college expenses. Following trial, the Chancery Court of Madison County, Mississippi, entered its "Opinion and Judgment on Petition for Modification and/or Clarification of Final Judgment of Divorce." Regarding child custody, the chancellor found a "material change in circumstances . . . which warrant[ed] modification of custody and the transfer of primary physical and legal custody of [the three youngest children] to [J.W.L.,]" based upon conduct of the children which was attributed to A.M.L. "impos[ing] little or no discipline." Yet the court delayed ordering custody modification, holding such ruling in abeyance, "subject to the parties adhering to" several court-imposed conditions. A.M.L. retained physical custody of the children. The "Opinion and Judgment" also modified J.W.L.'s child-support and college-expense obligations, and denied A.M.L.'s request for attorney fees. Following the denial of post-trial motions filed by A.M.L. and J.W.L. with respect to the rulings challenged on appeal, A.M.L. filed "Notice of Appeal" and J.W.L. filed "Notice of Cross-Appeal." Based upon this analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's findings: (1) that A.M.L. had not "actively engaged" in alienation efforts; (2) that there would be no "upward retroactive modification" in J.W.L.'s child-support obligations for C.D., W.X., and Y.Z.; (3) that J.W.L. did not act in contempt in failing to comply with the thirty-day, noncoveredmedical-and-dental-expenses reimbursement provision of the Agreement; (4) that J.W.L. did not act in contempt of the "written proof" requirement in the life-insurance provision of the Agreement; and (5) that A.M.L.'s request for contempt-related attorney fees should be denied. The Supreme Court reversed the chancellor's findings: (1) of child-custody modification, as there was no "material change in circumstances" in the custodial home and no "Albright" analysis at the time of the initial ruling; (2) of retroactively terminating J.W.L.'s child support obligations for A.B.; (3) of applying "Hambrick" to C.D. and, based thereon, limiting J.W.L.'s college-expense obligation for her; and (4) of denying A.M.L.'s modification-related attorney fees for failure to "timely introduce any evidence" thereon. View "A.M.L. v. J.W.L." on Justia Law

Allen Rogers, Jr. was convicted by a jury of two counts of child sex abuse and was sentenced to a total of thirty-three years' imprisonment. In Count One, Rogers was convicted of sexual battery against eight-year-old "Benjamin Hicks". In Count Two, Rogers was convicted of fondling "William Hicks," Benjamin's eleven-year-old brother. Rogers appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by overruling his hearsay objection to statements made by Benjamin to a forensic psychologist. He also argued that the State failed to prove that Count Two occurred in Scott County, as alleged in the indictment. Finding error on both counts, the Supreme Court reversed Rogers's convictions and sentences and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Rogers, Jr. v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Diana Ladnier and Lawrence Ladnier appealed the judgment of the George County Circuit Court which granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant Joseph Hester. The Court of Appeals, in a six-three opinion, affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for rehearing filed by the Ladniers. The Ladniers then petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted. Shortly after midnight on January 2, 2008, Diana Ladnier was driving her vehicle on River Road near Lucedale, returning home from her job as a correctional officer at a local facility, when three horses ran across the road. She struck the largest horse which weighed approximately 1,000 pounds. Diana claimed she was not speeding, and the road was unlit and dark. The horses were owned by Hester. Diana asserted that, because of the accident, she sustained serious personal injuries, resulting in medical bills in excess of $69,000. Diana also claimed damage to her vehicle. Diana and Lawrence Ladnier filed a personal-injury suit against Hester claiming she was entitled to damages because Hester was negligent for allowing his three horses to roam free on River Road, while Lawrence sued for loss of consortium. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court erred in granting Hester's motion for summary judgment and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court. Thus, the Court reversed the judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and remanded this case to the Circuit Court of George County for a trial on the merits. View "Ladnier v. Hester" on Justia Law

Marshall Keith Watkins was convicted of possession with intent to distribute five separate controlled substances and simple possession of one controlled substance. Watkins appealed his conviction, arguing the trial court erred by: 1) refusing to dismiss Counts Two through Six of his indictment based on double jeopardy; 2) granting several jury instructions submitted by the State on the morning of closing arguments; 3) permitting a jury instruction based upon constructive possession; and 4) excluding evidence related to the disposition of the two other individuals indicted with Watkins. Watkins also argued that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial, and asks the Supreme Court to reverse his conviction. Upon review, the Court found all of Watkins's assigned errors are without merit and affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "Watkins v. Mississippi" on Justia Law