Justia Mississippi Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the trial judge erroneously denied Defendant Merlin Hardison's peremptory strike during voir dire, holding that the juror's previous service on a jury in a criminal case was not a race-neutral reason for the strike: the juror had expressed regret that the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Defendant's jury ultimately convicted him, and this appeal followed. Defendant raised nine alleged issues of error at the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial judge's denial of Defnedant's peremptory strike to be dispositive. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Defendant's conviction. View "Hardison v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Defendant Matthew Miller was tried and convicted of aggravated assault and forcible rape of his girlfriend's minor daughter. The Supreme Court assigned the case to the Court of Appeals who affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences. Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which found reversible error in the trial judge's failing to recuse himself after having served as the county prosecutor in an earlier youth-court shelter hearing regarding the minor victim's custody as a result of Defendant's actions at issue in this case. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court's and the trial court's judgments and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Miller v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

Robert Lee Kitchens, Jr., and his wife, Mary L. Kitchens, died as a result of injuries received in a collision between their automobile and a train owned and operated by Illinois Central Railroad Company ("Illinois Central"). The Administratrix and wrongful-death beneficiaries of the Kitchenses' estate filed a wrongful-death action against several parties, including the parent company of Illinois Central, Canadian National Railway Company. Canadian National moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The circuit court granted the plaintiffs ninety days to conduct discovery "to justify piercing the corporate veil" and reserved ruling on the motion to dismiss pending completion of the discovery. Canadian National filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal, and the Supreme Court granted the petition. Upon review, the Court found that the plaintiffs did not allege with particularity the applicability of piercing the corporate veil to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Court vacated the circuit court's order permitting further discovery, reversed the circuit court's failure to grant Canadian National's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the circuit court for the entry of a final order of dismissal without prejudice. View "Canadian National Railway Co. v. Waltman" on Justia Law

Dwight Robinson filed suit against Bailey Lumber & Supply Company for injuries and damages he allegedly sustained as a result of a fall on Bailey Lumber's premises. A jury returned a general verdict in favor of Robinson in the amount of $1,500,000. The trial court reduced the award to $1,070,341.42 in economic and noneconomic damages. Bailey Lumber appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that the trial court erred in allowing expert testimony regarding the cause of Robinson's need for hip-replacement surgery and future medical treatment. View "Bailey Lumber & Supply Co. v. Dwight Robinson" on Justia Law

To pursue claims against Microsoft for alleged violations of the Mississippi antitrust and consumer-protection laws, Attorney General Jim Hood signed a contingency-fee contract with Hazzard Law, LLC, which, in turn, associated other law firms to assist with the litigation. The chancery court dismissed the antitrust claims, but allowed the consumer-protection claims to proceed. The parties eventually signed a settlement agreement that required Microsoft to provide up to $60 million in vouchers for Mississippi residents, and to pay the State of Mississippi $50 million in cash. However, the settlement agreement provided that $10 million of the cash money was to be distributed to the trust account of one of the outside lawyers in Houston, Texas. State Auditor Stacey Pickering wrote Hazzard, stating that payment of settlement funds directly to outside counsel violated Mississippi law. And because the same issue was pending in circuit court in another case, the auditor reserved all objections to the settlement until after the courts resolved the issue. Hazzard responded by filing a petition in chancery court, seeking approval of the attorney-fee payment. The auditor intervened in order to investigate and recover any public funds improperly withheld, misappropriated, or illegally spent. The auditor also filed a motion to have the $10 million held in trust disbursed to the State. The chancellor ruled in favor of Hazzard and ordered the settlement funds distributed directly to Hazzard and other retained counsel. The auditor appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General cross-appealed, claiming the Auditor's intervention was untimely. The chancery court held that the payment was proper. But because the law required that outside counsel retained by the Attorney General be paid from his contingent fund or from other funds the Legislature appropriated to his office, and because the Mississippi Constitution requires obligations and liabilities to the State to be paid "into the proper treasury," the Supreme Court reversed. View "Pickering v. Hood" on Justia Law

For four years, subcontractor Precision Welding, Inc. provided construction services to Denbury Onshore, LLC, under an oral agreement. Denbury, claiming its contract with Precision was terminable at will, terminated the relationship in 2006. Precision filed suit, claiming Denbury had breached its obligation to keep Denbury on the job until the completion of the project. A jury found for Precision and awarded it $1,500,000 in damages. But because the oral contract between Denbury and Precision was for a particular hourly rate for work performed and not for any particular or definite time period, the Supreme Court held that the contract was terminable at will, and reversed the jury verdict. The Court remanded for a new trial on the issue of whether, under the circumstances, Denbury provided Precision reasonable notice of the termination and, if not, the damages it proximately caused. View "Denbury Onshore, LLC v. Precision Welding, Inc." on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal presented the issue of whether a volunteer fire department incorporated under the Mississippi Non-Profit Corporation Act is a "political subdivision" under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and thus immune from liability. The volunteer fire department argued immunity for itself and its employee, asserting it was a "body corporate. . . responsible for governmental activities" under the MTCA's definition of "political subdivision." However, plaintiffs Milton and Brenda Spotts argued that the volunteer fire department was an independent contractor with Lowndes County and was not entitled to immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the volunteer fire department did not meet the definition of a political subdivision, as the term "body corporate" does not mean any corporate body, but a public corporate body. Furthermore, the Court found that the volunteer fire department was acting as an independent contractor with the county. Thus, the volunteer fire department and its employee did not have immunity for their alleged acts of negligence. View "Flye v. Spotts" on Justia Law

The Lee County Chancery Court entered a decree approving and ratifying, with modifications, an annexation ordinance adopted by the City of Tupelo. Notices of appeal were filed by Lee County, Mississippi; the Belden Fire Protection District, the Palmetto-Old Union Fire Protection District, the Unity Fire Protection District (the Fire Protection Districts); and the City of Saltillo, Mississippi. Tupelo adopted an annexation ordinance on July 3, 2007, which sought to extend and enlarge Tupelo's boundaries to include seven proposed areas, totaling approximately 16.2 square miles, identified as Area 1, Area 2 North, Area 2 South, Area 3, Area 4, Area 5, and Area 6 ("PAAs" or "annexed territory"), each of which lies adjacent to Tupelo's current municipal limits. Lee County, the Fire Protection Districts, and Saltillo, along with the Town of Plantersville, Mississippi, each filed answers and objections to Tupelo's annexation petition. Because the chancery court's findings were based on substantial, credible evidence, were not manifestly wrong, and were well within the chancery court's discretion, and because the chancery court did not employ an erroneous legal standard, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Chancery Court. View "In The Matter of The Extension of The Boundaries of the City of Tupelo" on Justia Law

In 2006, Lester Butler filed a personal-injury action against David Holmes and John Does 1-5. Later, he moved to amend his complaint to substitute a trucking company, D.P. Holmes Trucking, LLC, for Holmes or, in the alternative, to be allowed to file an amended complaint to add Holmes Trucking as a defendant. Both the circuit court and Holmes permitted Butler to amend his original complaint to add Holmes Trucking as a defendant; however, when filed, Butler had substituted Holmes Trucking for Holmes. After a responsive pleading had been filed, Butler filed a second amended complaint without leave of court and without permission of Holmes Trucking, identifying both Holmes and Holmes Trucking as defendants. Holmes Trucking responded with a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, but the circuit court allowed Butler to proceed, finding that the mistaken party name was a misnomer. Holmes Trucking filed notice of interlocutory appeal, requesting that the Supreme Court grant a dismissal with prejudice. The Supreme Court found misnomer did not apply in this case, and the circuit court erred in applying that doctrine. However, the court did not err in allowing Butler to amend his complaint. View "D.P. Holmes Trucking, LLC v. Butler" on Justia Law

Anadarko Petroleum Corporation petitioned the Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board to determine the propriety of costs that Kelly Oil Company was attempting to charge to Anadarko as a nonconsenting owner in a force-integrated drilling unit. The Board determined that all costs Kelly Oil was attempting to charge were properly chargeable. The chancery court affirmed the Board's order, and Anadarko appealed. Because the Board's order contained insufficient reasoning and findings of fact for the Supreme Court to conduct an adequate review, the Court vacated the Board's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Anadarko Petroleum Corporation v. State Oil & Gas Board of Mississippi" on Justia Law